Africa Capacity Indicators 2012: Capacity Development for Agricultural Transformation and Food Security by ACBF
A
C
I
AFRICA CAPACITY
INDICATORS 2012
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR AGRICULTURAL
TRANSFORMATION AND FOOD SECURITY
A
C
I
AFRICA CAPACITY
INDICATORS 2012
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR AGRICULTURAL
TRANSFORMATION AND FOOD SECURITY
2012 The African Capacity Building Foundation
7th Floor, ZB Life Towers, Harare, Zimbabwe
Produced by the Knowledge & Learning Department
The African Capacity Building Foundation
First printing March 2012
All rights reserved
For additional information on project and program operations and other activities of the African Capacity Building Foundation, please visit
our website at the following address: http://www.acbf-pact.org
Printed in South Africa by Colour King
ISBN:    978-1-77937-034-1
EAN:     9781779370341
Photo credits: ACBF photo database with the exception of Chapter 7 — which are courtesy of Rudo Nyangulu (Chapter 7 cover photo),
and Frannie Léautier.
This Report is a product of the staff of the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions
expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the ACBF Executive Board or Board of Governors.
ACBF does not guarantee the precision of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, and other information shown on any
map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the Foundation concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement
or acceptance of such boundaries.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying recording or otherwise, without prior written permission.
Foreword
iii
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
It's been almost a decade since African Heads of
State gathered in Mozambique and pledged to
apportion 10 per cent of their national budget to
agriculture by 2008. While there has been some
progress, the reality still exists that as of 2011 only
eight countries – Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger and Senegal – had
surpassed this target. The Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)
also has an agricultural growth target of 6 per
cent. Here again, we currently have only ten
countries which have exceeded this target,
namely, Angola, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Republic of the
Congo, Senegal and Tanzania.
For Africa to achieve the goals of CAADP and
ultimately maximize its vast agricultural
potential the best investment is probably in
human capital, through better-quality schooling,
vocational training, as well as meaningful
national and regional initiatives aimed at
attracting the younger generation back to the
land. There is also a need to invest in capacity
development and entrepreneurship across the
entire agricultural value-chain. To this end,
regional approaches to value chain development
have been advocated to address the relatively
small geographic size and population of many
African countries that have many sociocultural
and agro-ecological similarities across borders.
The 2006 African Food Security Summit, and the
2007 Declaration of , at the InternationalNyéléni
Forum for Food Sovereignty at , Mali,Sélingué
both focused on the importance of strategic
commodities as entry points for a regional
In Africa, the challenges impacting on the agricultural sector growth are multi-faceted. They include
but are not limited to, an over-dependence on rainfall, weak capacity to respond to shocks, political
governance, choice of crops, changing needs and changing food habits due to globalization, land
degradation, land renting and sale to foreign companies. All of these contribute to an unnecessary
level of food insecurity. The aforementioned are exacerbated by the low level of commitment to the
sector in terms of policy and physical and human investment, especially in Agricultural Research,
Extension and Education. This is coupled with the ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the supply side of
the Agricultural Knowledge and Information System (AKIS) – institutional and process – and the
absence of an organized and structured demand side of AKIS – the farmers.
Although progress has been achieved in raising agricultural productivity, this has so far been
insufficient, unstable and unequally distributed, resulting in Africa having the highest proportion of
people who are hungry, undernourished or food insecure. Losses occur when grain decays or is
infested by pests, fungi or microbes and physical losses are only part of the equation. The losses can
also be economic, resulting from low prices and lack of access to markets for poor quality grain, or
nutritional, arising from poor quality or contaminated food.
approach to value chain development thus
offering an opportunity to realize the benefits of
this new vision to agricultural development and
food sovereignty in Africa.
The vital role of agriculture in Africa's
development is without question, but African
agricultural policies are not yet a match for the
weight of agriculture and its stakes. About 60% of
the population in Africa is engaged in agriculture;
and agriculture also contributes roughly 30% to
GDP. Yet public expenditure is far less than 10% of
global budget. The sector clearly accounts for
the principal share of most African economies,
yet despite some improvements, challenges
persist. Production generally lags behind
demand, fostering food insecurity. Policy
reforms have so far brought only mixed results,
while measures to boost output have been
undermined by declining aid and low world
prices for Africa's key agricultural exports.
As succinctly articulated in the 2010-11 FAO report
– Women in Agriculture: Closing the gender gap
for development – given African women's central
roles with both food and cash crop production,
and their management skills for utilizing new
input packages and producing yields comparable
to those of men, it's essential to ensure that
women are able to effectively access land,
education, agricultural extension, credit, inputs,
and small business assistance programs. This
requires concerted effort to overcome cultural
and institutional barriers, and improve laws
related to inheritance, marriage and property
rights. Women's access to land and land tenure
security can be improved through implementa-
tion of land policies and laws oriented toward
equal rights for men and women. Efforts by
governments and civil society to foster
formation and strengthening of women's
organization and participation in farmer
associations will prove beneficial. More than
that, women should be key players in participa-
tory processes involving communities and other
stakeholders to set public investment priorities
and deliberate policies.
The 2012 seeks toAfrica Capacity Indicators
address the aforementioned issues of capacity
development on the continent, building on the
dialogue stemming from the inaugural 2011 ACIR
and linking this to a very pertinent issue facing
Africa today – agricultural transformation and
food security. The Report is very spot-on. It does
not only identify the underlying capacity
challenges facing Africa. It also attempts to help
Africa redefine its post-colonial agricultural
landscape and more importantly prescribes
policy-relevant solutions and recommendations
informed by country-specific ground truths. The
report triangulates field surveys from forty-two
African nations with thematically driven
commissioned studies whilst interrogating the
broader extant literature to collaborate or
contradict its findings.
Central to the Report is the basic fact that while
much has been written about agricultural
transformation and food security in many
African countries, what is missing is an
authoritative discussion of the capacity
development dimension needed to promote
food security and agricultural potential of the
continent. The Report's key index – the Africa
Capacity Index – ranks the 42 nations surveyed
on the strength of capacity development, in the
process providing a unique two time series data
on the status of capacity development on the
Continent. The Report also generates a very bold
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and ingenious index – Africa Capacity Index for
Agriculture – which again measures how
countries are doing in terms of capacity for
agricultural transformation and food security.
The Report confidently posits that capacity
development programs should come in the form
of building the capacity of research institutions
and the establishment of a positive relationship
between the research institutions and farmers
through a process where trained technical
extension specialists serve the agriculture
sector, especially those in the rural areas. It goes
on to argue that creating space for local
experimentation and innovation is a critical
means of generating large scale impacts from
incremental changes. Such successes emerge
from localized experiments that allow
participants to learn from their experiences or
exchanges on best practices, adapt to changes in
the landscape, evolve as the playing field
becomes more complex, and pursue incremen-
tal, step-by-step approaches to scaling up.
Relatedly, if agriculture is to play a vital role in
Africa's development, then it is critical to situate
it in the broader context of globalization, which
would define its role and will also shape
outcomes.
In today's era of global agriculture, the activities
of global multilateral and regional institutions
can hamper agricultural policy performance –
first, activities of regional organizations on
issues such as quota and quality can affect
market access; second, there are significant
variations in the support systems that African
states provide their farmers compared to what
their counterparts in the global north extend to
their farmers. This discrepancy has implications!
For example, there is the question of the extent
to which respective countries abide by WTO
provisions on agriculture. There is the issue of
the ability of the WTO itself to forge a global
compact on agricultural policy when it comes to
north-south agricultural relations. Take the case
of the African state and cotton farmers. Another
case in point is that of Malawi versus the
Washington Consensus on the issue of free
markets. The Consensus requested free market.
Malawi was opposed to it, and was right. The rice
from Malawi is both of excellent quality and
competitive. The experience proved Malawi
right. The market cannot work alone! It needs to
be guided!
Promotion of agricultural transformation that
markedly increases production, productivity,
and incomes in Africa and constitutes 'develop-
ment' as reflected in the Mil lennium
Development Goals requires serious, thoughtful
attention to the myriad issues outlined in this
Report!
I consider this 2012 ACIR a for all whomust read
seek to see Africa realize its potential. It is a 'must
have' for all policy makers and agriculture
pundits. I encourage all decision makers –
starting with the AU – as well as our
development practitioners, policy institutes, civil
society organizat ions and the myriad
stakeholders involved in capacity development
and agricultural production to embrace these
insightful findings and bold policy recommenda-
tions.
Dr. Mohamed 'Mo' Ibrahim
Board Chairman
Mo Ibrahim Foundation
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Given that agriculture continues to assume a
central role in the political, economic and social
relations in many, if not all, African countries it is
valuable to examine how capacity or the lack
thereof can impact African agriculture and
contribute to the achievement of important
development goals . To this end, the
performance of the agricultural sector is
instructive to gauging the extent to which
African countries can attain any of the United
Nations-sponsored Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs); especially, the goal to eradicate
extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. It is equally
vital to mapping how African countries are
fulfilling the goals detailed in the African Union's
endorsed Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) – an
initiative which has enhancing human and
institutional capacity in the agricultural sector at
its core.
When we talk about capacity development, and
particularly its impact in Africa, we are really
talking about the lives we envisage for all; and
the countless generations yet unborn. As stated
in the 2011 inaugural version of the Africa
Capacity Indicators Report, in the eyes of the
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF),
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In Africa, the agriculture value chain, which includes, in its broad sense, cultivation as well as food
processing, livestock farming, fisheries, and forest exploitation – is a crucial sector. The sector not
only contributes to the economy in diverse ways, but it is also essential to socio-cultural and political
relations. Agriculture provides a direct source of employment and livelihood for a sizable proportion
of the society, contributing to gross domestic production and essential for wealth. It is the primary
activity of over 60% of Africa's populace; as well as the backbone of the African economies as it
accounts for more than 30% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in many African countries.
Accordingly, there is therefore a general understanding and expectation that the development
prospects in Africa are inexplicably linked to the performance of the agricultural sector.
While a number of policy initiatives that were supposed to bring new perspectives and approaches to
Africa's development abound, especially post-Structural Adjustment Programs in the 1980s, Africa's
development prospects, even in the face of these myriad policies, remain fragile and uncertain at best.
The fragile nature of African development would therefore suggest, among other factors, policy and
institutional failures. To this end, the need to focus on and address problems in African agriculture, if
only to better address the development challenges in the region, is paramount. It is highly surprising
for a continent that is home to more than 60% or the world's arable land, that several African countries
repeatedly make international headlines when it comes to global discussions on food insecurity. For
example, on July 20, 2011, the United Nations announced that the persistent and widespread drought
in the Horn of Africa has led to famine in parts of Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti. This is
not the first time the Horn of Africa has experienced human suffering and food insecurity.
capacity development honors a commitment to
the poorest of the poor that they are not
marginal, not forgotten, and not excluded from
the vision of a better, more equitable and just
world. It honors a pledge to society's vulnerable
and marginalized that they are entitled to the full
protection of the law against discrimination,
violence, and abuse in all forms. These are all
central to the ACBF mandate to promote
capacity for sustainable development and
poverty reduction – a mandate we have been
vigorously pursuing for the past two decades in
partnership with our valued partners and
stakeholders across the African continent.
The challenge is enormous on a continent where
many Governments lack the resources – human,
financial, technological, organizational, and
leadership capacity to move forward without
support from the international community. The
perennial bane of African agriculture is that it is
not anchored in the society and is unable to
address the basic needs of the society. It is not an
over-exaggeration to contend that an export
focus has dominated the policy discourse of
African agriculture. Globalization, as a
contemporary discourse, simply reinforces
earlier ideologies and practices. Accordingly,
there is a critical need to rethink the future of
African agriculture and also draw attention to
three vital factors: institutional capacity; a focus
on producers; and, the broad issue of
governance and leadership.
This publication, the second edition of the
ACBF's annual ,Africa Capacity Indicators Report
surveys forty-two African countries' capacity
development needs, but also their agricultural
capacity landscape. In so doing, the Report
teases out the underlying geo-historical, macro-
economic, and socio-political elements that have
shaped the current capacity development
standings. Its premise is that it is certainly
superfluous to argue that it is people working in
institutions that make change and development
possible. Accordingly, a call for institutions to
carry through the agricultural policies is certainly
not a novel position. However, the emphasis has
to be on capable institutions, informed leaders,
and networked farmers. It is one thing to
establish an institution, but quite another issue
to have capable institutions! It is possible to have
good policies gather dust due to lack of
implementation arrangements. Leaders armed
with the right information, acting in the interest
of society, are a critical link for capable
institutions to show results. Farmers linked up to
information and with access to markets can
contribute enormously to the productivity
increase needed to solve Africa's food problems
and give place of pride to agriculture as a driver
of economic growth. While the desire of African
governments to establ ish agricultural
institutions is a tangible expression of the
importance of agriculture, most of the
institutions do not have the sufficient and
necessary resources for optimal performance.
Indeed, given the heterogeneity and complexity
of agro-ecological conditions and farming
systems observed throughout Africa, externally
generated blueprints have little or no positive
role in the continent's agricultural transforma-
tion. Genuinely collaborative research involving
institutions, scientists, local farmers and other
stakeholders is essential to identifying and
adopting appropriate practices for sustainable
agricultural intensification which blend local and
exogenous knowledge, and create space for
local experimentation and innovation – key
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undervalued elements in 'sustainability.' Such
efforts can, amongst others, engender a 'basket'
of agricultural technology and management
practices that provide farmers with flexibility in
choosing among options that best match the
site-specific diversity of their fields and
socioeconomic circumstances, effectively boost
farm productivity, and are resilient to weather
variability, resource availability and market
fluctuations.
To achieve and sustain meaningful advances
toward agricultural transformation and food
security, it behooves political leaders to work
painlessly to ensure that institutions have the
required resources to discharge their mandate.
In so doing, the circumstances of farmers should
be at the centre of the discourse. An equally
pressing challenge is at the global level. It is
worrisome what African countries have to
contend with as and when they want to extend
or assume some degree of control over their
act iv i t ies for farmers. S ince nat ional
development is not only about choices, but also
the ability to implement those choices, the ability
of African governments to address the genuine
aspirations of their citizens, in the face of global
imperatives, is an issue that also deserves the
utmost attention. African knowledge-producing
institutions within the agricultural system should
also assume a prominent role in support of the
Continent's development effort.
These challenges are all real. But in the end, they
are not only goals of capacity development, but
the means by which we can move toward
fulfilling our commitment to Africa. ACBF
concurs with many others that while different
types of countries require appropriately tailored
policies to achieve agricultural transformation
and food security; there is no one-size fits-all
solution. Nonetheless, we strongly believe that
capacity development as embodied in infrastruc-
ture development, institutional strengthening,
technological advances, training and education,
as well as a focus on leadership, entrepreneurial
and marketing skill-building, linking farmers to
research as well as addressing issues on critical
aspects of the agricultural value chain should be
at the core of efforts to transform agricultural
and empower African countries to assume their
own self-sufficient place at the global table.
Frannie A. Léautier
Executive Secretary
ACBF
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Africa has become a continent moving at multiple speeds! In the last two decades or so, African
countries have registered average annual economic growth of between 5-8% despite low foreign
investments and the global economic crisis. Such evidence of good returns even on minimal
investment indicates that Africa has great promise. In 2012 Africa is home to the seven fastest growing
economies in the world. At the same time, Africa is still dependent on external aid, including food aid.
In the last 50 years about one trillion US dollars in development aid has been transferred to Africa. But
real per capita income today is less than it was in the 1970s and more than half the population – about
500 million people – still live in poverty. At this rate, most African countries may not meet many of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Executive Summary
To sustain the high economic growth
momentum and ensure that growth generates
jobs and poverty reduction, Africa needs to
continue to develop capacity, including
capabilities to further transform its economies
and that means transforming agriculture. To
effectively use aid and to guarantee food
security, Africa needs capacity to negotiate aid,
secure fair trade deals, and manage under
uncertainty. To achieve the MDGs Africa needs
to focus on its capacity to get things done, to
implement programs to meet stated objectives,
and to harness the capacity of its vast domestic
resources to effectively leverage and allocate to
the right priorities the sources of funds it has for
development.
To ACBF:
Capacity comprises the ability of
people, organizations and society as a
whole to manage their affairs
successfully; and that is the process by
which people, organizations and
society as a whole unleash, strengthen,
create, adapt and maintain capacity
over time. Capacity is also better
conceptualized when answering the
question: capacity for what? Capacity
for individuals, organizations and
societies to set goals and achieve them;
to budget resources and use them for
agreed purposes; and to manage the
complex processes and interactions
that typify a working political and
economic system. Capacity is most
tangibly and effectively developed in
the context of specific development
objectives such as delivering services to
poor people; instituting education,
public service and health care reform;
improving the investment climate for
small and medium enterprises,
empowering local communities to
better participate in public decision
making processes; and promoting
peace and resolving conflict (ACBF,
2011:30-31)
This second Africa Capacity Indicators Report
(ACIR2012) discusses capacity for agricultural
transformation and food security. The first
report, published in 2011, dealt with fragile
states. The methodology used for the ACIR in
2012 maintains the three levels of core capacity
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that were measured in 2011 in addition to the
specific measures along the theme of the report-
-fragile states in 2011 and transforming
agriculture and food security in 2012. The three
levels of core capacity measured are: (i) the
enabling environment; (ii) the organizational
level; and (iii) the individual level (see Table A).
The enabling environment refers to the system
beyond the organization – including the tone set
by leadership and other countervailing factors. It
encompasses the broader system within which
individuals and organizations function thus
influencing their performance outcomes. The
role of leadership is to set the vision, the tone
and the stage by which activities that derive
results can be undertaken. As was done in the
2011 report, the data collected on a set of
indicators defined from the best known theory
and practice, is subjected to a cluster analysis.
The analysis confirms the four clusters calculated
in the last report and allows an assessment of
trends across time to gauge achievement and
uncover challenges. The four clusters include the
effectiveness of the policy environment, the
soundness of processes in place for implementa-
tion, the ability to achieve a track record of
development results, and the dynamic capability
to generate capacity development outcomes.
The four clusters are used in addition to the three
dimensions mentioned above to generate a set
of sub-indices and a composite index of capacity
that allows linkage to strategies and actions
Level Enabling environment Organizational level Individual level
Very Low 71.4
Low 19.0
Medium 9.5
High 0.0
Very High 0.0
Total
0.0
0.0
40.5
57.1
2.4
100
4.8
23.8
4.8
35.7
31.0
100 100
TABLE A
Capacity Dimensions in 2012 (% of countries by level)
Source: ACI database 2012
The organizational level of capacity is characte-
rized and driven by the internal policies,
arrangements, procedures and frameworks that
allow organizations to operate and deliver on
their mandate and that enable the integration
and consolidation of individual capacities to
work together to achieve specified goals. The
individual level assesses skills, experience, and
knowledge that are vested in people.
Leadership comes at the individual level in the
values espoused that determine accountability
and results, as well as at the level of policies and
frameworks that allow individuals to transform
the environment in which they work and
generate results.
The policy environment examines the conditions
that must be in place to make development
possible, with particular emphasis on effective
and development-oriented organizations and
institutional frameworks. It is focused on (a)
whether countries have put in place national
strategies for development (including a strategy
for agricultural development, given the
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importance of transforming agriculture and
achieving food security) and their level of
legitimacy; (b) the countries' levels of
commitment to meeting development and
poverty reduction objectives established within
the MDGs; (c) country-level awareness and focus
on better utilization of limited resources for
capacity development as measured by the
presence of policies for aid effectiveness; and (d)
degree of inclusiveness that supports their long-
term stability as measured by the existence of
gender equality and other socially inclusive
policies – indeed broad participation and good
governance underpin this measure. The role of
leadership is recognized in the ability to nurture
the development of strategy and embed it into
vision-driven activities. Also embedded in this
cluster is the concept that the leaders and their
strategy need to be legitimate. How committed
leaders are to achieving results such as those
defined in the poverty reduction objectives and
the MDGs is also embedded in this definition. The
role leaders play to inform and engage is
embedded in the concept of country level
awareness, as are the values including efficiency
and effectiveness that come from appropriate
use of public resources. Finally, the leaders' tone-
setting in inclusiveness is recognized as a key
aspect that generates stability in the long-term
and assures good governance. The role of the
leader in tone and stage setting is explicitly
visible in the conceptualization of the processes
for implementation as is the ability to generate a
track record of results and outcomes at the
national level for the good of the people.
Processes for implementation assess the extent
to which the countries are prepared to deliver
results and outcomes. This dimension is
concerned with the creation of an environment
that motivates and supports individuals; the
capacity to manage relations with key
stakeholders inclusively and constructively; and
the capacity to establ ish appropriate
frameworks for managing policies, strategies,
programs and projects. Equally important are
processes for designing, implementing, and
managing national development strategies to
produce socially inclusive development
outcomes. Development results are tangible
outputs that permit development. The main
areas covered by the cluster are; the coordina-
tion of aid support to capacity development; the
level of creativity and innovation in agriculture;
achievements in the implementation of the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; achievement in
gender equality and social inclusion as well as in
partnering for capacity development.
Capacity development outcomes tend to
measure the desired change in the human
condition. Indicators to this effect are captured
mainly through the financial commitment to
capacity development; the actual achievement
of the MDGs; gender and broader social equity;
and the achievements in agriculture and food
security, among other measures. Leadership is
recognized in the attention to the dynamic
aspects of human and organizational capacity
and leadership for capacity development. Such a
definition also includes the conceptualization of
anticipating future needs, such as the skills
needed to mitigate risks from climate change,
the ability to function in environments of low
predictability such as when food shocks are in full
effect, and the wherewithal to react and respond
in the face of disasters as will be needed when
the effects of climate change impinge on cities
and countries alike.
When the preceding ideas are applied to a
particular context or sector, then one gets the
levels of capacity in that context or sector. This
Report utilizes these concepts to define the
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capacity for agricultural transformation and
food security. The World Bank, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
and the US Agency for Internat ional
Development (USAID) for example, define food
security as 'access by all people at all times to
enough food for an active and healthy life'
(Tweeten, 1999:474). The most widely used
definition was offered at the Rome Declaration
of the World Food Summit of 1996. This
declaration defined food security as existing
when all people at all times have access to
sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a
healthy and active life (Boyer, 2010; Sowman and
Cardoso, 2010), and their dietary needs and food
preferences (Scanlan, 2001).
The Africa Capacity Index (ACI) 2012, just like its
predecessor, is a composite index computed
from the four sub-indices generated from an
analysis of clusters, each of which is an
aggregated measure calculated on the basis of
both a quantitative and a qualitative assessment
of various components that form a cluster.
Cluster analysis was used to generate the sub
measures along the dimensions of policy
environment; processes for implementation;
development results at country level; and
capacity development outcomes. It is notewor-
thy that the pattern in 2012 is similar to the
pattern in 2011 with a few important distinctions
(see Figure A and Tables A-D):
 In 2012 one country (Ghana) barely slipped
into a class of "High" capacity, as judged at
the ACI composite level. This is an
improvement relative to 2011 where there
was not a single country that classified in the
“High” category of capacity.
 There are notable improvements in
“Development results at country level”,
where the percentage of countries in the
lowest levels (Low and very Low) decreased
from 61.7% to 19%. The majority shifted from
“Low” to “Medium” Level and one can
observe one country (Ghana) in the “High”
level. These findings provide further
evidence of the optimism around Africa from
a number of sources including the World
Bank, the IMF, and the Economist Magazine.
Not only have a number of countries made
notable improvements in moving up from
the lowest levels of results, but they did so
because they invested in capacity develop-
0
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Very High: No country (0%)
High: (1 country = 2.4%) Ghana
Medium: (13 countries = 31.0%)
Benin; Burkina Faso;  Cape Verde; Ethiopia; Gabon; Kenya;
Mali; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Uganda; Zambia;
Zimbabwe.
Low: (22 country = 52.4%)
Botswana; Burundi; Cameroon; CAR; Chad; Congo (DRC);
Congo (Rep. of); Côte d'Ivoire; Gambia; Guinea Bissau;
Lesotho; Liberia; Malawi; Morocco; Mozambique;
Namibia; Niger; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Swaziland;
Tanzania; Togo.
Very Low: (6 countries = 14.2%)
Angola; Djibouti; Guinea; Madagascar; Mauritania;
Mauritius.
FIGURE A
ACI levels in 2012
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
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TABLE B
Pattern of ACI 2012 results
Level ACI 2012
(% of countries)
Policy
environment
Processes for
implementation
Development
results at country
level
Capacity
development
outcome
Very Low 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Low 52.4 0.0 19.0
Medium 31.0 2.4
High 2.4 11.9
Very High 0.0 2.4
Total 100 100
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
71.4
23.8
4.8
0.0
0.0
100
66.7
23.8
73.8
100
0.0
33.3
50.0
16.7
100
Country ACI 2012 value Rank Country ACI 2012 value Rank
ANGOLA LIBER IA
BENIN MADAGASCAR
BOTSWANA MALAWI
BURKINA FASO MALI
BURUNDI MAURITANIA
CAMEROON MAURITIUS
CAPE VERDE MOROCCO
CAR MOZAMBIQUE
CHAD NAMIBIA
CONGO (DRC) NIGER
CONGO, REP NIGERIA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE RWANDA
DJIBOUTI SENEGAL
ETHIOPIA SIERRA LEONE
GABON SOUTH AFRICA
GAMBIA SWAZILAND
GHANA TANZANIA
GUINEA TOGO
GUINEA BISSAU UGANDA
KENYA ZAMBIA
LESOTHO
17.2
43.4
23.1
53.4
39.5
37.3
40.2
28.1
20.2
34.5
34.1
24.6
18.2
52.8
40.4
33.9
60.2
15.7
27.0
58.1
24.6
38
11
33
3
15
17
14
25
36
20
21
30
37
4
13
22
1
39
27
2
31 ZIMBABWE
35.6
10.2
27.7
50.3
14.6
14.8
36.2
33.4
25.2
30.7
50.5
51.9
42.7
23.6
26.0
22.5
37.6
20.7
45.2
49.7
48.6
19
42
26
7
41
40
18
23
29
24
6
5
12
32
28
34
16
35
10
8
9
TABLE C
Country capacity levels in 2012.
Source: ACI database 2012
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Also, as was done in 2011, countries were asked
to do a self-assessment of their country policies
and institutions using the questionnaire
administered by the World Bank and the AfDB for
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) for countries receiving concessional
finance. This report has a unique feature that
also includes self-assessments for middle income
countries like Botswana which are not assessed
publicly by the multilateral aid agencies. The data
collected from self-assessment provided
opportunity for an analysis of two-years-worth
of CPIA data comparing ACBF-commissioned
self-assessments by countries to the World Bank
and AfDB assessments. The data cover CPIA
ratings for the years 2009 and 2010.
Analyzing the differences between the three
assessments indicates that the AfDB tends to
give ratings that are statistically similar to the
World Bank but higher than country self-
assessments. The variance amongst ratings is
the highest for the AfDB assessments, being
twice as high as the Self-assessment. However,
the AfDB assessments show more variability
than the World Bank assessments. The volatility
rankings are in the order of the AfDB, World
Bank, then country self-assessments.
All of these results indicate that it is very
important to use multiple measures before
classifying countries. A methodology that
accounts for the systematic biases would largely
adjust for this difference. Using a band to classify
countries would be more appropriate. Such a
band is used to illustrate the range of the
indicator in Figure B. The band is composed of
the country self-assessment, and measures that
are one standard deviation away.
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Capacity is at the heart of sustainable
development. A core message of this Report is
that improving the productivity and economic
returns of agriculture has immediate effects on
poverty and hunger in at least three important
ways: it increases the productivity and incomes
of the majority of Africa's poor, who work
primarily in agriculture; it reduces food prices,
which affect real incomes and poverty in urban
areas; and it generates important spillovers to
the rest of the economy.
The current Report also distinguishes between
four clusters of agricultural capacity, generated
using cluster analysis. The first is the ability to
have a good strategy for the agricultural sector,
which comes from leadership to embed a vision
for agriculture at the country level and the set of
vision-driven activities that can transform the
sector and have it contribute to development.
The second cluster captures the investment in
dynamic capacity, including the skills, knowledge
and innovation needed to get results in the
agricultural sector. The third cluster recognizes
the explicit role of the private sector in the
agricultural supply chain and the capacity of this
sector to contribute to the process of
transformation. The last cluster relates to the
information system that supports farmers,
buyers and sellers and other stakeholders in the
supply chain including making research relevant
for farmers. The same formula for the calculation
of the ACI composite index (see technical note) is
employed to compute the ACIAgric, i.e. the
harmonic mean of the following component
indices (Agricultural Strategy; Training-
Innovation; Role of Private Sector; Information
System)
This Report discusses the various issues relating
to the concept of agriculture in Africa, including
land productivity and the constraints upon it,
globalization and its effects on commodity
prices, as well as climate change and rural-urban
migration. The Report starts from the basis that
agriculture (and therefore the growth of
agriculture) is part of the key to Africa's
development. Various theoretical models have
been posited over the years, and it was long
thought that the key to development was
industrialization. In the post-industrial world,
development was thought to reside in the
market – through structural adjustment in the
1990s leading to the “Washington Consensus”
model of very recent times. Now the world is
beginning to realize that the State does have a
crucial role to play, and must exert responsibility
in many different areas in order for development
to take place. In developmental states, such as
China, the world has seen rapid growth, which
has resulted from the state playing a controlling
role in development while permitting private
ownership and entrepreneurship at the same
time. An active state is not necessarily a
repressive one. The world is also beginning to
r e a l i z e t h a t s o - c a l l e d “ f r e e m a r k e t ”
governments also exercise a tremendous
amount of control through protectionist
measures – and these are primarily to do with
agricultural trade.
The economies of most African countries are
agricultural. Agricultural labor comprised 59% of
the total labor force in Africa (FAO, 2011) and 13%
of value added to GDP in 2009 (World Bank,
2011b). Thus, agricultural growth holds the key to
overall growth and development in Africa.
Growth in agriculture has been relatively strong
in recent decades, while at the same time the
food security situation is worsening. Land
productivity has not increased, only the extent of
cultivated land. There is need for sustainable
intensification, so that more output is obtained
from the same area. Productivity is constrained
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by endemic diseases such as malaria and
HIV/AIDS, which have weakened the labor force.
Livestock diseases have affected livestock
production: such diseases often result from poor
livestock producers being unable to dip cattle,
when the state has withdrawn public dipping or
veterinary services. Furthermore, agricultural
producers are marginalized in society, and young
people no longer wish to farm, preferring to live
their lives in urban areas. Rural areas can become
depopulated, with agriculture being carried out
largely by the old or the very young.
Globalization has increasingly resulted in
unstable commodity prices, rising input costs,
low levels of investment and lack of credit. Food
policies have effects that cut across national
boundaries. Decisions such as that of the United
States to convert corn to ethanol, as well as the
growing interest in using large areas of African
land for the growing of biofuel crops affect food
prices. The extent of land available for growing
food will obviously become more limited.
Foreign acquisition of African farmland has
affected the land rights of the poor and of
women. This has implications for capacity
development.
Africa is the fastest urbanizing region in the
world, and Africa also currently contains some of
the world's fastest growing economies (in terms
of GDP). The way in which farming is done will
have to adapt in order to feed the urban poor.
Green belts and urban agriculture should be
encouraged, where today such activities are
marginal and even illegal in some countries.
There is also enormous diversity within Africa,
wealth, resource-rich countries such as Nigeria
alongside “least developed” states such as
Burkina Faso and Niger. There is also a wide
variance in climatic zones. But all of Africa is
characterized by lack of capacity, as well as low
levels of public spending on agriculture thus
food security
The majority of countries have a composite
capacity for agriculture that is rated Medium.
Countries have made important investments in
the dimension of capacity related to information
systems (Table D). These results support the
work done by many in the agricultural sector of
improving the information available to farmers
and others in the supply chain, enabling them to
make the right decisions. The impact of the
cellphone and the availability of mobile
communications platforms cannot be underesti-
mated in its contribution to this capability to get
information out to farmers.
TABLE D
ACIAgric - Percentage of Countries by Cluster
Agricultural
Strategy
Training-
Innovation
Role of Private
Sector
Information
System
ACIAgric
Very Low 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Low 9.5 47.6 4.8 2.4 11.9
Medium 50.0 52.4 23.8 9.5 54.8
High 35.7 0.0 33.3 26.2 33.3
Very High 2.4 0.0 38.1 61.9 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
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Also noteworthy is that the majority of countries
do have medium capacity to develop a good
agricultural strategy and to invest in the right
areas to build the skills and innovation needed
for the future (Figure C). There is evidence of
leadership in the area of dynamic capacity, and it
may be that the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)
is showing results. However, 12% of countries
remain with very low capacity and the majority of
them still have a long way to go to involve the
private sector and build their capacity for a
private sector that contributes to transforming
agriculture.
FIGURE C
ACIAgric capacity by clusters
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The results indicate that countries need to go
beyond strategy and focus on implementation.
As agricultural growth holds a major key to
overall growth and development in Africa, a
focus on implementation of agricultural
strategies would also yield overall development
results.
In agriculture and food distribution, infrastruc-
ture is pivotal, and in this, states cannot act
unilaterally. Regional groupings, such as NEPAD
Agency, must be encouraged, and can play a role
because of its own cross-continental nature to
support regional public goods. Lack of infrastruc-
ture affects exports of “cash” crops, but
improvements in roads and transport and
storage facilities can enable small producers and
those engaged in other farming activities to
market their surplus, making some income for
themselves and their families. Infrastructure
development is one of the key pillars for
achieving inclusive, sustainable and resilient
growth. Infrastructure does not only consist of
marketing facilities, but includes schools and
other training facilities.
Co-operation can be fostered not only between,
but also within states, and the role that co-
operatives can play in agricultural production
and distribution needs to be re-examined. The
private sector can also play an important role.
Africa should learn from her own experiences in
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agricultural transformation, placing a premium
on knowledge management to harvest lessons
learned and best practices. To this end, clearing
houses should be fostered, making use of such
fora as RUFORUM, the regional university forum.
Focus should also be on the enhancement of
livelihoods. Livelihoods encompass the
resources and strategies that individuals and
households use to meet their needs and
accomplish their goals, that is, people, their
capabilities and their means of living. Thinking in
this way accommodates women much more
seamlessly, and capacity building is a tool that is
eminently appropriate for sustainable
livelihoods. Small farms, which occupy 60% of
arable land worldwide, and are as much as 90% of
the world's 525 million farms, tend to be
operated by women.
Sustainable livelihoods approaches represent a
powerful theoretical development, and
vulnerability and resilience are key sustainable
livelihoods concepts. Land tenure insecurity is a
primary cause of vulnerability. Without tenure,
farmers can do no more than subsist.
Small farmers include the growing numbers of
people who are involved in urban agriculture, an
activity which is becoming more and more
important for food security and nutrition. Urban
agriculture provides employment, and urban
agriculture needs to be taken more seriously by
national governments – given that Africa is the
fastest urbanizing continent. Local governments
have tended to obstruct agricultural activities, in
many cases treating them as illegal. The issue of
the use of municipal water for agricultural
activities is extremely contentious.
The effects of agricultural policy, through the
state and government, cut across all levels of
agricultural activity from the small plot to the
vast plantations. And government activities such
as land distribution policies and the holding of
elections can have profound effects on
agricultural productivity. It is thus important to
look at the capacity of the state, as well as the
individual farmer, with regard to implementation
and policy formulation. But the state is not an
autonomous institution, and NGOs in particular
play an increasingly important role. NGOs are
supposed to represent the citizenry, and the
participation of people themselves in policy
formulation is vital. There is an obvious place for
capacity development here. Agricultural policy
has become a contested site between state and
non-state actors. Multilateral non-state
organizations like the European Union play a
further role in agricultural policy, including those
corporations that promote biotechnology and
genetic engineering. But the state is the only
body that can act to unify and regulate policy
across all the multiple players in agriculture.
African responses to biotechnology have been
mixed, with some countries adopting some
schemes, while others have refused even to
import Genetically Modified (GM) grain in times
of food shortage. This delay in initiating policy is
due to lack of political commitment and
foresight on the part of governments, but also
due to lack of scientific skill to make a proper
determination on the basis of the unique
conditions Africa faces. In other areas, too, policy
is inconsistent and short-term. Collaboration in
policy as well as research at a regional and also at
an international level must take precedence as
should the link between research and farmers.
In order to formulate and implement policy
governments require knowledge. Hitherto the
only repositories of knowledge in Africa,
specifically targeted at government, have been
the National Agricultural Research Systems
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(NARS), and these have been too “technical,”
ignoring the vast reserves of knowledge
possessed by individual farmers. New ways to
gather and process knowledge – the knowledge
management approach – are necessary here.
And nothing can proceed unless there is a
financial system in place, for Research and
Development (R&D) require investment, which
individual small states may not be able to afford.
Governments should build on the regional
research councils that exist. Farmers themselves
must become involved in R&D activities.
Although agricultural finance has hitherto been
supported through national agricultural banks,
with microcredit schemes operating at the very
margins, the international financial system has
had a devastating effect on African agriculture.
The global financial crisis led to increasing
amounts of commodity speculation, affecting
food prices throughout the world and national
agricultural financial policies have failed to
support agriculture. The Report recommends a
paradigm shift in the financing of agriculture,
with much more investment in rural financial
infrastructure. Microcredit schemes have
already proven effective in India, and
cooperatives can play an important role here.
Loans can be made available to farmers for
different ends – short, medium and long term
loans. Commercial banks are notoriously
reluctant to extend credit to small farmers, and
this situation is exacerbated by the farmers' own
ignorance of financial procedures. Both bankers
and farmers require training. Agricultural
development banks have been established in a
number of countries, but these have failed to
mobilize savings and domestic capital market
resources. The Report provides details on the
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
(GAFSP), which provides support for national
and regional strategic plans for agriculture and
food security.
The agricultural sector has been poorly served by
the financial system partly because of the
unfavorable policy environment. Poor banking
infrastructure is largely to blame for this,
alongside weak institutional capacity in the
financial sector. The risks inherent in agriculture
give rise to the reluctance by financial
institutions to provide credit to farmers.
Insurance schemes are not generally available,
but insurance would provide a sense of security
to both the creditor and the farmer seeking a
loan.
In 2003 NEPAD proposed that all governments
commit themselves to allocating 10% of their
budget to agriculture (Maputo Declaration,
2003). By 2011 only ten African countries had
reached or surpassed this target.
Recommended is the adoption of a value-chain
approach, and a regional approach to value chain
development is important where many countries
have small populations with many similarities
with neighboring people across borders. Value
chain financing implies that lending will be done
differently, with the appropriate framework for
capacity building. In value chain, financing risks
decrease as the value chain moves forward.
Different types of financial product will be
required. Expanding regional trade markets can
provide more opportunities and incomes for
small farmers. Indeed, well-functioning markets
increase income to farmers, reduce the costs of
food and the unreliability of supply, as well as
improving food security. Small farmers are
extremely vulnerable to risk, which can to a large
extent be offset by diversification, and well-
functioning markets.
The Report identifies numerous innovations
which might be used in delivering finance to poor
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farmers.
A major shift in emphasis from upstream
agriculture to the downstream sector is
required, in order to promote growth and
enhance food security. The private sector has
generally been very marginal to development
thinking on agriculture in Africa, but it must be
encouraged to play a role, and can do so here
through contract farming schemes. But mostly,
it is governments that have to provide the
enabling environment for the financial sector to
be strengthened.
There are also economic measures that
governments and financial agencies can take to
mitigate risks, such as weather insurance
schemes. In the green global economy,
governments invest in areas that stimulate the
greening of economic sectors, as well as in
capacity building, training and education. Taxes
and other financial instruments can also be
introduced. Measuring, report ing and
verification (MRV) of emissions should not only
be a tool of the developed world and, for this,
training will be necessary for African countries.
In all activities, different types of partnership
have been important in guaranteeing success.
The Comprehensive African Agricultural
Development Programme (CAADP) is a key
platform for the restoration of agriculture
growth, food security and rural development in
Africa, and ACIR2012 recommends adopting it.
The CAADP process involves the development of
partnerships, such as that between the private
and public sectors, and farmers' associations.
A number of key issues and recommendations
emerge clearly from the Report. The first of
these is that it is no longer viable (as the
Washington Consensus imposes) for the State to
play a secondary role in agriculture – and indeed
in development as a whole. It is imperative that
the State takes an active role, taking charge of
development activities and committing itself to
investing in development. Countries should
avoid the mistakes of the 1960's and 1970's of
having the state run everything in agriculture by
also ensuring that agriculture markets function.
First among the role of the state is that of
investments in rural and connecting infrastruc-
ture. Agriculture can only develop through trade,
and for this to take place there must be adequate
roads and other means of transporting fresh
produce rapidly and efficiently. The transport
infrastructure includes adequate storage
facilities for the different types of commodities.
The private sector seeing opportunities in bigger
markets will then make the needed investments
to support cold chain logistics and other
agribusiness ideas that add value to agricultural
production.
In developing policy, the state must involve the
farmers themselves, in harvesting the
knowledge that they possess. The concept of
livelihoods is a more inclusive conceptual
framework within which to consider the farmer.
Climate change is an urgent problem for
agriculture and food security, and ways to
mitigate this must be prescient not reactive, so
that the continent does not lurch from crisis to
crisis, dependent always on emergency relief.
Water issues cross boundaries, and African
governments must be prepared to work
together in order to allocate adequate water for
agriculture. As in all collaborative efforts, States
must be prepared to cede some aspects of their
sovereignty for the greater good.
But how can African governments pay for the
damage caused by extreme weather events due
to climate change? The threats of increasing
drought, flooding, rising sea levels and
population movements caused by disasters are
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real. Yet, for Africa they have sometimes proved
an opportunity. For the first time, African
governments spoke together at the recent COP
17 in Durban in December 2011, and were
successful in ensuring the inclusion of agriculture
in the final agreement.
The capacity to mitigate the effects of climate
change is vital if agriculture is to succeed and
people to have the ability to feed themselves.
Without water, no activity can take place, and
water resources for agriculture have always
been unevenly distributed. Agriculture in Africa
has been plagued by disputes over water
distribution, from controversial large dams to
small streams. The Nile River Basin has for some
time been a focus of dispute. Given that water
resources transcend national boundaries, water
rights must be devised at a regional level. It is
only governments that can agree on access to
transboundary water resources, as well as
developing the infrastructure for storage of
water. The very nature of farming systems will
have to change, with more emphasis on
integrated farms and horticulture production.
Irrigation schemes that were attempted in the
1960s and 70s have largely failed, but
smallholder irrigation has had more success.
Improved weather forecasting and early
warning systems assisted by the widely adopted
mobile phone networks can be used. Insurance
and compensatory measures could be put in
place. Fisheries could be integrated with other
types of farming, and livestock selection can be
enhanced, as well as programs to assist farmers
in re-stocking following a drought period.
African countries need to develop policies and
frameworks that allow for poverty reduction as
well as sustainable livelihoods, and need to be
well aware of emerging challenges such as
climate change and the need for climate
adaptation. Strategies must be developed to
deal with household vulnerabilities by strength-
ening resilience and reducing risks. Innovative
sources of financing have to be sought in the
context of the evolving global aid architecture.
Development assistance has the possibility to be
one of the major instruments for enhancing
global justice and equity if used appropriately by
both donors and recipients. Assistance –
especially food aid – has been known to have
immediate positive impact on food insecurity.
Developed countries' emissions of greenhouse
gases already undermine the productivity of
farming systems essential to survival of the poor
in many African countries. The burden of climate
change needs to be fairly shared.
Yet, countries need capacities of all kinds to
make these productivity improvements and
secure the required economic returns.
Governments have the responsibility to
implement policies, laws and regulations that
create an enabling economic and institutional
environment in which private and civil society
agents, including farmers, can flourish. Social
equity concerns challenge policy-makers,
researchers, practitioners and donors to work
together to provide not only the technological
means, but also the social support needed to
encourage and enable uptake of new techniques
by those previously lacking skills, training,
extension services or credit facilities. The
success of agriculture depends on what
resources and rewards are available to those
involved in it including young people.
With this Report, the African Capacity Building
Foundation (ACBF) hopes to bring political,
policy, research, investment, and capacity
development attention to the implementation,
monitoring, and tracking issues holding back the
transformation of African agriculture and the
guaranteeing of food security for its growing and
youthful population. Done right, agriculture can
indeed transform Africa. But it needs to start by
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1.o Introduction
It is a well-known fact that social development is increasingly linked to a nation's ability to acquire and
apply technical and socio-economic knowledge, and the process of globalization is increasingly
accelerating this trend through the speed with which knowledge can become obsolete (Hanson and
Kararach, 2011). Comparative advantages come less and less from abundant natural resources or
cheaper labor, but emerge increasingly from technical innovations and the competitive use of
knowledge.
Terms like “absorptive capacity” which were originally defined for firms (see Cohen and Levinthal,
1990; Zahra and George, 2002) as the ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it,
and apply it for added value, have been used by many to argue for investments in improving
accumulation and use of knowledge at the country and organizational level. In today's world, socio-
economic development is as much a process of knowledge accumulation as it is capital accumulation.
According to Salmi (2005:1), “firms devote one-third of their investment to knowledge-based
intangibles such as training, research and development, patents, licensing, design and marketing. In
this context, economies of scope, derived from the ability to design and offer different products and
services with the same technology, are becoming a powerful factor of expansion.” In high-technology
industries like electronics and telecommunications, economies of scope can be more of a driving force
than traditional economies of scale. At the same time, there is a rapid acceleration in the rhythm of
creation and dissemination of knowledge, which means that the life span of technologies and
products gets progressively shorter and that obsolescence comes more quickly.
The aforementioned factors are composites of capacities for development. The Africa Capacity
Indicators Report goes beyond the definition of capacity to absorb and use knowledge and extend the
concept to the capacity to implement, borrowing from lessons in evidence-based practice that have
been in use in areas of social policy (see for example Schaughency and Ervin, 2006). The choice to
widen the search for defining indicators of capacity is in part due to the importance of capacity
development in Africa and the need for a definition and set of indicators that can serve equally well in
economies that are largely dependent on agriculture, those that are transforming into industrial
countries with growing manufacturing of products for domestic use and export, and those that may
be competing in knowledge services on a global basis. A lot has been learnt since the African Capacity
Building Foundation (ACBF) published its inaugural Africa Capacity Indicators Report in 2011. The 2011
Report focused on the concept of fragility and gave a lot of importance to the role of capacity to
ensure stability. The theme of the current Report is on Agricultural Transformation and Food Security.
Reaffirming Capacity
Development in Africa
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The Report argues that capacity for agricultural transformation and food security is critical for Africa
given emerging challenges such as climate change and the need for climate adaptation, but also
because of the link between food security and social stability.
1.1 Capacity development landscape
in Africa - conceptual issues
Africa has become a continent of mixed
messages! Over the last 50 years pproximatelya
one trillion US ollars in development aid hasd
been transferred to Africa. But real per capita
income today is less than it was in the 1970s and
more than half the population – about 500
million people – still live in poverty. At this rate,
most African countries may not meet many of
the Millennium Development Goals . At(MDGs)
the same time, in the last two decades or so,
African countries have registered average
annual economic growth of between 5-8%
despite low foreign investments and the global
economic crisis. Such evidence of good returns
even on minimal investment indicates that Africa
has great promise (Kagame, 2011). Arguably, this
turnaround in economic performance has been
powered by dramatic improvements in political
stability and the quality of governance. Incidents
of civil violence fell 34 percent between 2004 and
2008, while scores on the Ibrahim Index of
African Governance have improved in 42 out of
53 African countries since 2002. Sierra Leone is a
case in point whereby tens of thousands were
killed and 2 million people were displaced from
their homes due to civil war. A decade later,
Sierra Leone has held two free and fair elections
– its – andﬁrst peaceful transfer of power
recorded one of the fastest improvements in
political stability of any country in the world
(Blair, 2010).
Africa is also experiencing new waves of global
confluence. The rising inﬂuence of China and
other emerging powers, and the growth of new
south-south partnerships, have challenged the
traditional donors' intellectual monopoly on
how development assistance should be
provided. China's investment in African
infrastructure has skyrocketed, rising by 46
percent a year between 2001 and 2007. There
are heated debates about what China is doing in
Africa. But what shouldn't be missed are the
lessons of how it is going about it. The Chinese
approach is focused on delivering rapid, visible
results (Schiere et al., 2011). Whatever one thinks
of it, China is certainly meeting a real demand felt
by African leaders for politically signiﬁcant 'quick
wins'. Even if one does not always agree with
China, there is need to recognize and respond to
the power of this approach, and its impact on the
expectations of African leaders and citizens for
other development ass istance ( ib id) .
Furthermore, China is a country with an
exemplary record on absorptive capacity, where
learning from external interventions is at a
premium and results are the driver of decision-
making. Africa can learn from China what
capacities need to be developed such that
investments, private and public alike, including
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can be used to
deliver development results.
1
For these 'winds of change' to be exploited to
benefit Africa, there must be capable leadership
to empower society (Lopes, 2002:128). Indeed
there is a need not only for effective leaders who
can take risks and show results, but also who can
create an environment for success in
development because of the values they
espouse for promoting human development for
common good and benefit of their countries
(Safty, 2003).
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Defined thus, leadership is also needed for
capacity development itself, through vision-
driven activities of people who are able to
transform their environments and chart new
paths of progress (Safty, 2003). As Blair (2010: 5)
posits: “the biggest opportunity of all is the new
generation of visionary, reformist leaders that
has emerged in many African countries,
intolerant of the old excuses, determined to turn
the page on the past. Not all of these leaders will
succeed—risk is inherent to real leadership—but
the signs are positive.” As Mkandawire
(2002:150) argues, governments can commit
two types of errors: that of omission – where the
state fails to do what it ought to do; and errors
that of commission where the state does too
much and overstep its bounds. Here Blair can be
quoted extensively when he argues that:
[E]very leader must balance the risk of
committing 'errors of commission',
doing things they should not do,
against the risk of committing 'errors
of omission', neglecting to do the
things they should. Yet when it comes
to Africa, the development community
seems to be much more worried about
the danger of doing wrong than the
challenge of getting things done. The
major donor countries of the OECD
invest more than $3.5bn in governance
every year, but much of this—perhaps
as much as 60 percent—is focused on
tackling 'errors of commission'
through public ﬁnancial management
systems, strengthening of civil society
and oversight bodies, support to
parliaments, media, NGOs, human
rights watchdogs and anti-corruption
commissions. The question is not
whether these things are important—
they clearly are — but whether more
and diﬀerent support needs to be
given to leaders to help them do the
right thing, not just catch them when
they do wrong. In fact, supporting
leaders is crucial to creating the
conditions where real, vibrant
democracies can ﬂourish. It is not a
question of doing this instead of
strengthening transparency and
accountability. The two must go hand
in hand, to create a positive cycle
where elected leaders are able to
deliver for their citizens, in turn
nurturing a politics that is about issues
and competence not just ethnicity or
patronage, and which oﬀers a model to
inspire future generations of leaders.
But to get there we need a proper
understanding of the realities of
leadership…Government is not a
single, monolithic thing, with a single
set of views and interests, even if it is
convenient for outsiders to think of it
that way. It is a set of sometimes co-
o p e r a t i n g , o f t e n c o m p e t i n g
organisations and personalities, with
d i ﬀ e r e n t v a l u e s , w o r l d v i e w s ,
incentives and loyalties (2010:8-9).
Evidence of the complexity of state capacity was
visible in the Africa Capacity Indicators Report of
2011 where some countries showed great
achievement in the areas of policymaking, but
limited achievement in implementing policy or
even achieving results (ACBF, 2011). These
findings point to an important dimension of
choice a state that may be overstepping its—
bounds in certain areas could be woefully
inadequate in others, and thus may need to be
strengthened at the same time as it is checked.
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That is also why strong individual institutions
must be matched by mechanisms to make
governments work as a coherent whole more
than the sum of its parts. African governments
today have a number of demands put on them;
not only do they need to get the basics right but
are additionally being asked to deliver justice,
h e a l t h c a r e , s c h o o l i n g , e n v i r o n m e n t a l
protection, gender equality and a whole panoply
of other standards and services, even when they
have only just emerged from conﬂict, and with a
fraction of the resources and revenues. In such
highly resource-constrained environments,
leaders face a daily dilemma: do they try to
govern responsibly, and drive a weak and cash-
strapped bureaucracy to deliver the services that
will persuade people that government is on their
side; or do they take the easy way out, and secure
the loyalty of their citizens through patronage,
favors and intimidation? The rationale for
encouraging contested elections, supporting
powerful anti-corruption authorities and other
accountability mechanisms is to sharpen leaders'
incentives to choose the ﬁrst path. But this
assumes that the capacity of the state to
respond to what leaders ask it to do is not in
question.
So beyond what has been said earlier about
leadership, absorptive capacity and its links to
knowledge, innovation and learning, what does
one operationally mean by capacity? According
to ACBF (2011:30-31),
[capacity] comprises the ability of
people, organizations, and society as a
whole to manage their affairs
successfully; and capacity development
is the process by which people,
organizations, and society as a whole
unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and
maintain capacity over time.
Capacity is also better conceptualized
when answering the question: capacity
for what? Capacity for individuals,
organizations, and societies to set goals
and achieve them; to budget resources
and use them for agreed purposes; and
to manage the complex processes and
interactions that typify a working
political and economic system. Capacity
is most tangibly and effectively
developed in the context of specific
development objectives such as
delivering services to poor people;
instituting education, public service,
and health care reform; improving the
investment climate for small and
medium enterprises; empowering local
communities to better participate in
public decision making processes; and
promoting peace and resolving conflict.
ACBF therefore recognizes capacity in its
dynamic sense and its context. This definition is
in agreement with the approach taken by the
Afr ican Union/NEPAD in the Capacity
Development Strategic Framework (CDSF)
adopted by African Head of States in 2003. The
CDSF has six pillars (see Figure 1.1) and is
designed to assist countries and institutions to:
• deeply analyze the fundamental capacity
challenges confronting them;
• promote the adoption of innovative,
appropriate and effective solutions to
capacity development that take into
account local needs, priorities and
context; and
• encourage the application of integrated,
c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d s u s t a i n a b l e
solutions.
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The ACBF - AU/NEPAD conceptualization of
capacity when applied to a particular context or
sector, then one gets the levels of capacity in
that context or sector. This Report utilizes these
concepts to define the capacity for agricultural
transformation and food security whereby
c h a n g e i s d r i v e n b y a n e n a b l i n g
situation/environment, management capacity
and supportive vision (see Figure 1.2). The World
Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, and the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) for
example, define food security as access by all"
people at all times to enough food for an active
and healthy life (Tweeten, 1999:474)." However,
the most widely used definition was offered at
the Rome Declaration of the World Food Summit
of 1996. This declaration defined food security as
existing when all people at all times have access
to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a
healthy and active life (Boyer, 2010; Sowman and
Cardoso, 2010), and their dietary needs and food
preferences (Scanlan, 2001).
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Capacity development remains a central tool for
the social transformation and food security of
Africa. Leaders need to focus on it for change to
occur at the speed and sustainability required for
Africa to secure development for its people. In
the last twelve months, a series of international
meetings have reaffirmed capacity as being at
the heart of sustainable development. This was
most recently reflected in the March 2011 Cairo
Consensus on capacity development. The Busan
HLF4 in November 2011 provided yet another
opportunity for building a consensus to improve
capacity development practice. However,
important policy and technical challenges
remain. Capacity development faces several
important challenges: ownership and readiness
for change cannot be taken for granted; multiple
stakeholders are involved that can be both
providers of and recipients of capacity
development support – the role of the private
sector and civil society merit particular attention;
contextual factors, including opportunities for
change can have a major influence on capacity
development outcomes. There is a need for
pragmatic approaches, moving from rhetoric to
pract ice: development partners ' own
procedures and business processes need to be
adapted in areas cr i t ica l to capacity
development. These include internal competen-
cies such as cultural sensitivity and communica-
tion skills, alignment, flexible planning, risk
taking and a focus on learning amongst others. A
tension exists between results orientation and
process support: the pressure to deliver fast
measurable results is not conducive to an
engagement in capacity development
processes. In the end, capacity development is
both a means to produce results, and a strategic
priority. The tension needs to be managed. There
is also a need for an increased use of knowledge
sharing and collaborative tools to allow for
stakeholders learning across as well as within
countries. Capacity development is highly
contextualized; therefore, centralized decision-
making should be balanced by information
sharing between practitioners. The practice of
capacity development is also still evolving and
there is room to learn from the large reservoir of
knowledge that can be drawn from the private
sector.
The discussions in this Report are also guided by
a number of additional concepts. These concepts
and their operational definitions (the state, non-
state, agricultural policy, farmers, globalization
and scientific knowledge) are briefly examined
as follows:
 The state and its institutions: To a large
extent, the work of Karl Marx and his
colleague Friedrich Engels, and that of
Max Weber have influenced much of the
scholarly debate on the state (Gerth and
Mills, 1946; Engels, 1884/1986). In Africa,
theorizing about the state has followed
Enabling
situation
Appealing
Vision
Change
management
capacity
FIGURE 1.2
Three key elements shaping change readiness for
successful sector and capacity development
Source: Djibo, 2012
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either the Marxian or Weberian
perspective with particular emphasis on
its nature, organizational capability and
relative autonomy (Leys, 1975; Saul,
1974). The state, in this Report, will be
conceptualized in terms of a central or
national political actor that interacts with
several social groups (agricultural and
non-agricultural) in initiating agricultural
policies.
 These areNon-state institutions:
generally private and, theoretically
speaking, operate independently of the
state institutions. There are different
types (small, big, local, international, non-
profit and for-profit) of non-state
institutions or non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
 Agricultural policy: As a general term,
policy “implies state intervention in the
economy, while policies are the specific
type of intervention, such as, for
example, producer pr ice pol icy,
exchange rate policy, credit policy, or
research policy” (Ellis,1992:7). If policy is
conceptualized only in terms of
i n t e r v e n t i o n o r a c t i o n s , t h e
consequences of the absence of policies
cannot be accounted for. However, it is
important to take into consideration the
absence of policy, because policy
absence is itself a policy (Galjart, 1971:38-
39). Agricultural policies in Africa are the
actions and non-actions that result in
intended and unintended consequences
in the ability of state and non-state
institutions to provide social groups with
resources and rewards.
 AsFarmers: agricultural producers,
farmers play a major role in agricultural
systems. Two broad categories of
farmers will be considered in this Report
( )small-scale and large-scale farmers .
Small-scale s tend to rely on familyfarmer
land and labor and relatively little capital.
Large-scale farmers have been privileged
by the contemporary African state in its
modernization schemes. Another
distinction between small-scale and
large-scale farmers is their relationship to
the state. Small-scale farmers, residing
mostly in rural areas are "at arm's length,
from the social sources of [state] power"
(Shanin, 1990:43). The state, nonethe-
less, requires small-scale farmers to
produce export and domestic food crops,
to raise foreign exchange and conserve
foreign exchange spent on food imports
respectively. Small-scale farmers also
require income from the sale of crops, in
order to buy non-agricultural goods and
services. They depend on the state for
access to some resources, for example,
research and extension services.
However, small-scale farmers can also
resist state agricultural policies when
they smuggle exports crops for sale in
neighbouring countries for higher prices,
or produce food crops for their own
consumption. As a result, the state and
small-scale farmers depend on and
require each other.
Large-scale farmers are traditionally
major players in the production of non-
traditional agricultural crops for export
(for example, flowers, pineapples and
bananas). They have extensive non-
agricultural interests and a better
working relationship with the state. This
is particularly because large-scale farmers
are, in some cases, serving or retired
political elites and formally educated, and
have a closer relationship with ruling
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coalitions. Given their extensive non-
agricultural interests, some large-scale
farmers are mostly absentee farmers,
who do not live near their farms.
Farmers occasionally coalesce into
associations in an attempt to influence
agricultural policy. These associations
reflect the character of what the farmers
produce as well as the social characteris-
tics of the group. For example, producers
are made up of small-scale and large-scale
producers, or of farmers producing crops
for local consumption or export
agriculture, and are located either in the
urban or rural areas. Even though the
specific group of interest in this Chapter is
the producers, it is worth noting that
producers have to liaise with buyers,
consumers and agricultural policy
makers. Thus, the relations between and
within social groups in the agricultural
sector are fluid. Underlying the relations
between and within the social groups are
political and socio-cultural consider-
ations. The dynamics of these relations
define and shape how producers relate to
other groups in terms of access to
agricultural resources and rewards. Thus,
the conceptual distinctions are not static;
especially with the changing nature of
production systems in an era of
globalization.
 An interactive process thatGlobalization:
involves political, economic and social
relationships among nations. It is a
process that has historical origins, but has
taken on a distinct qualitative character
with the emerging breakthroughs in
communicat ion and informat ion
technologies. These changes have given
rise to the compression of time and space
and the “intensification of worldwide
social relations which link distant
localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events
occurring many miles away and vice
versa” (Giddens, 1990:64). Globalization
is thus integrative by nature and the
compression of time and space has
implications for state and non-state
institutions in agricultural policy and
access to agricultural resources and
rewards.
 Is generallyScientific knowledge:
considered as the set of ideals or
intellectual phenomena generated with
the scientific method. The scientific
method proceeds on the assumption that
systematic processes can be employed to
study phenomena, and such outcomes
are rational. As used here, scientific
knowledge is associated with knowledge
producing entities like policy analysts and
researchers in state and non-state
institutions (national, international,
public or private).
The aforementioned concepts and their
theoretical value will be assessed while
discussing the nexus between civil society,
private sector, the state and African agriculture
in an era of globalization.
1.2 Agricultural capacity: issues and
options
A core message in this Report is that improving
the productivity and the economic returns of
agriculture has immediate effects on poverty
and hunger in at least three important ways: a) it
increases the productivity and incomes of the
majority of Africa's poor, who work primarily in
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
25
agriculture; b) it reduces food prices, which
affect real incomes and poverty in urban areas;
and, c) it generates important spillovers to the
rest of the economy. Yet, countries need
capacities of all kinds to make these productivity
improvements and secure the required
economic returns.
The sector has a big footprint in a number of
critical economic processes. Agricultural labor
comprised 59% of the total labor force in Africa
(FAO, 2011), with agriculture contributing 13% of
value added to GDP in 2009, with $322 value
added per worker in agriculture (World Bank,
2011a). Growth in agricultural GDP in Africa has
been relatively strong in recent decades (4.8% in
2009), and was the highest of the developing
regions in 2009. The size of the sector and the
positive growth prospects for Africa bode well
for improving the contribution of this large
footprint to food security and improved
livelihoods.
But there are a number of constraints. First and
foremost is the capacity to raise productivity.
Agricultural production has somewhat kept pace
with population growth (Livingston et al., 2011).
However, in contrast to other regions, this has
occurred largely through expansion of the
cultivated area rather than increases in land
productivity. Extensification reflects the lack of
capacity to increase agricultural productivity.
Research shows that for each 10% increase in
small-scale agricultural productivity in sub-
Saharan Africa, approximately 7 million people
are moved above the poverty line (IFPRI, 2006a;
IAASTD, 2009a). Due to the economic multipliers
between agriculture and the rural non-farm
sector where growth is generally faster and labor
productivity and wages are higher, the urban
poor benefit along with the rural poor from
broad-based agricultural productivity growth
(IAC, 2004). GDP growth in agriculture is four
times more effective in raising incomes of
extremely poor people than when it originates
outside the sector (World Bank, 2007a).
Capacity to raise production while facing
sustainability constraints is another area of
importance. 'Sustainable agricultural
intensification' is likely to be an integral
component in efforts to increase production in a
sustainable manner among small-scale farmers.
It is a cornerstone in the emerging global hunger
and food security initiative 'Feed the Future' that
constitutes a 'whole of government' approach in
the United States (USG, 2011). Agricultural
intensification involves three different ways: (1)
increasing yields per hectare; (2) increasing
cropping intensity (i.e., two or more crops) per
unit of land or other inputs (water); and (3)
changes in land use from low-value crops or
commodities to those with higher market prices
(e.g., from maize to fruits, vegetables and
flowers in Kenya). Sustainable agricultural
intensification involves producing more output
from the same area while reducing negative
environmental impacts and increasing natural
capital and environmental services (Conway and
Waage, 2010; Godfray et al., 2010; Royal Society,
2009).
Characteristics typically attributed to a
sustainable production system are that it:
 Utilizes crop varieties and livestock
breeds with a high ratio of productivity;
 Avoids unnecessary use of external
inputs;
 Harnesses agro-ecological processes
such as nutrient cycling, biological
nitrogen fixation, allelopathy, predation
and parasitism;
 Minimizes use of technologies or
practices with adverse impacts on
environment and human health;
 Makes productive use of human capital,
in the form of knowledge and capacity to
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adapt and innovate, and social capital to
resolve common landscape-scale
problems; and
 Quantifies and minimizes the impacts of
system management on externalities
such as greenhouse gas emissions, clean
water availability, carbon sequestration,
conservation of biodiversity, and
dispersal of pests, pathogens and weeds
(Lele et al., 2010:11-12).
Sustainable intensification requires research on
technology and policy and institutional changes.
It involves development of enabling institutional
environments to build on strengths, address
weaknesses, exploit opportunities and remove
threats to achieving sustainable development
(Lele et al., 2010).
Capacity to harness the complexities facing the
sector and handle policy reforms and implemen-
tation processes in a holistic manner is also an
area for attention. The multiple potential
benefits from increased agricultural productivity
in Africa confront six stark realities. First, an array
of local conditions constitutes significant hurdles
to be overcome. Endemic diseases such as
malaria and yellow fever, and the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, have weakened Africa's labor force.
Debilitating livestock diseases such as
trypanosomiasis have severely limited livestock
rearing, animal traction, and mixed cropping in
the tropical zones. Africa's meager output gains
in recent years have come mainly from area
expansion. This extensification, coupled with
shortened fallow periods and minimal input use,
has led to nutrient mining and declining soil
fertility (Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994; Haggblade
et al., 2010a). During the past decade, net food
imports, measured in constant prices, increased
more than 60% in Africa, further widening the
food trade deficit, as increases in food
production have been outstripped by rapid
population growth (FAO, 2011).
Second, globalization has increased pressure on
the agricultural sector as declining commodity
prices, rising input costs, low levels of
investment and lack of credit take their toll on
small-scale farmers, their families and
agricultural workers in terms of uncertainty of
income, indebtedness, unfulfilled needs, and
deteriorating economic and social conditions.
Most agricultural producers are increasingly on
the margins of economic, social, and political life.
Productivity enhancement is not so much a
technical issue, as one of political, economic and
social choices and constraints, and thus an issue
of equity (UNDP, 2006a). These equity concerns
challenge policy-makers, researchers, practitio-
ners and donors to work together to provide not
only the technological means, but also the social
support needed to encourage and enable uptake
of new techniques by those previously lacking
skills training, extension services or credit
facilities (IAASTD, 2009b).
'Equity modifiers' that involve human capital
enhancement may reduce poverty and
contribute to broad-based agricultural
development. These include targeting small and
medium sized family farms as priority
beneficiaries for publicly funded agricultural
research and extension, marketing, credit and
input supplies; setting public investment
priorities through participatory processes;
investing in human capital to raise labor
productivity and increase opportunities for
employment; ensuring that agricultural
extension, education, credit and small business
assistance programs reach rural women;
undertaking land reform; and actively
encouraging the rural non-farm economy
(Hazell, 1999; IAASTD, 2009b).
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Third, Africa is a region particularly vulnerable to
climate change - because of limited adaptive
capacity (IPCC, 2007a). Analysis of long-term
trends (1900- 2005) indicates rising tempera-
tures in Africa as a whole as well as decreased
precipitation (IAASTD, 2009a). Longer and more
intense droughts have been observed since the
1970s, particularly in the tropics and subtropics
(IPCC, 2007b). By 2050, Africa may be 0.5-2°C
warmer and drier, with 10% less rainfall
exacerbated by higher evaporation (Nyong,
2005). Changes in rainfall and temperature
patterns are likely to negatively affect water
availability and growing conditions, reducing
food production and security, as well as
hydroelectricity production. Biodiversity and
ecosystems are likely to be severely affected
(IAASTD, 2009a).
 Fourth, countries in protracted crisis have
special requirements in terms of interventions by
the development community. Of 22 countries
currently in protracted crises, 17 are in Africa.
Protracted crisis situations are characterized by
recurrent natural disasters and/or conflict, long-
term food crises, breakdown of livelihoods and
insufficient institutional capacity. The aid
architecture needs to better address both
immediate needs and the structural causes of
protracted crises (FAO, 2011:12):
 Food assistance helps build the basis for
long-term food security;
 Improving food security in protracted
crises requires going beyond short-term
responses in order to protect and
promote people's livelihoods over the
longer term;
 Agricultural and rural-based livelihoods
are critical to the groups most affected by
protracted crises, but they are not
properly ref lected in aid f lows.
Agriculture accounts for one-third of
protracted crisis countries' gross
domestic product and two-thirds of their
employment. Yet agriculture accounts
for only 4% of humanitarian aid received
by countries in protracted crisis and 3% of
development aid;
 Broader social protection measures help
countries cope with protracted crises and
lay the foundation for long-term
recovery; and
 Supporting institutions is key to
addressing protracted crises.
Fifth, there is need for Africa to invest in
infrastructure to ensure better connectivity to
markets. The importance of leveraging efforts
and resources to enhance the enabling
environment for infrastructure development
and bridge the investment gap in the agricultural
sector cannot be over-emphasized. Indeed,
infrastructure has been recognized by both the
G20 multi-year action plan and the Comprehen-
sive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
(CAADP) as one of the key pillars for achieving
inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth. While
African countries can bridge their infrastructure
gap through further strengthening their
investment frameworks, there is the need for
development partners to take decisive actions
that have a strong leverage effect on infrastruc-
ture investment on the continent. Financiers
currently provide only half of the US$93 billion
that the continent needs every year for new
physical infrastructure and operations and
maintenance. Bridging the remaining gap
requires a bigger public-sector role as the
primary financier and infrastructure service
provider; attracting the private sector to
contribute its expertise and capital; and,
identifying how official development assistance
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can help leverage private investment in
infrastructure and also strengthen the enabling
environment, including the appropriate
investment policy frameworks and institutional
capacity on which hard infrastructure depends.
African countries need to assess and diagnose
public sector capacity bottlenecks that hamper
infrastructure investment. In this regard, there
is a clear need for more capacity building for
undertaking public-private partnerships (PPPs).
Sixth, the African continent continues to
experience increasing urbanisation rates
(between 3% and 5% annually). This imposes
severe pressure on urban food supply with
consequent rise in urban poverty. As is discussed
in Chapter 3, there is an apparent lack of political
will to promote African urban agriculture over
the years reflected in weak or absent policy
frameworks; and resulting in an enormous
capacity deficit. Policy makers and planners need
systematic information for planning and
managing capacity development centered on
urban agriculture. Such a focus on urban
agriculture will unlock its potential to address
the growing urban demand for food and to
alleviate urban poverty. To fully reali e thez
potential of urban agriculture and deal with
existing challenges, however, requires
developing capacities at various levels. For
example, African states must understand the
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e r a p i d l y s h i f t i n g
socioeconomic and demographic profiles of
their cities. Furthermore, African states must be
able to balance the need to preserve physical
aesthetics of urban spaces as cities attract
foreign capital, with the need to ensure food
security through urban agriculture. Additionally,
efforts to promote urban agriculture should be
accompanied by an attempt to mitigate the
negative impacts of changes in urban ecological
systems, including public health threats that
urban farming may cause. Thus, African cities will
require the capacity to develop and implement
policies and funding instruments that foster
ecologically sound urban agriculture, including
appropriate land tenure reforms (Arku et al.,
2011).
Political economy issues, choice of crops,
changing needs and changing food habits with
globalization, land degradation, land renting and
sale to foreign companies on a large scale
amongst others, do contribute to food insecurity
in Africa. However, given the difficulty of
discussing all these factors in detail, this Report
focuses on and argues that food insecurity can
be explained by factors which include poor policy
choices by governments, maldistribution of food
supplies, lack of rains and drought, lack of proper
storage facilities, and the recent attempts in the
international community to promote biofuels.
Efforts to overcome food insecurity will be
realized through improvement in storage
facilities, infrastructure, and the promotion of
b i o t e c h n o l o g y . P a r t i c u l a r l y c a p a c i t y
development efforts as embodied in the
provision of extension services, training and
educating personnel for agriculture sector,
entrepreneurial, and marketing skills, are crucial
to attaining food security in Africa. Countries like
Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia
have experienced huge improvements in food
production and the agriculture sector as a whole
through capacity development measures and
government support and investment in research
and extension services. However, at the same
time, extensive investments both in infrastruc-
ture and institutional capacity development as
well as increased investment in modern
technology and a determined effort to build up
public research capacity will be needed to
sustain the food security currently enjoyed by
these countries (Swedish FAO Committee, 2009;
see also Juma, 2011).
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Moreover, notwithstanding the contribution of
existing capacity development measures to
promote and sustain food security, there is the
concern that many of the current food security
promotion measures, which have international
trade and agribusiness at the centre of the food
chain, only reinforce the neo-liberal paradigm
advanced by international institutions. It is in this
regard that food sovereignty offers a framework
that can remedy the problems associated with
the current approach to promoting food
security. Food sovereignty, as characterized by
deepening citizen participation, agrarian
reforms, promoting property rights for local
people, access by small-scale farmers to local and
regional markets, putting producers and
consumers at the centre of decision-making
process on food issues, while having its
constraints, represents a way out for African
governments' efforts to reform and improve
their food and agriculture sector.
In order to make significant progress toward
reducing hunger and poverty, improving rural
l ivel ihoods, and faci l itating equitable,
environmentally, socially and economically
sustainable development in Africa, identification
of innovative approaches and commitment to
implementing them is clearly needed.
1.3 Africa Capacity Indicators Report
2012: highlights and trends
As in the ACIR 2011, the methodology used for
the ACIR 2012 is maintained and three levels of
capacity are measured: (i) the enabling
environment; (ii) the organizational level; and
(iii) the individual level (Table 1.1). The enabling
environment refers to the system beyond the
organization – including the tone set by
leadership and other countervailing factors. It
encompasses the broader system within which
individuals and organizations function, thus
influencing their performance outcomes. The
role of leadership is to set the vision, the tone
and the stage by which activities that derive
results can be undertaken.
The organizational level of capacity is character-
ized and driven by the internal policies,
arrangements, procedures and frameworks that
allow organizations to operate and deliver on
their mandate and that enable the integration
and consolidation of individual capacities to
work together to achieve specified goals. The
individual level assesses skills, experience, and
knowledge that are vested in people. Leadership
comes at the individual level in the values
espoused that determine accountability and
results, as well as at the level of policies and
frameworks that allow individuals to transform
the environment in which they work and
generate results.
The Africa Capacity Index (ACI) 2012 is a compo-
site index computed from four sub-indices, each
of which is an aggregated measure calculated on
the basis of both a quantitative and a qualitative
Level Enabling
environment
Organizational
level
Individual
level
Very Low 71.4
Low 19.0
Medium 9.5
High 0.0
Very High 0.0
Total
0.0
0.0
40.5
57.1
2.4
100
4.8
23.8
4.8
35.7
31.0
100 100
TABLE 1.1
Capacity Dimensions in 2012 (% of countries by level)
Source: ACI database 2012
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assessment of various components that form a
cluster. Cluster analysis is used to generate the
sub measures. The clusters have the following
dimensions: policy environment; processes for
implementation; development results at country
level; and capacity development outcomes.
The policy environment examines the conditions
that must be in place to make development
possible, with particular emphasis on effective
and development-oriented organizations and
institutional frameworks. It is focused on (a)
whether countries have put in place national
strategies for development (including a strategy
for agricultural development, given the
importance of transforming agriculture and
achieving food security) and their level of
legitimacy; (b) the countries' levels of
commitment to meeting development and
poverty reduction objectives established within
the MDGs; (c) country-level awareness and focus
on better utilization of limited resources for
capacity development as measured by the
presence of policies for aid effectiveness; and (d)
degree of inclusiveness that supports their long-
term stability as measured by the existence of
gender equality and other socially inclusive
policies – indeed broad participation and good
governance underpin this measure. The role of
leadership is recognized in the ability to nurture
the development of strategy and embed it into
vision-driven activities. Also embedded in this
cluster is the concept that the leaders and their
strategy need to be legitimate. How committed
leaders are to achieving results such as those
defined in the poverty reduction objectives and
the MDGs is also embedded in this definition. The
role leaders play to inform and engage is
embedded in the concept of country level
awareness, as are the values including efficiency
and effectiveness that come from appropriate
use of public resources. Finally, the leader's
tone-setting in inclusiveness is recognized as a
key aspect that generates stability in the long-
term and assures good governance. The role of
the leader in tone and stage setting is explicitly
visible in the conceptualization of the processes
for implementation as is the ability to generate a
track record of results and outcomes at the
national level for the good of the people.
Processes for implementation assess the extent
to which the countries are prepared to deliver
results and outcomes. This dimension is
concerned with the creation of an environment
that motivates and supports individuals; the
capacity to manage relations with key
stakeholders inclusively and constructively; and
the capacity to establ ish appropriate
frameworks for managing policies, strategies,
programs and projects. Equally important are
processes for designing, implementing, and
managing national development strategies to
produce socially inclusive development
outcomes. Development results are tangible
outputs that permit development. The main
areas covered by the clusters are: the coordina-
tion of aid support to capacity development; the
level of creativity and innovation in agriculture;
achievements in the implementation of the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; achievement in
gender equality and social inclusion; as well as in
partnering for capacity development.
Capacity development outcomes tend to
measure the desired change in the human
condition. Indicators to this effect are captured
mainly through the financial commitment to
capacity development; the actual achievement
of the MDGs; gender and broader social equity;
and the achievements in agriculture and food
security, among other measures. Leadership is
recognized in the attention to the dynamic
aspects of human and organizational capacity
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and leadership for capacity development. Such a
definition also includes the conceptualization of
anticipating future needs, such as the skills
required to mitigate risks from climate change,
the ability to function in environments of low
predictability such as when food shocks are in full
effect, and the wherewithal to react and respond
in the face of disasters as will be needed when
the effects of climate change impinge on cities
and countries alike.
With these definitions the Report assesses and
compares capacity achievements in Africa. It is
noteworthy that the pattern in 2012 is similar to
that in 2011 with a few important distinctions
(see Figure 1.3 and Table 1.2):
 Overall, as judged at the ACI composite
level, whereas in 2011 there was not a
single country that classified in the
“High” category of capacity, in 2012 one
country (Ghana) improved by barely
sliding into that Level.
 There are notable improvements in
“Development results at country level,”
where the percentage of countries in the
lowest levels (Low and very Low)
decreased from 61.7% to 19%. The majority
shifted from “Low” to “Medium” and
one country (Ghana) moved into the
“High” category. These findings provide
further evidence of the optimism around
Africa expressed by a number of actors
(World Bank, the IMF, and the Economist
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Low: (22 country = 52.4%)
Botswana; Burundi; Cameroon; CAR; Chad; Congo (DRC);
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FIGURE 1.3
ACI levels in 2012
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
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Map of Africa by ACI Rankings
Source: Generated from ACI database 2012
TABLE 1.2
Pattern of ACI 2012 results
Level ACI 2012
(% of countries)
Policy
environment
Processes for
implementation
Development
results at country
level
Capacity
development
outcome
Very Low 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Low 52.4 0.0 19.0
Medium 31.0 2.4
High 2.4 11.9
Very High 0.0 2.4
Total 100 100
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
71.4
23.8
4.8
0.0
0.0
100
66.7
23.8
73.8
100
0.0
33.3
50.0
16.7
100
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Another aspect that was possible to do in 2012
was to check the stability of the definition of
the four clusters of capacity. An assessment of
the correlation among the indicators was
done to see if there have been any structural
changes across clusters. The results are shown in
Tables 1.3 for 2012 and Table 1.4 for 2011.
TABLE 1.3
Correlation coefficients between ACI 2012 indicators
Policy
environment
Processes for
implementation
Development results
at country level
Capacity
development
outcome
Policy environment
Processes for
implementation
Development results at
country level
Capacity development
outcome
1.00
0.36
0.09
0.14
1.00
0.42
0.29
1.00
0.05 1.00
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
TABLE 1.4
Correlation coefficients between ACI 2011 indicators
Policy
environment
Processes for
implementation
Development results
at country level
Capacity
development
outcome
Policy environment
Processes for
implementation
Development results at
country level
Capacity development
outcome
1.00
0.20
0.00
-0.09
1.00
0.24
0.12
1.00
-0.09 1.00
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
The analysis shows that the correlation among
the four clusters of capacity are weak, further
reinforcing the need to maintain the use of the
four clusters to compute the composite index. In
particular, the correlation coefficient between
the policy environment and the development
results at country level is nil in 2011 and close to
zero in 2012. One may recall that, as the pattern
presented in Table 1.2 shows, African countries
have made an effort to foster an enabling
environment, but development results are not
following through. The absence of a correlation
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between the pol icy environment and
development results at the country level, though
it does not prove that the two indicators are
independent, follows a pattern similar to that
observed in in Table 1.2. One suspects the policy
environment is struggling to create significant
impacts on development results at the country
level. The lack of implementation of policies
defined could be one reason for the absence of a
link between policy and results. Another
possibility could be that of isomorphic mimicry,
where countries develop blueprints for the type
of policies they perceive donors need to see,
merely to access development aid. Noteworthy
is the fact the correlation between the policy
environment and processes for implementation
increased from 0.20 in 2011 to 0.36 in 2012, as did
the correlation between processes for
implementation and development results which
increased from 0.24 in 2011 to 0.42 in 2012. There
may also be some evidence for the dynamic value
of capacity development, in the fact that the
capacity development outcomes and all other
measures—including policy, implementation
and results— show improved correlation
between 2011 and 2012.
2
Table 1.5 overleaf presents the agriculture and
food security sub-indices and component index.
The last column depicts the composite index for
agricultural transformation and food security
(ACIAgric). We distinguish between four clusters
of agricultural capacity, generated using cluster
analysis. The first is having a good agricultural
sector strategy, which has leadership embedded
in the vision for agriculture at the country level
and a set of vision-driven activities that can
transform the sector and have it contribute to
development. The second cluster captures the
investment in dynamic capacity, including the
skills, knowledge and innovation needed to get
results. The third cluster recognizes the explicit
role of the private sector in the agricultural
supply chain and the capacity of the sector to
contribute to the process of transformation.
The last cluster relates to the information system
that supports farmers, buyers and sellers and
other stakeholders in the supply chain including
making research relevant for farmers. The same
formula for the calculation of the ACIR
composite index (see Technical Note) is
employed to compute the ACIAgric, i.e. the
harmonic mean of the following component
indices (Agricultural Strategy; Training-
Innovation; Role of Private Sector; Information
Investing in dynamic capacity - A tea processing plant in Zimbabwe
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CountryRank
Agriculture
Strategy
Training-
Innovation Private Sector
Information
System ACIAgric
TABLE 1.5
2012 ACI for Agriculture - ACIAgric (Countries by decreasing order)
1 GHANA 67.8 53.2 82.7 88.5 70.2
2 ETHIOPIA 69.8 47.1 78.8 97.9 68.5
3 MALI 78.1 43.5 88.5 87.5 68.3
4 GAMBIA 93.6 40.4 82.7 83.3 67.2
5 ZAMBIA 64.0 47.5 84.6 86.5 66.6
6 NIGERIA 51.7 56.3 82.7 83.3 65.4
7 SIERRA LEONE 74.8 40.8 82.7 88.5 65.3
8 MOROCCO 65.4 48.4 73.1 85.4 65.2
9 NIGER 78.4 40.4 82.7 82.3 64.8
10 UGANDA 64.6 42.5 80.8 91.7 64.2
11 MALAWI 63.7 37.9 90.4 82.3 61.3
12 CHAD 68.6 37.8 71.2 95.8 61.1
13 SENEGAL 53.5 40.4 90.4 90.6 61.0
14 BURKINA FASO 59.5 40.8 75.0 90.6 60.9
15 GUINEA BISSAU 67.7 39.5 59.6 92.7 59.1
16 SWAZILAND 45.7 40.8 90.4 91.7 58.5
17 CAPE VERDE 68.3 43.5 48.1 92.7 57.8
18 CAMEROON 56.1 41.0 75.0 72.9 57.8
19 MADAGASCAR 42.2 48.3 69.2 93.8 57.6
20 TOGO 58.1 40.7 75.0 68.8 57.4
21 ZIMBABWE 45.6 45.9 69.2 82.3 56.9
22 BENIN 60.4 37.9 80.8 65.6 56.7
23 RWANDA 78.1 36.9 65.4 62.5 56.2
24 TANZANIA 42.2 43.7 84.6 78.1 56.2
25 KENYA 70.6 33.9 73.1 67.7 55.5
26 LESOTHO 53.1 36.7 59.6 87.5 53.8
27 SOUTH AFRICA 41.1 53.9 46.2 100.0 53.7
28 NAMIBIA 40.6 34.2 82.7 85.4 51.5
29 CONGO, REP 47.1 40.1 53.8 64.6 49.9
30 LIBERIA 50.2 26.6 76.9 89.6 48.9
31 MAURITIUS 46.5 33.4 82.7 50.0 47.9
32 DJIBOUTI 48.3 35.9 42.3 66.7 45.9
33 GABON 51.9 32.9 53.8 50.0 45.4
34 MOZAMBIQUE 32.1 38.5 55.8 75.0 45.3
35 GUINEA 49.1 22.6 53.8 88.5 42.4
36 ANGOLA 54.3 21.4 73.1 58.3 41.7
37 BOTSWANA 29.4 23.6 94.2 85.4 40.5
38 MAURITANIA 42.2 29.4 34.6 63.5 39.1
39 CAR 49.9 25.5 36.5 63.5 39.1
40 CONGO (DRC) 19.3 41.7 44.2 89.6 36.5
41 BURUNDI 28.9 36.8 76.9 25.0 34.9
42 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 23.9 22.1 75.0 50.0 33.2
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
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The country level results in Table 1.5 are
summarized in Table 1.6 and Figure 1.5 in order to
better interpret the patterns observed. The
majority of countries have a composite capacity
for agriculture that is rated Medium. Most
countries have made important investments in
the dimension of capacity related to information
systems. These results support the work done by
many in the agricultural sector of improving the
information available to farmers and others in
the supply chain, enabling them to make the
right decisions (Arthur, 2011; Mazur, 2011b).
TABLE 1.6
ACIAgric - Percentage of Countries by Cluster
Agricultural
Strategy
Training-
Innovation
Role of Private
Sector
Information
System
ACIAgric
Very Low 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Low 9.5 47.6 4.8 2.4 11.9
Medium 50.0 52.4 23.8 9.5 54.8
High 35.7 0.0 33.3 26.2 33.3
Very High 2.4 0.0 38.1 61.9 0.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
Also noteworthy is that the majority of countries
do have medium capacity to develop a good
agricultural strategy and to invest in the right
areas to build the skills and innovation needed
for the future. There is evidence of leadership in
the area of dynamic capacity, and it may be that
the CAADP is showing results. However, 12% of
countries remain with very low capacity and the
majority of them still have a long way to go to
involve the private sector and build their capacity
for a private sector that contributes to
transforming agriculture.
FIGURE 1.5
ACIAgric capacity by clusters
Very High
High
Medium
Low
Very Low
Agr. Strategy
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
%
 o
f 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
Train-Innov Private Sector Info System ACIAgric
Source: Generated from ACI database 2012
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
37
The results indicate that countries need to go
beyond strategy and focus on implementation.
There is support for the work ACBF has been
doing in developing the right skills for agriculture
through its partnership with the World Bank to
invest in Masters degree training programs in the
Collaborative Masters Program in Agricultural
Economics as well as for the work of the Africa
Economic Research Consortium (AERC) in linking
research to farmers. Attention by the African
Development Bank (AfDB) and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) on building a private
sector response to the agricultural sector also
has support from the results of this assessment.
On the basis of the available data, one can offer
some comments on the association between
agricultural capacity and food security. The
analysis suggests a strong association between
agricultural capacity and food insecurity. Overall,
the performance in agriculture and food security
is good. The majority of countries surveyed are
ranked either High (33%) or Medium (55%).
However, five countries are at the Low level
(Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo (DRC),
Côte d'Ivoire and Mauritania). Countries that
have chronic food security problems such as
Kenya did not rank very well. The vagaries of
climate change and food prices put a premium
on this measure of capacity and necessitate
investments to ensure countries realize the
highest possible capacity to manage this
important element of development.
There appears to be an intense variation within
the components of agricultural capacity. The
main strengths are that countries surveyed are
doing very well in equipping themselves with an
information system (98% of countries are ranked
High or Very High). Yet there is still work to be
done to guarantee food security, as only 12% of
countries surveyed scored very high on the food
security index (Figure 1.6). This suggests that the
availability of information does not necessarily
achieve results. The private sector is playing an
active role in agriculture (71% of countries ranked
High or Very High) but needs to do more.
FIGURE 1.6
ACIAgric and Food Security Ranking by Country Percentage
ACIAgric Sec. Food
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The aforementioned notwithstanding, there
are a number of areas for attention. More
effort needs to go into “training, research and
innovation in agriculture.” Not a single country
featured in the highest levels (High or very
High) and close to half (47.6%) were ranked low
in this measure (Table 1.6). The finding also
suggests that there is an inadequate skill pool
available to employ research-related and other
information. Investment in the future, as well
as building the dynamic capacity to manage
uncertainty and anticipate change in
agriculture puts added pressure on countries
to try to do better in this aspect of capacity.
Attention should also be paid to agricultural
strategy, because only 38% of countries
surveyed are ranked at the high or very high
level. Having a good strategy sets the tone by
which results can be achieved in the other
dimensions of capacity.
TABLE 1.7
Comparison of 2009 and 2010 Data on CPIA Assessments
CPIA Index Based on Data in 2010
Country CPIA World Bank CPIA Self-Assessment CPIA AfDB
BENIN 3.5 4.0 3.9
BURKINA FASO 3.8 4.3 4.2
BURUNDI 3.1 3.4 3.0
CAMEROON 3.2 3.1 3.8
CAPE VERDE 4.1 4.0 4.4
CÔTE D'IVOIRE 2.7 3.5 3.0
GHANA 3.9 3.6 4.1
KENYA 3.8 4.3 4.2
LIBERIA 2.9 4.0 3.6
MADAGASCAR 3.4 3.4 3.4
MAURITANIA 3.2 3.0 3.7
NIGER 3.4 4.3 3.6
TANZANIA 3.8 2.7 4.0
UGANDA 3.8 3.1 4.3
ZAMBIA 3.4 3.4 3.9
ZIMBABWE 2.0 3.9 1.9
1.4 The Country Policy and Institu
tional Assessment (CPIA) – self-
assessment for 2012
As in 2011, an analysis of two-years-worth of CPIA
data comparing ACBF-commissioned self-
assessments by countries to that of the World
Bank was conducted. This time effort was also
made to bring in a comparison with the AfDB's
CPIA.
A comparison of the 2009 and 2010 CPIA
assessment by the three institutions – AfDB,
World Bank and ACBF – suggests that the AfDB
inclines to give ratings that are similar on average
to the World Bank but higher than country self-
assessments (Table 1.7). The variance amongst
ratings is highest for the AfDB assessments,
being twice as high as the Self-assessment. AfDB
assessments show more variability than the
World Bank assessments as well. The volatility
rankings are in the order of the AfDB, World
Bank, then country self-assessments.
CPIA Index Based on Data in 2009
Country CPIA World Bank CPIA Self-Assessment CPIA AfDB
BENIN 3.5 3.1 4.06
BURKINA FASO 3.8 4.2 4.22
BURUNDI 3.1 2.9 3.09
CÔTE D'IVOIRE 2.8 3.5 2.92
KENYA 3.7 4.0 4.2
LIBERIA 2.8 3.4 3.63
MAURITANIA 3.2 3.3 3.6
NIGER 3.3 3.8 3.67
UGANDA 3.9 4.2 4.24
ZAMBIA 3.4 3.4 3.97
ZIMBABWE 1.9 4.0 1.8
BENIN 3.5 3.1 4.06
AVERAGE 3.31 3.63 3.64
VAR 0.29 0.22 0.44
STD DEV 0.54 0.47 0.66
Volatility as a % of the mean 16% 13% 18%
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012; World Bank: IRAI 2010 table and AfDB Website
[accessed 06 January 2012]
TABLE 1.7 (cont'd)
Comparison of 2009 and 2010 Data on CPIA Assessments
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The differences in ratings between AfDB, World
Bank and ACBF's country self-assessments are
presented in Table 1.8. The data cover CPIA
ratings for the years 2009 and 2010. There are
three countries where there is a big difference of
20% or more between the country self-
assessments and the World Bank assessments in
2009 compared to five countries in 2010. In 2009
the big differences relate to Côte d'Ivoire,
Liberia, and Zimbabwe. In 2010, these
differences relate to Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Niger,
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The fact that there are
more large variations between the ratings in
2009 than in 2010 may indicate some form of
divergence between the ratings. Since feedback
was provided to countries in 2009 on the
differences between their self-assessments, one
could argue that learning has not taken place or
that adjustments on both sides of the ratings
may be taking place, thus negating any pattern in
the observed differences. Benin is a case in
point, where it had rated itself much more
harshly than the World Bank in 2009 and
reversed to rate itself leniently, and agreed that
Benin is not a Fragile State. There are no similar
anecdotes as Benin but in the future one could
observe a pattern of change in countries where
dissemination has taken place and assess the
role of convergence and learning. In the data so
far there is no evidence of this, but do observe
divergence in the ratings over time.
Country self-assessments are in closer
agreement with the AfDB than with the World
Bank, as can be seen in Table 1.7. The World Bank
may be adjusting for international comparisons
and rating African countries on an international
scale, which may explain their ratings. On the
other hand, countries and the AfDB are closer to
the ground and may have better information on
the policy environment than the World Bank,
explaining the closer agreements in their ratings.
Differences in the Ratings Using Data from 2009
Country Difference Difference Difference
ACBF-WB ACBF-AfDB AfDB-WB
BENIN -11.4% -23.6% 16.0%
BURKINA FASO 9.6% -1.3% 11.1%
BURUNDI -5.3% -5.0% -0.3%
CÔTE D'IVOIRE 23.9% 18.8% 4.3%
KENYA 8.6% -4.3% 13.5%
LIBERIA 22.6% -5.4% 29.6%
MAURITANIA 1.8% -9.5% 12.5%
NIGER 16.3% 4.5% 11.2%
UGANDA 6.9% -1.7% 8.7%
ZAMBIA -1.2% -15.4% 16.8%
ZIMBABWE 108.9% 120.5% -5.3%
Differences in the Ratings Using Data from 2010
BENIN 13.9% 2.5% 11.1%
BURKINA FASO 13.9% 3.8% 9.7%
BURUNDI 9.6% 12.2% -2.3%
CAMEROON -2.0% -16.6% 17.5%
CAPE VERDE -1.3% -8.8% 8.3%
CÔTE D'IVOIRE 31.4% 19.0% 10.4%
GHANA -7.9% -12.2% 4.9%
KENYA 14.5% 3.6% 10.5%
LIBERIA 36.2% 8.8% 25.2%
MADAGASCAR -0.2% -0.8% 0.6%
MAURITANIA -5.6% -17.4% 14.4%
NIGER 27.2% 20.1% 5.9%
TANZANIA -28.7% -32.9% 6.3%
UGANDA -18.0% -27.2% 12.6%
ZAMBIA -0.9% -13.1% 14.1%
ZIMBABWE 97.2% 106.5% -4.5%
AVERAGE 13.3% 4.6% 9.7%
VAR 8.9% 11.7% 0.7%
TABLE 1.8
Differences between CPIA from Country Self-Assessments, AfDB and World Bank
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012; World Bank: IRAI2010 table and AfDB Website
[accessed 06 January 2012]
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Source: Computed from ACI database 2012 and IRAI 2010
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Plotting the data to see the scatter in the
differences shows that there is close bunching
toward the zero area, which indicates
convergence in the ratings (Figure 1.7).
However, one notes the outliers mentioned
above for both 2009 and 2010. There are as many
outliers five in the difference between– –
country self-assessments with the AfDB as there
are between the AfDB and the World Bank.
FIGURE 1.7
Understanding the Outliers
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The pattern of outliers indicates that there are a
number of systematic biases, especially with
respect to the type of country (fragile or non-
fragile). This is seen clearly when looking at the
percentage agreement by country type as
shown in Table 1.9.
TABLE 1.9
Impact of Country Type on Differences in CPIA Assessments
Areas of Agreement Non-Fragile States Fragile States
Country Self-Assessment and World Bank 74% 13%
Country Self-Assessment and AfDB 84% 13%
World Bank and AfDB 100% 63%
Country Self-Assessment, World Bank and AfDB 63% 13%
41
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012; World Bank: IRAI2010 table and AfDB Website
[accessed 06 January 2012]
The results in Table 1.9 may suggest that
countries are cautious in rating themselves
fragile as opposed to the World Bank and AfDB.
The World Bank rates countries overall more
harshly than they rate themselves. As depicted in
Figure 1.8 below, the World Bank and AfDB
assessment agree on country-classifications
with regard to fragility. Using the sample of 16
countries where the survey was conducted, the
Kappa coefficient for CPIA based on World Bank
3
and AfDB assessments was calculated at k = 0.82
(indicating perfect agreement) for 2010.
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FIGURE 1.8
Comparing the World Bank and AfDB CPIA scores in 2010
Source: World Bank: IRAI 2010 table and AfDB Website [accessed 06 January 2012]
Whereas the analysis suggests that the World
Bank and AfDB CPIA assessment are in
agreement, it appears that a similar comparison
between the World Bank and country self-
assessment (see Figure 1.9) show strong
disagreement (kappa coefficient = -0.33).
Agreement (12 countries)
Agreement (3 countries)
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The above results indicate that it is very
important to use multiple measures before
classifying countries. A methodology that
accounts for the systematic biases would largely
adjust for this difference. Using a band to classify
countries would be more appropriate. Such a
band is used to illustrate the range of the
indicator in Figure 1.10. The band is composed of
the country self-assessment, and measures that
are one standard deviation away.
The areas of systematic bias are clearly visible in
Figure 1.10 overleaf, with specific countries
indicating large or wider bands. Country
dialogue and further interrogation of these
differences at the sub-indicator level could be
helpful to better understand the areas of
difference.
FIGURE 1.9
Comparing the World Bank and Country Self-Assessment scores in 2010
Agreement
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1.5 Some implications of the ACI
work
There are a number of implications for capacity
development and the ACI exercise overall. Some
of the issues to be considered are:
(a) Capacity development remains a priority – as
p e r t h e A C B F d e f i n i t i o n , c a p a c i t y
development is a multi-dimensional activity
that can address a variety of components in a
'development' initiative taking place within a
given environment. The ACI is calculated
based on various levels and dimensions,
many of which can be the focus of an analysis
process or intervention to increase system
performance. Strengths or weaknesses in
any of these dimensions or levels indicate
potential areas to be reinforced so as to
improve system effect iveness and
performance. Indeed, any weaknesses in any
of these dimensions or levels will negatively
impact the ability of an organization or
country to address its development
objectives. Both strengths and weaknesses
a r e p o t e n t i a l p o i n t s f o r C a p a c i t y
Development inputs. As found in the raw
data from the survey, controlling for ACBF
support in cluster 4 significantly affect the
ranking of countries in the composite ACI.
The absence of ACBF-supported projects in a
country negatively impacts the ranking of
that particular country. Accordingly, the ACIR
in future will attempt to map out capacity
development interventions by all external
agencies in a given country at a given time.
The capacities in agriculture transformation
and food security equally remained varied
across countries.
(b) Need to embed the ACI findings in partners'
programs – as noted in this Chapter and
reiterated throughout much of this Report,
the findings from the exercise impresses
FIGURE 1.10
Range of band to classify countries in the CPIA
Source: Computed from ACI 2012, World Bank and AfDB databases
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upon ACBF, governments and other
development partners the need to embed
the findings of the Report in their work.
There is need to distill and compile key
programmatic (design, implementation, and
M&E) issues from the Report into a user-
friendly version convenient and amenable to
programmatic interventions in capacity
development. There may be need to organize
learning events such as seminars to
disseminate key issues and findings at
country and organizational level as well as
within ACBF itself. Multilateral and bilateral
donors could also find the report useful as
they design their interventions. The need for
embedding also emerges from the fact that
'doing' capacity development requires a
cultural reorientation whereby there is a
change in values (beliefs, attitudes,
incentives and motivations) of the people in
the system. However, there is a political
economy caveat as noted by Blair: “develop-
ing capacity is about change, change is about
choices, and choices are political. However
technocratic we might try to make it sound,
every capacity development intervention is
political to some degree because it creates
winners and losers, strengthens some rather
than others, and pits reformers against the
status quo. Yet the risk of being 'too political'
is sometimes overblown while the
alternative risk—of interventions failing
because they do not understand or engage
with the politics of reform—is often
understated” (2010:13).
(c) Thinking more about partnerships – because
the work around the ACIR is resource-
intensive – especially in terms of the number
of people that need to be involved,
partnership would appear to be the logical
way forward. ACBF will strengthen its
existing partnerships with institutions such
as AfDB, ECA, AU-NEPAD and the UNDP to
conceptualize and implement the ACIR
exercise as much as possible. Additionally,
ACBF will engage in joint launch of the Report
with key partners/countries to consolidate
partnerships for the future development and
dissemination of the ACIR. This will enhance
the ownership and up-take of the ACIR both
across Africa and globally. Given the
importance of leadership in and for capacity
development, partnerships wi l l be
particularly sought in the area of interface
with organizations such as the Africa
Governance Initiative and the Blair Founda-
tion, as well as the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to
ensure these aspects are properly engaged
with at the country level. Given the special
focus on agriculture, partnerships with
players in the agricultural field would also be
of great relevance going forward.
(d) Country ownership and self-assessments –
since the Paris Declaration a new consensus
on the importance of 'country ownership' to
the success of development efforts emerged
and has been reaffirmed in Busan in 2011. It is
now recognized that the effectiveness of aid
depends critically on whether or not a
country's leadership is really committed to
development. The question has always been:
how can international actors support the
emergence of country-owned development
efforts? The assumption seems to be that
most countries already have development-
oriented political leaderships (Booth, 2011).
This assumption may be untenable and
country-ownership should be treated as a
desirable outcome, not an achieved state of
affairs. Given that some commentators have
argued that aid as such is probably on
balance bad for the institutional fabric of
poor developing countries (Moyo, 2010),
much more attention should be given to
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reforming the non-aid policies of donor
countries which are known to affect the
economic and pol it ical systems of
developing countries in negative ways. The
starting point for designing any development
strategy is participation and ownership. For
many years before the Paris Declaration,
authorities in developing countries and major
donor agencies started with top-down
approaches with well-meaning experts
telling local communities what to do leading
to a range of problems (Johnson-Sirleaf,
2008). First, the diagnosis of the problem is
often incorrect. Second, without local
participation the design of the intervention
may be flawed, exclusionary and irrelevant.
And third, and more importantly, without
local participation in the process of decision-
making, the people tend not to own the
project. Self-assessments make people own
the decisions, and be deeply involved in
determining the success or failure of the
outcome. Underlying the principle of
participation and ownership is good
governance. The shift towards democracy in
Africa has been accompanied by measurable
improvements in governance by many
countries: greater stability, improved human
rights and civil liberties, a strengthening of
the rule of law, greater accountability to the
people, and lower rates of corruption.
Donors can streamline their bureaucracies
and shorten the time between commitment,
cash and project implementation. They can
rely more on country ownership and local
participation as the cornerstone of more of
their interventions. For example, they
provide budget support to a small number of
selected countries on a pilot basis to help
strengthen local systems of financial
management, rather than imposing new and
complicated parallel systems. In that respect,
the use of country systems becomes less
contested.
(e) Methodology – the different partners:
especially the World Bank, AfDB and ACBF
may want to revisit the way CPIA is assessed
and the index calculated. One approach is to
have a harmonic mean for the indices from
the three agencies. These would go a long
way to deal with the short-comings discussed
in the previous section – especially issues to
do with outliers.
(f) Outreach and dissemination as ACIR is–
intended to serve as a key reference point for
capacity development support in Africa, it
should be widely circulated as much as
possible. The first edition which focused on
Capacity Development in Fragile States in
Africa; and was launched in Kigali, Rwanda,
February 2011; stimulated a lot of interest.
This notwithstanding, there is the need to
sustain and expand the interest, distribution
and coverage of ACIR. This second edition
has coverage of 42 countries, up from 34
countries in the last report. There is also need
to create critical awareness on the findings of
the Report for countries that were surveyed.
1.6 ACIR – one year down the road
As noted above, the launch of 2011 ACIR
generated a lot of interest and created optimism
about how to track and focus capacity
development efforts in Africa. Evidence from
print and electronic media, user feedback, etc.,
support the fact that the Report is reshaping
capacity development discourse, rejuvenating
interest in capacity development; and raising the
expectation of key stakeholders of the strategic
and the unique role ACBF can play in promoting
and susta in ing capacity and capacity
development on the African continent.
The last report attracted a lot of reviews both in
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academic and popular press. As one reviewer
noted: “[T]he ACI marks the ACBF's two decades
(see pp. 29–30 for a potted history) with its
'Country Policy and Institutional Assessment'
(CPIA) of the continent. This is commendably
critical about the low level of 'capacity
development' at the start of the new decade
(p.33): of the 34 countries ranked, most are low
or medium in terms of composite capacity
indicators, with Togo and Guinea being 'very low'
and none judged to be high, Burkina Faso scoring
highest (pp. 218–219), along 30 diﬀerent
i n d i c a t o r s s u c h a s g e n d e r e q u a l i t y
mainstreaming and tertiary training. ACI is
revisionist, focusing on the limitations of neo-
liberalism and the nature of the failed, fragile or
failing states in Africa (pp. 48–55 and 105–107),
including limitations of the neo-liberal peace
model (pp. 49–60). Its 30 indicators (pp.
266–295) can be contrasted to the several
established rankings, such as the annual Failed
States Index from Foreign Policy or the
Brookings Institution's newer 'Index of State
Weakness' or Mo Ibrahim Foundation's 'African
Governance'…” (Shaw, 2011:335-336).
The ACIR has had influence in the way countries
view capacity development. Two examples
come to mind. Cameroon initiated the revision of
its budget nomenclature to capture the spirit of
ACI2011. Equally, the ACI2011 informed the
debate Zimbabwe had around its planning and
budget execution for 2011. Indeed, there has
been relatively good uptake as many institutions
including AfDB and GDN now have the Report on
their websites. The EU did a special interview on
capacity based on the ACIR which it published on
its website before the Busan Aid Effectiveness
High Level Forum in November 2011.
This second edition of the Report responds to
some of the feedback received. To this end,
attempts have been made in this Report to use
the findings of other efforts to get a more
balance picture of drivers of capacity
development in Africa. One year down the road,
the ACIR remains a tool that should be
considered to be complimentary and not in
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2.0 Introduction
The modern history of Africa is one in which a number of African smallholders became involved in
international trade through agricultural products. For the purposes of analysis, agriculture in this
Report covers crops, livestock, agroforestry and aquaculture. The discussions of the link between
agriculture and forestry are undertaken when deforestation, climate change and related environmen-
tal services are considered. This is also based on the notion that agricultural transformation and the
achievement of food security can occur in isolation from these other areas. During the late 1800's
under colonial rule, agro-commodities from smallholders were the main source of agricultural trade.
Later in the 1900's larger farms and estates were organized to extract more effectively from the land.
Early agricultural labor pools were created to serve these large estates, but they co-existed with
smallholder production. This pattern was unlike the period of colonization in some Asian countries
where large groups of people were relocated far from home to work on estates, such as in the tea
estates of Sri Lanka.
The cause for the increased trade is to be found in improved incomes and increased demand for
tropical products in Europe. Many local systems of production in sub-Saharan Africa proved to be
adaptable and dynamic to serve this increasing demand. The most well-known example of this kind of
trade is probably in West Africa, where smallholders were almost solely responsible for the
production of export crops such as cocoa, groundnuts and palm oil. A number of transitions then
occurred in the way land in Africa came to be used. Emergent cities, which consumed large swathes of
agricultural land, began to depend on rural areas for their food supplies, a pattern that continues to
date. The history of African socio-economic and political development is closely tied to the history of
transformation of agriculture whether positively or otherwise!
Special Focus on Agriculture
2.1 The need for investing in
agriculture now
The importance of agriculture in African
economies has not been in doubt either as a
propeller of growth or the cause of their
stagnations. As Green et al. (2011:1) posit: “Africa
has generally been described as a continent of
stagnation…One fundamental explanation
given for the stagnation has been the assumed
low productivity levels of African agriculture.
Yet, we know very little about long term actual
performance of the agricultural sector at the
aggregate level.” This Report seeks to undertake
assessment of the dynamics in African
agriculture to identify some of the capacity
issues necessary for its transformation.
Change has been taking place in African
agriculture in ways that are sometimes not
recognized. While the sector is seen by many in
the images on television and social media of
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starving populations ravaged by the elements,
the sector has also seen dramatic change led by a
small but growing number of innovative
smallholders, who combine all sorts of
discoveries with traditional processes to get
better yields. Some of the discoveries come
from experiments in new types of seeds and
crops, others in new ways of farming and storing.
Yet others use innovations in technology,
logistics and banking to get ahead. The role
played by mobile and cellular technology in the
agricultural sector is one whose full effects are
yet to be uncovered. Other innovations are in
the area of banking and finance with its
subsequent impact on the access to finance for
farmers and rural residents as well as in smaller
innovations in the transport and logistics
systems (see Figure 2.1). Even the improvements
in access to health in rural areas contribute to the
increase in smallholder productivity through
simple relations such as the link between
reduced malaria infections and the number of
Africa has done well in use of mobile technologies: Mobile & cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
 Raising productivity of milk using iCow
 Banking and finance using mobile phones
mPESA
 Mobile health solutions to rural areas using
mHEALTH
 Bicycle technology for charging cell phone
batteries
Region
East Asia &
Pacific
Middle East
& North
Africa
South Asia
Sub
Saharan
Africa
2005
29
22
8
13
2007
53
58
33
33
Source: Calculated using data from World Bank Datafinder
FIGURE 2.1
Innovation and usage of mobile technologies
Conceptually, as the World Bank (2007a:1) notes:
“the worlds of agriculture are vast, varied, and
rapidly changing, with the right policies and
supportive investments at local, national, and
global levels, today's agriculture offers new
opportunities to hundreds of millions of rural
poor to move out of poverty. Pathways out of
poverty open to them by agriculture include
smallholder farming and animal husbandry,
employment in the “new agriculture” of high-
value products, and entrepreneurship and jobs in
the emerging rural, nonfarm economy.”
The commitments made by world leaders in the
name of the MDGs to halve poverty and hunger
by 2015 have significant dependence on the
performance of the agricultural sector. Although
the agricultural sector by itself may not be
enough to reduce poverty in the required
manner, it is a major contributor to that effort
(World Bank, 2007a:1). The sector arguably
contributes in different 'planes': a) agriculture-
based; b) transformational; and c) urban-based.
Most of Africa falls in the agriculture-based
countries. In these types of countries, as the
World Bank notes: “[A]griculture and its
associated industries are essential to growth and
to reducing mass poverty and food insecurity.
Using agriculture as the basis for economic
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growth in the agriculture-based countries
requires a productivity revolution in smallholder
farming” (World Bank, 2007a:1).
Africa also has countries that fall under the
transforming plane. In these countries, the key
issue is managing the urban-rural interface
appropriately within a global context of
commodity price shocks. Consider the countries
in North Africa, which have seen unprecedented
rises in the rural-urban income gap and
continuing rise in both urban and rural poverty.
These patterns of inequality have become
sources of social and political tensions and
instability. Lagi et al. (2011:5-6) seem to confirm
this association. As Lagi and colleagues note:
“[T]he importance of food prices for social
stability points to the level of human suﬀering
that may be caused by increased food
prices…the timing of peaks in global food prices
and social unrest implies that the 2011 unrest was
precipitated by a food crisis that is threatening
the security of vulnerable populations.
Deterioration in food security led to conditions in
which random events trigger widespread
violence.”
Many countries, particularly during an election
year, attempt to manage commodity price
shocks through instituting controls on food
prices. Such controls, while useful in attenuating
the instability effects of increasing food prices in
the countries using the controls, have severe
negative consequences on other countries. As
Lagi et al. (2011:6) have found: “The condition of
these vulnerable populations could have been
much worse except that some countries
controlled food prices in 2011 due to the unrest in
2008. Food price controls in the face of high
global food prices carry associated costs.”
The types of policies used by transforming
countries are also of relevance more globally due
to the cross-country effects of agricultural
practices and policies. Because of the intercon-
nections across countries in the food and other
agricultural commodity markets, it is sufficient
for only a few countries to have the wrong
policies for an effect to be exerted on other
countries. Lagi et al. (2011:6) further point out
that “[b]ecause of the strong cascade of events
in the Middle East and North Africa only some
countries had to fail to adequately control food
prices for events to unfold.”
Effects could also come from countries that are
intervening in other areas of the commodity
space for purposes other than food security.
Consider the policy decision of the United States
to support the conversion of corn to ethanol or
the move to commodity trading during the
recent collapse of the real estate market in
London and New York. Such choices by
individuals in countries far removed from the
African continent have an effect on prices and
hence choices by African policy makers and
farmers alike. Lagi et al. (2011) conclude that
understanding these linkages suggests that
reconsidering biofuel policy as well as commod-
ity market regulations should be an urgent
priority for policy makers, further adding that:
“Reducing the amount of corn converted to
ethanol, and restricting commodity future
markets to bona ﬁde risk hedging would reduce
global food prices. The current problem
transcends the speciﬁc national political crises to
represent a global concern about vulnerable
populations and social order” (2011: 6).
Having the indicators and the data that allows
better understanding of the country and cross-
country effects of policy should help get
agricultural contributions to development and
poverty reduction in the right policy space. Lagi
et al. (2011) have shown that there is a link
between global food prices and social unrest,
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and their work supports a growing conclusion
that it is possible to build mathematical models
of global economic and social crises. They further
argue that: “Identifying a signature of unrest for
future events is surely useful” (Lagi et al. 2001: 5-
7). But such identification requires a holistic
response to deal with not just the cause of
poverty but also the role that is played by income
inequal i ty , socia l exclus ion and poor
governance.
Figure 2.2 below, shows the link between
fragility and agricultural productivity. Of
particular relevance in this analysis is the fact
that African countries with stable political
environments have not performed better than
fragile states in benefiting from the high prices in
cereals around the world, as many of them are
net food importers and rely on cereals for their
food security. Actually some fragile states that
rely heavily on agriculture, like Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Central African Republic, have
hedged against the destabilizing effects of high
prices by raising the productivity of cereal
production (see Figure 2.3). Fifty percent of the
countries that have been able to raise both
agriculture value added and cereal yields during
the period of high global prices are fragile states.
However, the effect of fragility does show up in
the share of countries that have raised cereal
yields during the period of high global prices but
have not been able to raise the contribution of
the agricultural sector to the economy. The
results seem to support the argument that
effects of governance show up in the ability to
take long-term decisions that secure the
contribution of the agricultural sector to income
and economic growth. Indeed, there appears to
be an association between social instability (an
indicator of fragility) and performance of the
agricultural sector, but that the effects may not
always go in the same direction. The Lagi et al.
(2011) finding may be explaining the short-run
effects, while the governance environment
Source: Agriculture value added as a share of GDP and cereal yields per hectare from World Bank Data Finder.
All other data from ACI
Countries with stable political environments have not
performed better than fragile states in benefiting from the
high prices in cereal yields than countries that are fragile and
unstable. Countries like Central African Republic, Liberia and
Sierra Leone have not been able to increase yields between
1990 and 2010 due to their high dependency on agriculture.
Share of Non-Fragile States in each of Four
Categories of Agricultural Performance
Increase in both agricultural value
added and cereal yields
Increase in agricultural value added
but decline in cereal yields
Decline in agricultural value added
but increase in cereal yields
Decline in both agricultural value
added and cereal yields
I
II
III
IV
Quadrant Category III
33%
I
50%
IV
67%
II
83%
FIGURE 2.2
Fragility and Agricultural Performance
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FIGURE 2.3
Dynamics of change impacting Africa:
Agricultural dependency and arable land. Top 10 Countries over 5 Years
Availability:
Arable land makes up 11% of total global land
area (1.4 billion hectares globally)
Europe and Central Asia has the highest arable
land per capita (0.57 ha per person)
Arable land per capita has declined by 19% in
low income countries over the past two
decades.
Technology:
Fertilizer use per hectare is highest in East Asia
and Pacific and lowest Sub-Saharan Africa (by a
factor of 17). During the past 30 years, Africa
has experienced at least one major drought
each decade.
Country Ag. Value Rank
in 2008 (%GDP) in 2008
Liberia 61 1
Guinea Bissau 56 2
Central African Rep. 53 3
Capabilities: agricultural productivity, innovation in drought
resistant technologies, managing food security, regional for
markets and agricultural supply chains.
Tanzania 45 6
Ethiopia 45 7
Rwanda 37 9
Togo 44 8
Source: World Development Indicators, World Atlas
On the third plane, which relates to urbanizing
countries, there are also some important areas
to consider. Africa is the fastest urbanizing
region of the world, and policy needs to provide
a good balance between rural and urban
development, including the unique role that
agriculture needs to play as the continent further
urbanizes. In rapidly urbanizing countries, the
agricultural sector can help in the reduction of
both rural and urban poverty through the
provision by small-holder farmers of direct
supplies to modern food markets, jobs get
created in agriculture and agro-industry, and
markets for environmental services are created
(World Bank, 2007a:2). Rising resource scarcity
and externalities cause agricultural transforma-
tion and environmental services to be
intertwined. In this respect, ACIR 2012 discusses
the role of urban agriculture for poverty
reduction and food security in Africa.
One can add a fourth category to the three
planes identified by the World Bank (2007a),
which is fast growing countries. Africa is home
to seven of the ten fastest growing economies in
2011-2012, largely due to the dividend from the
economic reforms of the past 15 years (IMF,
2011). Africa has a distinctive potential to harness
contributions from agriculture along the three
planes, while channeling the effects of the added
dimension of the fast economic growth. Along
with the continent's unique institutions,
including the growing role of sub-regional and
regional entities that can speed up its
integration, the transformation of agriculture in
Africa will have to be different from the Asian
green revolution. The key challenge is how to
identify the many innovations and successes on
the continent, map them to the potential and
uniqueness of Afr ica, define a pol icy
environment that enables the continent to
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harness this potential, and support implementa-
tion of new ideas to take advantage of the
opportunities present in today's global
economy. This, is the main role of agricultural
capacity.
There are therefore several reasons why Africa
should invest in agriculture – without going in
detail here, as these are discussed extensively in
upcoming chapters. As noted earlier, agricultural
transformation can only happen in a holistic
policy environment that acknowledges the roles
of the other sectors of the economy. Subsequent
sections and chapters will highlight that the
sector contributes to development as economic
activity, source of livelihood and provider of
environmental services.
One other point to keep in mind is the heteroge-
neous nature of the agricultural sector – which
has been historic and prevalent in Africa. The first
area of heterogeneity is the co-existence of large
commercial farmers alongside small-holders
many of whom are also involved in commercial
farming. As noted by the World Bank (2007a:5):
“Commercial smallholders deliver surpluses to
food markets and share in the beneﬁts of
expanding markets for the new agriculture of
high-value activities. But many others are in
subsistence farming, mainly due to low asset
endowments and unfavorable contexts.
Consuming most of the food they produce, they
participate in markets as buyers of food and as
sellers of labor. Membership in these categories
is affected not only by asset positions, but also by
gender, ethnicity, and social status, as they imply
differing abilities to use the same assets and
resources in responding to opportunities.”
Africa also has heterogeneous rural labor
markets as the continent maintains a high share
of low-skill, poorly paid rural workers employed
in agriculture. Despite the innovations in the use
of technology and cold-chain logistics, there are
at present only a small number of high-skill jobs in
rural Africa offering workers pathways out of
poverty. Most African villages have limited rural
nonfarm activities, whose economies are served
by low productivity self-employed small
operators engaged in first stage agricultural
transformation. Many of these small operators
are women and they engage other women to
develop products as varied as plantain chips and
rice cakes that are sold in roadside informal
trade. Yet one can find wage-employment
coexisting with employment in dynamic
enterprises, such as the production of skin and
hair care products using first stage transforma-
tion of agricultural inputs such as shea butter
(Karite nuts) (see case of Burkina Faso in Figure
2.4). The second aspect of heterogeneity comes
from the rural-urban linkages built as a result of
migration. Much of Africa's urbanization has
come as a result of migration of rural poor
moving to cities and towns. The outcome of this
type of migration is also heterogeneous, as some
of the rural poor are able to come out of poverty
and send remittances to their families in the rural
areas, but others have continued to be poor and
have even become destitute and relegated to
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FIGURE 2.4
Transforming Agriculture: Burkina Faso's Capacity to tap into
the "green" and "health" movements
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This pervasive heterogeneity in agriculture has
deep implications for public policy in using
agriculture for development (World Bank,
2007a:5). Countries that have tried liberalizing
trade to raise the prices of food have helped net
sellers and rural farmers with surpluses but hurt
urban and rural food buyers. Policies would also
have a differential effect on the basis of gender,
as men and women are engaged in different
activities. There are also varied effects whether
dealing with crops for export, food production,
livestock or forest products. Any policy reform is
likely to have winners and losers and it is
important to balance the heterogeneity of the
agricultural subsectors, regions, households and
genders. Defining a set of appropriate and
differentiated policies is one of the toughest
policy dilemmas facing poor countries, especially
those with severe resource constraints. Doing
so requires evidence-based policy choices, which
rely heavily on the availability of data (informa-
tion systems), a cadre of skilled and talented
analysts and researchers (training and
innovation capacity), and linking research to
policy design and implementation (policy and
implementation capacity).
The World Bank in its 2008 World Development
Report (WDR) identified many of these issues.
However, the World Bank has been heavily
criticized for failing to follow its own recommen-
dations with respect to policy (Oxfam, 2007).
Oxfam argues that the broad messages of the
WDR 2008 are welcome. “However, to tackle
rural poverty effectively in this new context,
policies for rural development will need to
change, along with the conception of how
different institutions will deliver those policies.
In emphasizing efficiency gains, the WDR fails
both to grapple with new relations of power in
the global marketplace and to ensure that equity
(including gender equity) remains a core goal for
policy-makers” (Oxfam, 2007:1).
The need for data and a political economy
perspective is paramount. Indeed the 2012 ACIR
survey data suggests that countries that held
elections recently had the same likelihood of
Source: Generated from World Bank data finder
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seeing an increase in both agricultural value
added as a share of GDP and cereal yields in
kilograms per hectare. Countries that have not
had a recent election, however, are overwhelm-
ingly likely (85.7%) to see a decline in both
agricultural value added and cereal yields. The
results are mixed when looking at the trade-off
between agricultural value added and productiv-
ity. Elections in Africa lead to instability in many
countries and this can prevent farmers from their
productivity. Ability to respond to global price
signals will be improved in stable conditions, and
that may be the reason for the increase in cereal
yields in countries not facing elections.
Furthermore, when looking at averages and not
changes during the period 1990-2010, one sees
that while both categories of countries have
seen an increase in the average cereal yields,
those that have had no election have seen a
higher increase in cereal yields during the period
1990-2010. The results support findings by others
that democracy is important for raising both
productivity and yield (Diao, 2010) as well as for
avoiding famine. However, in the African
context, given the instability during elections,
there could be a net loss to productivity and
value added that mutes the overall effect.
50.0%
62.5%
33.3%
14.3%
50.0%
37.5%
66.7%
85.7%
Increase in both Agricultural Value
Added and Cereal Yields
Increase in Agricultural Value
Added but Decline in Cereal Yields
Decrease in Agricultural Value
Added but Increase in Cereal Yields
Decrease in Both Agricultural
Value Added and Cereal Yields
No Elections Elections
Source: Computed from ACI data base 2012
2.2 Focus on policies, challenges
and opportunities
Given the potential of the agricultural sector to
significantly reduce poverty in Africa, there is
also need to develop appropriate policies and
strategies to guide the sector's transformation.
As argued by Guvheya and Léautier (2011), there
is a wide diversity across national economies in
Africa, ranging from emerging economies such
as South Africa and Tunisia; resource rich
countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Equatorial
FIGURE 2.5
Average Change in Performance of the Agricultural Sector in Africa from 1990-2010
for Countries that Have and Have Not Had a Recent Election.
Guinea and Uganda; least developed countries
such as Niger, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, and
Rwanda; resource-poor countries such as
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya; reforming countries
such as Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia;
post-conflict countries such as Liberia and
Burundi, within a broader bracket of fragile
states; and the extreme case of Somalia as a
failed state. The continent is also characterized
by a wide variation in ecological zones and
climatic conditions, from the vast expanses of
desert and sparsely populated savannah with
weak to medium agricultural potential, to the
densely populated coastal areas in West Africa
and the Great Lakes Region of East Africa.
Resource dependency coexists with the
dependency on agriculture as demonstrated in
the Great Lakes Region, because of heteroge-
neous morphological conditions.
Country Main Exports
Burundi Coffee, tea, sugar, cotton, hides
Central African Republic Diamonds, tobacco, coffee, timber, cotton
Democratic Republic of Congo Diamonds, copper, coffee, cobalt
Republic of Congo Oil, timber, plywood, sugar, cocoa, coffee, diamonds
Rwanda Coffee, tea, hides, iron ore
Uganda Coffee, fish and fish products, tea, tobacco, cotton, corn,
beans, sesame
TABLE 2.1
Resource Dependence Co-exists with Dependence on Agriculture—Case of Great Lakes
Source:  Export rankings data taken from International Trade Center (ITC)
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All of these call for context-specific policies to
reflect the heterogeneity and capacity
development required. Indeed from the field
s u r v e y d a t a , r e s o u r c e r i c h c o u n t r i e s
underperform those poor in natural resources in
all measures of capacity (see Figure 2.6).
However, the difference is highest in the area of
capacity to achieve development results and
having the right policies in place. The issue of
management of natural resources is then
strategic and the need of adapted policies as well
as their implementation is central for capacity
89.6
85.4
72.6
60.9
51.3
43.8
16.8
16.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Non-Resource Rich
Resource Rich
Capacity Outcomes
Development Results
Implementation Processes
Policy Environment
FIGURE 2.6
Capacity profile of resource and non-resource rich countries.
Source: Computed from ACI data base 2012
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African agriculture remains largely underdevel-
oped with inadequate adoption of yield-
enhancing technologies, due to underinvest-
ment especially in infrastructure, policy
inefficiency/urban bias, a retraction of the state
from output and input markets without a
compensating increase in private-sector activity,
and a systemic lack of capacity throughout the
entire spectrum of actors required to manage
the complex process of agricultural transforma-
tion. These factors have precipitated a vicious
cycle of low yields, food insecurity, environmen-
tal degradation, and poverty (Diao, 2010 p.5).
Many agriculture-based countries show little
structural transformation (a declining share of
agriculture in GDP and a rising share of industry
and services as GDP per capita rises). The same
applies to vast areas within countries of all types.
Rapid population growth and migration,
declining farm size and land grab (Box 2.1), falling
soil fertility, and missed opportunities for income
divers iﬁcat ion undermine agr icu ltura l
transformation by putting pressure on the
sector.
Excessive taxation of agriculture and under
investment in agriculture are also to blame,
reﬂecting a political economy in which there is an
urban-bias, but largely neglecting urban
agriculture. When compared with successful
transforming countries during the days of a high
share of agriculture in GDP, the agriculture-
based countries have very low public spending in
agriculture as a share of their agricultural GDP
(4% in the agriculture-based countries in 2004
compared with 10% in 1980 in the transforming
countries. The pressures of recurrent food crises
also bias public budgets and donor priorities
toward direct provision of food rather than
investments in growth and achieving food
security through rising incomes (World Bank,
2007a) – although food aid is increasing being
sourced locally. In most circumstances, women
are the majority of smallholder farmers, whereby
failure to release their full potential in agriculture
is a contributing factor to low growth and food
insecurity (FAO, 2011).
BOX 2.1
Land grabbing — a growing phenomenon?
Private, government and public-private joint ventures, usually from capital-rich countries, are acquiring long-term leases
or ownership rights to large portions of land (often more than 1,000 hectares) in developing countries. Economically
powerful developing countries, such as China, India and Saudi Arabia, as well as developed countries, are joining the land
grab. While sources differ, all suggest a recent acceleration, with estimates of more than 20–30 million hectares
transacted between 2005 and mid-2009 and about 45 million hectares between 2008 and 2010. The rise in commodity
prices appears to be motivating both government and private purchases.
Some see this phenomenon as an opportunity for long-awaited investments in agricultural modernization that will
provide access to better technology, create more jobs for farmers and reduce poverty in rural areas. But others consider it
a threat to local populations. A recent World Bank study supports the latter view, ﬁnding that expected beneﬁts were not
achieved. Several studies have reported human rights violations, with local populations forcibly displaced and access to
local natural resources restricted. Hurt most were smallholders, indigenous people and women, who often lack formal
title to the lands on which they live and farm. Environmental organizations have criticized negative impacts, including
deforestation, loss of biodiversity and threats to wildlife.
Recent international initiatives seek to provide a regulatory framework to spread out the beneﬁts and balance
opportunities with risks. The challenge is to implement multilevel institutional arrangements, including effective local
participation, to promote sustainability and equity in this major change in land use and ownership.
Source: Borras and Franco 2010; Deiniger et al. 2011; Da Vià 2011
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However, there is rigidity in transforming
countries – like South Africa and Tunisia - such
that rapid growth in nonagricultural sectors,
results in the exodus of large numbers of poor
people from the rural areas which eventually
widens the rural-urban income gap (World Bank,
2007a). In such circumstances, there is need for
farming populations to be given subsidies and
protection. But weak fiscal capacity to sustain
transfers large enough to reduce the income gap
and continuing urban demands for low food
prices creates a policy dilemma. The opportunity
cost of subsidies has reduced public goods for
growth and social services in both rural and
urban areas. Raising incomes in agriculture and
the overall nonfarm economy must be part of an
integrated solution.
Indeed, one of the immediate consequences of
the underperformance of African agriculture has
been the worsening food security situation on
the Continent. The FAO (2009a) estimates that
some 30 percent of Africa's population suffers
from chronic hunger and malnutrition — the
largest incidence in the world — which sharply
increased by 269 million people since 2009 in the
wake of the food price and global financial crises
(FAO, 2010a). Food insecurity is a defining
feature of poverty, which condemns the poor to
some of the vicious cycles that they face —
namely that, lack of adequate food engenders ill-
health and low earnings in labor or product
markets, in turn leading to low command over
food and, critically, inability to send their children
to school, thereby not only deepening extant
poverty but propagating it to future generations.
Furthermore, malnutrition of under-five children
permanently impairs their cognitive abilities,
resulting in poor education outcomes leading to
low incomes thereby further entrenching
poverty (Guvheya and Léautier, 2011).
Equally important, is for Africa to seize on
emerging opportunities. There are a number of
such opportunities: dynamic new markets, far-
reaching technological and institutional
innovations, and new roles for the state, the
private sector, and civil society all characterize
the new context for agriculture (World Bank,
2007a). Burkina Faso, is a good case in point, as
highlighted in Box 2.2.
The emerging 'new agriculture' is led by 'private
entrepreneurs' in extensive value chains linking
producers to consumers and including many
entrepreneurial smallholders supported by their
organizations. However, the role of small-scale
farmers must be interpreted in context of the
global political economy. The agriculture of
staple crops and traditional export commodities
may find new markets as it becomes more
differentiated to meet changing consumer
demands and new uses (for example, biofuels)
and benefits from regional market integration
but it can equally be decimated by global
competition. In short, agriculture faces large
uncertainties that are difﬁcult to predict and call
for caution in managing the global food supply.
The exploitation of any opportunities therefore
requires careful consideration and planning.
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BOX 2.2
Burkina Faso – great reformer and promoter of integration and sub-regional stability as a basis for sustainable
development
Burkina Faso is a great reformer. The country was ranked 6 reformer in the world and 2 in Africa, behind Senegal (World
th nd
Bank, 2011b). With regard to regulation, the country has made significant progress on the start and closure of economic
activities as well as promotion of competition. It is now easier to obtain a license and do business in Burkina Faso. As a
result of such noticeable progress, the country's rank shifted from 164 in 2008 to 154 in 2010 (World Bank (2011b).
th th
Moreover, the country has reduced the tax rate and the number of taxes on businesses activities and put in place
simplified and harmonized payment procedures. Documentation requirements for import and export have been reduced.
The execution of contracts and the granting of building permits have also improved. In addition, the opening of a Single
Window for business property in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso allows a simplification of procedures and formalities,
reduces time and costs in setting title and Operations mutation.
On the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, in 2010, Burkina Faso was ranked 98 over 178 countries,
th
was first among the less corrupted countries in the WAEMU zone and 5 within the ECOWAS zone (behind Cape Verde,
th
Ghana, Liberia and the Gambia). On the other hand, in 2010, Burkina Faso made more effort in pursuit of peace in Togo,
Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. Its mediation contributed to a gradual return of peace and increased stability in West Africa.
The role the country played in the Peace and Security Council of the African Union from 2007-2010 gave it the opportunity
to share its experience with other African countries in the field of peace and international security and to contribute to the
efforts of peace developed by the African Union. As a result, the country was awarded the Flame of Peace in Addis Ababa
during the 14 ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
th
The organization of 'Annual Communities' day reflects the willingness of authorities to promote integration and a positive
interaction between Burkina Faso and other communities living in Burkina Faso.
Burkina Faso has signed and ratified numerous treaties and conventions adopted within the framework of the African
Union, ECOWAS and UEMOA. The country devotes 0.5% of customs duties levied annually as its contributions to the
following sub-regional organizations (CILSS, WAEMU, Liptako-Gourma Authority (ALG)) as well as continental
organizations (such as African Union and CAMES).
Source: World Bank, 2011b; Transparency International, 2010.
There should be a heterodox vision of agriculture
for development redefining the roles of
producers, the private sector, and the state.
Production is mainly by smallholders, who often
may not be the most efficient producers, even
when supported by their organizations.
Sometimes these organizations cannot capture
economies of scale in production and marketing,
labor-intensive commercial farming can be a
better form of production, and efficient and fair
labor markets are the key instrument for
reducing rural poverty. A redistributive fiscal
stance then becomes necessary to provide social
safety nets in the event of any spikes, and rising
inequality. Considering the whole value chain in
agriculture can also help unlock much needed
productivity gains. For example, the value chain
in cotton production has allowed Burkina Faso to
become a leader in a number of process steps
because of its focus on building policy capacity in
the agricultural area (Figure 2.7). The use of
science and biotechnology in particular, has
allowed the country to move its cotton lint
exports from the rank of number twelve in the
world in 1967 to number one in 2007.
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Ordinarily, the private sector drives the
organization of value chains that bring the
market to smallholders and commercial farms.
The state—through enhanced capacity and new
forms of governance — corrects market failures,
regulates competition, and engages strategically
in public-private partnerships to promote
competitiveness in the agribusiness sector and
support the greater inclusion of smallholders
and rural workers. Africa should seize the
renewed global international interest in its
agricultural transformation to solve one of the
structural yet most intractable problems in the
region's long-run growth and development. The
recent food price crisis creates an urgent
impetus for agricultural transformation in Africa,
so the macroeconomic and development gains
achieved so far could be entrenched and
deepened.
2.3 Food security and African
development prospects
It is a widely shared position that broad-based
and sustained agricultural growth holds the key
to overall growth and development in Africa
(Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade, 2003; Dorosh
and Haggblade, 2003; Sahn et al., 1997). For most
countries in Africa, agriculture will continue to
drive exports and economic growth for several
years to come with significant implications for
food security.
1967
12. Cotton Lint
5. Cow Peas
6. Fresh Vegetables
7. Fresh Cow Milk
15. Okra
18. Karite Nuts
19. Fresh Fruit
1977
7. Cotton Lint
4. Cow Peas
6. Fresh Vegetables
8. Fresh Cow Milk
18. Okra
13. Karite Nuts
20. Fresh Fruit
1987
3. Cotton Lint
6. Cow Peas
7. Fresh Vegetables
8. Fresh Cow Milk
18. Okra
15. Karite Nuts
19. Fresh Fruit
2007
1. Cotton Lint
6. Cow Peas
9. Fresh Vegetables
13. Fresh Cow Milk
14. Okra
15. Karite Nuts
16. Fresh Fruit
1997
1. Cotton Lint
6. Cow Peas
11. Fresh Vegetables
20. Fresh Cow Milk
17. Okra
18. Karite Nuts
19. Fresh Fruit
FIGURE 2.7
Transforming Agriculture – Burkina Faso rank in World, by commodity 1967-2007
Source:  Developed using Export Data taken from FAOSTAT
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Africa's food security situation has been
worsened by the increasingly tight global
markets — with adverse implications for the
poor who spend a large fraction of their incomes
on food — thereby stoking overall inflation,
creating fiscal pressure, and above all, social
instability and generally retarding progress
toward the achievement of the MDGs. After an
uneasy lull, the World Bank food price index has
raised alarm on the resurgent food price inflation
across the world, showing that food prices have
surpassed their 2007-08 levels, mainly for sugar,
wheat, soybean, and maize (World Bank, 2012).
The global food price crisis, often conspiring with
high youth unemployment, is stoking social
instability across the world, notably the Middle
East and North Africa that have already seen the
dramatic fall of three governments, but also as
seen in earlier riots in countries such as
Mozambique, Cameroon, Guinea and Senegal.
Fuelling the food price crisis is the fact that global
agricultural supply has not been increasing
adequately enough to meet the surging global
demand for agricultural commodities, driven
chiefly by rising demand for food (and animal
feed) in emerging markets; as well as that for
agricultural feedstock to sustain the biofuel
industry, itself a consequence of the sustained
rise in international oil prices. As a result, there
has been a steady reduction in the global stocks
of key agricultural commodities, leading to
4
excessive volatility in prices in response to
external shocks especially in the major
agricultural commodity producers of the world.
The adverse external shocks are exacerbated by
protectionist policies such as export bans as
countries try to control domestic prices, such as
recently happened in Russia and Pakistan for
wheat, with a direct implication for world prices
since these are large-country exporters.
5
Similarly, the political instability in Cote d'Ivoire,
the largest cocoa producer in the world, saw
world cocoa prices rise by over 14% by January
25 2011 since the disputed election which
th
marked the onset of the political crisis.
Indeed, even predating the global food price
crisis, there was professional concern that the
world would not be able to feed the projected 9
billion people by 2050, at the current rate of
technological change as manifest in the declining
yields of most cereal crops, increasing water
scarcity thanks to global climate change, and the
increasingly binding land resource constraint.
This specter of global food insecurity is an
ominous one, breaking with the complacency of
the previous three decades since the success of
the green revolution, where food insecurity was
perceived as a national and household phenome-
non confined to developing countries (The
Economist, 2011).
There has consequently been a rising global
interest on Africa's farmland in response to the
growing global demand for food and feedstock
for biofuel production. International attention is
particularly focused on the so-called Guinea Belt,
which is billed as arguably one of the largest
underused agricultural land reserves in the world
— alongside similar tracts in Latin America
including Brazil. The Guinea Belt is a vast loop of
sparsely populated savannah of low to medium
agricultural potential, measuring an estimated
600 million hectares, two thirds of which is
arable, stretching round the Continent from
West Africa to Mozambique. The Brazilian
cerrado (savannah) and northern Thailand
shared very similar initial conditions on the eve of
their agricultural revolutions with the current
conditions for the Guinea Belt, inspiring optimism
that with the right investments and political will,
a successful agricultural revolution could dawn
on Africa notwithstanding the mammoth
challenge involved (World Bank, 2010).
Increasingly, there has been a rising wave of
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foreign acquisition of African farmland by
governments or foreign companies eager to
secure their food supplies or the supply of
agricultural feedstock for biofuel production.
However, starting with the 2009 overthrow of
the Madagascan government after a huge land
deal with a South Korean company in 2008, there
has been growing concern that the foreign
acquisition of agricultural land could undermine
individual land rights for the domestic
population, let alone the opaqueness of these
deals which throws into question their
contribution to the social development of the
countries given the latter's weak governance.
Furthermore, the underlying business model to
these land deals narrows the space for African
countries to profit from international agricul-
tural trade, notwithstanding the supposed
technology spillovers, enhanced employment
generation, and greater infrastructure
development that the foreign land acquisition
could bestow on domestic agricultural sectors.
As a result, the World Bank (2011c) and its
partners have taken leadership in investigating
the scale and nature of the rising global interest
in farmland, reaching the conclusion that land
governance and administration should be
improved or foreign land acquisition would
undermine local land rights, especially for the
poor, women and other vulnerable groups. This
conclusion, has clear implications for capacity
development for land policy administration.
2.4 Specialized capacities for
agricultural transformation
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are a number of
capacity development initiatives that need to be
undertaken for agricultural transformation and
the achievement of food security in Africa.
Agricultural transformation requires a multi-
pronged approach that, among other things,
improves the asset position of the poor, makes
smallholder farming more competitive and
sustainable, diversifies income sources toward
the labor market and the rural nonfarm
economy, and facilitates successful migration
out of agriculture (World Bank, 2007a:9).
It is generally accepted that African social
planners and leaders have not been lost to the
urgency of agricultural transformation on the
continent (Guvheya and Léautier, 2011). In 2003,
African Heads of State and Governments made
the Maputo Declaration on the Comprehensive
Africa Agriculture Development Programme
(CAADP) as the core pillar for agricultural
transformation and food security — the goal
being the elimination of hunger and reducing
poverty through agriculture. CAADP is thus an
African-led and African-owned framework for
revitalizing agriculture in Africa at both the
national, sub-regional and regional levels. African
leaders agreed to commit at least 10 percent of
their national budgets for agricultural
development, and increase agricultural produc-
tivity by at least 6 percent in order to enhance
agriculture's contribution to sustainable
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economic growth and the elimination of hunger
and poverty. A CAADP multi-donor trust fund
was founded and is managed by the World Bank
to help coordinate donor action and raise
resources for African agriculture. While
considerable progress has been made at various
levels, there is however quite some way to go in
the full implementation of CAADP. Inadequate
capacity for agricultural transformation has been
singled out as one of the key causes of the delay.
Nonetheless, there have been considerable
success stories so far in the implementation of
CAADP across the Continent. This is all the more
notable when juxtaposed with the widely shared
understanding that improving agricultural
productivity and efficiency is a long-term
e n d e a v o r r e q u i r i n g n o t o n l y m a j o r
improvements in seeds and livestock and the way
land is managed, but also a reform of mindsets,
institutions and policymaking. As of November
2010, 25 countries had signed CAADP compacts
and incorporated them into their national
agricultural agendas; 8 countries had exceeded
the 10% budgetary threshold while most had
made significant progress towards it; while 10
countries had met the 6% agricultural growth
target and another 19 had achieved productivity
growth of between 3 to 6% (NEPAD, 2010). There
is however, much muted progress on regional
coordination, itself a central feature of CAADP
design, where African regional economic
communities (RECs) were assigned the key task
of promoting regional coordination and policy
harmonization. Two RECs have been most
actively involved in CAADP implementation,
namely, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the sub-region that has
advanced furthest with implementation, and the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(NEPAD, 2010). Figure 2.8 and Table 2.2 highlight
the aforementioned progress across RECs
graphically.
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FIGURE 2.8
Average annual agriculture expenditure share in total expenditures, 2003-09
Source: Djibo, 2012
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The CAADP framework recognizes the
importance of enhancing the assets of farming
households. This is because such assets are
“major determinants of the ability to participate
in agricultural markets, secure livelihoods in
subsistence farming, compete as entrepreneurs
in the rural nonfarm economy, and ﬁnd
employment in skilled occupations. Three core
assets are: land, water, and human capital”
(World Bank, 2007a:9). More often than not in
Africa, these assets of the rural poor are
squeezed by population growth, environmental
degradation, expropriation by dominant
interests, and social biases in policies and in the
allocation of public goods. In many instances,
farm sizes in many of the more densely
populated areas are unsustainably small (e.g.
Burundi and Rwanda), land is severely degraded,
investment in irrigation is negligible, and poor
health and education limit productivity and
access to better options. In some cases, it is more
a matter of institutional development, such as
enhancing the security of property rights and the
quality of land administration without creating
social polarization (e.g. Zimbabwe and South
Africa).
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 highlight the differences of
achieving development results within and
outside an election year. During an election year
there is more focus on allocating funds,
developing leaders, and involving Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in sectors
such as agriculture where the poor are engaged.
Outside the election year there is more attention
to strengthening institutions, staffing important
Region/REC Focal point
appointed
Stocktaking,
Growth and
investment
Analysis
undertaken
Round
table held
and
compact
signed
Investment
plan drafted,
reviewed and
validated
Financing plan
secured and
annual review
mechanism
agreed upon
Execution of
investment
plan
Africa 39 31 29 21 3 5
Central 5 2 3 0 0 2
Eastern 12 10 6 6 1 1
Northern 2 0 0 0 0 0
Southern 5 4 4 1 0 0
Western 15 15 15 13 2 2
RECs 5 2 1 1 1 0
Source: Djibo, 2012
TABLE 2.2
Number of countries and RECs achieving selected Milestones
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FIGURE 2.9
Difference between the achievement of development results during and outside of an election year
Source: Computed from ACI database 2012
No Elections Elections
FIGURE 2.10
Major activities during an election year
Source: ACI 2012 database
Infrastructure is yet another major capacity
constraint that needs to be considered seriously.
Even though the basic ingredients of a dynamic
rural nonfarm economy are a rapidly growing
agriculture and a good investment climate;
linking the local economy to broader markets by
reducing transaction costs, investing in
infrastructure, and providing business services
and market intelligence; enhancing overall
connectivity and communication are critical.
For example, current Africa's investment in road
infrastructure is estimated to be only compara-
ble to 1960's rural India and 1980's China, leading
to an estimated 40-60% of post-harvest loss by
African farmers (Guvheya and Léautier, 2011).
The other area that requires attention is the
establishment of adequate institutions with the
appropriate incentives for change in the
agricultural sector. These include investments in
market infrastructure, institutions and related
support services. Market development for
agricultural transformation not only focus on
food staples, traditional bulk exports, high-
value-chain products, but also those related to
inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. Innovative
ways to deal with risks though appropriate
insurance mechanisms have to be devised and
accessible to farmers.
Another important area to have capacity for
agricultural transformation is that of technology,
training and research and development. The role
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of technological change in economic growth and
broader development has become an accepted
fact since the model developed by Solow (1952)
and subsequent followers. Yet the answers to
the political economy questions of who really
has access to new technologies, who adopts
them, how quickly, and at what cost to society
remain elusive. Since the “Green Revolution”
there has been a lively and long debate on the
growth, and particularly the distributional
consequences, of technological change in the
agriculture of developing countries. The main
question being: what is the distributional
consequence of technological change on
technology adopters that is brought about
through changes in relative output prices?
Productivity changes consequent of technologi-
cal innovation drive price and income
adjustments to both directly and indirectly
impact on poverty (Gabre-Madhin et al., 2002).
The importance of technology is recognized in
one of the CAADP pillars.
Finance is another major constraint on farmers –
especially small scale farmers. For example, well-
organized farmer organizations provide a matrix
(framework) for mobilizing resources and
financing agricultural research and extension,
not least for attaining economies of scale (or the
critical mass) in agricultural policy advocacy, bulk
procurement and market bargaining, as well as
credit market facilitation. Multilateral agencies
are equally crucial in setting up agro-banks and
'food-banks.' Strategic partnerships are critical
for leveraging resources for agricultural
transformation, paying special regard to the key
donors: bilateral and multilateral agencies
currently funding agricultural development
programs in Africa; and emerging-market South-
South donors and philanthropic foundations.
Financing agriculture should be done in light of
emerging aid architecture.
One of the major emerging issues affecting
Africa is that of climate change and how best the
continent can adapt. Ringler et al. (2011) using a
comprehensive climate change scenario (CCC),
based on ensembles of 17 Global Circulation
Models (GCMs) selected for their relative
performance regarding past predictions of
temperature and precipitation at the level of 2o x
2o grid cells, generated by a recently developed
entropy-based downscaling model, found that
climate change impacts vary significantly. While
climate change impacts in the form of yield
declines are less severe in Africa than in Asia,
Africa is much more vulnerable to climate
change. This is because Africa's adaptive
capacity is extremely low, and is linked to acute
poverty levels and poor infrastructure, as
reflected in a high dependence on rain-fed
agriculture. They argue that sub-Saharan Africa
faces increased net food imports even under the
historic climate scenario as a result of growing
populations; faster economic growth than in the
past; and growing urbanization, coupled with
insufficient improvement in agricultural
productivity; and conclude that climate change
will lead to changes in yield and area growth,
higher food prices and therefore lower
affordability of food, reduced calorie availability,
and growing childhood malnutrition in Africa.
Chapter Six explores in detail, the threats and
opportunities posed by climate change for
agricultural transformation and food security in
Africa.
2.5 Moving forward – Africa,
agriculture and food security
If Africa is committed to reducing, let alone
ending, poverty, food insecurity and achieve
sustainable growth, the powers of agriculture
for development must be unleashed. It must be
recognized by all stakeholders that using
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agriculture for development is a complex
process. There is need for workable partnerships
with existent actors on the ground wherever
possible, especially at the regional level, creating
new ones only when absolutely necessary. To
this end, the African Capacity Building
Foundation will seek to consolidate further its
relationship with NEPAD, being both the
implementing agency for CAADP and bestowed
with the African Union mandate for capacity
building in Africa. Also ACBF will court new
partnerships, and strengthen existing ones, with
institutions at the fore-front of agricultural
research and policy in Africa and as well as
beyond the continents boundaries.
For the process to succeed, governments will
also need to acknowledge that the many
partners will demand broad consultations at
country level to customize agendas and reﬁne
implementation strategies. It also requires
agriculture work in synergy with other sectors. It
needs building the capacity of smallholders and
their organizations, private agribusiness, and the
state. It will also entail developing technologies
and infrastructure for sustainable natural
resource use, as well as savvy and strategic
leadership.
Equally important, is that Africa learns from her
own experiences in agricultural transformation
placing a premium on knowledge management
to harvest lessons learned, best practices, and
their codification and wide sharing across the
continent. African agricultural development
clearing houses should be fostered to aid this
cause, in addition to other tools of knowledge
utilization such as agricultural development
communities of practice. The regional university
forum, RUFORUM, can be leveraged to great
effect for sharing lessons learned, best practices,
and new technologies (and collaborative
scientific research) in agricultural development.
Invariably, the positive transformation of
Africa's agricultural sector for food security is
linked to how comprehensively the aforemen-
tioned strategic choices are embraced.
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The Status of Agriculture,
Poverty Reduction,
Sustainable Livelihoods
and African Development.

33.0 Introduction
While many post-colonial African governments have widely recognized the role of agriculture in
national development, and capacity development efforts for education and skills have been ongoing
for several years, progress to attain food security has been slow. This is partly due to the adoption of
approaches and institutions that do not have supporting mechanisms to utilize the capacities
generated. Accordingly, a mapping of the underlying dynamic interrelations among poverty,
sustainable livelihoods and agricultural transformation is critical if Africa is to formulate credible and
relevant development policies and strategies. Characterizing poverty, hunger, vulnerability, and
agricultural development in Africa – with explicit attention to issues of inclusion and equity – becomes
essential. There is need to develop an understanding of the dynamics of sustainable livelihoods, and
approaches that successfully promote them – while recognizing and supporting women's crucial
roles, to address rural poverty and achieve agricultural development. What are the conditions
(agronomic, socioeconomic, institutional, political, infrastructural, etc.) that need to be addressed to
facilitate transformation of agriculture in Africa to promote sustainable livelihoods? This Chapter is
therefore an examination of the causes and consequences of Africa's food insecurity, the policy
hurdles, and the necessary interventions that can address the varying challenges that have
contributed to this food insecurity. It is argued that putting in place appropriate capacity
development initiatives can help alleviate the problem of food insecurity in Africa. In addition, food
security efforts in African countries need to be complemented by food sovereignty principles that
have at their core citizen participation, agrarian reforms, the promotion of property rights for local
people, access by small-scale farmers to local and regional markets, and the putting of producers and
consumers at the center of decision-making process es on food issues. The chapter seeks to delineate
the link between the need for agricultural transformation – including urban agriculture, food security,
poverty reduction – and African development.
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The Status of Agriculture, Poverty
Reduction, Sustainable Livelihoods and
African Development.
3.1 Agriculture is critical – but why?
Guvheya and Léautier (2011) argue that there is
now clearer consensus in the development
fraternity that agricultural development is vital
for engendering rapid economic growth,
poverty reduction and structural transformation
for most countries in Africa. Many of Africa's
economies are classified as agriculture-based,
where agriculture is the major contributor to
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national food security for most countries. In
addition to being responsible for an important
share of economic growth and employment, the
sector is also an important earner of foreign
exchange, notably through traditional commod-
ity exports such as coffee, tea, cocoa, cotton,
and livestock. As a result of globalization and
increased access to markets, agriculture is
increasingly contributing to economic growth
through fresh-produce exports such as fruits,
vegetables, meat and dairy products to high-
value markets, especially in Europe and the
Middle East. The dynamic growth of high-value
fresh produce production is offering a historic
opportunity for export diversification and
prospects for poverty reduction to the extent
that smallholders are involved in domestic and
export value-chains for high-value fresh
produce, either directly through production, or
through participation in the associated labor
markets. According to the World Bank (2007a:1),
the sector accounts for “over 30 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in Africa and employs
over seventy percent of the population.”
Empirical studies (Diao, 2010) have confirmed
that agricultural GDP growth is twice as effective
as other sectors at fighting poverty in countries
that are at the lower rungs of development. The
economic history of developed and emerging
market countries suggests that no country has
attained sustained economic growth without an
antecedent or concurrent growth of their
agricultural sectors, especially attention to the
needs of women farmers.
As the FAO (2011:3) puts it, there is need for
deeper analysis:
G o v e r n m e n t s , d o n o r s a n d
development practitioners now
recognize that agriculture is central to
economic growth and food security –
particularly in countries where a
significant share of the population
depends on the sector – but their
commitment to gender equality in
agriculture is less robust. Gender issues
are now mentioned in most national
and regional agricultural and food-
security policy plans, but they are
usually relegated to separate chapters
on women rather than treated as an
integral part of policy and program-
ming. Many agricultural policy and
project documents still fail to consider
basic questions about the differences in
the resources available to men and
women, their roles and the constraints
they face – and how these differences
might be relevant to the proposed
intervention.
A more nuanced understanding is required to
promote agriculture as the major driver of
economic growth and development in Africa,
especially in respect of the urgency to meet the
poverty, hunger and environment related MDGs
(World Bank, 2007a).
One of the immediate consequences of the
underperformance of African agriculture has
been the worsening food security situation on
the continent, particularly in lieu of the structural
changes currently affecting global markets for
agricultural commodities.
Diao et al. (2007) outline a number of roles and
implications of the agricultural sector in the
development of Africa:
1. Paradigm shift in thinking about the role of
the agricultural sector – early thinking about
development perceived the agricultural sector
as characterized by low productivity, traditional
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t e c h n o l o g y a n d d e c r e a s i n g r e t u r n s .
Development therefore required sectoral
adjustments from primary production toward
the modern industrial sector where there is
higher productivity and increasing returns. In this
view, the agricultural sector's main role was
rather passive, in providing food and
employment. Development was thus conceived
in terms of the sectoral decline in agriculture and
the evolving importance of the industrial and
services sectors. The debate around the
Malthusian population trap and the Lewis model
(Lewis, 1954) were reflective of the views of the
relatively passive role of agriculture in
development. Figure 3.1 below shows the
important link between capacity and agricultural
2. Agriculture as an active sector in develop-
ment – the Green Revolution is credited with
demonstrating that, given relevant technology,
traditional agriculture can be transformed into a
modern sector. The Malthusian population trap
would be broken by advances in mechanical and
biological technology by removing constraints
imposed by endowments in land and labor. Given
backward and forward sectoral linkages,
innovation in the agriculture sector can generate
growth in other sectors ala Hirschman (1958).
Johnson and Mellor (1961) suggested the
existence of production and consumption
linkages within the agricultural sector as well as
between agriculture and other sectors of the
economy. Authors such as Gollin et al. (2002)
empirically showed the importance of
agriculture in early stages of economic
development. Other scholars (Hazell, 1982;
Hazell and Haggbalde, 1991; Binswanger, 1986)
focused on the role of agriculture in rural, as
opposed to national, development to
investigate viz.: (i) imperfect/missing commodity
and factor markets, (ii) rigidities in rural-urban
factor mobility, (iii) high transport/marketing
costs, (iv) existence of rural non-tradable
sectors, and (v) rural unemployment and
underemployment. Infrastructure is given a
Capacity is important for increasing value and
productivity of agriculture
Information systems are very important for increasing both
agriculturevalueaddedandproductivity. Agoodagricultural strategy
can make the difference between high and low value added to GDP.
Training and investment in innovation are important for raising
farmer and land productivity. The private sector role is critical for
raising productivity and increasing the contribution of agriculture to
GDP.
Component of
Capacity
Information
Systems
Private Sector
Role
Training and
Innovation
Agriculture
Strategy
Increase in
agriculture value
added to GDP (%)
79.2
71.7
38.5
58.3
Increase in cereal
yields per hectare
(%)
80.1
60.1
39.4
48.6
57
56
55
54
53
52
51
50
49
48
ACI Agriculture
Increase in
agriculture
value added
to GDP
Increase in
cereal yields
per hectare
Increase in
both value
added to
GDP and
cereal yields
FIGURE 3.1
Agricultural Capacity and Performance
Source:  Agricultural value added as a share of GDP and cereal yields per hectare from World Bank Data Finder.
All other data from ACI.
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primary role in galvanizing the nonfarm
economy due to increases in demand from the
agricultural sector to bring about agricultural-
demand-led-industrialization (Adelman, 1984).
3. Nutrition and economic development –
agriculture is an important sector due to its
contribution to the nutritional health of a
society. Inadequate and irregular availability of
food increases the chances of malnutrition,
lowers labor productivity and the quality of
human capital (Fogel, 1994; Nadav, 1996). The
agricultural sector has the potential to stabilize
food production and enhance food security.
Food crises undermine both political and
economic stability with deleterious effects on
the levels and efficiency of investments (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
Another neglected area of debate is that of
urban agriculture. A general consensus about
the exact definition of urban agriculture does
not exist. However, many researchers tend to
define urban agriculture as any agricultural
enterprise within or on the fringes of a town, city,
or a metropolis that grows or raises, processes,
and distributes food and non-food products
(Moustier, 1999; Mougeout, 2000; Bryld, 2003).
Some scholars have considered related
practices, such as the production of agricultural
goods by urban residents within officially
defined urban spaces (Zezza and Tasciotti, 2010).
Yet others define urban agriculture as any
farming activity occurring in built-up 'intra-
urban' areas and 'peri-urban' fringes of cities and
towns (Thornton, 2008). These varied
definitions illustrate the peculiarity and diversity
of urban agriculture and, therefore, the range of
policies and actors affected by it.
Rigid conceptions that focus excessively on
urban–peri-urban dualisms or rural–urban
binaries may be useful on a range of scales, but
they also gloss over important interactions that
make rural and urban spaces interdependent
and mutually constitutive (Tacoli, 1998; de Bon et
al., 2010). Hence, a perception of urban
agriculture as a dynamic concept is paramount,
as is the recognition of the diversity of urban
agr iculture. Bryld (2003) argues that
policymakers and scholars dealing with urban
agriculture issues should not only consider the
particularities of the setting but also understand
that urban agriculture is not an isolated
phenomenon. The practice is diverse and
interconnected with various urban, peri-urban,
and rural activities. Although scholars have
difficulty providing a classification that neatly
captures the distinctive characteristics of urban
agriculture, classifications can be created by
using a range of attributes, including the physical
location the activity, motives and gender ofof
practitioners, scale of cultivation, kinds of crops,
sources of labor, and land tenure issues, as
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Urban agriculture in Africa has a great potential
to enhance the wellbeing of urban residents,
including meeting the food needs of a burgeon-
ing urban population. Africa's urban population
is projected to increase from 39% in 2005 to 53% in
2030 (Table 3.2). Even though the projected
urban population growth rate seems to indicate
a slight decline (as shown in the table), this rate
nonetheless will translate into a dramatically
high increase in urban population when
compared to developed regions. Such growth is
expected to significantly increase household
food demand in urban areas at the same time as
rural-urban migration is contributing to a
declining rural agricultural productivity due to
loss of farm labour (Lee-Smith, 2010). It is within
this context that urban agriculture stands to play
a strategic role not only enhancing urban food
and livelihood security but also in meeting
overall national food self-sufficiency.
Attribute Home subsistence farmers
Family-type commercial
farmers
Multi-cropping
peri-urban farmers Entrepreneur
Location UA–Backyard home
gardening/farming
PUA–UA
Open spaces and
unused land spaces
PUA
Unused land
spaces
PUA
Unused land spaces
Outlets Home Urban markets Home + urban
market
Urban market +
export
Objective Home consumption Income for subsistence Home
consumption and
income for
subsistence
Additional income,
leisure
Size Usually < 100m 2 Usually < 1000m 2 Usually > 5000m 2 Usually > 2000m 2
Products Leafy vegetables, cassava,
plantain, maize, rice, goats,
sheep, poultry, fruits
Leafy vegetables,
temperate
vegetables, poultry,
sheep, milk
Staple food crops,
local vegetables
Temperate
vegetables, fruits,
poultry, livestock,
fish
Intensification6 2 2–3 1 4
Gender F F + M F + M M
Limiting factor Small size Small size, access to
inputs, marketing risks,
water and services,
Access to inputs,
fertility
Technical expertise,
marketing risks
Land Tenure Secured land access Land insecurity Land insecurity Secured land access
Labor Family labor Family and hired labor Hired labor Hired labor
Source: Modified from Moustier and Danso (2006)
TABLE 3.1
Characteristics of Urban Agriculture (UA) and Peri-Urban Agriculture (PUA)
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4. –Household food security and nutrition
Urban agriculture is already demonstrating
enormous potential in enhancing the welfare of
poor urban populations in some cities of certain
African countries (Maxwell, 1995; Lourenco-
Lindell, 1996; Mwalukasa, 2000; Nugent, 2000).
For example, a significant number of people in
cities such as Accra and Dar es Salaam
increasingly depend on crops grown in public
spaces for food and income (de Zeeuw et al.,
2010). Urban agriculture contributes to
improved food availability and nutritional status.
Resources freed by self-production of food can
be utilized to complement household diets by
providing other nutritious food items such as
fish, fruits and vegetables (Bryld, 2003). This
means that urban agriculture can contribute to
food diversification through increased
availability of household disposable income
(Zezza and Tasciotti, 2010). With more diverse
foods available, households become more food
secure (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). Thus self-
grown food can reduce the challenges that the
urban poor face, especially the dangers of
meeting their household food and nutrition
security entirely through the market.
The ability of urban agriculture to supply fresh
perishable products such as vegetables is in line
with Von Thunen's agricultural land use model
(de Bon et al., 2010). Vegetable supplies from
within 30 km to urban areas in African countries
attributes 70% of the source of these foods to
urban agriculture. The figures for the supply of
vegetables are significantly higher in Asia (de
Bon et al., 2010), signifying the potential for
growth and expansion of this sector in African
cities.
5. Urban food security and HIV/AIDS – Urban
agriculture plays an important role in improving
nutritional status of households affected by
HIV/AIDS who tend to be more food insecure. As
urban areas in Africa continue to account for an
expanding number of people living with
HIV/AIDS urban agriculture can be an important
source of nutritional security (Gillepse, 2006).
Enhanced food security in these households can
also contribute to increased adherence to
HIV/AIDS treatment. This means that urban
agriculture can contribute to efforts toward
reduction of the spread of HIV/AIDS.
The location of food producing areas within and
around cities significantly cut the cost of
transportation usually leading to reduced
market prices of food. This makes it more
affordable for poorer households to access food
sold in urban market centers. Indeed, several
studies on African cities have shown that urban
agriculture provides a large proportion of food
consumed in households (Moustier and Danso,
2006; Cofie et al., 2003; Nugent, 2000; see also
Table 3.3).
Population (millions)                                          Average annualrate of change (per cent)
Year 1950 1975 2000 2005 2030 1950-2005 2005-2030
Total Population 225 416 812 906 1463 2.54 1.92
Urban population 33 105 294 347 742 4.29 3.04
TABLE 3.2
Total and Urban Population in Africa, 1950 – 2030
Source: Tibaijuka (2009)
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6. Food price/supply stabilizer – by complement-
ing rural production, urban agriculture can also
stabilize food prices on the market (Moustier
and Danso, 2006). As African countries depend
on food produced in rural parts to feed national
populations, including those living in urban
areas, urban agriculture can play a strategic role
in cushioning market prices and/or supplies
especially during times when rural production is
unexpectedly low due to poor rains. Other
instances where urban agriculture can provide
stability to market prices of food include
occasions when rural supplies are limited or cut
off by transport problems (e.g. heavy rains) or
conflicts. In addition urban agriculture can
reduce a country's dependence on food imports,
further preventing excessive foreign exchange
losses.
7. Employment/Income – In the insufficiency of
formal jobs in many African cities, urban
agriculture is increasingly becoming an
important source of employment for the urban
poor (Table 3.4). The mismatch between the
mounting urban populations and the availability
of employment opportunities in Africa,
especially in the wake of weak industrial and
manufacturing sectors, renders urban
agriculture a vital source of employment. Urban
agriculture is a particularly important source of
employment for people who may not
successfully compete for formal sector jobs due
to their low skill levels. It is estimated that 40% of
urban dwellers in Africa are involved in
agricultural and related sectors (Zezza and
Tasciatti, 2010), including not only the urban poor
but also the not-so-poor willing to increase their
income. Agricultural production can help all
types of countries generate jobs, especially
those who need to raise the level of productivity
(see Figure 3.2). Reportedly, in some cities such
as Libreville, Kumasi and Lusaka, the proportion
of urban dwellers in agriculture far exceeds the
continental average (Cofie et al., 2003). Thus,
just as agriculture provides the bulk of rural
City All food items Vegetables Milk/Poultry/Eggs
Brazzaville 80
Dakar - 70-80 65-70
Dar Es Salaam - 90 60
Harare 60 - -
Kampala 60 - -
Kumasi 58 90 -
Lusaka 20-30 - -
Nairobi 50 - -
Yaounde - 80
Source: Moustier and Danso (2006): Cofie et al. (2003), Nugent (2000)
TABLE 3.3
Percentage of Household Food Consumption provided by Urban Agriculture
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employment in Africa, urban families without
formal employment can enhance their labor
productivity by engaging in urban agriculture.
Increasing productivity of labor is central to
achieving MDGs especially the goal of reducing
poverty (Goal # 1).
 Data span of 28 years
 Per capita agricultural
production of 37.89-98.36
 Average GDP growth of 2.17%
 Unemployment 22.57%
 Data span of 26 years
 Per capita agricultural
production of 100.4-108.61
 Average GDP growth of 4.52%
 Unemployment 26.75%
 Data span of 19 years
 Per capita agricultural
production of 116.5-147.23
 Average GDP growth of 4.67%
 Unemployment 23.59%
Low per capita
agricultural production
Medium per capita
agricultural production
High per capita
agricultural production
Mauritius
South Africa
Morocco
FIGURE 3.2
Unemployment levels and per capita agricultural production
Source: Developed using data from Africa Development Indicators
Reducing unemployment is vital for addressing
other MDGs. However, this does not mean that
urban agriculture is exclusively an activity of the
poor. There is evidence of participation by
better-off groups who carry out farming in order
to supplement or diversify their diets. Others
also engage in urban agriculture on a larger scale
with a primary goal of making profit. For
example, Jacobi et al. (1999) found that while
vegetable growing was common in all income
groups in Dar es Salaam, the better-off had larger
farms and tended to produce for the market.
Similarly, in urban and peri-urban areas of
Monrovia, different groups of people including
youth (amidst high unemployment) engage in
various forms of faming, but the middle class
tend to be particularly market-oriented in their
farming activities (UNDP 2006b).
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8. Spreading livelihood risk – Urban residents
who engage in agriculture in African cities do so
to meet more direct goals such as reducing
household expenditure on food, increasing
incomes, or dietary diversification. However,
large segments of the urban populace also
pursue urban agriculture in order to mitigate the
negative effects of unforeseen circumstances.
As Africa urban socioeconomic and political's
environments tend to be volatile and highly
unpredictable, this means that families tend to
face increased levels of uncertainty regarding
present and future livelihood security. As part of
insurance against risk families tend to engage in,
a range of routines and activities within as well as
outside domestic spaces, with farming being one
of possible measures to cover themselves
against such threats. Thus, urban agriculture can
reduce vulnerability of poor families to shocks.
9. Stimulating niche markets – Increased
demand for urban agriculture produce can in
turn stimulate other economic activities through
forward and backward linkages. For example,
TABLE 3.4
Percentage of households involved in urban agriculture (UA) and related monthly incomes
City % of Household in UA Monthly income per General Net Income
farm size ($) per month ($)
Accra 46 40-57 27
Bamako - 10-300 24
Bangui - n.d .-320 22
7
Banjul - 30-n.d. 26
Bissau 30 24 12
Brazzaville 25 80-270 53
Cotonou - 50-110 36
Dakar - 40-250 46
Dar es Salaam 20 60 24
Douala 16 - -
Freetown - 10-50 13
Kampala 30 - -
Kumasi 57 35-160 27
Lagos - 53-120 27
Libreville 80 - -
Lomé - 30-300 26
Lusaka 45 - -
Maputo 37
Nairobi 30 10-163 33
Niamey - 40 17
Ouagadougou 36 15-90 25
Takoradi - 10-30 27
Tamale 26 - -
Yaoundé 35 34-67 53
Source: Moustier and Danso (2006); Dreschel et al. (2006) and Cofie et al. (2003)
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increased customer base spread in different
parts of the city may give rise to the need for
wholesale or retail services of farm products
such as fruits and vegetables. The fresh cut
flower market is an area of growing demand for
urban agriculture. Such market chains have
emerged in some parts of African cities such as
Brazzaville, Bangui, and Bissau (de Bon et al.,
2010). This creates entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties for groups of people who have the transport
and logistical capacity to buy these farm
products from farmers wholesale and sell them
to retailers for resale. Similarly, urban agriculture
can also create backward linkages in terms of
increasing demand for seed and other farm
inputs. This can lead to emergence of groups of
private traders who can provide these services.
Urban agriculture, therefore, cannot be
considered as having only a marginal contribu-
tion to a nation's economy. Instead, urban
agriculture should be viewed as an economically
viable activity. As summarised in Box 3.1, its
contributions to food security, in particular, need
to be considered and planned for as a central
component of wider national development
strategies. However, for its contributions to be
fully realized, constraints, such as the lack of
adapted regulations and policies in African states
and city planning, need to be addressed. Urban
agriculture plays various roles that go beyond
ensuring food and livelihood security discussed
in the preceding sections. For example, urban
agriculture can contribute to a better balance
between built and green areas. In addition, in the
absence of urban agriculture cities would incur
additional costs associated with maintaining
these spaces. Using trees for shade and energy
(charcoal, wood stoves) could have a potential
when looked at as a sustainable forestry solution
for cities where residents use charcoal stoves.
Also use of food and farm waste for generating,
biogas provides new opportunities in green
energy. Urban agriculture can a offset somegain
of the environmental footprint that comes from
transporting food over long distances.
BOX 3.1
The Role of Urban Agriculture for Food Security
 Reduce urban food deficits in the face of Africa's rapid population growth and changing
consumption patterns
 Household food security for urban poor unable to achieve food security from the market
 Nutritional diversification for urban residents
 Nutritional security for HIV/AIDS-affected families thereby contributing to ARV treatment
compliance
 Generate foreign exchange savings and eases fiscal pressures, especially among food-import
dependent countries
 Increase disposable income among urban employed and unemployed alike
 Contribute to employment
 Contribute to emergence of niche markets
 Stabilizer of market prices of food
Source: Arku et al., 2011
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3.2 Debating food security and food
sovereignty
While much has been written about food
insecurity in many African countries, what is
missing is a discussion of the capacity building
measures needed to promote food security on
the continent. The appropriate capacity
development measures, defined as institutional
infrastructure, comprehensive program of
education, skil ls training, professional
development activities, and other systemic
approaches to improve or enhance the
performance of personnel within a sector or
institution (Development Associates Inc., 2003),
to promote food security in Africa seem not to
have been adopted. While an important
antecedent to the emergence of food security as
a template mechanism was the post-war
thought that stressed national food self-
sufficiency in developing countries (Boyer, 2010:
322), the need for food security became a matter
of concern and shot to prominence in the
international community following the oil crisis
and the concomitant world food crisis of 1972-
1974. The focus on food security was to increase
even further following the drought and famine
that many African countries had to grapple with
in the early part of the 1980s. The concept and
idea of food security has evolved over the past
few decades in recognition of changes in the
p e r s p e c t i v e s a m o n g p o l i c y m a k e r s ,
governments, international agencies and others
focused on addressing issues centred on the
challenges facing the agriculture sector in
various parts of the world. It is not surprising that
there are a number of definitions for food
security. As Ehrlich et al. (1993:3) argue, a
nutritionally secure society has the ability to
provide its entire people with diets adequate to
sustain work and other normal daily activities.
This means that individuals and society have
buffers against inadequate harvest due to
regional drought or other climatic events and
against difficulties in obtaining food through
international trade.
Based on this definition, it can be stated that the
main aspects and dimensions of food security are
food availability, food access and acquirement,
as well as food utilization for individuals at the
household level. Food availability deals with the
actual supply of foodstuffs in any country from
local production or imports. It involves sufficient
quantities of appropriate and necessary types of
food from domestic or local sources. According
to the International Fund for Agriculture
Development (IFAD, n.d.), food access and
acquirement refer to the ability of households to
acquire food for personal consumption through
production, exchange, or transfer. This means
that individuals in a household have adequate
sources of income to purchase or obtain the
levels of appropriate foods needed to maintain
consumption of an adequate diet or nutrition
level. It also involves the ability to cope with
shocks, as well as the ability to improve and
maintain the level of acquirement. Food access
and acquirement are important because not
having the resources to buy may contribute to
food insecurity even when enough food is
produced (IFAD, n.d.). Finally, food utilization
involves the appropriate use based on
knowledge of basic nutrition and care, food
processes and storage techniques, as well as
adequate water and sanitation. It entails the
situation where there is actual biophysical
consumption of food and whether or not that
food has adequate nutritional properties to
meet the basic health needs of any given
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population (Tweeten, 1999: 475; Jenkins and
Scanlan, 2001; IFAD, n.d.). Despite the different
definitions and dimensions, underlying all is the
idea that food security is about the ability of
households to easily have secure, quality and
culturally acceptable access to sufficient food for
a healthy life as and when they need it. This
Report, thus, adopts the perspective of
Devereux and Maxwell (2001) in conceptually
defining food security as the success of local
livelihood strategies to guarantee access to
sufficient and nutritious food at the household
or family level for a healthy life.
While food security is about having access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food, the idea of
food sovereignty emerged and developed in the
1990s as a reaction to the perceived failures and
weaknesses in the approach to attaining food
security. There was growing concern by
international civil society that the knowledge,
priorities and aspirations of small-scale
producers, and other citizens whose livelihoods
depend on food provisioning, were rarely
included in policy debates on the future of food,
farming and development (Edelman, 2003).
Thus, the idea of food sovereignty was launched
in the 1990s by the global farmers' movement
and transnational coalition, La Via Campesina.
The focus of food sovereignty, which adopts a
rights-based approach, is more on access to
productive resources (Windfuhr and Jonsén,
2005), and the international framework and
factors that contribute to food insecurity,
hunger, malnutrition and undernourishment
(Boyer, 2010). The need for food sovereignty in
Africa has received a lot of attention because of
its ability to provide the base from which local
decision-makers and professional organizations
can regain leadership in defining and directing
policies (SWAC, 2006). Indeed, the Declaration
of Nyéléni, which occurred in 2007 at the
International Forum for Food Sovereignty at
Sélingué, Mali, defined food sovereignty as the
right of people to have a healthy and culturally
appropriate food produced through ecologically
sound and sustainable methods and the right to
define their own food and agricultural system.
This Report, thus, operationally defines food
sovereignty as the process of restoring sectoral
policies and public intervention in the
agricultural sector (SWAC, 2006), as well as
placing food producers at the centre of the
agricultural system rather than the demands and
expectations of the big businesses and
corporations, the market, and international
forces (Boyer, 2010).
3.3 Causes of food insecurity- review
of evidence
(a) Policy Failures
While food insecurity occurs in many parts of
Africa, the extant literature is replete with
divergent conceptual and theoret ica l
perspectives and paradigms to explain it. Hence,
not only will it be impossible to be exhaustive in
terms of the factors behind food insecurity, but
also it is important to point out that rather than
one singular perspective, there is a diversity of
reasons and causes of food insecurity in Africa.
One of the earliest theories advanced to explain
food insecurity in Africa was offered by Robert
Bates (1981, 1988). Arguing from a rational
choice perspective, Bates (1981, 1988) asserts
that while most Africans dwell in the rural areas
and make a living in farming and the agricultural
sector, the policies undertaken by their
governments often go against the interests of
the farmers, and this for him contributes to a
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decline in food production to feed citizens.
According to him, African governments
generally try to increase agricultural supplies by
means of costly and inefficient state-run
projects, and subsidies for farm inputs, rather
than raising prices (Leys, 1996: 44). With support
from the urban el i tes and interests ,
governments pursue policies that take resources
away from the agriculture sector to advance the
supposed industrial development goals of their
countries. The nature of government policy
involved the extraction of rents and other
resources from the agricultural sector through
the activities of various marketing boards who
determined prices offered to farmers, most of
which were below the prices on the world
market. In addition, African governments
adopted the policy of subsidizing farm inputs like
machinery, fertilizer and seeds which are more
often used by large-scale farmers as opposed to
small-scale ones (Bates, 1981, 1988). While such
inefficient policies by governments created
market distortions and the misallocation of
resources, negatively impacted the collective
welfare, and were thus economically irrational,
Bates (1981, 1988) suggests that the policies
bring political benefits that enable the political
leaders to hold onto power. The collective
welfare would have been best served by
allowing prices for farm produce to rise in
response to conditions of demand and supply.
However, because large-scale farmers are few
and they benefit from subsidies on their input,
and urban workers are concentrated and more
easily organized and benefit from cheap food
(Leys, 1996: 45), African governments pursue
such policies because it is politically rational for
them.
In sum, declining agricultural output that
contributes to food insecurity in Africa is part of
the wider pattern whereby governments of all
ideological persuasions have tended to favor
projects in urban areas or on highly mechanized
export agriculture at the expense of small-scale
farmers (Cheru, 2002: 109). Central authorities
naively believe that they are better placed to
make key decisions on agricultural policy than
illiterate peasants. As a result, poor policies and
institutional failures have undermined the
productivity of peasant farmers and contributed
to food insecurity in Africa. The low prices
granted to farmers fuel the downward spiral in
agricultural output as the farmers switch to
other more lucrative activities outside of the
formal market (Cheru, 2002: 94-95). Given that
inappropriate and inefficient state-led policies
serve as a hindrance to the overall socio-
economic development of African countries,
Bates (1981, 1988) implies that it is important that
African countries pursue a much more neoliberal
and market-fr iendly approach in their
agricultural policy. Thus, by reducing the bias
against the agricultural sector and 'getting the
prices right,' the supply response by farmers will
dramatically improve and set the foundations for
a well-functioning market (Cheru, 2002: 92) that
can also help attain food security in Africa.
The argument by Bates (1981, 1988) has
however, come under criticism. As Leys
(1996:45-46) points out, Bates (1981) represents
low producer prices as 'exploitative' for
peasants and assumes that the resulting
surpluses cannot be used to invest in the
creation of a more diversified economy that
could ultimately serve the interests of
agriculture producers. Moreover, Bates (1981) is
criticized for relying on 'stylized facts' rather
than a systematic analysis of comparative
evidence to support his argument and
conclusions. This means that he simply proposed
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a general or common pattern, whose accuracy or
validity was supported only by reference to,
rather than general examples from, various
countries (Leys, 1996: 46).
(b) Institutional, structural and health-related
challenges
Aside from the Bates' rational choice paradigm,
there is the perspective and argument by Cheru
(2002) that many African countries face the
challenge of being food secure because of the
lack of investment in agriculture production,
insecure land tenure system, the lack of political
will, as well as inadequate support services and
infrastructure. According to Cheru (2002), land
degradation is becoming a major factor pushing
poor peasants in Africa off the land. Environmen-
tal degradation, desertification around fertile
lands that stem from global warming and climate
change, overgrazing, and biodiversity loss have
worsened the food insecurity situation of many
African countries. In particular, the depletion of
groundwater, decreasing of croplands, and the
dying of livestock has meant increasing poverty,
food insecurity and the subsequent movement
of the farming population. In addition, Cheru
(2002) notes that productivity decline in
agriculture and food insecurity can be explained
by the lack of extension services and the absence
of efficient research and inadequate training
opportunities. For example, the Development
Associates, Inc. (2003) report on Mozambique
that was prepared for USAID concluded that
farmers in that country lacked well-prepared
researchers, basic skills in areas important to
farming, trained technical extension specialists
serving rural areas, as well as basic business and
management skills. In Mozambique, as is the
case in many African countries, the provision of
extension services is small, and the majority of
farmers have low technical education. This is
exacerbated by inadequate marketing and
transport services. Because of transport
bottlenecks that stem from the poor state of
roads, short and expensive supply of motorized
transport services, farmers cannot market their
goods or access basic supplies in the major cities
(Development Associates, Inc., 2003).
Coupled with the above, the lack of proper
storage facilities leads to the situation where
many African farmers lose a significant amount
of harvested crops to pests and insects (Cheru,
2002). According to the FAO/World Bank (2011)
report, Missing Food: The Case of Post-harvest
Grain Losses in Sub-Saharan Africa, which was
produced in collaboration with the United
Kingdom's Natural Resources Institute, losses
occur when grain decays or are infested by pests,
fungi or microbes and physical losses are only
part of the equation. Losses can also be
economic, resulting from low prices and lack of
access to markets for poor quality grain, or
nutritional, arising from poor quality or
contaminated food. Physical grain losses prior to
processing, which range from 10 to 20%,
contribute to high food prices by removing part
of the food supply from the market. They also
have negative environmental impacts as land,
water and non-renewable resources such as
fertilizer and energy are used to produce,
process, handle and transport food that no one
consumes. Indeed, post-harvest grain losses in
sub-Saharan Africa stand at around US$4 billion a
year. This lost food, the FAO/World Bank (2011)
notes, could meet the minimum annual food
requirements of at least 48 million people. In
Eastern and Southern Africa alone, food losses
are valued at US$1.6 billion per year, or about
13.5% of the total value of grain production. While
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no similar regional loss estimates are available
for Central or West Africa, assuming losses of a
similar magnitude, the value of post-harvest
grain losses in sub-Saharan Africa could total
US$4 billion a year out of an estimated annual
grain production worth US$27 billion (2005-2007
annual average). This is roughly equivalent to the
value of annual cereal imports in the region
during the same period. Given the near doubling
of global grain prices since 2005-2007, the value
of current losses, according to the FAO/World
Bank (2011) is likely much higher.
As noted earlier, another trend of great concern
for farmers and food security in Africa is the
HIV/AIDS epidemic (Jayne et al., 2010: 1391). de
Waal and Whiteside (2003) have argued that the
food insecurity that has bedeviled much of
Southern Africa for example, was distinct from
the conventional drought-induced food
shortages with respect to those vulnerable to
starvation and the course of impoverishment
and recovery. For them, food insecurity in
Southern Africa was attributable to the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in the region. In their argument, they
hypothesized that caring for HIV/AIDS infected
and affected individuals take the productive
adults away from formal work. The implication
and consequence is that there are fewer working
adults, especially in the agriculture sector, and
that in turn contributes to a decline in
agricultural production and food insecurity. In
sum, household labor shortages attributable to
adult morbidity and mortality; the loss of assets
and skills from increased adult mortality; the
burden of care for sick adults and children
orphaned by AIDS have all contributed to food
insecurity in the Southern African region. This
argument is consistent with household survey
evidence from Kenya, Zambia, and Rwanda
which showed significant adverse impacts on the
crop output, assets, and non-farm income of
households incurring the death of a male
household head (Jayne et al., 2010: 1392).
(c) Maldistribution, natural hazards and
political crisis
Another reason for food insecurity in Africa and
other parts of the developing world has centered
o n i n c r e a s i n g m i s m a n a g e m e n t a n d
maldistribution of food supplies. Ehrlich et al.
(1993: 3-4) note that the persistent widespread
food insecurity and chronic undernourishment
result from maldistribution of otherwise
abundant food supplies and that better
distribution would solve the hunger problem.
For them, outright starvation today is primarily a
problem of food distribution failures, often
precipitated by political turmoil in an already
vulnerable, poorly nourished population as in the
tragic situation in Somalia and a few years ago in
Ethiopia and Sudan. Similarly, the political crisis
and the post-election violence of 2010 in Cote
d'Ivoire hindered food supply and food security
in parts of the country, as well as in neighboring
countries like Burkina Faso and Mali that are
heavily dependent on Cote d'Ivoire for food
supplies. Also, in Egypt, disruption to food
stocks, loss of manpower and population
movements which arose from the political
turmoil of 2011 has affected food security in the
country. The inability of farmers to get access to
seed, fertilizers and other resources because of
political instability has affected both the short
and long-term future of agricultural food
production, food security and income
generation. In effect, food insecurity can also be
explained by political crisis and maldistribution
resulting from poverty and related economic
factors. So the question is: does democracy lead
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to improved policy design? Evidence from the
ACI field survey shows that countries that have
had an election in the year prior to data collection
have outperformed those that have not in all
twelve measures of policy capacity except those
related to presence of an aid coordination policy
and mechanism, and embodying the principles of
equality of men and women in the national
constitution or appropriate legislation (see
Figure. 3.3). The data supports the conventional
wisdom that external influence through aid
declines under democracy as do some rights of
FIGURE 3.3
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Finally, one cannot ignore the fact that natural
hazards and droughts that stem from the lack of
seasonal rains do contribute to food insecurity in
many parts of Africa. The last two years has seen
some countries in the Horn of Africa (Somalia,
Djibouti, and Eritrea) as well as parts of East
Africa (Kenya, and Uganda) experience the
worst droughts in decades. Poverty, the
successive failed rains and pasture shortages,
together with an unstable social and political
environment that can be traced to increasing
civil strife and conflict, as well as the absence of
good governance have combined and
contributed to serious food crisis and food
insecurity in the Horn of Africa. In the face of the
worst drought in more than half a century and
the official declaration in July 2011 by the UN of a
famine in some areas of southern Somalia,
militant groups like al-Shabab banned and
denied some aid organizations like UN's World
Food Program and Mercy Corps access to areas
in southern Somalia to provide much needed
food to starving people. This shows the extent to
which food insecurity and famine, as Brunel
(2007) argues, is a political tool and can be used
as a weapon of war by some militant groups. So,
does democracy lead to better policy
implementation capacity? Countries with
elections under perform those with no elections
in the areas of: equity, aid coordination
mechanism and policy (Figure 3.4) Countries
with elections out-perform those with no
elections in: vulnerable groups, equal
opportunity, mainstreaming gender, ratifying
CEDAW, developing agricultural strategy,
endorsing the Paris Declaration, committing to
the MDGs and having legitimate strategy (Figure
3.5).
FIGURE 3.4
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(d)  International conditions and factors
While the domestic factors that contribute to
food insecurity in Africa cannot be ignored, it
would be disingenuous not to take into
consideration the international dimensions of
the problem. One such international factor
relates to the efforts to promote biofuels.
Montefrio and Sonnenfeld (2011) have pointed
out that governments throughout the world
have expressed their commitment to promote
biofuels by formulating and enacting new
policies and laws. Countries like Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru and Philippines have mandated
both the production of biofuels and their
blending with fossil fuels sold in retail fueling
stations. While these policies are seen as crucial
to advancing environmental policies by curbing
greenhouse gas emissions, reducing reliance on
fossil fuels, satisfying domestic energy needs in
the face of rising oil costs, and mitigating climate
change (Montefrio and Sonnenfeld, 2011; IFPRI,
2011), critics note that this has the propensity to
undermine food security and also force up global
food prices. Oxfam (2008) has pointed out that
the promotion of biofuels does not help food
security because at a time when food prices are
increasing, the United States and European
Union (EU) use as much as 15% of world maize
production to make fuel. Similarly, biofuels
absorbed around 20% of sugar cane in 2007-2009,
9% of oilseeds and coarse grains and 4% of sugar
beet. Thus, not only have biofuels sparked a
fierce “food versus fuel” debate since a spike in
food prices in 2007/08 that triggered riots in
some developing countries, but they have also
come under increasing scrutiny for encouraging
FIGURE 3.5
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deforestation, a side-effect that can sometimes
make their carbon footprint bigger than that of
fossil fuels (Dunmore, 2011). In addition, biofuels
increase stress on water resources and habitats
and accelerates the release of soil carbon into
the atmosphere, potentially undermining efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that many
governments hope to achieve through the use of
renewable fuels and alternative energy sources
(IFPRI, n.d.). In sum, not only can ethanol and
biofuels production lead to extensive
environmental problems, but also critics point
out that to use agriculture land for production of
goods other than food is unethical because it is
wrong to produce anything else but food when
people are starving (Swedish FAO Committee,
2009).
In addition, there is the argument by Daily and
Ehrlich (1996) that colonialism played a role in
the current food security predicament in many
African countries. According to this perspective,
colonial rule led to foreign businesses taking
over the arable and fertile lands of Africans, and
then pushing them to areas that were less fertile.
With many of the big foreign businesses
employing the land to produce primary products
like cocoa, tea, coffee and cotton for exports,
the less fertile land available to Africans to
produce food was simply unable to sustain the
needs of the local population. Consequently,
many post-colonial African states imported food
products to meet the needs of the population.
This restructuring of the economies of African
countries undermined the agricultural self-
reliance that they hitherto enjoyed (Daily and
Ehrlich, 1996). This situation has recently been
worsened by the increasing sale of land and
agricultural resources by African governments to
foreign nations such as Korea, China and India.
While often presented as way of addressing food
insecurity in Africa, unfortunately, many of the
foreign acquisitions and deals seem to be only
interested in taking advantage of the available
land and establishing bases in Africa to enable
them to feed the population of their home
countries. Aside from that, Boyle and Holben
(2006) attribute food insecurity in Africa to the
nature of international trade and the concomi-
tant debt of many countries on the continent.
For them, the increasing prices of imported
manufactured products relative to the primary
products exported by African countries means
that there is an unequal terms of trade between
African countries and the rest of the world. The
consequences are increasing payments on
interests to the West; funds that could have been
used to provide social welfare needs or improve
agricultural activities and reduce food insecurity.
3.4 Consequences of food insecurity
Whatever the causes, one thing that is undoubt-
edly clear is that food insecurity has a number of
negative consequences. First, food insecurity
contributes to inadequate dietary intakes,
reduced dietary diversity, and acute malnutri-
tion, which also has implications for the ability of
individuals to properly manage medical
situations and conditions. In addition, it limits the
choices that people have about education, as
well as the options that they have about work as
well as earn an income. Furthermore, the
negative consequences of food insecurity are
evident in the fact that it can lead to poor
physical, psychological, socio-emotional and
cognitive development of people, and especially
children's school attendance and adults' long
term income-earning ability (Drimie and Casale,
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2009: 30). In addition, food insecurity leads to
socio-emotional and behavioral problems such
as stress and anxiety, and also affects human
development. According to Drimie and Casale
(2009:31), food insecurity affects the ability to
recover from various stressors and other
socioeconomic shocks, and also adequately plan
or act for the future. They note that children
suffering from food insecurity do not have
access to adequate foundations such as
sufficient investment and attention to human
capital development that are essential to
achieving a stable existence in a fast changing
political economy. Aside from that, Jenkins and
Scanlan (2001) note that food insecurity and
malnutrition represent a major impediment to
the socioeconomic development and growth of
any society because they affect the ability of the
population to live and maintain normal lives and
be economically and socially productive. It is in
this regard that there is the need to urgently
increase food production to alleviate the
widespread food insecurity in the region (Kijima
et al., 2011), as well as overcome the negative
consequences of food insecurity.
3.5 Agriculture and poverty – young
people, women and livelihoods
Agricultural transformation in Africa should
promote sustainable livelihoods and contribute
to eradication of poverty, a moral and ethical
imperative rooted in principles that govern the
United Nations. To live a life free from poverty
and hunger is a fundamental human right
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Poverty is also a violation of social justice
standards, such that socioeconomic policy
should address issues of vulnerability,
discrimination and segregated development.
Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon that
was characterized in the Program of Action of
the 2005 World Summit for Social Development
(United Nations 2006, resolution 1, annex II) as
follows:
Poverty has various manifestations,
including lack of income and productive
resources suff ic ient to ensure
sustainable livelihoods; hunger and
malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack
of access to education and other basic
services; increased morbidity and
mortality from illness; homelessness
and inadequate housing; unsafe
environments; and social discrimina-
tion and exclusion. It is also character-
ized by a lack of participation in decision
making and in civil, social and cultural
life (para. 19) (UN, 2009).
Following the Millennium Summit of 2000,
eradicating poverty has been central to national
and international policy agendas and actions.
The overarching goal of the MDGs is to halve
world poverty between 2000 and 2015, with
targets for key dimensions of poverty, hunger,
disease, lack of shelter, and exclusion. The
ultimate development goals are improving living
conditions and empowering people to
participate fully in the economic, social and
political spheres.
Estimates of extreme poverty in developing
countries vary by data source, method of
calculation, and assumptions used – making
direct comparisons problematic. According to
the World Bank, extreme poverty in developing
countries decreased from 28% in 1990 to 19% in
2002, and was projected to fall to 10% by 2015
(World Bank, 2006a). Results to date have been
positive in East Asia and the Pacific, where the
target of the MDGs has already been achieved,
and in South Asia, where progress is on track. But
the proportion of people in Africa, particularly
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), who live in extreme
poverty, has changed little since 1990, and
remains at about 44% (World Bank, 2006a;
IAASTD, 2009b). Another recent estimate found
that the incidence of poverty in SSA fell
marginally from 54 to 51% between 1981 and 2005
(UN, 2009). Yet another source suggests a
dramatic decrease in extreme poverty in the
world, from over 1.3 billion in 2005 to under 900
million in 2010 (Chandy and Gertz, 2011). For SSA,
the percent living in poverty was 54.5% in 2005
and 46.9% in 2010. Despite progress, poverty is
increasingly viewed as an African problem.
Poverty reduction requires a combination of
economic growth and a reduction in inequality.
Progress in meeting the MDG poverty target is
seriously threatened by the worst financial and
economic crisis since the Great Depression of the
1930s, which followed immediately after the
surges in energy and food prices pushed another
115 million people into conditions of chronic
hunger in 2007 and 2008 (FAO, 2009b), as well as
hurt a large proportion of the lower and middle
classes in developed economies (UN, 2009). The
economic recession had a severe negative
impact on export revenues, foreign direct
investments and foreign migrant remittances
received by developing countries (FAO, 2011).
Based on the World Bank's new international
poverty line of US$1.25 purchasing power parity
dollars a day in 2005, contraction of the world
economy by 0.5-1.0% would add another 60
million people to the ranks of the poor in
developing countries (UN, 2009). Poverty and
inequality are closely related, and income and
wealth differentials have been rising internation-
ally and within countries where more than 80% of
the world's population lives. The poorest 40% of
the world's population accounts for only 5% of
global income, while the richest 20% accounts for
75% (UN 2009). Income and non-income
inequalities are high across Africa (Okojie and
Shimeles, 2006). The GINI coefficient, a measure
of inequality that ranges from 0 to 1, reveals that
Africa (0.444) was second only to Latin America
(0.493), and is followed by East Asia and the
Pacific (0.381), South Asia (0.319) in the 1990s
(IAASTD, 2009a).
The number of undernourished people in the
world was estimated as 1.02 billion in 2009 (FAO
2009a). Of these, nearly 90 percent were in Asia
and the Pacific (642 million) and Africa (265
million), including the additional 100 million
people pushed into hunger in 2009. Hunger
encourages child labor, leads to withdrawals
from schooling - particularly of girls, prompts
out-migration, prostitution, child trafficking, and
permanent destitution, and fuels conflicts (Lele
et al., 2010). The impact is most severe in Africa,
where many countries are highly dependent on
imported cereals (in some cases for up to 80 per
cent of dietary energy supplies) and undernour-
ishment is already widespread (FAO, 2009a).
Problems of children being underweight in Africa
are higher in rural (24.0%) than urban areas
(16.8%), and among the poorest quintile (28.8%)
compared to the richest quintile (15.3%) (FAO,
2011) . Afr ica 's aggregate agr icu l tura l
performance has lagged at the same time that it
confronts the most daunting demographic
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challenge of any developing region. Annual
flows for African agriculture fell from US$2 billion
in the mid-1980s to US$1 billion in early 2000s
(Haggblade et al., 2010a, 2010b).
While one billion people are currently hungry
every day, approximately the same number of
people were estimated to go hungry every day in
the late 1950s, even though the world's
population has more than doubled in the past
half century. Thus, substantial progress has been
achieved in increasing global food production.
However, rapid degradation of the world's
natural resource base, changes in rainfall and
moisture availability due to global climate
change, and volatility associated with closely
integrated international markets militate against
undue optimism. Learning from real successes in
agricultural development in Africa and
elsewhere is urgently needed and can provide
useful guidance in the way forward.
3.6 Sustainable livelihoods,
diversification and dynamics
The concept 'livelihoods' refers to the resources -
tangible and intangible - and strategies that
individuals and households use to meet their
needs (produce food, income, etc.) and
accomplish their goals. Livelihoods involve
households making choices, taking into account
the natural and institutional environments, to
combine resources in different production and
exchange activities, generate income, meet
various needs and goals, and adjust resource
endowments to sustain the process. Chambers
and Conway (1991:6) provided the most widely
used definition:
A livelihood comprises people, their
capabilities and their means of living,
including food, income and assets.
Tangible assets are resources and
stores, and intangible assets are claims
and access. A livelihood is environmen-
tally sustainable when it maintains or
enhances the local and global assets in
which livelihoods depend, and has net
beneficial effects on other livelihoods.
A livelihood is socially sustainable which
can cope with and recover from stress
and shocks, and provide for future
generations.
Access and rights to assets (resources),
particularly natural capital (land for agriculture
and grazing, forests, water, etc.) and the
conditions and security of access to these assets
fundamentally affect the livelihoods of the
world's poorest households. Other key
resources are human capital (health, education,
training, skills, labor power); physical capital
(technology, infrastructure, moveable
property); social capital (relations of cohesion,
trust, and reciprocity; networks; organizations;
leadership; linkages among organizations and
communities); financial capital (savings, credit,
etc.); political capital (connections to agents of
institutions of governance in the political and
administrative systems); and, cultural capital
(worldview, values, norms, identity).
The stock of productive assets that households
and individuals control largely determines their
ability to escape from poverty or to avoid it
despite adverse shocks. In a larger sense it
determines their structural position in society.
Productive assets are the durable inputs used to
grow crops and generate income. They also
serve as collateral for credit. Endowments of
assets such as labor, land and livestock influence
households' ability and willingness to risk
investing in emerging opportunities. The
socioeconomic mobility or immobility of
households and individuals over time reflect
their initial asset positions, the incomes and
security that their assets generate, variation in
households' experience of shocks, and their
propensity to take up promising new technologi-
cal and market opportunities (Barrett et al.,
2006).
Just as small scale farming households strive to
operate integrated farming systems with diverse
crops and livestock that meet an array of needs
(food security, nutrition, income), diversification
of income earning activities is important for
many households in rural Africa. Their livelihood
portfolios are diverse and evolving, and can be
considered as systems that generally involve an
integrated set of economic activities as they
adapt to changing domestic and external
circumstances, adding or dropping some
activities while continuing others. These may
include small-scale rural non-farm enterprises,
non-farm employment, and migration (commut-
ing, temporary, seasonal). Diversification of
livelihood activities can reduce risks and
vulnerability, and overcome the 'consumption-
smoothing' problem created by the seasonality
of output in rain-fed agriculture. It can also be
part of a strategy to accumulate assets.
Virtuous spirals of accumulation typically involve
diverse livestock ownership, engagement in
non-farm self-employment, and diversity of on-
farm and non-farm income sources (Ellis and
Freeman, 2004). Better off households tend to
diversify in non-farm business activities (trade,
transport, shop keeping, brickmaking) or
salaried employment. With the introduction of
improved technologies or new crops, political
and economic reforms, new opportunities are
accessible and attractive only to relatively
better-off households. Those with relatively
large initial holdings of land, livestock and adult
male labor power often systematically enjoyed
better yields and terms of trade and
accumulated wealth and remained secure in
their livelihoods (Barrett et al., 2006). The poor
tend to diversify in casual wage work while
remaining heavily reliant on subsistence crop
production (OECD 2006). While wealthier
households are able to smoothen consumption,
poorer households often do not use the few
assets they possess to stabilize consumption,
instead holding on to their limited assets, even if
it entails reduced food intake (Barrett et al.,
2006).
Economic diversification levels are higher and
more complex than official statistics indicate.
According to Ellis and Freeman (2004), the
contribution of non-farm sources to rural
household income was roughly 60% in South
Asia, 50% in sub-Saharan Africa, and 40% in Latin
America (OECD, 2006). The significance of
diversification may be multidimensional, both in
the short and long term. More diversified
household livelihoods may provide more capital
to invest in new agricultural technologies and
resource improvements and be better able to
withstand shocks and risks (IAASTD, 2009a).
Conversely, small farms that diversify may
prioritize non-farm activities which provide more
regular income, thereby giving lower priority to
farming and may not take up promising new
technology options that compete for their
available labor time. More broadly, institutional
settings shape property rights and access to
infrastructure and social support services.
Recent attention to technologies and markets
for rural poverty reduction has increased analysis
of geographic and socio-political factors that
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condition uptake of improved technologies and
market access (Barrett et al., 2006).
Control of resources determines household
resilience when food production and incomes
fluctuate in response to changing economic
conditions or natural disasters. Options in
livelihood strategies are affected by economic,
social and cultural considerations (e.g., what is
considered appropriate according to gender,
age, status). The range of livelihood 'choices' is
generally more restricted among the asset poor.
Moreover, some livelihood strategies may
compete for the same resources (Hanson, 2005).
Tradeoffs among different components of the
resource endowment illustrate why simple or
short-term definitions of poverty, hunger and
food security provide an incomplete understand-
ing of household's livelihood strategies. This has
i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r e c o n o m i c
sustainability, environmental sustainability and
social equity (IAASTD, 2009b).
Sustainable livelihoods approaches (SLAs) to
rural development represent an evolution in
development thinking but also a significant
breakthrough by focusing on lives rather than
project resources and outputs. SLAs embody
principles that have emerged through critical
reflection on decades of successful - and
unsuccessful - rural development experience.
Key principles are: being people-centered
(primarily households and communities);
starting with a focus on strengths rather than
problems and needs; taking a long-term
perspective (retrospective and prospective);
operating in a participatory, socially inclusive,
and dynamic (flexible and responsive) manner;
utilizing a holistic (multidimensional and multi-
level) perspective; and explicitly committing to
long-term sustainability. The unique contribu-
tions of SLAs involve understanding the portfolio
of livelihood activities (producing food and
earning income), improving access to critical
resources, strengthening capabilities and social
protection to effectively utilize resources,
building a diversified set of assets, reducing
vulnerability to risks (shocks and stresses), and
increasing resilience (Ellis and Freeman, 2004,
2005).
The variety of livelihood activities and strategies -
within agriculture and involving other sectors of
the economy – affect the quantity and composi-
tion of resource endowments over time.
Livelihoods depend not only on current incomes
but on how individuals, households, and nations
use resources over the long term. Physical and
financial capital are critical and their stocks and
flows can be measured relatively easily. Equally
important but less easily measured are
sustainable use of natural capital and investment
in human and social capital. Yet the quality and
quantity of the household's resources depend,
at least in part, on the consumption and
investments made previously. For example, a
household makes decisions about how much of
its income to spend on food, health care or
education (each of which affects the quality of its
labor resources), how much to spend on seeds,
fertilizer and other agricultural inputs, and how
much to save or invest in other ways. “Once we
recognize the dynamic interaction between
household resources, choices, and outcomes, it
becomes clear that a more complete
understanding of hunger and poverty requires
not only a broader understanding of the factors
that affect them, but also a longer-term
perspective on how they interact over time”
(IAASTD, 2009b:27). This means that social and
spatial factors have also to be taken into account
to define poverty, which increases the
complexity of its quantitative measure.
Different resource endowments and different
goals imply different incentives, choices, and
livelihood strategies. For example, two
households that have the same endowments of
land, labor, and materials may choose different
cropping strategies if one household does not
have access to savings, credit or insurance and
the other one does. In this case, the first
household may choose to plant a safe but low
yielding crop variety while the second household
will plant a riskier variety - expecting higher yields
while at the same time knowing that additional
financial capital could help sustain income (and
consumption levels) even if it were to suffer a
poor harvest. Likewise, different livelihood
strategies and different weather and market
conditions imply different outcomes, which in
turn imply different endowments. In the
example just mentioned, the first household may
suffer smaller losses in a drought year, but also
[experience] smaller gains in average and good
years. Even when both households suffer losses,
their coping strategies might differ. The first, in
order to meet consumption needs, might be
forced to sell assets. If many other households
are in a similar position, asset prices might fall,
making it even more difficult to exchange them
for sufficient food. Households with sufficient
food or financial reserves, by contrast, may be in
a position to buy assets at discounted prices,
increasing not only their own ability to survive
future droughts but also the degree of inequality
in the region (IAASTD, 2009b:29-30).
Sustainability can be understood in terms of
maintaining or increasing a household's ability to
produce desired goods and services - which may
or may not involve maintaining or increasing the
level of each particular component of the
household's resource endowment.
Vulnerability and resilience are key SLA concepts.
The concept of vulnerability captures the
likelihood that people will fall into poverty
because of economic shocks or personal
mishaps. Small scale farmers are very aware of
their vulnerabilities to multiple risks – including
direct drivers (diseases, pests, climate, natural
disasters) and indirect drivers (markets,
infrastructure and external inputs). Therefore,
they adopt diverse risk-minimizing and
mitigating strategies (IAASTD, 2009b).
Vulnerability to these risks is a result of poverty
and socioeconomic position, influenced by social
dimensions such as income levels, asset
ownership, ethnicity, age, class, and gender
(World Bank, 2009a). Resilience refers to the
capacity of an individual, household or
community to cope with a stress or shock,
overcome adversity or adapt positively to
change. The ability to 'bounce back' from
negative experiences (drought, flood, illness,
injury, or death), rather than lose income and
assets, may reflect the innate qualities of
individuals or be the result of experience and
learning. Resilience can be developed and
enhanced to promote greater wellbeing. It is a
complex construct with many interrelated
factors: experience, learning, sense of purpose,
positive outlook, social networks and support,
infrastructure, and support services (Hegney et
al., 2008).
Because commonly used poverty measures are
generally static, they tend to miss this dynamic
aspect of poverty. Unlike poverty, which is
assessed after the fact, vulnerability “focuses on
assessing the extent of the threat of poverty or
low well-being, measured , before the veilex ante
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of uncertainty has been lifted” (Dercon, 2005).
Vulnerable households deal with shocks by
selling assets, which are very difficult to rebuild,
by reducing food consumption in terms of
quantity and variety, and reducing or eliminating
health and education expenditures. These ex
post coping mechanisms have long-term
negative effects on quality of life and long term
viability of livelihoods (FAO, 2011). Practical
Action has developed the framework 'From
Vulnerability to Resilience' for analysis and action
to reduce vulnerability and strengthen the
resilience of individuals, households and
communities. It sets out the key factors that
contribute to peoples' vulnerability, explains the
links between these factors, and includes ideas
for action to strengthen resilience (Pasteur,
2011).
For many, the core component of SLA
frameworks concerns access to and control over
assets. However, the real value of SLA
frameworks concerns much more than assets.
SLAs reflect an integrated conceptualization of
'structure' and 'agency' that is essential in
addressing poverty. They involve identification
and multi-sectoral analysis of contextual factors,
condit ions and trends (demographics,
environment, markets, policies), institutions and
organizations that influence access to and use of
livelihood resources, the portfolio of livelihood
activities (food production and income earning),
and outcomes in terms of well-being and
sustainability (Hussein, 2002).
SLAs are being applied and adapted to a range of
different development challenges – particularly
community-driven development, making
markets work for the poor, food security,
disaster-risk reduction, and climate change
adaptation. “The language has changed so much
in the last 15 years – from thinking about an
'adequate' and 'decent' standard of living to
'livelihoods strengthening,' 'l ivelihoods
diversification' and beyond that linking to
discourses on climate change, resilience, and
power – these all present big steps forward”
(Turrall, 2011:1). Earlier criticisms are resulting in
changes in practitioners' methods and areas of
work to increase accountability to local
populations, not just donors. These include:
greater emphasis on understanding cultural and
social contexts and on organizational learning to
improve outcomes; commitment to changing
power relations related to control over assets
between men and women, commercial and
political actors, and community organizations
and local governance structures; and willingness
to engage in policy making processes in ways
that link micro and macro arenas.
3.7 Gender and livelihoods
Despite their central role in agricultural value
chain across Africa, women are faced with many
factors that constrain their effective participa-
tion in achieving food security. Women are
typically marginalized at household, production
and consumption levels. They are usually
responsible for most activities in agricultural
production, but are often prohibited from
making household decisions about land
selection, labor and expenditures (FAO, 2011).
The general lack of access to credit and
microfinance makes it harder for women to hire
labor, access new technologies, purchase inputs
such as fertilizer and improved seed varieties
that could increase yields, grow crops that
require cash investments, or buy land. Women
often have limited access to markets for cash
crops, as markets generally are established and
maintained through relationships among men.
Agricultural production and household
management leave women 'time poor.' The use
of improved farm implements and appropriate
mechanization can increase productivity, reduce
drudgery, conserve labor and ensure timely farm
operations while mitigating pressure on women.
However, adoption of strategies that primarily
benefit women may be inhibited by men, who
often have greater decision-making power.
Gender differences in access to and control over
assets also dictate power asymmetries and
negotiating power between men and women
within the household and community (World
Bank, 2009a). When women are not prohibited
from accessing land, labor and credit, their
management skills result in adoption of new
input packages and yields that are similar to
those of men (IAASTD, 2009a; Haggblade, 2010).
Significantly, addressing the 20-30% yield gap
between women and men farmers due to input
differentials could increase aggregate domestic
production by 2.5-4%, and reduce the number of
undernourished people by 12-17% (FAO, 2011).
The vital role of women farmers requires
measures to increase their managerial and
technical capacity and to empower them to play
a dynamic role in implementing future
improvements at market, institutional and policy
levels (Dixon et al., 2001). The failure to
incorporate women's roles in implementing
technological change has three interrelated
consequences with significant implications:
First, there is loss of adaptive efficiency
from not taking their operational
knowledge into consideration; second,
there is a reduction in women's
household bargain ing posit ion
accompanied by an increase in their
work. Third, there are lower adoption
rates due to their lack of access to
technology and training and failure by
the proponents of the technology to
address women's time constraints”
(IAASTD, 2009a:42).
Mainstreaming gender analysis in project design,
implementation, monitoring and policy
interventions is thus an essential part of
implementing an integrated approach in
agricultural development (IAASTD, 2009b).
Women's access to land and their degree of land
tenure security on private and communal lands
can be improved through the implementation of
land policies and laws oriented towards equal
rights for men and women. Although many
countries are at an advanced stage in the
formulation of gender sensitive policies, laws,
and other instruments, implementation is slow
(e.g., women received only 20% of land under the
recent Zimbabwe land reforms). “To catalyze
implementation, reforms can be accompanied
by mechanisms such as the harmonization of
laws related to inheritance, marriage and
property rights. In addition, political will and
clear guidelines and benchmarks for monitoring
implementat ion to al low appropr iate
authorities, including citizens, to hold
governments accountable in this regard are
more likely to lead to successful implementation
of land reforms” (IAASTD, 2009a:108). It is
noteworthy that village land councils in Tanzania
which settle land disputes are comprised of
seven members, at least three females (Ikdahl,
2008). Ethiopia's land certification process has
also been hailed as effective, low-cost, rapid and
transparent, and gender equity goals have been
advanced because land administration
committees at the local level are required to
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have a least one female member. Ethiopia's land
program also requires that certificates for
women bear their photographs to help retain
control over their land.
Despite lingering cultural biases, progress has
been made in a number of African countries
(Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Zambia and
Zimbabwe) in terms of improving women's
access to productive resources. Recent
diversification in food production in Malawi
away from green revolution technologies
(hybrid maize) to traditional, female entitled
crops (roots, tubers and legumes) was initiated
by women. Women now dominate the supply of
fresh produce and its sale in daily markets found
in towns, cities and along transport routes and
weekly rural circuit markets. This has also
opened a range of small, medium and micro
enterprise opportunities, again largely
dominated by women, in agro-processing, and in
the production and sale of food and alcohol.
Strengthening of gender entitlements was
crucial in lessening impacts of southern Africa
severe drought 2001-2002. In Zambia, women
drove crop diversification that made alternative
staple crops available, women had disposable
income from market gardening and small
enterprises to purchase imported maize, and
women initiated vegetable gardens that would
enable the maintenance of nutritional security at
household level (Charman, 2008).
Creation of community-level water harvesting
facilities and land rehabilitation initiatives are an
important element in Ethiopia's Productive
Safety Net Program (since 2005) that reaches 7
million chronically food-insecure individuals
(FAO, 2011). In Kenya, women farmers pooled
their land parcels and organized themselves to
establish savings associations, improve access to
land, credit and information, and obtain better
trade terms with stockists and traders. Recent
evidence from Malawi confirms that increasing
women's – but not men's – access to credit
increases total household expenditures on food
and improves the long-term food security of
young female children (Hazarika and Guha-
Khasnobis, 2008). Improved gender equality in
access to opportunities and returns to assets not
only improve nutrition, health and education
outcomes, but can also have a long-lasting
impact on economic growth by raising the level
of human capital in society.
The most significant impact of livelihood
initiatives has been through fostering women's
organization and participation in farmer
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . S t a t e c o m m i t m e n t t o
mainstreaming opportunities for women - with
support from NGOs, has facilitated women's
entry into farmers clubs and groups, enabling
women to access institutional finance, inputs,
and support in marketing (Charman, 2008). In
Malawi's farmer organizations, women are
strongly represented in most district and
national organizations (apart from dairy
cooperatives and tobacco clubs). These
representations are particularly strong in the
poultry sector. An important underlying change
for advancing women's rights in Ghana, Rwanda
and Zambia is reform of inheritance laws
regarding property and agricultural land. Thus,
changes in both state and market are essential to
improve livelihood opportunities for women,
reduce poverty, and improve food security and
household level well-being.
3.8 Land, soil fertility management,
and irrigation
Small farms of less than two hectares occupy 60%
of the arable land worldwide, constitute 90% of
the world's 525 million farms, and contribute
substantially to global farm production. In Africa,
90% of agricultural production is derived from
small farms (IAASTD, 2009b). Average farm size
varies considerably by region: Africa 1.6 hectares
(ha), Asia 1.6 ha, Western Europe 27 ha, Latin
America and Caribbean 67 ha, and North America
121 ha. Geography and natural resource
endowments represent a series of concerns and
challenges for agriculture in Africa. Only 8% of
Africa's land is arable and permanent cropland.
Africa's geological stability has resulted in a high
proportion of low-fertility soils. In the absence of
volcanic rejuvenation, cycles of weathering,
erosion and leaching on the continent over the
years have left soils inherently low in nutrients.
There is a wide diversity of soil types, differing
dramatically in their ability to retain and supply
nutrients to plants, to hold or drain water, to
withstand erosion or compaction and to allow
for root penetration. About 55% of the continent
is considered unsuitable for cultivated
agriculture. Of the remaining land, 16% is
considered high quality, 13% medium, and 16% of
low potential. Over 40% (95 million hectares) of
land in SSA has been degraded to the point of
greatly reduced productivity (Livingston et al.,
2011). Approximately 25% of soils in Africa are
acidic, and deficient in phosphorus, calcium and
magnesium with often toxic levels of aluminum
(Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994; IAASTD, 2009a). Its
tropical climate precludes freezing winter
temperatures that in temperate latitudes help to
control pests and fracture soil clods and plow
pans to facilitate plant root development.
Endowed with a paucity of domesticable plant
and animal species, African farmers have
operated with a restricted agricultural genetic
base (Haggblade et al., 2010a). Last but not
least, given the continent's limited irrigation
potential, most farmers depend on rain fed
cultivation often under difficult climatic
conditions.
Efforts to improve soil fertility are necessary,
though it is recognized that no single approach is
sufficient. Although many farmers have
developed soil management strategies to cope
with the poor quality of their soil, low inputs of
nutrients, including organic matter, contribute
to poor crop growth and the depletion of soil
nutrients (IAASTD, 2009a). Integrated soil
fertility management, utilizing techniques that
conserve and concentrate soil moisture and
organic matter and apply organic fertilizers
(compost, manure, green manure) and
reasonable quantities of inorganic fertilizers is an
approach adaptable to locally available
resources (IAASTD, 2009a). Involving farmers in
soil fertility research improves the likelihood of
recommendations that are more relevant to
farmers' situations (CIAT, 2002). On-farm
experiments with farmers are more likely than
on-station research to identify green manures
with food or forage uses that are best suited and
will be adopted by farmers, and can facilitate
estimation of realistic rates of return to different
technologies (IAASTD, 2009a).
Many improved agronomic management
practices that do not involve recurrent input or
marketing subsidies can effectively boost farm
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productivity. Some ready examples can be cited
(Haggblade, 2010:325-326; IAASTD, 2009a:18):
 dry season minimum tillage enables
improved timing of key on-farm
operations, better moisture retention,
improved fertilizer responsiveness, and
long-term soil fertility maintenance;
 timely planting, weeding and surveillance
can help limit damage from pests and
diseases;
 managed fallows of two years using
carefully selected varieties of leguminous
shrubs, followed by two or three seasons
of staple food production, enables
farmers to supplement soil nitrogen
levels biologically, thus reducing reliance
on inorganic fertilizers; and
 n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e m a n a g e m e n t ,
integrated soil fertility management, soil
a n d w a t e r c o n s e r v a t i o n , a n d
conservation agriculture are broad sets
of practices.
While the most dramatic yield increases result
from improved management practices
combined with new input packages, realization
of such increases is complicated by on-the-
ground-realities in Africa. Many new technolo-
gies have been and are being introduced with
great promise of increasing agricultural
production. Dissemination of new input
packages can raise productivity while essentially
maintaining conventional management
practices. However, adoption tends to be slower
for management intensive production packages
because behavioral change requires greater
levels of extension support. Farmers commonly
cite problems (non-availability, late delivery,
prohibitive prices) with inputs (hybrid seeds,
fertilizers, pesticides), and weak or non-existent
e x t e n s i o n s e r v i c e s ( I A A S T D , 2 0 0 9 a ) .
Interestingly, while women consistently have
less access to these inputs than men, improved
fallow and conservation farming techniques
which emphasize careful labor management and
minimize cash inputs appear to attract women
adopters as readily as men (Haggblade, 2010).
Because investments in better natural resource
management yield payoffs over the long term,
they require secure long-term property rights
over resources. Inadequate land tenure
structures are still a major obstacle to
sustainable agriculture and rural development in
many countries (Haggblade, 2010a, 2010b,
IAASTD, 2009a). Formal land title is not required
for farmers' long-term investments, but that
individual farmers truly perceive their claims to
farming land as sufficiently secure to invest in
adoption of new technologies. Women's weaker
rights to land and tenure security are a constraint
to meeting sustainability and development
goals. More research is needed on how land
tenure systems and property rights can be
developed that benefit women and minority
groups such as pastoralists (IAASTD, 2009a).
Table 3.5 overleaf contains descriptive
information regarding the area and population in
nine major farming systems in Africa. The three
most significant farming systems are (1) mixed
cereal and root crop, (2) mixed maize, and (3)
root crop. All were assessed as having medium
to high potential for agricultural growth and
poverty reduction (Dixon et al., 2001). The
assessment characterized the relative
importance of household strategies for poverty
reduction. In mixed cereal and root crop
systems, the most appropriate strategies are
intensification, increasing farm size, and
diversification. In mixed maize systems,
diversification is most strongly encouraged. In
root crop systems, diversification and
intensification are recommended. Tree crop
systems also have medium potential for growth
and poverty reduction, and are favored for
intensification. For most other systems, there is
little scope for intensification, diversification,
increasing farm size, or increasing off-farm
income; instead, it is expected that many living in
such systems will find employment outside
agriculture.
The Pan-African Land Initiative aims to develop a
land reform framework and guidelines to
facilitate the formulation and implementation of
land policies. Led by the African Union in
collaboration with the Economic Commission for
Africa and the African Development Bank, a
series of sub-regional consultations designed to
ensure that regional realities and initiatives
inform the continental framework. This
consultative process, involving key stakeholders
in land and natural resource issues, can ensure
the necessary political will for the adoption and
implementation of the framework and
guidelines in accordance with NEPAD's African
Peer Review Mechanism framework (IAASTD,
2009a).
C o m m u n i t y - b a s e d n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e
management (CBNRM) approaches view local
people as capable of managing lands and natural
resources through locally devised rules based on
specific contexts and procedures. They
strengthen and support local institutions to
effectively use and manage natural resources.
Successful CBNRM requires genuine proprietor-
ship - the right to use resources, and determine
rules of access, modes of usage, and distribution
of benefits. Some important ecological,
economic, and institutional achievements across
Africa are (Roe et al., 2009):
 In Namibia communal land conservancies
cover more than 14% of the country,
involve over 200,000 people and earn
US$ 2.5 million per annum. Key wildlife
resources have recovered and illegal use
of wildlife has fallen.
 In Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE generated $20
million in revenues for local communities
and district governments 1989-2001, with
40,000 km of communal land being
2
managed for wildlife production.
Stakeholders have adapted to the current
economic and political crises by forming
new types of relationships to maintain
w i l d l i f e p r o d u c t i o n s y s t e m s o n
communal land.
 In Tanzania, more than 3.6 million
hectares of forests and woodlands are
managed as Village Land Forest Reserves,
entirely under the control of locally
elected village governments, or as co-
managed forests between villages and
either local or central government.
 In Kenya, development of community-
level wildlife-based tourism ventures on
communal and private land is making a
major contribution to national conserva-
tion efforts.
 In Cameroon, revisions of forestry laws
have enabled community associations
and cooperatives to acquire exclusive
rights to manage and exploit 5,000 ha of
customary forest, under a 15-year
contract, resulting in the creation of 100
new Community Forests.
 In Ghana, 200,000 hectares of forest have
been demarcated under the Community
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Irrigation has long been seen as an option for
improving rural livelihoods in Africa by increasing
crop production (Table 3.6). The steady increase
in the amount of agricultural land irrigated
worldwide in the last 50 years has mostly
occurred in Asia, where irrigated land has
increased from 27% to around 36%. In contrast,
only 11% of land is irrigated in Latin America and
the Caribbean, and about 4% Africa (Livingston et
al., 2011; World Bank, 2007a).
While there is considerable potential to expand
irrigation in Africa, opportunities vary greatly
across the region, due to differences in rainfall,
renewable water resources and land. While
some areas have high irrigation potential, they
also receive abundant rainfall, making irrigation
less crucial; others receive less rain, but have less
water from which to draw. An important
consideration in any expansion of irrigation is
access to fresh water supplies and aquifers, and
possible overtaxing the recharging capacity of
such areas. One-third of the irrigation potential is
concentrated in two very humid countries: the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola
(Livingston et al., 2011).
Experiences to date with irrigation in Africa
reveal mixed results. Massive investments in
formally structured irrigation schemes during
the 1970s and 1980s did not meet food
production targets, had extremely high costs,
and revealed technical and management
problems that remain unsolved. Organized
efforts by funders and governments to
accelerate development are predominantly 'top
down' with limited farmer participation and
inadequate understanding of markets. Modern
piped irrigation technologies (trickle/drip or
sprinkle) can raise the productivity of water and
labor, but are afforded mainly by richer farmers
growing cash crops (vegetables, fruits, flowers).
Expansion of irrigated agriculture has often been
at the expense of other water users, biodiversity,
ecosystem services, fisheries and wetlands.
Nonetheless, smallholder irrigation has
demonstrated success stories, particularly
where farmers have made the investments
themselves. Successful smallholders generally
use simple technologies (water harvesting,
TABLE 3.6
Irrigation Potential – Selected African Countries
Country Irrigation Potential (ha) % of Potential Used
DR Congo 7,000,000 0
Liberia 600,000 3
Angola 3,700,000 6
Burkina Faso 165,000 28
Kenya 353,060 31
Senegal 409,000 37
Zambia 523,000 49
Botswana 13,000 61
South Africa 1,500,000 100
Source: Mazur, 2011a
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swamp irrigation, spate irrigation, flood plain
irrigation using seasonal water and shallow
aquifers, hill irrigation, and groundwater
irrigation), have secure water supplies over
which they have full control, and are funded by
farmers' own resources. More successful
technologies improve existing farming systems
rather than introduce radically new ideas. The
broader context for technology uptake includes:
market-driven demand for agricultural produce;
a well-designed technology that is appropriate
and affordable for local farming and manufactur-
ing systems; a local private sector capable of
mass producing reliable equipment; and
effective private sector distribution networks
(Kay, 2001).
Small-scale does not mean simple. Complex
social, economic, technical and institutional
issues surrounding smallholder irrigation
schemes, making each unique and demonstrat-
ing the importance of getting the mixture right.
Moreover, farmers' participation as 'owners' not
'beneficiaries' is essential in planning, implemen-
tation and evaluation (FAO, 2000). In Chitora,
Zimbabwe, a successful farmer-managed small-
scale scheme irrigates nine hectares with drag-
hose sprinklers since 1994. The government
extension agency Agritex provided training,
extension services, and all the inputs for the
scheme, including seeds for the first growing
season. Young farmers (mid-20s) were involved
from planning to implementation, and now have
full responsibility for operation, maintenance,
and financing. They grow high value horticultural
crops for markets in Harare, earning four times
more than unskilled laborers in town. Their
Irrigation Management Committee enforces by-
laws, coordinates activities, and manages
finances. The farmers' sense of 'ownership' and
responsibility are essential elements. In contrast,
the large scale (216 ha with 154 plots 0.5-1.5 ha)
Ngezi Mamina, Zimbabwe, a government-built
(mid-1990s) and run irrigation scheme, had
difficulty getting farmers to 'own' the scheme
constructed without their input 'for their
benefit.' Gravity-fed sprinklers draw on a dam to
irrigate low value crops with few high value
vegetables. There are regular disputes between
farmers and government which still runs the
scheme and pays for electricity, water and
services (Merrey et al., 2008; Kay, 2001).
Institutional reform of large-scale irrigation
schemes also heralds some encouraging
successes. In the 1970s, Mali's Office du Niger
large irrigation scheme was in disarray as a result
of highly centralized top-down management. In
the 1980s, its mission was redefined - introducing
strong private sector incentives in its
management, empowering farmers, and
building a strong coalition of stakeholders. The
scheme's greater efficiency quadrupled yields,
and overall production increased by a factor of
5.8 between 1982 and 2000. Attracted by
employment opportunit ies, the area's
population increased by a factor of 3.5, and
poverty fell more than in other areas (World
Bank, 2007a).
Communal irrigation can also work well, with 700
successful small (<20 ha) village schemes
established in the 1990s in Senegal. Typically,
40–80 equal size plots are supplied by an open
channel system fed by 15 kW (20hp) engine
pumps from the Senegal River. Farmers cleared
bush and dug canals, and requested assistance
from the local government for site survey,
equipment for construction, pump-set, and
pipes. Elements of success include (Diemer and
Huibers, 1996):
 Pursuit of a clear economic objective;
 Selection of sites not usually used for
agriculture;
 Construction through investment of
labor by farmers (using donor-funded
equipment); and
 Full autonomy for each village scheme –
h y d r a u l i c a l l y , o p e r a t i o n a l l y a n d
managerially.
Even success can generate some problems. The
introduction of treadle pumps resulted in
significant (six fold) income gains in Zambia due
to increased area irrigated, crop varieties grown,
and cropping intensity (three crops annually).
Higher yields created a market glut when most
farmers grew the same crops at the same time.
Their ability to exploit distant markets was
limited by transport costs and poorly developed
feeder roads in remote rural areas. Another
challenging element concerns increasing equity
and security, goals in almost all irrigation
projects. In Tanzania and Ghana, one-third of
irrigated plots were allocated to women. In
addition, women contributed much of their labor
towards scheme construction to assure
themselves of a plot or extra income. Men
generally decide land tenure issues in The
Gambia, Mali, and Senegal, despite project
initiatives (Kay, 2001).
3.9 Conclusion
As is relatively well-known, poverty in Africa has
remained pervasive – and especially in rural and
peri-urban areas and among women. Promotion
of agricultural transformation that markedly
increases production, productivity, and incomes
in Africa and constitutes 'development' as
reflected in the Millennium Development Goals
requires serious, thoughtful attention to poverty
reduction and sustainable livelihoods among
smallholder farmers. Smallholder households'
ability and willingness to invest in emerging
opportunities requires assistance initiatives that
are consistent with their goals and values. This
involves support for diverse livelihood activities
that can: strengthen resilience and reduce risks
and vulnerability of individuals, households and
communities to shocks and stresses; reliably
increase incomes; and facilitate accumulation of
various types of valued assets. Meaningful
assistance begins with analyses of current
portfolios of livelihood activities and fully
understanding strengths before identifying
vulnerabilities, problems and needs. It involves
removing barriers and improving access to
critical resources, strengthening capabilities to
effectively utilize resources, and social
protection.
Given women's central roles with both food and
cash crops, and their management skills for
utilizing new input packages and producing
yields comparable to those of men, it's essential
to ensure that women are able to effectively
access land, education, agricultural extension,
credit, inputs, and small business assistance
programs. This requires concerted effort to
overcome cultural and institutional barriers, and
improve laws related to inheritance, marriage
and property rights. Women's access to land and
land tenure security can be improved through
implementation of land policies and laws
oriented towards equal rights for men and
women. Efforts by governments and civil society
to foster formation and strengthening of
women's organization and participation in
farmer associations will prove beneficial. More
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than that, women should be key players in
participatory processes involving communities
and other stakeholders to set public investment
priorities and deliberate policies. Formal land
title is less important than farmers' understand-
ing that their claims to land are sufficiently
secure to invest in new technologies. Better
understanding of the link among these various
factors will make African countries be better
prepared in their attempts to transform the
agricultural sectors and achieve food security
and food sovereignty.
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4.0 Introduction
There is considerable consensus on the significance of the agricultural sector to national development
in most, if not all, African countries (Bruntrup, 2011; Diao et al., 2007; World Bank, 2007a; NEPAD, 2003,
2001). The sector not only contributes to the economy, but it is also essential to socio-cultural and
political relations. Agriculture provides a direct source of employment and livelihood for a sizeable
proportion of the society, contributing to gross domestic production and essential for creating value
as well as wealth (Chuhan-Pole and Angwafo, 2011; World Bank, 2007a). Agriculture provides
employment, and is therefore a source of income. The performance of the agricultural sector has
implications for addressing the food security needs in particular and human security in general. There
is therefore a general understanding and expectation that the development prospects in Africa are
inextricably linked to the performance of the agricultural sector. This Chapter reviews the nature of
agricultural policies and role of the state in their development in Africa.
The focus on policy and the state is well placed in extricating the key questions and critical factors
driving performance of the agricultural sector and its contribution to development results. The
policy-state interface allows us to draw conclusions on several dimensions of capacity; mainly policy
capacity and implementation capacity. The kinds of skills and capabilities needed to effectively
manage the sector and its contribution to development are also identified through focus on the
policy-state interface, thus making it possible to comment on issues of capacity development (see
Chapter 1).
Agricultural Policies in Africa
and the Role of the State
4.1 Rethinking agricultural policies -
context and problem
Since independence, there has been a long list of
policy initiatives that were supposed to bring
new perspectives and approaches to Africa's
development. Most of the initiatives were
proposed by African institutions, sometimes, in
partnership with their global partners, including
bilateral and multilateral institutions. More of
these initiatives have emerged recently.
An initial point of departure was the influential
Organization of the African Union-sponsored
1980 , which was followed byLagos Plan of Action
the World Bank 1981 study, Accelerated
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, that
launched the region's structural adjustment
program. Furthermore, at the beginning of the
current millennium, the African Union in 2001
launched the New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) and the subsequent
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
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Programme (CAADP) in 2003. Another initiative is
the UN (2003) Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), in which member states of the world
body pledged to, by 2015, among other things,
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger for major
segments of the population and forge global
partnerships for development. Finally, there is
the World Bank's (2007a) World Development
Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, which,
as the title indicates, was exclusively devoted to
agricultural issues.
While the overall motivation of these initiatives
to promote global development is laudable, the
nature and impact of global development varies
among countries and within populations in
respective countries. The African continent is
one region of the world where the fruits of global
development are yet to reduce inequality and its
harmful effects. Africa's development malaise
informed the profound statement a decade ago
by Tony Blair, the then British Prime Minister,
when he opined that the “state of Africa is a scar
on the conscience of the world” (cited in Mann,
2001). Blair therefore established the
Commission for Africa (2005) to offer him some
policy guidance on the region when Britain
assumed the presidency of the Group of Eight
(G8) industrialized countries in 2005. While it is
customary for national leaders, in the lead-up to
G-8 Summits, to stake out an agenda that
includes Africa the real issue is the extent to
which G8 policy announcements are consistent
to the development agenda of African countries
let alone there being consistency in implementa-
tion of the announcements (G8 Research Group,
2006; Maxwell, 2005; Booth, 2005).
There is no dispute about the fact that there has
not been a shortage of development policy
initiatives on Africa. However, Africa's
development prospects, even in the face of
numerous policies, remain fragile and uncertain
(United Nations, 2011a; Seck and Busari, 2009;
Taeb and Zakri, 2008; Johnson, 2007; Smith,
2006). The fragile nature of African development
therefore suggests, among other factors, policy
and institutional failures. African agriculture
suffers not only from institutional inefficiencies,
but also bottlenecks in the access to resources
and rewards and a general failure of policy. The
need to focus on and address problems in African
agriculture, if only to better address the
development nightmare in the region, is that
several African countries continue to make
international headlines when it comes to global
discussions on food insecurity (United Nations,
2011b; Suresh, 2009; Kidane, Maetz and Dardel,
2006; Smith, Alderman and Aduajom, 2006;
Rosegrant et al, 2005). n July 20,For example, o
2011, the United Nations announced that the
persistent and widespread drought in the Horn
of Africa has led to famine in parts of Somalia,
Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti. This is not
the first time the Horn of Africa has experienced
human suffering and food insecurity. When the
World Food Program launched the Africa Hunger
Alert Program on December 16, 2002, the focus
was both on the food situation in the Horn of
A f r i c a a n d s o u t h e r n A f r i c a ( M a l a w i ,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe). Since agriculture
continues to assume a critical importance in the
political, economic and social relations in many, if
not all, African countries, it is valuable to
examine how the aforementioned policies
impact African agriculture and contribute to the
achievement, for example, of the MDGs in Africa.
Therefore, the performance of the agricultural
sector is instructive to understanding the extent
to which African countries can attain any of the
United Nations-sponsored MDGs; especially, the
goal to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by
2015 (United Nations, 2011a; World Bank, 2007a;
Rosegrant et al., 2006; UNDP, 2003).
Indeed, the agricultural sector in Africa, its
contribution, problems and prospects to
national development is the source of several
studies (Bates and Block, 2011; Chuhan-Pole and
Angwafo, 2011; Devèze, 2011; FAO, 2011; Mason et
al., 2011; Rauch, 2011; Anseeuw, 2010; Resnick and
Birner, 2010; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010;
Anderson and Masters, 2009; Diao et al., 2007;
Oya, 2006; Poulton, et al., 2006; World Bank,
2007a, 1994, 1989, 1981). There are two related
issues in the vast literature on African agriculture
that are germane to this Report: the role of the
state in agriculture and the agricultural policy
framework. The African state, like many others,
is involved in setting the policy framework for
the agricultural sector, because of the sector's
importance to the national economy. State
involvement in agriculture highlights the political
context of agricultural policies, a context that
has implications for the performance of
agricultural policy. The specific aspect of
agricultural policy in this is how policyChapter
frames access to agricultural resources and
rewards. The success of agriculture, like any
other form of economic activity, depends on
what resources and rewards are available to
agricultural groups. Agricultural resources
include land, labor, water supply and inputs like
pesticides and fertilizers. Other resources
include knowledge, technological innovations
and diffusion, agricultural credit, infrastructural
support (research, communications and market
networks) and foreign exchange.
Given the role of the state in the agricultural
sector and critical role in society, the basis ofits
access to resources for agriculture implicates the
state and highlights the political context of
agricultural policy. The continuing role of the
state in agriculture and the persistence of
agricultural problems in Africa lead to questions
about the nature and structure of the state, its
capacity, as well as broader social forces,
particularly farmers, in the initiation of
agricultural policies. This Chapter thus seeks to
examine the relationship between the state and
agricultural policy in Africa. The working
assumption is that the state is not an
autonomous institution. Hence, it is useful to
situate an analysis of agricultural policy in a
broader context of state-society relations and
forces in contemporary globalization.
4.2 Debating the conceptual
framework
The state is not an autonomous institution. It has
to work with the broader society in initiating and
implementing agricultural policy. However, in
the last three decades, there have been changes
in the role of the African state in the economy,
due to or in response to globalization; changes
that have implications for agriculture in the
global south as a whole (Jobodwana, 2011;
Anderson and Valenzuela, 2007; Gibbon, 2007;
Moore, 2007; Puplampu, 2006). The changing
role of the state has, theoretically, opened up the
policy arena to other actors. Specifically, non-
state actors or non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) of different stripes (national or
international) and motivations (non-profit or for-
profit) have become major players in the
agricultural policy terrain (Davis, 2010; Rizzo,
2009). Agricultural policy has therefore become
a contested site between the state and non-state
actors, a contest that has given rise to unpredict-
able outcomes with respect to farmers' access to
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agricultural resources and rewards (Berry,
1993a).
This Chapter, in examining the relationship
between the state and agricultural policies in
Africa, addresses three-related questions. First,
what are the relative capacities of state and non-
state institutions in the formulation of
agricultural policy? Second, what are the
implications of the changing role of the state,
due to or in response to globalization, for
agricultural policy? Finally, what is the extent of
participation by farmers in crafting agricultural
policy?
4.3 The State, African agriculture
and globalization: an overview
The role of the state in the agricultural sector and
the status of the sector in Africa has been the
source of several studies: three distinct
perspectives can be identified – the internalists,
the externalists and the new international
division of labor Satgar, 2011; Yusuf, 2009;(
Mkandawire, 1989; Lofchie, 1986). The first two
perspectives mirror the nature of the debate on
African agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s and
will be briefly reviewed. The third perspective,
emerging since the 1990s, is tied to the growing
significance of globalization in an understanding
of contemporary agriculture and will be
examined in relative detail.
Briefly stated, the internalists contend that
agricultural policies of the postcolonial state,
especially in agricultural markets and prices,
account for the problems of African agriculture.
Agricultural policy, according to this perspective,
distorts the market for agricultural produce in an
attempt to placate the articulate urban
population. Because the markets are not free,
producers are not adequately rewarded, and
that creates disincentives for production. The
perspective specifically attributes agricultural
problems to marketing and pricing policies
pursued by African states. The essential aspect
of this argument is the role of African
governments in agricultural markets through
state marketing boards. State marketing boards
are monopsonies, that is, single buyers for many
producers and sellers. The boards set the buying
price and use "their market power to keep the
price paid to the farmer below the price set by
the world market, [and in so doing] they
accumulate funds from the agricultural sector"
(Bates, 1981:12). While the policy is to generate
funds for national development, subjecting
agricultural markets to extensive control also
"lowers the returns farmers can expect from
production for the market, both in absolute and
relative terms" (Bates,1984:252). Farmers as,
rational actors respond to low prices by,
withdrawing from the market and decreasing
production. In effect, pursing policies that sap
resources from agriculture to address non-
agricultural needs, undermining the future
growth and development of the agricultural
sector.
The argument by the internalists has some
obvious implications. First, it is important to
adequately reward farmers, as producers of
agricultural goods. Satisfactory rewards will
motivate agricultural producers to enhance and
invest in their productive capabilities for the
eventual benefit of the society at large. Second,
state marketing boards have to be restructured
so that agricultural producers can be able to
better reap the rewards of their labour. Finally it
is in the interest of the state to leave the
agricultural marketing primarily to the invisible
forces of the market, since the free market is a
good-mechanism that can influence the
allocation and rewards of agricultural goods.
These implications were critical in the
agricultural aspects of the structural adjustment
programs that many African countries pursued in
the 1980s (World Bank, 1994, 1981, 1989).
However, the consequences of these reforms
are still being debated and remain contentious.
Externalists, on the other hand, view agricultural
policy in Africa as the inevitable outcome of
colonial and neo-colonial structures of
dependency and underdevelopment (Osaghae,
1985; Amin, 1973). Colonial agricultural policy,
under the guise of the free market, the
externalists argue, promoted the export of
agricultural crops for the import of industrial and
consumer goods. Externalists do not deny the
role of internal policies in the agricultural crisis.
Drawing on insights from the Latin American
structural dependency debate, externalists
rather maintain that internal policies result from
external forces. The Latin American dependency
debate has several variants (Larrain,1989;
Palma,1981). Briefly stated, development in Latin
America is explained through trading relations
between the region and developed industrial
markets. Extending this debate to the African
scene, agricultural policy performance is traced
to colonialism and neo-colonialism. These
processes, externalists contend, incorporated
previously self-contained units of production
into a world capitalist system (Amara and
Founou-Tchuigoua, 1990; Gakou, 1987;
Wallerstein, 1985). Externalists also point to
wide fluctuations in agricultural prices compared
with imported industrial goods, fluctuations
caused by the demand elasticities of agricultural
exports. This unpredictability is worsened by the
introduction of synthetic products produced
cheaply as substitutes for natural commodities,
giving rise to an "unequal exchange"
(Emmanuel,1972) in which many African
countries have to export ever more raw
materials to import a given level of industrial
goods (Lofchie, 1986).
The argument by the externalists also has some
noticeable implications. First, there have to be
fundamental changes in the structure and nature
of relations at the national level between the
state and producers, as well as other social
groups in the agricultural sector. Changes at the
national level will provide a catalyst for changes
also at the global level of the capitalist world
economy. Second, African countries will have to
find novel ways for a broader participation of the
citizenry in social and political processes. Finally,
leadership and problems of institutional inertia
have to be addressed, not only to deal with the
divergence of interests between the state and
social groups, but also the coincidence of
interest between powerful internal and external
forces relating to their participation in the global
economy, albeit each participates for a different
set of reasons.
As stated earlier, the debate between the
internalists and externalists occupied the
academic discourse in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, by the mid-1980s, African agriculture
was still in crisis and the need for a new
framework was becoming increasingly clear. The
early 1980s was marked by, among other things,
the increasing debt of developing and developed
societies, a global depression and the
ascendency of the international financial
institutions (IFIs), specifically the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. This is the
context of the structural adjustment program
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(SAP) as outlined by the influential World Bank
(1981) Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa (also known as the Berg Report). The ideas
of the IFIs and thus key aspects of the Berg
Report (for example a minimal role of the state in
the economy) were decidedly neo-liberal and
consistent with what is often termed as the
“Washington consensus” (Williamson, 2000).
There are remarkable areas of consistency
between the structural adjustment program and
globalization (Puplampu, 2003). For example,
both stress a minimal role of the state in the
economic sphere and a renewed emphasis on
free markets as well as the private sector or non-
state actors. Hence, the third strand in the
literature on the state and African agriculture,
known as the new international division of labor
theory deals with the political, economic and,
socio-cultural aspects of globalization and the
related implications for African agriculture.
Globalization, underpinned by the dramatic
changes in communication technologies, has
given rise to changes in political, economic and
socio-cultural institutions and relations (Steger,
2009; Scholte, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2004;
Smith, 2006, 2003; Hoogvelt, 2001; Schuurman,
2001). The political aspects of globalization
include a minimal role of the state in economic
and social issues, and an enhanced role for non-
state actors under the broad rubric of the private
sector. Thus, there are, at least, reductions in the
autonomy of the state. Economic globalization
can be seen in the internationalization of the
production system, the prominent role of private
sector institutions and an unparalleled mobility
of financial capital, relative to labor. The socio-
cultural aspects of globalization entail consump-
tion and claims about the emergence of global
culture and related assumptions about the
standardization of cultural practices.
The agricultural sector in Africa is not immune to
these changes, and analysts have addressed the
implications of the changing role of the state in
African agriculture, and the nature of African
agriculture in an era of globalization (Satgar,
2011; Prabhakar, 2010; Yusuf, 2009; Baffes, 2009;
Juma, 2008; Gibbon, 2007; Puplampu, 2006;
Gross, 2006). Globalization of agriculture can be
related to the three aspects of agricultural
organization – production, marketing and
consumption. At the angle of production,
globalization of agriculture has given rise to new
farming arrangements, such as contract farming
and a renewed role for transnational agro-based
companies. Contract farming involves the
cultivation of plants and animals under
conditions determined by the “changing profit
conditions of global capitalism” (Watts,
1990:149). The farming system utilizes
technology as both a means and an end. As a
means, technology introduces “distinctive work
routines” (Watts, 1990:149) and the end result is
to produce agricultural goods that would fit the
requirements for industrial inputs.
Major transnational agro-based companies in
Africa include Unilever, British American
Tobacco, Dole, Pamol, Compagnie Fruitière and
Del Monte, who have established contract farms
in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon. Many
contract farms produce for the export of off-
season exotic fruits like (bananas, pineapples),
vegetables (tomatoes, cucumbers), agro-based
industrial inputs (oil palm) and fresh-cut flowers
(roses, lilies) (Vagneron, Faure, and Loeillet,
2009; Riisgaard, 2009; Danielou and Ravry, 2005;
Konings, 1998; Daddieh, 1994; Jaffe, 1994).
These production systems characterize the
emergence of “New Agricultural Countries”
(NACs) (Friedman, 1993:45-47). The marketing
aspect of globalization of agriculture also
involves transnational agro-based corporations
like Unilever, Nestle, Tate and Lyle, Lonrho,
Compagnie Fruitière and lately some local
private actors, especially in the pineapple market
(Vagneron, Faure, and Loeillet, 2009; Danielou
and Ravry, 2005; Dinham and Hines, 1983). The
pineapple market in West Africa, for instance in
Ghana, mirrors the marketing aspect of global
agriculture. Local actors (Farmapine, Koranco
and Tongu), and subsidiaries of transnational
corporations (Golden Exotics), have, through
the Sea-Freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana
(SPEG), established the infrastructure (for
example, storage facilities at national airports
and seaports) for the speedy movement of fresh
horticultural crops to overseas markets. In the
process, some of these companies have
integrated the production and marketing
aspects of agriculture.
There is an increasing reliance on biotechnology
in producing some of the above export crops.
Pineapple producers in Ghana are using tissue
culture to produce crops that will satisfy the
quality standards of the export market, and
researchers in Ghana are also examining how to
develop a variety of cocoa that will be resistant
to the swollen shoot virus through mutagenesis
using gamma irradiation (Essegbey and
Puplampu, 2007). In Egypt, researchers have
used plant tissue to produce maize and tomato
resistant to stemborers and Gemini viruses
respectively (Komen, Mignuoma and Weber,
2000). Uganda has embarked upon field trials of
GM bananas, cassava and cotton (Wamboga-
Mugirya, 2010). Notwithstanding the examples
above, there are only three noteworthy African
countries involved in the cultivation of
agricultural biotechnology crops. The three
countries are: South Africa (maize, soybean and
cotton); Burkina Faso (cotton); and, Egypt
(maize) (James, 2010). South Africa, for example,
is the only African country among the leading
developing countries (China, India, Brazil and
Argentina) involved in the cultivation of a
biotech crop, while Burkina Faso had the second
largest proportional increase (126%) in the
biotech hectarage in the world (James, 2010:6).
T h e m a r k e t i n g a s p e c t o f a g r o - b a s e d
transnational corporations link the production
and marketing of agricultural products to global
consumption patterns. On one hand, fresh,
frozen and processed fruits, vegetables, and
plants are airlifted under “just-in-time”
conditions to wealthy markets in the North for
their growing multicultural populations. On the
other hand, imported processed food items are
making their way to the emerging retail
supermarkets giants like Shoprite, Pick 'n Pay,
Metro Cash and Carry that dot the urban
landscape in several African countries
(Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Reardon et
a l . , 2 0 0 3 ) . T h e u n f o l d i n g m a r k e t i n g
arrangements require a focus on quality control
systems in the transportation and delivery of
agricultural goods for the market. The question
then is whether or not the farmers will be able to
afford the required investment or whether the
agro-based transnational corporations will
preside over both the production and marketing
processes and what that might mean for the
economic returns to farmers.
Another aspect of globalization that affects
African agriculture is the emergence of non-state
actors, specifically regional-based and global or
multilateral institutions. Examples of the former
include the African Union (AU), European Union
(EU) and the European Union-Africa Caribbean
Pacific commission (EU-ACP), while the latter is
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best represented by the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). As noted in Chapter 2, the African
Union's principal policy positions on African
agriculture are in the New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) and the Comprehensive
Africa Agriculture Development Programme
(CAADP) (NEPAD, 2003, 2001). Both policy
documents emphasize the significance of
agriculture to shoring up the development
possibilities in Africa.
NEPAD (2001:30-32) situates both the physical
and human setbacks of African agriculture within
an internal and external framework to account
for the decreases in “agricultural supply and
incomes in the rural areas, leading to poverty.”
The document reiterates how improving
“agricultural performance is a prerequisite of
economic development on the continent.
Furthermore, the policy document makes a
specific reference to “institutional support in the
form of research centres and institutes, the
provision of extension and support services …
[to] boosts the production of marketable
surpluses.” In recognizing institutions “as an
integral part of the process to increase
agricultural productivity” (Puplampu, 2006:239),
the document acknowledges the role of the
state and argues that the “regulatory framework
of agriculture must also be taken into account,
including the encouragement of local
community leadership in rural areas and the
involvement of these communities in policy and
the provision of services.” Finally, NEPAD argues
that there “is an urgent need to diversify
production and the logical point is to harness
Africa's nature resource. Value added in agro-
processing…must be increased … through a
strategy of economic diversification based on
inter-sectoral linkages” (NEPAD, 2001:38).
The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) outlines four
major pillars of investment to address problems
in the region's agricultural activities: a)
sustainable land and water management
systems; b) rural infrastructure and market
access; c) food security; and finally, d) pushing
the boundaries of agricultural research,
technology, dissemination and adoption
(NEPAD, 2003). Two subsequent pillars have also
been identified: strengthening capacity for
agriculture and agribusiness, and information for
agricultural strategy formulation and implemen-
tation (Bruntrup, 2011:84). As a working
document, CAADP's success is contingent on
several factors. Three important factors are the
role of regional economic communities; the
allocation of resources for institutional
capacities; the sense of ownership and
mechanisms for participation by society at large
(Bruntrup, 2011). Implicit in these three factors
are issues of enhancing human and institutional
capacity in the agricultural sector, tapping into
and utilizing information and knowledge
systems to ensure that the goals of CAADP are
consistent with broader global development
objectives, for example, the UN-sponsored
MDGs (Omilola et al.,2010:4).
Any analysis of CAADP has to be situated against
the 2003 African Union Maputo Declaration. At
the Second Ordinary Assembly of the African
Union in July 2003, African Heads of State and
Government endorsed what became known as
the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food
Security in Africa (African Union, 2003). In the
Declaration, African leaders committed “to the
allocation of at least 10 percent of national
budgetary resources to agriculture and rural
development policy implementation within five
years” (African Union, 2003). Thus, by 2008,
African governments were supposed to allocate
10 percent of national resources to the
agricultural sector. The commitment was also
part of the African Union's attempt to ensure
that the development strategies in Africa are
consistent with the first goal of the MDGs which
is to cut global poverty and hunger in half by 2015
(UNDP, 2003).
The WTO represents both a policy and an
institutional framework to establish a
predictable and a rule-based global trade. Its
activities are consistent with one aspect of the
MDGs – the call to forge global partnership for
development. However, since its inception in
1995, the WTO has become like the child whose
birth everyone thought would herald peace to
world trade, but who was immediately received
with disdain, scorn and almost strangled to
death at birth. The WTO is an off-shoot of the
conclusion of the multilateral Uruguay Round
(UR) of trade negotiations in 1994 under the
GATT. It is deeply involved in the on-going
attempts to craft a new policy framework on
global trade, including agriculture and services,
but has been confronted with several difficulties
in launching a comprehensive trade round, let
alone a meaningful discussion on global
agriculture. As far as African agriculture is
concerned, the WTO's 1999 Seattle Ministerial
meeting, the 2001 Doha Development Agenda
and several others (2003 Cancun Summit, the
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference) were
remarkable for their failures. Underpinning
these failures, as the subsequent case of African
cotton farmers will demonstrate, is not only the
politics of agricultural markets, but also the
structural location of specific countries in the
global political system. The lack of progress has
persisted leading to the Eighth Ministerial
Conference of the WTO held in Geneva,
Switzerland from 15-17 December 2011 (United
Nations, 2011b). These failures have persisted
despite the resolve of the WTO, to address the
one issue of importance to Africa and other
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s – a g r i c u l t u r e
(Panitchpakdi, 2002).
In developing the measures of agricultural
capacity, this Report focused on three significant
aspects of the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture,
namely market access, domestic support to
producers, and export competition (Morrison
and Sarris, 2007; Diaz-Bonilla, Frandsen and
Robinson, 2006; Anania et al, 2004; WTO, 1995).
Briefly stated, market access aims at reducing
both tariffs and non-tariff measures; such as the
role of state agricultural marketing boards or
trading enterprises, minimum import prices, and
import levies. Marketing boards, specifically,
were presented as the likely tools that
governments would use to “circumvent WTO
rules on market access and subsidies ....[because
of] their ability to use their exclusive marketing
powers to compete unfairly in export markets”
(Miner, 2001:104). The policy objective here is
expanding market access by removing barriers
that make it difficult for economic actors to
participate fairly in agricultural markets. The
question therefore is the extent to which
countries abide by WTO provisions on
agriculture and the impact on farmers.
The final aspect of globalization of agriculture
that is integral to agricultural capacity is the
governance structure and its impact on
agricultural producers. The governance
structure can be gleaned from the changing role
of the state in globalization and the emergence
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of various non-state actors, from national
producers' associations, to regional groups like
the African Union to multilateral entities like the
WTO. In essence, agricultural producers, as an
interest group, will be faced with some
challenges in an era of globalization. Halpin
(2005) advances a thesis, which although geared
to agricultural groups in the global north, has
some utility for addressing the case of
agricultural producers in Africa. The thesis also
situates the source of the challenges agricultural
producers will be confronted with as either from
above or below (Coleman, 1997). To be
challenged from above implies “whether the
policy environment, including the state, remains
supportive of 'partnerships' and the 'insider'
oriented groups they encourage” and challenge
from below focuses on “whether changes
among the farming constituency have affected
the ease by which they are organized, and the
capacity for groups to generate resources and
capacities valued by the state” (Halpin, 2005:19).
The preceding highlights the significance of
globalization to an understanding and analysis of
agricultural policy in Africa and the ensuing link
globalization has on agricultural capacity. Such
an analysis, by definition, will focus on the
relationship between the state and non-state
actors in the policy arena. Accordingly, an
examination of the relative capacity of state and
non-state institutions in the agricultural policy
arena in an era of globalization is key. If
agriculture is to continue to play a vital role in
African development, then it is crucial to situate
it in the broader context of globalization, which
would define its role and will also shape
outcomes. Globalization is also integral to an
analysis of agricultural producers and their
engagement with the policy process; particularly
farmers' access to agricultural resources and
rewards. Before addressing these questions, the
next section presents a critique of the prevailing
perspectives on African agriculture, in order to
propose an alternative framework.
4.4 Critique of revailingp
p aerspectives and lternate
framework
The three perspectives covered in the previous
section provide answers to some aspects of
agricultural policy failure in Africa. While the
internalists focus on the state, they cannot
explain the failure of policies adopted. A major
problem of the internalists' approach is that their
analysis does not pay any attention to historical
factors and power relations. The criticism of the
state's role in marketing boards, for instance,
needs to be placed within a historical context.
The postcolonial African state simply inherited
the marketing boards from their colonial
counterpart. Established by the colonial state,
marketing boards served as an important
institution in the accumulation of revenue
needed for the reconstruction effort in Britain
and other European countries after the Second
World War. Even though some of these funds
w e r e l a t e r a v a i l a b l e t o p o s t c o l o n i a l
governments, the role of these institutions in the
accumulation of revenue is worth stressing. In
setting up these institutions, the colonial state
demonstrated that power, and not the notion of
free market, is critical to the understanding of
agricultural policy (Kay, 1975; Bauer, 1963). Cash-
strapped postcolonial governments, having
observed that state power can be used to
control marketing boards to generate funds,
continued with the practice originating from the
colonial era.
The externalists rectify the ahistorical and
apolitical analysis in the internalists' framework,
pointing to historical circumstances and the
power dimensions of agricultural policy in Africa.
However, many African countries attained
political independence four or more decades
ago. African agricultural policy cannot possibly
be "explained" solely from an external historical
perspective. A continued focus on external
forces can serve only as an excuse for policy
failure in Africa. Further analysis is required on a
number of questions. For example, what factors
account for some of the continuities between
colonial and postcolonial agricultural policy?
Where does the postcolonial state stand on the
coincidence of interests between internal and
external forces? Externalists have not provided
satisfactory insights into these questions (Kiely,
1995; Moore and Schmitz, 1995; Brewer, 1990).
Analysis of the historical relationship between
imperialism and capitalist development in Africa
has been treated in a mechanical and dogmatic
fashion (Nyang'oro, 1989; Callaghy, 1988;
Lubeck, 1987).
One has to unbundle the “new international
division of labour theory” as the basis for the
analysis of agricultural capacity, particularly in
the policy and implementation dimensions. The
perspective purports to signify a paradigm shift
in understanding of African agriculture.the
However, the novel aspects of the perspective
include the qualitative differences wrought by
technology, for example, biotechnology and its
application to agricultural organization at the
levels of production and marketing. Another key
aspect of this perspective, is the changing role of
the state in agriculture under globalization. In
terms of how this perspective frames
agricultural activities, “there is no doubt that
contract farming [for example] resembles the
historical plantation system in colonial Africa”
(Puplampu and Tettey, 2000:258-259). The
historical agro-based transnational entities
continue to determine the structure and nature
of production systems in Africa. Finally, the
perspective also links African agriculture to
external forces and thus is extraverted in nature.
In spite of differences in analysis, the three
perspectives are consistent on the importance of
the agricultural sector and the state's role in the
s e c t o r . T h e c o n s i s t e n c i e s w i t h i n t h e
perspectives, against the backdrop of
agricultural problems in Africa, call for an
alternative framework.
4.4.1 The ociological nalysis of griculturals a a
policy
To engage in a sociological analysis of policy
performance is to analyse the disjunction
between stated policy objectives and outcomes.
Two lines of policy analysis can be identified. In
one approach, policy makers cite "obstacles to
implementation" (Schaffer, 1984:181) as reasons
for poor performance, and do not account for
their lack of understanding on why policies do
not achieve stated objectives. Policy makers
contend that farmers, for example, "refuse" to
use new technologies. Problems in setting the
policy and research agenda, the power play
between institutions involved in agenda setting,
and the lack of representation of the farmers'
viewpoints within the policy context are not
addressed. Policy analysis from this approach or
what Clay and Schaffer (1984:3) call the
“mainstream" approach does not raise these
questions, and is of limited value in explaining
policy performance.
The other analytical framework reali es thatz
policy makers usually do not state their real
intended objectives, and what may seem as poor
policy performance may be achieving unstated
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goals. The key issue in this framework is the
sociological analysis of power. Keen (1994), in a
provocative study, offered a thorough and
sophisticated analysis of the famine in Sudan
between 1985 and 1989. The political regime,
Keen (1994) argues, was unable to transcend the
long-running sectarian conflicts between the
north and south. It used famine in the south-
western corner as state policy to contain these
conflicts. Thus, the famine benefited some
groups at the expense of others, an important
insight for exploring policy performance. Put
differently, "[e]ven as policymakers "fail" to
achieve stated goals, it is quite possible that they
are achieving other, unstated goals" (Keen,
1994:9). The question, therefore, is "not why
public policy 'fails.' It does not always necessarily
or completely do so...Public policy is, after all,
what it does [and does not do]" (Schaffer,
1984:189).
Social and political pressures prevent the state
from serving as an effective institution in
agricultural policy. Exploring these social and
political pressures requires a "fundamental
rethinking of the role of states in relation to
economies and societies" Skocpol 1985:7), and( ,
reconceptualizing the state as a complex
institution made up of individuals and interest
groups with diverse links to society. The nature
of state and society relations should be the core
of any attempt to explain agricultural policy in
Africa (Migdal, Kohli and Shue, 1994; Chazan et
al., 1992; Rothchild and Chazan, 1988).
The African state's involvement in agriculture is
predicated on political rather than economic
reasons (Bates, 1983; 1981). As major employers,
African governments are naturally interested in
how much the urban worker spends on food,
because urban protests over the scarcity of food
can lead to political instability. However, the
provision of cheap food and other politically-
inspired practices constitute an implicit
acknowledgement that governments are aware
of their obligations to the citizenry. To undertake
these activities would require revenue. As such,
governments face challenges not only in terms
of how revenue is extracted, but also how to
ensure that extraction does not solicit a violent
reaction. In other words, there are limits on state
power. To understand these limits, in the context
of agricultural development policy, means
exploring the dynamics of state-society relations
over conditions of access to the resources that
generate the revenue in the first place.
With conditions of access to resources and
rewards as the main issue in this Chapter, the
analysis of policy within the context of power and
the socio-cultural processes will afford us a better
opportunity to understand agricultural policy.
Such an analysis will, for example, enable toone
look beyond prices of agricultural produce, and
focus on farmers' access to productive resources,
patterns of control over output and marketing
(Berry, 1993b). Given the importance of
agriculture, the question is not whether or not
the state should intervene, but what kind of
intervention will enhance policy performance
(Hansen, 1989:191). When the pace of commercial
agriculture accelerated since the colonial era,
changes occurred in the availability of resources
(for example labour, land and credit). The
challenge for the state is how to structure the
relationship between policy and agricultural
groups. Given that the colonial and postcolonial
state obtained their revenue from export crops
production, both emphasized the enhancement
of "a political order that would facilitate and
underpin the spread of export crop production"
(Boone, 1994:113). When governments pursue
politically advantageous policies and at the same
time, are concerned about the impact of those
policies on society and producers at large, they
are aware of the limits of state power. The
complexities of state and society interactions led
to varying levels of policy performance and
"inconclusive encounters" between farmers and
agricultural policies (Berry, 1993a:45). Inconclu-
sive encounters in the sense that although the
state initiates policies, the consequences of
policies are uncertain and cannot be understood
or explained from their stated aims (Berry,
1993a:46). The policies are heavily influenced by
group "interests and contrasting ideological
positions that have prevailed within, or were in
control of, the state apparatus at any point in
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TABLE 4.1
A Sociological Analysis of Agricultural Policy in Africa: An Analytical Framework
Levels of Analysis Selected Issues in State and
Society Relations
Policy Outcomes
Nature and Structure of
the State/Non-State
Strong and weak
Institutional structure for
administration
Collaboration with and resistance
by farmers
Short-term political gains and long-
term difficulties
Scarcity of qualified personnel
Weak Institutions/Clientele and
patronage
The State, Globalization
and Agricultural Policy
The role of ideology
Institutional structure for
agricultural development
Collaboration with and resistance
by farmers
Market Conditions
Production Focus
Access to agricultural and non
agricultural services
-
The State and Farmers Social context of agricultural
policies
Institutional Presence
Access to resources and rewards
Difficulties in initiation and
implementation
Differential impact and reactions
from farmers
Food insecurity
Source: Puplampu, 2011a
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4.5 Politics of agricultural marketing
and agricultural marketing
politics in Africa
At the height of the agricultural crisis in Africa in
the 1980s, there was considerable consensus
among analysts of various ideological
perspectives about the negative role of state
agricultural marketing boards. Therefore, under
the SAP, the policy argument was that state
interference in the market distorts price signals.
Consistent also with economic globalization, the
state had to "free" agricultural market, by
withdrawing from it, so as to improve the
incentive structure for export agriculture. Since
the mid-1980s, several African governments
have restructured their state-owned agricultural
marketing boards. Overall four main patterns
have emerged: 1 eliminate all marketing boards( )
(Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda) or the boards for
some specific crops (Madagascar, Kenya, Niger);
( )2 allow producer prices to reflect world market
prices and reform some aspects of the board
(Benin, Kenya and Malawi); 3 license private( )
sector organizations to compete with marketing
boards in crop purchasing and exporting
activities (Zimbabwe); 4 partially privatizeand, ( )
or straddle two or more of the patterns in search
of an optimal or viable option in Burkina Faso
(cotton), Ghana (cocoa) (World Bank, 1994).
Recent assessments of restructured agricultural
marketing and inputs supply institutions in
Burkina Faso (cotton), Mali (mango), Rwanda
(coffee), Ghana (cocoa and fertilizer), Kenya
(fertilizer) and Malawi (fertilizer and credit
subsidies, controlled prices) did not indicate a
full-blown privatization of agricultural markets
and the supply of inputs, and the irrelevance of
the state, but underscore the need to pay a
closer attention to the local context of the policy
framework, human resource issues and
institutional capacity, than a strict adherence to
the theory of free agricultural markets and
inputs supply (Ariga and Jayen, 2011; Banful, 2011;
Boudreaux, 2011; Dorward, Chirwa and Jayne,
2011; Kaminski, 2011; Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011;
Sangho, Labaste and Ravry, 2011).
Analysis of the outcomes of the two periods,
especially the recent assessment of agricultural
markets, provide some insights into the
following: first, the nature of agricultural
markets, their organization and the politics of
their operations; second, the role of state and
non-state actors, including the private sector in
restructured agricultural markets in Africa; and
third, the global divide between the north and
south with respect to WTO provisions on
agriculture, in particular market access and
finally the governance and sustainability of
agricultural policy. The overriding argument in
economic globalization is the role of the market
in the allocation and distribution of rewards.
With reference to agricultural marketing, this
means that the impersonal forces of demand and
supply would set the value and reward for
agricultural goods. A key aspect of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture on market access is
the removal of non-tariff provisions, explicitly,
state agricultural marketing boards (SAMB) in
the export of tradeables (for example, cocoa,
coffee and tea) and opening such activities to the
private sector. However, the “varying levels of
policy implementation are indicative of the
dynamics [largely political aspects] of domestic
policy implementation” in African countries
(Puplampu and Tettey, 2000:260). The varying
levels are also reflections of the political
sensibilities and calculations that inform the
operations of agricultural markets. In reforming
the marketing boards, the argument was to
open marketing activities to private sector
participation.
Many African states did not actually implement
the reforms, and others implemented it in such a
way that made it difficult for private sector
investment (Jayne et al., 2002). Even if they did
implement the reforms, there is “the question of
whether [or not] private investors have the
working capital, the human resources, and
institutional capacity to cope with the vagaries of
international commodity markets” (Puplampu
and Tettey, 2000:261). These critical elements
were found lacking in the privatizing of
agricultural services in Tanzania and Ghana and
the situation is not different in other African
countries (Cooksey, 2011; Baffes, 2004; Nyanteng
and Seini 2000). Perhaps, the persistence of
problems, specifically with regard to input
supply and distribution account for the re-
emergence of such schemes in several African
countries.
A number of African countries (Malawi, Nigeria,
Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana) have reinstituted
fertilizer subsidies programs, even though the
historical performance of fertilizer subsides in
the region has been mainly unsatisfactory
(Morris et al., 2007). In the case of Ghana, which
reinstituted the fertilizer program in 2008,
Banful (2011) shows how the problem has been
politicized, such that fertilizer subsidy vouchers
were targeted to farmers in districts that the
ruling government lost at the ballot box. Even
though the private sector was involved in the
program at the retail end, it was the state or
public sector that imported the fertilizer. In
effect, the state was still a major actor and
because of the political calculations that
influenced the allocation of the fertilizer in the
first place, the private sector was indirectly
affected by the political considerations in the
program. Consequently, the situation is one of
incomplete restructuring of agricultural
institutions and this “has left an institutional
vacuum …. [and] in many cases neither
government nor the private sector has taken on
these roles” (FAO, 2004a:24). Thus, the
restructuring of agricultural markets has been
accompanied by mixed results, some of which
are poor outcomes. NEPAD (2009) noted several
constraints, especially in the political and
institutional realm, in African countries, in terms
of compliance to the 2003 Maputo Declaration.
Despite the high level of political endorsement of
the Declaration, there is an inadequate political
will that can inspire the priority that agriculture
should assume in the national development
strategy. As a result, agricultural sector policy
strategies are insufficient, capacity issues in
agricultural sector ministries remain and an
overall lack of domestic policy ownership.
Consequently, the calls for a minimal state,
market reforms and the private sector per se are
not the only necessary and sufficient conditions
that inform the productive behaviour of farmers.
Unburdening farmers by removing the state
from the agricultural marketing and the creation
of a competitive private sector environment do
not occur in a vacuum. Governments,
irrespective of ideological or polit ical
orientation, are involved in agricultural policy in
order to reap the contributions of agriculture to
national development. The question is the
extent to which restructured state institutions or
the emerging private sector ones are tied to
institutional capacity or sustainable institutions
(Eicher, 1989; World Bank, 1989). A sustainable
institution comes about when “domestic
political support is mobilized to provide
adequate domestic financing of all core salaries
and operating expenses” of policy and research
institutions (Eicher, 1989:1). To the World Bank
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
129
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
130
(1989:5), capacity development seeks “not just
less government but better government.” The
aspects of capacity development critical to this
Report are the “restructuring of many public
[agricultural] and private institutions to create a
context in which skilled workers can function
effectively, [and a] [p]olitical leadership that
understands that institutions are fragile entities,
painstakingly built up, easily destroyed, and
therefore requiring sustained nurturing” (World
Bank, 1989:54).
Beyond the politics of agricultural market
restructuring, another major hindrance to
institutional capacity is structural barriers
(Abbott and Young, 2001:133-135). Such barriers
include poor market infrastructure and
information channels, and activities by
transnational agro-based companies associated
with contract farms (FAO, 2004a:24).
Furthermore, farmers' incomes also depend on
the world market for agricultural commodities.
For the greater part of the 1980s and 1990s,
international prices for most of Africa's
agricultural exports (for example, cocoa and
coffee) fluctuated drastically with long periods
of price falls than increases (FAO, 2004a:9;
Oxfam, 2002:153-154; World Bank, 1994:77-79). In
view of the global economic recession in 2008,
developing-country exports dropped 9 per cent
in 2009, recovered in 2010 growing by 13% and
expected to grow at 8% in 2011 and 2012 (United
Nations, 2011b:xiii). For African countries that
depend on the export of agricultural produce,
high and volatile commodity prices mean
increasing difficulties in relying on trade as a
route to poverty reduction (United Nations,
2011b).
The desire of African governments to minimize
dependence on mono agricultural export,
possibly, accounts for their support of contract
farming, often with transnational agro-based
companies at the helm. However, these same
governments offer transnational agro-based
companies monopsony control over the
selected crop, retention of foreign exchange
earnings and claims on imported production
material. The companies accept government
support, but the benefits do not flow directly
into national economies, let alone benefit
farmers. This is because transnational agro-
based companies, the chief proponents of free
market principles, are more than content with
policies and practices that enable them to avoid
the goals of such a market (FAO, 2004a: 30-31;
Puplampu and Tettey, 2000:261).
In the era of global agriculture, the activities of
global multilateral and regional institutions can
hamper agricultural policy performance
(Muhammad, Amponsah and Dennis, 2010;
Mausch et al., 2009; Puplampu, 2006). First,
activities of regional organizations on issues
such as quota and quality can affect market
access. Second, there are significant variations in
the support system the African state provides to
its farmers compared to what their counterparts
in the global north extend to their farmers. There
are several implications of the argument. For
example, there is the question of the extent to
which respective countries abide by WTO
provisions on agriculture. There is the issue of
the ability of the organization itself to forge a
global compact on agricultural policy when it
comes to north-south agricultural relations. Take
the case of the African state and cotton farmers.
Castells (1997:243) argues that the state, in an
age of globalization, may seem “to be losing its
power, although, … not its influence”. The
significance of Castells' contention can be
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demonstrated by the state's continuing role in
agricultural markets. Even in Africa where the
state is supposed to be on its way to oblivion, it is
the only viable development partner in the
region, notwithstanding the increasing
preference for non-governmental organizations.
The level of the state's power highlights its
structural location in the global political
economic system. The nature and location of the
state and its relationship to global agricultural
policies is best exemplified by cotton policies.
Cotton, produced in both rich and poor countries
and integral to the global textile industry, has
been providing a clear demonstration of the
state advancing the national development
agenda with respect to agricultural support.
Theoretically, free impersonal market forces of
demand and supply, and comparative advantage
determine the allocation and rewards to cotton
farmers. These principles are supposed to
rationally discriminate and reward cotton
producers on the basis of quality and other
factors. However, cotton markets, like many
other agricultural commodities, are not entirely
free. For the greater part of the 1990s, world
cotton exports increased while revenues
declined, a trend associated with other
agricultural commodities like coffee, cocoa and
banana (FAO, 2004a:20).
For African cotton farmers, the declines in
revenue with increases in production and export
bring home the theoretical limitations of free-
market principles. Indeed, cotton “trade and
production are highly distorted by policy”
(Gillson et al., 2004:3). The nature and form of
state agricultural policy and the related
distortions in agricultural markets, informed by
domestic politics, also reflect the nature of the
global divide. Governments in developed (the EU
and USA) and developing (Africa) parts of the
world offer their cotton producers different
levels and forms of support, regardless of WTO
provisions on domestic support and export
performance (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2007;
Gibbon, 2007; Gillson et al., 2004; FAO, 2004a).
Such forms of support would explain some of the
differential results in the production of cotton by
value across the world shown in Table 4.2 below.
Burkina Faso, which ranks number one in the
export of cotton ranks number 14 in the
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Rank Country Value
($1000)
Rank Country Value
($1000)
1 China 11,317,680 11 Australia 406,747
2 India 6,531,712 12 Egypt 335,492
3 USA 6,207,813 13 Nigeria 228,609
4 Pakistan 2,942,239 14 Burkina Faso 218,367
5 Brazil 2,013,801 15 Argentina 215,249
6 Uzbekistan 1,877,462 16 Mexico 215,249
7 Turkey 1,428,101 17 Tajikistan 206,342
8 Syria 541,835 18 Kazakhstan 163,992
9 Turkmenistan 460,188 19 Benin 161,748
10 Greece 445,344 20 Mozambique 139,884
Source: FAOSTAT, 2010
TABLE 4.2
Transforming Agriculture: Top 20 Producing Countries of Cotton Lint in 2007
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Support for cotton growers under the EU's
agricultural policy, the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), began in 1981 when Greece and
Spain joined the union. The two countries
“accounted for 2.5 percent of world production
and 6 percent of world exports in 2001, but they
accounted for 16 percent of world cotton
subsidies” (Gillson et al., 2004:17). The subsidies
include input factors like credit for machinery
purchase, insurance and publicly financed
irrigation schemes (Gillson et al., 2004:18). In the
USA, support for farmers comes through various
parts of the Farm Bills, which in 1996 offered,
“direct payments to producers which were
decoupled from production” (Gillson et al.,
2004:16). Other aspects of the support include
insurance, export subsidies and emergency
payments.
Contrast the experiences of cotton producers in
the EU and USA with their African counterparts
(Jobodwana, 2011; Kaminski, Headey and
Bernard, 2011; Tschirley, 2010; Moseley and Gray,
2008). African cotton farmers, although with low
product costs, have not adequately benefited
from the market. This is, in part, because of
competition from other producing countries;
particularly the USA where state support
compensates for the high production cost.
Cotton producers in African countries do not
have governments with either the resources or
the political will or both to offer them any
meaningful support in the midst of lower world
market prices. They therefore find themselves in
a market situation distorted by various forms
and levels of domestic state support.
The impact of state support on agricultural
production is the fact that it disengages farmers
from market signals, artificially decreases the
cost of production and increases their ability to
export cheap agricultural goods to overseas
markets. Ultimately, these practices lower
agricultural prices and incomes for a significant
number of farmers and make it difficult for
African farmers to compete fairly in the
international cotton market. Thus the world
market prices for cotton, supposedly
determined by invisible free market forces and
beneficial to farmers worldwide participating on
an equal playing field, is also influenced by the
extent of support available to some cotton
farmers. In sum, political forces continue to play
a major role in determining market outcomes.
From the perspective of developing countries,
the proposal by the Cotton-4 and the Cancun
processes failed because WTO meetings are not
transparent and are highly undemocratic. The
meetings tend to cater to the needs of the
powerful countries, leaving out the grievances of
the less powerful ones (Hormeku, 2003). Given
that the WTO is expected to establish a
predictable and a rule-based framework for
global trade, the case of the African cotton
farmers might be a forerunner for other
agricultural crops produced by African farmers.
The WTO and the cotton problem, within the
context of the MDGs, has implications for the
extent to which the institution can be seen as a
global partner for development in Africa. Not
only are WTO initiatives ignored by powerful
countries of the world, the organization also
appears as a tool for extending the influence of
powerful countries, a scenario that suggests its
inability to forge a global partnership for
development.
After the failure of the Seattle conference in
November 1999, which was supposed to launch
the Millennium Rounds of Talks, the Doha Round
of November 2001 was bi l led as the
Development Round. The Round was expected
to address agriculture and other development
issues of importance to Africa and other
developing countries. However, the Doha
Development Agenda, after a decade of
deliberations, has not been ratified (United
Nations, 2011b). It is a well-known fact in policy
analysis that it is better to focus on what policy
makers actually do, rather than on declarations.
Hence, WTO continues to make declarations
while the problems identified above continue to
persist. The cumulative effect of the WTO's
record raises questions about the future
trajectory of the organization and global trade.
Market conditions vary for agricultural exports.
Moves towards market access, either through
r e s t r u c t u r e d m a r k e t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s ,
transnational agro-based companies or a
diversified agricultural economy are insufficient
factors that would necessarily improve
agricultural markets, farmers' incomes and
ultimately agricultural development. Non-tariff
measures, in this case, institutional restructuring
of state agricultural marketing boards, are not
the magic bullet for successful market
outcomes. Structural conditions also determine
prices and rewards in agricultural export
markets. These conditions, their origins and
dynamics, with roots in the historical context
have taken on new forms, but with predictable
results in the contemporary global era. The
extent to which the WTO can play the role of a
partner in global development, via the MDGs, is
tied further to the changing role of the state in
agricultural production. This case was best
illustrated with reference to African cotton
farmers. Without addressing how agricultural
policy impact agricultural groups in terms of
access to resources and rewards, a minimal state
and a return to the market per se will be
meaningless and ineffective measures.
4.6 Agricultural producers and
governance: survival or
sustainability?
African agriculture features one of the most
vulnerable segments of its population – farmers.
These farmers, particularly small-scale
producers, are the major players in the
production of national agro-food needs and
export agriculture and are critical to discussions
on national food security. Given the state's role
in framing the national development agenda, the
relationship between the state and farmers is
essential for the sector and the national
development effort. However, the relationship
between the African state and farmers has been
ambiguous at best. On one hand, the state values
farmers, whether small or large, when they
produce for external markets, because it reaps
the benefits of agriculture for non-agricultural
sectors and, ultimately, national development.
The state therefore, in many cases prefers to
organize the farmers and have farmers'
organizations that “are subordinated to the
dictates and political manipulations from the
national level” (Puplampu, 2004a:130). On the
other hand and despite their importance,
farmers' groups in several African countries,
relative to others, for example, in the industrial
sector, have not been a force to reckon with in
the policy arena, either as a response to or the
result of lack of stability in agricultural incomes,
the scattered nature of their location and other
structural factors. This tenuous relationship
between the state and farmers' associations
began from the colonial era.
The essential point is that the colonial state
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tolerated farmers' organizations and other
forms of resistance, because the absence of such
outlets or spaces would have generated
numerous social and political problems which
the colonial mandate could not afford. The
colonial order was “managed by extreme
caution” (Kay, 1972:9) and “proposals were
abandoned on the faintest suspicion of
[political] disaster” (Phillips, 1989:158). The
political structure at independence comprised
various coalitions (professional, middle, to lower
class groups in urban areas and farmers in the
countryside), fragile in their relations with the
state (Ford and Holmquist, 1988). Groups that
had a significant power base during the colonial
era “had a stake in reproducing power already
achieved. They [political elites, teachers, clerks
and petty traders] correctly perceived access to
the postcolonial state as a means of doing so”
(Boone, 1994:121, italics in original). One group
that was not effectively represented in this
coalition was farmers in the countryside.
However, the urban-based groups had roots in
the farming communities in the countryside and
did not hesitate to rely on such contacts to
control the countryside or establish a political
presence. Here is the context that accounts for
the willingness of the postcolonial state to
organize farmers (Beckman, 1976).
The changing role of the state in an era of
globalization and the increasing importance of
diffused actors and multilateral institutions in
the economic sector present some unique
opportunities and challenges for farmers'
organizations (Held and McGrew, 2004; Scholte,
2005). The organizing points for analysis revolve
around the extent to which when it comes to
agricultural policy, the capability of agricultural
producers are first, in decline, second, resilient
and finally in adaptation and/or in transforma-
tion in an era of globalization (Halpin, 2005:20-
22). The decline thesis suggests a loss of
significance of agricultural producers in a global
era, because of the changes in the role of the
nation-state, and the emergence of multilateral
institutions. These processes would undermine
the need for the state to even bargain or
compromise with agricultural producers, since
the state itself is under tremendous pressure.
The resilience argument presents a central role
for the state, even if in a “more complex and
multi-level world, and that associative processes
of governance remain important in assisting
national economic sectors to adapt to global
change” (Halpin, 2005:21). This position points to
a desire for partnership and various forms of
cooperation between the state and agricultural
producers. The adaptation and/or transforma-
tion thesis is that agricultural producers “may
not merely adapt to new conditions, but
fundamentally transform their existing
structures, roll-over into new structures or be
taken over or subsumed by new or existing
groups” (Halpin, 2005:22).
The subsequent analysis will draw on two
particular examples that highlight the
relationship between the state and farmers in a
global context: cashew nut producers in
Mozambique and poultry farmers in Ghana
(Nazneen et al , 2004; Maykuth, 2005; Christian.
Aid, 2005; Puplampu, 2004a; Hanlon, 2001,
2000). The agricultural policy adopted by
Mozambique under SAP and consistent with
globalization required the state to free itself
from the market; this policy had a direct impact
on the cashew nut industry. As an important part
of the economy, the state benefited from the
export tax on cashew nuts. Under the
adjustment program, the World Bank argued
that the industry, compared to others,
specifically Brazil and India, was inefficient,
because “the value of the processed kernels was
less than the value of the raw nuts had they been
exported directly” (cited in Hanlon, 2000:34).
From this position, the World Bank asked the
Government of Mozambique to export only
unprocessed cashew nuts and also abolish any
laws that protected the industry.
The Government of Mozambique decided to
stagger the export taxes imposed on cashew
imports because of the considerable opposition
from the cashew producers and trade unions
who contested the World Bank findings and the
policy proposals. There was a prolonged
confrontation between the World Bank and the
Government of Mozambique from the early
1990s to 2001 when the Bank modified and hence
agreed to some of the proposals from the
Government of Mozambique (Hanlon, 2001). A
key arsenal that the Government of
Mozambique used to defend its interest and that
of the farmers is the use of subsidies by the
global north, even as they talk about the need for
“free” trade and market reforms. Indeed, the
government noted how the EU subsidises its
agriculture and then uses the IFIs to prevent
Mozambique from protecting its cashew
producers (Hanlon, 2000). The Mozambican
authorities stressed the implicit double talk of
global agricultural policies and used it to show
the selective implementation of global
agricultural policies.
The case of poultry farmers in Ghana started in
2005, when a two year-old parliamentary act that
increased the import taxes on poultry products
was overturned. The poultry farmers had in 2003
successfully convinced the Parliament of Ghana
“that imports of cheap, subsidized chicken were
killing local businesses – and raised tariffs on
imports” (Christian Aid, 2005:32). The parliamen-
tary position was further affirmed by a high court
judge, hence any proposal to suspend the tariffs
had implications to undermine the will of
parliament. The Ghana National Association of
Poultry Farmers (GNAPF) and its membership
were obviously troubled by the decision to
suspend the tariff increases. According to
GNAPF, the Government of Ghana caved in
because of pressure tactics from the
International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. The policy change raises questions about
democratic governance, definitely the need for
elected officials to address the needs their
citizenry.
The two cases above highlight significant
aspects of democratic governance, the nature of
the state and role of agricultural producers in
agricultural policy. At the heart of democratic
governance is how institutions work on behalf of
and in the interest of citizens at large. In both
Mozambique and Ghana, the governments were
legitimately elected by the citizens and were
working to attain the interests of their citizens. In
other words, given the democratic space for
citizen engagement, poultry farmers lobbied the
government to enact certain policies on their
behalf. In Mozambique, the government,
cashew farmers and other groups contested the
position of the World Bank. The two cases
therefore show how democratic governance can
be utilized to address specific social problems,
and in this case, in the agricultural sector, and
thus show elements of resilience according to
Halpin's (2005) model. The analysis also shows
the continuing role of the state, even if in a
different form. Hence, globalization of
agriculture provides a context for not only the
survival of farmers, but also a framework for
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sustainability; especially in the policy process.
However, the two cases also show the limits of
democratic governance in the global context. As
the government of Mozambique clearly
articulated, it is problematic when the same
institutions charged with global governance are
selective in terms of their policy implementation
process. The Mozambicans did not understand
why the European Union provides subsidies to
agricultural producers, yet expect them to offer
no support to their farmers. Similarly, the Ghana
poultry farmers took issue with the fact that their
government was more in tune with the demands
of external forces than the interests of internal
forces. In effect, issues of democratic
governance are likely to assume a prominent role
in how state and society relate at the national
and global levels. This is because with African
countries deepening and consolidating their
democratic orientation, African policy makers,
like their counterparts in more advanced
democracies, also have the duty to listen to,
respond to and address the needs of their
constituencies (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005).
4.7 Conclusion
The perennial bane of African agriculture is that it
is not anchored in the society and is unable to
address the basic needs therein. It is not an over-
exaggeration to contend that the export focus
had dominated the policy discourse of African
agriculture. Globalization, as a contemporary
discourse, simply reinforces earlier ideologies
and practices. The analysis calls for rethinking
the future of African agriculture and also draws
attention to three main factors: institutional
capacity; a focus on producers; and the broad
issue of governance.
It is certainly superfluous to argue that it is
people working in institutions that make change
and development possible. Consequently, a call
for institutions to carry through the agricultural
policies is certainly not a novel position.
However, the emphasis has to be on capable
institutions. It is one thing to establish an
institution, but quite another issue to have
capable institutions. While the desire of African
governments to establ ish agricultural
institutions is a tangible expression of the
importance of agriculture, most of the
institutions do not have the sufficient and
necessary resources for optimal performance.
Perhaps, the politics of institutional creation
accounts for the ineffective performance of
institutions. Politics has to be tied to addressing
the needs of the society at large. Given that
agriculture is the cornerstone of the society, it
behooves political leaders to take their work
more seriously to ensure that institutions have
the required resources to discharge their
mandate (Savitch, 1998; Eicher, 1989).
Therefore, the circumstances of farmers should
be at the centre of the discourse.
African farmers, as their counterparts
elsewhere, are a differentiated social group.
Their differentiation, to a large extent, accounts
for the nature of their relationship with policy-
makers. Farmers who produce for the export
market generally tend to fare better than those
who produce for the domestic market, even
though the benefits to export producers are not
equal. While globalization, theoretically, opens
up space for the involvement of farmers in
agricultural policy, positive outcomes are not
inevitable. While there is still the tendency to
organize the farmers, “when and if farmers
organize themselves, their impact on policy will
depend on how government perceives their
activities. A well-defined system of governance
in which both the policy making institutions and
farmers possess power, and are able to exercise
it, would provide a system of checks and
balances” (Puplampu, 2004a:130). Perhaps, it
will be prudent to revisit the idea of
cooperatives, given that cooperatives in several
African countries seem to have survived
liberalization of agriculture and are devising
novel ways to address the needs of their
membership (Francesconi and Heerink, 2011;
Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Barham and
Chitemi, 2009; Wanyama, Develtere and Pollet,
2009). The agency of farmers, even within the
cooperative framework, is dependent on the
broader democratic and governance impulses at
the national and global levels (World Bank,
2007a). At the national level, the democratic
dispensation blowing across the African
continent assumes the consolidation of
competitive domestic politics in the policy area.
The historical neglect or marginalization of
farmers' association calls for a better framework
to nurture such aspirations. The new framework
should aim at coordination of activities across
various sectors and institutions.
A deeper problem, however, remains at the
global level. The preceding discussion on the
WTO, World Bank, IMF with reference to farmers
in Africa and other parts of the world
demonstrates that subsidies undermine notions
of free market or a level playing field. The
situation brings governance into sharp focus. It is
worrisome what African countries have to
contend with as and when they want to extend
or assume some degree of control over their
act iv i t ies for farmers. S ince nat ional
development is not only about choices, but also
the ability to implement those choices, the ability
of African governments to address their genuine
aspirations of their citizens, in the face of global
imperatives, is an issue that deserves the utmost
attention. Indeed, it is becoming clear that the
activities of global institutions, like the WTO, are
not always consistent with democratic
governance. Democratic practices have to be
transferred to the workings of international
agricultural institutions. It is essential to have
democratic spaces “not only at the national
level, but also at the international level so that
the task of forging alliances and compromises of
all actors towards the difficult but essential task
of societal development can be attained”
(Puplampu, 2006:245).
Finally, it remains to be seen whether or not
“Africa can claim the 21 century” (World Bank,
st
2000) by making demonstrable strides in
agricultural policy performance. The strategic
balancing required in coordinating activities,
accountability and transparency have been
absent in the relationship between the African
state and agricultural policy. The idea that
agriculturally endowed African countries cannot
produce enough food to feed their “citizens is a
serious indictment of a theory and practice of
development planning” that privileges export
agriculture at the expense of domestic needs
(Puplampu, 2004a:126). What is known is that
assuming food items have to be imported,
“great economies would be realized if those
commodities [imported] or their equivalent,
could be produced profitably at home, … to
replace imports” (La-Anyane (1963:194). It is still
ironic that an agriculture-based region should
continue to have problems relating to
agricultural production and marketing and be
unable to feed its people. This irony should not
exist any longer. Political leaders, development
practitioners and civil society must come
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5.0 Introduction
As argued in the preceding chapters, the need for having a concrete strategy for agricultural
transformation in Africa cannot be over-emphasized. Africa's food situation has policy makers and
analysts increasingly concerned about the extent to which African agricultural systems can explore
biotechnological innovations for production in particular and agricultural development in general.
The interest in the relationship between biotechnology and the agricultural sector stems from the
fact that the sector is critical to national development in most, if not all, African countries (World Bank,
2007a; NEPAD, 2001). Hence, there is a general understanding and expectation that any future
breakthroughs with respect to African development will have to involve the agricultural sector. There
are a myriad of capacities that need to be developed to ensure transformation of the agricultural
sector. Given that it will be very daunting if not impossible to address all these issues, this Chapter will
address a select number of key issues – biotechnology, infrastructure, agricultural financing and
markets.
5.1 Biotechnology for agricultural
transformation – the
quandary
Several global and regional communities,
towards the end of the last millennium,
embarked upon policy and institutional
initiatives to enhance development prospects in
Africa. One global pact was the UN-sponsored
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in
which member states of the world body pledged
to, among other things, eradicate extreme
poverty and hunger for major segments of the
population by 2015 (UNDP, 2003). Another goal
of the MDGs was a call for global partnerships for
development, stressing the need to utilize new
technologies to transform agricultural
production systems for African development
(Holt-Gimenez, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Africa
Union, 2006; NEPAD, 2006; UNDP, 2003). The
specific technology at stake is biotechnology.
The case for biotechnology in African
agriculture, however, predates the MDGs.
The World Bank (1989) made the initial argument
about the extent to which biotechnology can
benefit African agriculture against the
background of the agricultural crisis of the 1980s
and global trends in agricultural innovation and
development (World Bank, 1991). The World
Bank's earlier assessment found expression in
subsequent global initiatives. The 1992 Rio Earth
Summit (UNCED, 1993), UNEP's (2000)
Convention on Biological Diversity, specifically
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the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the UNDP
(2001) and the FAO (2004b) all identified the
potential of biotechnology to bring about
improvements in agricultural organization in the
global south. At the regional level, African
governments have also acknowledged the
significance of biotechnology in African
agriculture (NEPAD, 2003; 2001). The African
Union (AU), through NEPAD, initiated several
continent-wide programs in the agricultural
sector in general, and biotechnology in particular
(African Union, 2006). In view of the global and
regional consensus on the role of biotechnology,
many African governments, sometimes working
with their international partners, have initiated
policies and established institutions to better
engage with or harness biotechnology for
African agricultural development (Essegbey,
2008; Ayele et al., 2006; Ayele and Wield, 2005).
Despite the enthusiasm for policy pronounce-
ments and the establishment of institutions,
many African countries have not enacted
biosafety rules to govern biotechnology.
Biosafety, in particular, is an essential part of any
policy framework on biotechnology, making the
two concepts inextricably linked. Given their
close relationship and sometimes interchange-
able usage, biosafety, the legislative and
administrative framework that seeks to
minimize the potential risks stemming from
biotechnology, is either initiated alone or as an
integral component of biotechnology policy
(UNEP, 2006:7). The extent of development in
African countries of agricultural biotechnology
has not been significant. South Africa, for
instance, is the first African country to have
initiated and launched its own national policy on
biotechnology, as well as carry out trials on
genetically modified organisms (Moola and
Munnik, 2007; UNEP-GEF, 2006a). South Africa
was also the sole African country cultivating
genetically modified maize, cotton and soya
beans, before Egypt and Burkina Faso recently
started the cultivation of maize and cotton
respectively (Kumwenda, 2011; James, 2010).
While many African countries have signed the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, have
guidelines on biosafety and have also drafted
legislations on biosafety, only a few (South
Africa, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Kenya) have
actually passed laws to govern genetically
modified (GM) organisms (Nature, 2010). The
Nigerian Senate, for example, passed the
country's biosafety bill in June 2011, but
President Goodluck Jonathan is yet to give his
assent to the bill (Johnkingsley, 2011). The policy
vacuum loomed large in the decision by Zambia
and Zimbabwe in 2002 and Angola in 2004 to
reject shipments of GM maize from the USA
(Scott, 2004; Njoroge, 2002). Since 2002, Zambia
has been grappling with how to establish a policy
on biosafety. In Apri l 2007, Zambian
policymakers adopted a biosafety bill and
submitted it to Parliament for debate, only for
the government in August 2007 to issue a
statement rejecting a call for the country to use
GM crops to reduce poverty and hunger
(Malakata, 2007a,b). The famine situation in the
Horn of Africa of 2011 compelled Kenyan
authorities to allow the import of GM maize from
South Africa, a move that has brought to light,
once again, the contentious nature of
agricultural biotechnology in Kenya (Kahare,
2011).
Indeed, it has been several decades since the
World Bank (1989) held out the promise of how
biotechnology would transform African
agriculture and shore up the development
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prospects of the region. However, the role of
biotechnology in African agriculture, as in other
parts of the world, including developed
societies, has been ambiguous and sometimes
met with outright resentment (Andrée, 2007;
Taylor, 2007; Gaskell and Durant, 2002). In view
of the foregoing, the question then is how to
reconcile the view that biotechnology presents
the “breakthrough technology for developing
countries” (UNDP, 2001:E-2-1) with the minimal
and ambivalent role of the technology in
agricultural organization in Africa.
This Report acknowledges that technology does
not function in a vacuum. It rather functions in a
social context. The social context not only
influences technology, but also shapes it.
Indeed, there are complex issues in science-
society relations that affect outcomes.These, for
a number of reasons, take on an added
significance in an era of globalization. The crisis
of the African state due to or in response to
globalization has given rise to a changing role of
the state in setting the framework for
biotechnology pol icy and inst i tut ion.
Specifically, the state now has to contend with a
plethora of non-state actors of different stripes
(national or international) and motivations (non-
profit and for-profit) with regard to the role of
biotechnology in Afr ica's agr icultural
transformation (Essegbey, 2008; Essegbey and
Puplampu, 2007; Puplampu and Essegbey,
2004).
This Chapter, examines the social context of
science and the implications for agricultural
biotechnology policy and institutions, by
addressing three-related questions: First, what
accounts for the lag in establishing the required
policy and institutional framework for
biotechnology in Africa? Second, what are the
implications of changing state-society relations,
in an era of globalization, for agricultural
biotechnology policy and institutions? Finally,
what are the barriers to farmers' utilization of
agricultural biotechnology research?
5.2 The agriculture biotechnology
debate and Africa: an overview
The discourse on agricultural biotechnology can
1
be broadly divided into proponents and
opponents. The position of the proponents
revolves around three main issues (Cherry, 2002;
Omiti, Chacha and Andama, 2002; Wambugu,
2001). First, biotechnology can alter the genetic
traits of a seed, and that would give African
agriculture the necessary boost to contribute to
increases in production, and offer farmers the
possibility of producing high-yielding crops
through, for example, drought resistant crop
varieties. Biotechnology therefore has the best
opportunity to address the periodic hunger and
food insecurity that has become part of the
African condition. Second, improvements in
seed technology can make agricultural systems
less laborious and more profitable in the long
term. Third, the proponents contend that it is
morally imperative to adopt biotechnology since
transgenic technologies can increase food
production in Africa, thus biotechnology
researchers “cannot afford not to make the
technology available to [African] farmers”
(Puplampu and Essegbey, 2004:272).
The opponents counter the above arguments
around three main issues as well (ETC, 2006;
Maathai, 1998; Shiva and Holla-Bahr, 1996). First,
biotechnology is unsafe because it poses a
danger to human health and the environment.
According to this argument, biotechnology,
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which is equated to genetic engineering, can
give rise to some allergies. A second related
problem is the unknown and uncertain
outcomes of biotechnology. Since technological
i n n o v a t i o n s c a n l e a d t o u n i n t e n d e d
consequences, the argument for the opponents
is to proceed on the basis of the precautionary
principle (Barrett and Brunk, 2007). The
opponents cite the contamination of the entire
USA corn market by StarLink and in Mexico in
2000 and 2001 respectively to bolster their
contention. Finally, the opponents are of the
view that biotechnology is not an appropriate
technology to address the needs of resource
poor African farmers, especially at the level of
production. There is an implicit cost of the
technology to farmers. “Today's world,” George
(1986:23) reminds us, "has all the physical
resources and technical skills necessary to feed
the present population of the planet or a much
larger one." Therefore, to the opponents,
biotechnology is not the magic bullet for
agricultural production in Africa, and they
underscore how multinational corporations
involved in biotechnology research reap
enormous profit. For instance, genetically-
produced cocoa and vanilla flavors are
undermining the export market for cocoa beans
from Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana (Syngenta
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, 2002;
DaSilva, 2001).
This section acknowledges the views of the
proponents and opponents of agricultural
biotechnology, specifically, the political context
of the technology and the implied power
relations among the state, private actors (non-
profit and for-profit) and farmers. The power
relations, for instance, have implications for the
cost of the technology which can affect the
extent to which farmers have access to the
technology or utilize research findings.
However, the Report contends that the debate
has to be placed in a broader social context that
also explores biotechnology in Africa within a
framework of globalization and pays attention
to the nuances in the relationship between
power and knowledge and other social aspects
2
of science-society relations . Perhaps, it is
3
necessary to note that the role of biotechnology
agricultural systems in the global north has had
its difficulties. On one hand, the global north can
boast of policy and institutions that can best
engage and harness biotechnology for social
development. For example, agricultural research
systems (both public and private) are
4
spearheading research and utilization of
biotechnology research to improve production,
marketing and consumption (Janssen, 2002;
UNDP, 2001). The giant private biotechnology
firms have their focus on temperate crops
destined for markets in the global north (DaSilva,
2002). On the other hand, biotechnology has
been a source of profound public resentment,
particularly in Europe. The French activist, José
Bové acquired celebrity status when he led a
campaign against McDonald's, the popular
global fast-food chain, and the destruction of
genetically altered rice fields. Prominent
Europeans like Prince Charles and musician Sir
Paul McCartney both made critical remarks on
the role of biotechnology in society. Western
Europeans, particularly the British and French,
have been critical and ambiguous about
genetically modified food (Hodgson, 1999).
Public sentiment among North Americans
(specifically Canada and the United States),
mainly through organizations like Green Peace
and some farmers' organizations, has been
critical of GM foods (Eichenwald, Kolata and
Petersen, 2001; Einsiedel, 2000). What is
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remarkable in the global north is that various
e m i n e n t a n d s c i e n t i f i c b o d i e s h a v e
acknowledged the potential and importance of
biotechnology provided there is a regulatory
framework that contained sufficient and
enforceable safeguards (Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, 1999). With contestations towards the
safety of GM food for human consumption, the
implications of the technology for the
environment and the regulatory framework
being proposed by government and private
industry, technology has been a source of
considerable controversy in global agricultural
systems (Gaskell and Durant, 2002; Gaskell and
Bauer, 2001).
The global controversy of biotechnology is
further complicated in the African context by the
peculiar form and processes that globalization
takes on the continent. The interest here is the
role of globalization in the lag in establishing the
required policy and institutional framework for
agricultural biotechnology in Africa, the
changing role of state and non-state institutions
in the policy arena, and barriers to farmers'
utilization of agricultural biotechnology. If
agricultural biotechnology is to continue to play
a vital role in African development, then it is
crucial to situate it in the broader context of
globalization, which would define its role and will
also shape outcomes. Analysts have examined
the role of agricultural biotechnology, related
innovations and the implications of the changing
role of the state in African agriculture in an era of
globalization (Sangho, Labaste and Ravry, 2011;
Diagne et al., 2011; Baffes, 2009; FAO, 2004b).
The significant aspect of globalization of
agriculture for this Report is the role of
biotechnology in agricultural production. At the
level of production, contract farming and
biotechnology are key aspects of globalization of
agriculture (Watts, 1990:149; Vagneron et al.,
2009; Rissgaard, 2009; Danielou and Ravry, 2005;
Raikes and Gibbon, 2000; Konings, 1998; Little
and Watts, 1994).
5.2.1 Critique and alternative framework
The debate between the proponents and
opponents of agricultural biotechnology has
been sometimes acrimonious and unfruitful.
Proponents of agricultural biotechnology are
correct in asserting the technical efficiencies of
the technology with respect to drought resistant
varieties of crops and less labor intensity in
agricultural production. However, there is an
unstated assumption that the technology is both
a means and an end, and there is no attention to
context. The significance of context was laid
bare by the Green Revolution several years ago.
It is therefore unfortunate, if not disingenuous,
of the proponents to present agricultural
biotechnology as a disembodied entity that will
yield predictable outcomes in all and any social
system. The opponents of agricultural
biotechnology argue that Africa's resource-poor
farmers cannot afford the cost of the technol-
ogy, even though donor assistance might make
that a little more manageable. What is not clear is
how the cost of any change and development
can be avoided. Another argument by the
opponents is that the technology is
inappropriate. If the technology is inappropriate,
what kind of technology would be considered
appropriate for Afr ican farmers? The
ethnocentric tone of this argument is naïve and
troubling. While the opponents are right to point
out the health and uncertain outcomes of
biotechnology, the call to shun the technology
outright does not seem to be in the interest of
the African farmers they purport to protect in the
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first place. For example, Gockowski et al. (2011)
have shown that fine flavor cocoa, the product of
clonal planting material, is more profitable to
cocoa farmers in Ghana than conventional
production systems. Biotechnology, like any
form of technology, will involve some benefits
and risks.
What is not addressed by both perspectives and
germane here is to find out the barriers that
farmers are confronted with in their interaction
with agricultural biotechnology. That line of
inquiry has to focus on the policy and
institutional framework since that would
determine how agricultural biotechnology is
harnessed and utilized, the choices that have to
be made with respect to the regulation, risks,
governance, the private sector, biosafety,
technology transfer, the patent regime and
issues of biodiversity (Thomson et al., 2010;
Mugwagwa, Wamae, and Outram, 2010; Njoki,
2010; Makinde, Mumba and Ambali, 2009; Ayele,
2008; Munro, 2008; Essegbey, 2008; Eicher et al.,
2006; Thomson, 2007; Kelemu et al., 2003;
Alhassan, 2001, 1999). A more comprehensive
effort is required to address the question of why
several Africans have experienced significant
time lags as they attempt to enact relevant
policies or establish institutions that can
incorporate biotechnology into the national
agricultural development agenda (Puplampu,
2010; Kameri-Mbote, 2007; Eicher et al., 2006,
Harsh, 2005; Cohen and Paarlberg, 2004; Morse,
2004; Thomson, 2004). This is because the policy
vacuum has affected the choices that have to be
made with respect to biosafety, the private
sector, technology transfer, the patent regime,
the risk, resistance and governance aspects of
the technology. The emerging literature on
agricultural biotechnology in Africa therefore
makes a compelling case to transcend the
current debate and focus on policy and
institutional issues.
The focus also has to be on broader questions of
how citizens and society at large relate to
scientific knowledge claims, derive meanings
from, attach values and learn about the practices
associated with science, particularly the risk and
uncertainty of agricultural technology (Scoones,
2006; Entine, 2006; Leach, Scoones and Wynne,
2005). There are two specific models at play in
the science-society literature: the deficit and
contextual models. The deficit model proceeds
on the assumed rationality and objectivity of
scientific knowledge and expect farmers to trust
biotechnology researchers or scientists and
utilize research findings to their agricultural
activities (Njoki, 2010; Rampton and Stanber,
2000). Scientists are thus above reproach,
disinterested, blameless and infallible (Wynne,
1995). In light of such assumptions, the refusal of
farmers to engage with the technology, for
instance, is explained in terms of lack of know-
ledge.
The attitudes of farmers to biotechnology are
perceived to flow from an ignorant and passive
group who dwell on myths to shape their
attitudes and worldview. These 'defects'
farmers have about science can be 'cured' by
deepening their knowledge and understanding
of the technology (Collins and Evans, 2002). The
deficit model privileges scientists or researchers;
specifically, those in the national agricultural
research system (NARS) (Jansen and Roquas,
2005). Furthermore, the “cure” of knowledge
will come about through increased levels of
participation by relevant social groups in
agriculture, particularly farmers, in initiating
biotechnology policy and establishing relevant
institutions. What these assumptions fail to
acknowledge is that science is not infallible, and
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the knowledge of researchers is not the only
source for farmers. Farmers have their own
knowledge base and there is also the problem of
institutional trust.
To move beyond the above assumptions,
requires a framework that takes into consider-
ation the basis of the relationship between
knowledge producing sites (for example,
national agricultural research systems) and
farmers as end-users of research outcomes –
hence the contextual model. This model places
the individual in the social and cultural milieu,
and takes into consideration prevailing
knowledge forms in the society and knowledge
about institutional processes (Wynne, 1995,
1991). For instance, it is critical to address
whether or not farmers have any role in setting
the research agenda, and that requires
rethinking their participation in the NARS. In the
contextual model, attention is paid to the
complex relationship between power and
knowledge, how that influences the research
agenda, priorities or options of the research
establishment, and how research findings are
disseminated to farmers. The model implies an
understanding of the nuances of knowledge
creation and utilization. An understanding of
what constitutes knowledge, and what does not,
ultimately involves questions of power.
Foucault's (1983, 1980) sophisticated analysis of
the relationship between power and knowledge
provides an appropriate theoretical framework
in the context model. Foucault submits that
power designates a set of relationships between
social actors, and “what defines a relationship of
power is that it is a mode or action which does
not act directly and immediately on others.
Instead, it acts upon their actions” (Foucault,
1983: 220). Foucault demonstrations how the
subject is drawn into the power nexus through
techniques like surveillance, which aim at
creating a disciplined individual.
Another integral part of Foucault's work on
power and knowledge is the issue of resistance.
Resistance connotes the refusal to accept a
“truth” that is constructed based on a specific
body of knowledge. Any total or partial refusal to
conform to the “truth” constructed by
knowledge producing sites is an act of resistance
(Wang, 1999). For instance, when farmers refuse
to behave according to the “truth” constructed
by and imposed on them by researchers that
constitute resistance. Resistance by farmers can
be visible or organized as well as invisible and
subtle, hence the idea of “a plurality of
resistances” (Foucault, 1990:26). Foucault's
analysis of power and knowledge is significant in
understanding the relat ions between
knowledge producing institutions and farmers
as end-users of research findings or policy
pronouncements.
Implicit in the power-knowledge nexus and how
farmers relate to agricultural biotechnology is
the notion of perception or subjectivity with
respect to risk and governance of biotechnology
(Wafula and Clark, 2005; Aerni, 2005; Aerni and
Bernauer, 2005; Bauer, Petkova and Boyadjieva,
2000). Subjectivity has several components. One
component is how individuals and groups, and in
this case farmers, derive meanings from social
processes related to agricultural biotechnology.
Another aspect of subjectivity is the extent to
which individuals, and subsequently group
behavior can be understood with respect to their
sense of self. Self is an active entity and capable
of deriving meanings from a given social
situation. These meanings will be drawn from
statements made by state and non-state
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knowledge producing institutions. However, the
meanings are interpreted according to the
position (ascribed or achieved) of the individual
or group and constitute the social construction
of reality. The agency of farmers when it comes
to interpretation and deriving meanings from
agricultural biotechnology, the trustworthiness
of institutional knowledge cannot be ignored.
Farmers' agency is also related to risk and
governance.
African farmers, often the most vulnerable
group in the agriculture value chain, have to
factor risk into their decision making process.
The impact of technology is not neutral; hence a
better understanding of risk is a rational human
behavior. A governance structure with a
verifiable and enforceable regulatory regime,
genuine participation by relevant stakeholders,
including farmers, would help provide a context
in which farmers would be more willing and
better able to engage with biotechnology. What
flows from the above review is not a question of
whether or not biotechnology is good or bad for
African agricultural development. Rather, it is
whether or not there are effective policies and
capable institutions that can initiate, monitor
and engage agricultural biotechnology for
national development. This line of questioning
requires an analysis critically interrogating the
nexus of science and society in terms of the
initiation and consequences of science policy.
Before addressing the empirical context of the
above assertions, the next section presents an
overview of agricultural biotechnology policy
and institutions in Africa. It is therefore
important to note that analysis of the ACI data
shows that information systems had the highest
contribution to increasing both agricultural
5.2.2 Agricultural Biotechnology Policy and
Institutions in Africa
The 1990s offered two contrasting pictures of
the African condition. On one hand, the decade is
generally considered the lost decade for African
development, following the mixed outcomes of
structural adjustment policies on African
agricultural development (Heidhues and Obare,
2011). On the other hand, the 1990s marked the
end of a millennium, and that impelled public and
private institutions to prepare for the next
FIGURE 5.1
Information Systems Contribute More to Increased Agriculture
Value Added and Productivity than Other Dimensions of Capacity
Source: ACI database 2012
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millennium on the basis of hope; a narrative that
is closely associated to agricultural biotechnol-
ogy. This is the background for the African Union-
sponsored New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD) (2001), which calls for
“institutional support in the form of research
[centers] and institutes … [to] boost the
production of marketable surpluses.” The focus
on institutions as part of a strategy to increase
agricultural productivity is worth stressing
(Puplampu, 2006). However, the interest in
institutions should be tied to capacity or
sustainability (Eicher, 1989; World Bank, 1989).
The AU, beyond NEPAD (2001), launched the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Programme (CAADP), initiated a Biosafety
Project, and enacted the 2003 African Model Law
on Safety in Biotechnology (Zerbe, 2007). The
plans were followed by the Africa Science and
Technology Consolidated Plan of Action and the
Freedom to Innovate policy documents (Juma
and Serageldin, 2007; NEPAD, 2006). The latter
document, for example, stressed the need to
anchor biotechnology and its governance
structure to the aims and aspirations of the
society and explore new forms of knowledge,
calling on research establishments to conform
with global advances in science and technology.
The African Union designated the Forum for
Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) as a key
part of promoting agricultural biotechnology
(Steffens, 2007; FARA, 2006).
Another essential institutional aspect of
agricultural biotechnology in Africa is the
capacity of the various national agricultural
research systems (NARS) (Beintema and Stads,
2011; Alene and Coulibaly, 2009; Liebenberg and
Kirsten, 2006; Elliot and Perrault, 2006;
Puplampu, 2004b). Four main features of the
NARS in Africa can be briefly identified. The first
is their institutional set-up. They are made up of
institutions and personnel from several areas of
agricultural interest and expertise – policy units
in agriculture, higher education, specifically
researchers from universities, professionals in
science and technology policy to environment
and women's issues. Most of these institutions
are in the public domain and depend on the state
for their funding requirements (Cohen, 2005;
Cohen and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2002). The level
of public funding of national agricultural
research in Africa, with the exception of South
Africa, has lagged behind that of other
developing societies (Alston and Pardey,
2006:18). As the FAO (2004b) correctly notes,
public agricultural research institutions have
been under severe financial constraints in recent
years, partly in light of the changing role of the
state in an era of globalization. However, other
developing countries, for example, China, India,
Taiwan and Korea continue to invest heavily in
agricultural research (Ochem, 2006; FAO,
2004b). Theoretically, the changing role of the
state opens the door for private sector
participation in agricultural research. Yet, except
in South Africa, the role of the private sector in
agricultural research is minimal in many African
countries (Liebenberg and Kirsten, 2006).
Agricultural research systems play a major role in
defining the role of agro-biotechnology in any
society. Consequently, the nature of the
research capacity could serve as a useful proxy in
classifying African countries with regard to
agricultural biotechnology. Beintema and Stads
(2011:11-12) used the level of funding and staff to
categorize public agricultural research in Africa.
They identified what they called Africa's “Big
Eight” countries as Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria,
Kenya, Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania, and
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Uganda. One significance aspect of the “Big
Eight” is their regional locations. For example,
Ghana and Nigeria, both on the west coast, could
serve as centers for regional growth. South
Africa, however, is alone in the southern part of
the continent.
A second feature of the national agricultural
research systems in Africa is their orientation.
There is an excessive focus on technical issues
and export crops, relative to social issues, or
crops for domestic consumption. This
orientation has its origins in the history of
agricultural research in the Third World (Deo and
Swanson, 1991; George, 1986). The focus on
technical research is particularly troubling since
the success of any agricultural research system
calls for close collaboration between technical
and social aspects of research (Biggs and
Farrington, 1991). A third feature is the human
capital of the NARS in Africa. Two major factors
are worth mentioning – a quantitative
assessment of the areas of specialization and
number of qualified staff as well as a qualitative
analysis of the physical infrastructure and
working conditions, which in turn, are reflections
of the state of higher and science education in
Africa (Beintema and Stads, 2011; Urama et al.,
2010). Many African countries were able to
improve the human capital base in the
immediate post-colonial period, but only to lose
them to the diaspora with the economic crisis
that engulfed African countries since the 1980s,
due to, among other problems, shortfalls in
funding to the research institutions (Tettey,
2006; Tettey and Puplampu, 2005; Puplampu
and Tettey, 2000).
Finally, NARS in Africa are over dependent on
external multilateral agencies and institutions.
As indicated earlier, the World Bank (1989)
initiated agricultural biotechnology in Africa.
Several agencies of the United Nations
introduced policy documents on the potential of
the technology for agricultural development in
general and African agriculture in particular
(UNEP, 2006; FAO, 2004b; UNDP, 2001; GEF,
2000). The UNEP-GEF project on biosafety has
been the most instrumental global initiative to
establish a national framework for biosafety in
African countries (UNEP, 2006; GEF, 2000). The
UNEP-GEF effort, consistent with the Cartagena
Protocol, placed specific requirements on
countries. One major requirement, in line with
Article 23 of the Protocol, was to organize and
involve public participation in the deliberations
towards a biosafety policy (Jaffe, 2005:307).
According to UNEP-GEF (2006b:11) twenty-seven
African countries, have completed their National
Biosafety Framework (NBF), four countries
(Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia and Uganda) have
implemented their NBF (see also African Union,
2006). Several African countries are either at the
advanced stage of a draft or working on one
(Moola and Munnik, 2007).
Beyond the UNEP-GEF program, other external
institutions are also involved in establishing the
biosafety policy framework in Africa. The notable
ones are the World Bank, Britain's Department of
Finance and International Development (DFID)
and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). USAID, for instance,
through the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa
established the Program for Biosafety Systems
(PBS) under the auspices of the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and
coordinated workshops in several African
countries including Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi,
Mali, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda (IFPRI, 2006b;
Alhassan, 2006). The World Bank was the major
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actor in the West African Economic and
Monetary Union-sponsored project (on behalf of
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal and Togo), as
part of the West Africa Regional Biosafety
Project (World Bank, 2006b).
Several African countries are involved in
different aspects of biotechnology research,
mainly production of quality controlled bio-
fertilizers, cloning of plants (mainlyin vitro
export crops) and bio-prospecting of new
nitrogen fixing species of bacteria (Thomson et
al., 2010; Ayele, 2008; Brink, Woodward and
DaSilva, 1998). The Kenya Agricultural Research
Institute (KARI), through its collaboration with
Monsanto, the agro-biotech giant, worked on
transforming the sweet-potato to produce
resistance to the feathery mottle virus as well as
improvements to banana production (using
tissue cultured pathogen-free banana planting
materials) (Omiti, Chacha and Andama, 2002;
Hassanali, 2000). The project also benefited from
the assistance of the International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA)
as well as funding from the Canadian
International Development Research Centre. In
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria,
the introduction of high-yield, drought resistant
and early ripening varieties of maize led to
impressive gains in production (DaSilva, 2001;
Twumasi-Afriyie et al, 1999).
Juma (2011:35) posits that tissue culture “has not
only helped produce new rice varieties in Africa
but has also helped East Africa produce pest- and
disease-free bananas at a high rate.” The
development saw Kenya's banana production
for example, more than doubling “from 400,000
to over one million tons in 2004, with average
yields increasing from 10 tons per hectare to 30-
50 tons.”
DaSilva (2002) cites the cooperation between
the International Potato Centre in Peru and the
Uganda National Agricultural Research
Organization that led to the introduction and
growth of disease-free potato crops in Uganda.
Komen, Mignouna and Weber (2000) also
examined the extent of biotechnology
investment in Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, South
Africa, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Nigeria with
respect to banana, plantain, cassava, cowpea,
maize, sorghum and yams. Pineapple producers
in Ghana are using tissue culture to produce
crops that will satisfy the quality standards of the
export market, and researchers there are also
examining how to develop a variety of cocoa that
will be resistant to the swollen shoot virus
through mutagenesis using gamma irradiation
(Essegbey and Puplampu, 2007). In Egypt,
researchers have used plant tissue to produce
maize and tomato resistant to stemborers and
Gemini viruses respectively (Komen et al., 2000;
Moawad and Madkour, 2000). Uganda has
embarked upon field trials of GM bananas,
cassava and cotton (Wamboga-Mugirya, 2010).
In terms of actors, the agricultural biotechnology
landscape in Africa is occupied by state and non-
state institutions. All the illustrations above
involve state institutions in the NARS. It is the
state institutions that provide the initial entry
point for non-state institutions, whether they are
multinational corporations whose activities are
geared towards profit or non-profit institutions
involved in policy advocacy (Cohen, 2005; FAO,
2004b).
Notwithstanding the examples above, there are
only three noteworthy African countries
involved in the cultivation of agricultural
biotechnology crops. The three countries are
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South Africa (maize, soybean and cotton),
Burkina Faso (cotton) and Egypt (maize) (James,
2010). South Africa, for example, is the only
African country among the leading developing
countries (China, India, Brazil and Argentina)
involved in the cultivation of biotech crops, while
Burkina Faso had the second largest
proportional increase (126%) in biotech
hectarage in the world (James, 2010:6; Juma,
2011). The next two sections examine the time
lag in enacting biotechnology policy in Africa and
the extent to which farmers engage with the
technology.
5.2.3 Agricultural biotechnology
policy in Africa – where are we?
The state continues to be the main agent for
agricultural biotechnology in Africa. Thus,
contrary to globalization, the state plays an
influential role in society (Castells, 1997:243). In
addressing agricultural biotechnology in Africa,
some facts have to be stressed. First, even
though Kenya, for example, as part of the UNEP-
GEF (2006b) project, completed its National
Biosafety Framework (NBF) in 1999, the final
Biosafety Bill was signed in February 2009, ten
years after the completion of the framework
(African Centre for Biosafety, 2009). According
to UNEP (2006:13), the four countries that
implemented their NBF were able to do so
because they were part of “the Pilot Biosafety
Enabling Activity project funded by GEF and
implemented by UNEP”. This implies that African
countries are dependent on external agencies to
establish their NBF. While that in itself is
significant, it underscores the real possibility of a
lack of policy ownership, since it is likely that
once the funds for a specific project run out, the
survival of the project is also doubtful.
Under the auspices of the UNEP-GEF, a key
aspect of initiating a biosafety policy is to
establish a National Biosafety Committee (NBC).
The NBCs are made up of units and representa-
tives from various sector ministries and
agencies; entities that might not necessarily
share the same ideas for creating a sound policy
on biotechnology or biosafety. The National
Agricultural Research System (NARS), like the
National Biosafety Committee (NBC), is made up
of several sector ministries and units within
these ministries. Most of these institutions have
different mandates, and are accountable to
different sector ministries. For example,
universities in the NARS will be under the
ministry of education, while agricultural colleges
and institutes are accountable to the ministry of
agriculture. In such an institutional framework,
the nature and commitment to the overriding
goal of the NARS cannot be easily accomplished.
The issue of the commitment of related officials
in sector ministries, coordination and
underfunding are prominent features of the
NARs in Africa (Beintema and Stads, 2011;
Essegbey, 2008). In effect, one factor in the long
search for biosafety policy in Africa is the
institutional framework for agricultural research
(Puplampu, 2010:194)
The problems of commitment exist even when
there is a single national agricultural research
agency, as in Niger, Togo and Eriteria, or an
umbrella organization as in Ghana and South
Africa (Beintema and Stads, 2011:2). In Ghana,
where the Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) (itself made of different
research institutions) is in charge of the entire
NARS, a “turf” mentality as well as institutional
squabbling, personality conflicts is prevalent
(Puplampu and Essegbey, 2004). Nigeria created
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the Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria
(ARCN), ostensibly to enhance coordination and
linkages across research agencies, better relate
to researchers and their clients, and deepen
synergies in institutional mandates (Flaherty et
al., 2010). The move towards a better handling of
coordination in Nigeria is a direct result of the
desire to establish a new framework for
agricultural policy and research in that country,
and to offset years of neglect and under-
investment in the 1990s. The institutional
capacity of both the NBC and the NARS, how
each perceives itself and relates to the other,
underpin the delay in crafting biosafety policy in
Africa.
The commitment and coordination problems are
further worsened by the funding regime. The
historical dominant presence of the state in
NARS was noted earlier. Notwithstanding the
restructuring of the state machinery in the 1980s,
“the government sector still dominates
agricultural research in the region, but its relative
share has declined over time. In 1991,
government agencies employed 82 percent of
full-time equivalent public R&D staff in SSA [Sub-
Saharan Africa] on average, but this share had
fallen to 73 percent in 2008” (Beintema and
Stads, 2011:2). While there are, of course,
variations across Africa, there have been some
increases in agricultural research funding. In
Ghana, the increases were entirely due to
increased salary expenditure at CSIR, rather than
expanded research activities or greater
investment in equipment or infrastructure, while
the expenditure increases in Nigeria and Sudan
were to compensate for years of underfunding
(Beintema and Stads, 2011:11-12). Meanwhile,
countries like Brazil, India and China consistently
invest in public agricultural research and
development institutions compared to Africa as
a whole (Beintema and Stads, 2011:9). Hence, it is
not the case that the state, even in an era of
globalization cannot fund agricultural policy and
institutions. Rather, the African state lacks the
political will to fund agricultural policy and
institutions (Makinde, 2009).
One enduring feature of state funding of
agricultural policy and institutions in Africa is
unpredictability. While politicians tout the role of
agriculture in the national development effort,
promises to release funds are not matched with
actual delivery. In Ghana, calls from Parliamen-
tarians to the Ministry of Finance to release funds
to augment the national biosafety effort made
no difference (Ghana Web, 2005; Alhassan,
2001). In cases where the funds are released, the
timing does not make it possible to properly plan
and utilize the funds. The lack of political
commitment to guide the national development
effort is a major impediment to agricultural
policy and research planning in Africa. These are
clear indicators of an absence of good
governance and accountability in state-society
relations. In other words, African governments
are yet to realize the importance of funding
agricultural institutions with the personnel
required for the institutions to effectively
discharge their duties. The funding question is a
fundamental one of how to engender national
development in a context of scarce resources
and competing needs. No country, either in the
global north or south, has an infinite supply of
resources. The question then is “how to organize
and prioritize scarce resources for optimum
outcomes” (Puplampu, 2010:195). Essgebey
(2008) is therefore correct, in an analysis of
biotechnology policy issues in Nigeria, Kenya,
Namibia, Rwanda, Ghana and South Africa, in
arguing that the extent to which African
countries can utilize biotechnology and create
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the required policy framework will depend on
the orientation and priorities of national
development planning (Essegbey and
Puplampu, 2007). A key aspect of this orientation
is the awareness or realization that agricultural
biotechnology is expensive, but if properly
funded will provide valuable benefits in the long
term (FAO, 2004b).
The 1980s and 1990s, characterized by calls for a
minimal state, assumed the emergence of
considerable private sector participation which
would take over the role of the public sector in
agr icultural biotechnology pol icy and
institutions. However, there is a lag in private
sector involvement in agricultural biotechnology
policy and institutional development, due to the
nature of the market for agricultural research
(Puplampu and Tettey, 2000). In general,
agricultural policy planning and research in
particular are expensive. Private sector
involvement in agricultural research and the
consequent desire to shape the policy
environment for agricultural biotechnology
“would be predicated on a perceived profitabil-
ity, and not necessarily because there is a social
good to be derived from it” (Puplampu,
2004:112). Some recent initiatives in Senegal and
Côte d'Ivoire suggest a trend that might bode
well in the future (Beintema and Stads, 2011:19-
20). Large private companies in these countries
funded research activities, and the process could
well have implications for the nature of the policy
process and institutional capacity building in
agricultural development. Lately, some African
countries (Kenya – coffee and tea; Malawi – tea
and tobacco; Zambia – cotton) have instituted
commodity levies, which primarily tied to
research relating to those commodities, could
also have long term consequences for the policy
process (Beintema and Stads, 2011:20). Several
conditions are required for any meaningful
private sector participation in the policy,
institutional and private framework and the
broader goal of public support and assistance in
accepting agricultural innovations. Specifically,
there is the need for a policy environment that
strongly protects intellectual property rights,
facilitates importing and testing of new
technologies, and a tax regime that favors the
exemptions and rights of venture capitalists
(Alston, Pardey and Piggott, 2006). Since many
of the private institutions are likely to be
transnational in nature, it is essential that
whatever policy environment the political
authorities put in place should also pay attention
to the interests of local, even if nascent, private
agricultural institutions.
Given the never-ending mantra from African
leaders that they lack the resources for
development, it comes as no surprise that there
is a heavy dependence on external sources of
funding for policy development, implementation
and monitoring. As stated in the previous
section, several donors were involved in
biotechnology policy development in Africa and
used their involvement to influence agricultural
biotechnology policies in the region. If
institutional capability with respect to
biotechnology policy is contingent on the state
and the private sector, or commodities for
funding which might be unstable or erratic, the
funding regime from bilateral and multilateral
donors and institutions also has its shortcom-
ings. Donors, like private sector organizations,
are selective in terms of their assistance
programs. The US Government-sponsored
Program for Biosafety Systems and the World
Bank West African Regional Biosafety Project are
notable examples. According to ETC (2006), the
two projects were part of a broader US strategy
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to introduce GMOs into the developing world:
the timing of the projects and the specific focus
on cotton aligned with an agenda to push Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) cotton in West Africa make
governments and farmers receptive to the
world-wide league of GM producers.
The argument of the ETC (2006) was made at the
height of the row between cotton producers in
the four African cotton countries (Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali) and Brazil over US domestic
cotton subsidies, which were inconsistent with
WTO provisions on agriculture (Jobodwana,
2011; Kaminski, 2011; Kaminski, Headey and
Bernard, 2011; Tschirley, 2010; Moseley and Gray,
2008). The projects, from ETC's (2006)
perspective, were hegemonic in form and
intention. Burkina Faso was at the centre of the
West African Regional Biosafety project,
because through a Ministerial Directive, the
country became the only country in West Africa
conducting field trials on Bt cotton (Alhassan,
2006). In the long-run, however, the country was
negatively affected by the volatilities in world
cotton prices, mainly because of cotton
subsidies in the United States and synthetic
fibers in Europe (World Bank, 2009b).
Donor funding, mostly from the public sector, is
generally tied to a specific project and is short-
term; hence it raises the possibility of a
discontinuity when the funding period expires,
and questions about the long-term commitment
required for policy and institutional effective-
ness. Furthermore, the nature of the funding
regime, whether or not it involves any
partnership with the private sector, and the
ability of the recipient country to negotiate
better terms with the duration of the project,
affect donor assistance. Most African countries
embarked upon drafting their National Biosafety
Framework because of the availability of
external funding from the UNEP-GEF (Gupta and
Falkner, 2006). The various national biosafety
committees eventually exhausted their funding
and were unable to promulgate the policy. The
essential point is that “creating a framework is
quite different from having capable research
institutions” (Puplampu, 2010:195) that will
implement the framework. In the midst of
bureaucratic and institutional polit ical
wrangling, and an erratic and unreliable funding
regime from national, international and
multilateral development agencies and
institutions, many African countries have not
been able to enact an effective biotechnology
policy and institutions. Consequently, the
engagement, outcomes and potential of
agricultural biotechnology to transform African
agriculture remain just that – a potential. Any
discussion of the role and place of farmers has
been missing in the debate on agricultural
biotechnology in particular and African
agriculture in general.
5.2.4 Farmers and agricultural
biotechnology utilization: challenges
and opportunities
One useful way to address the role of farmers in
agricultural policy making in general, and
biotechnology research and utilization in
particular, is to revisit the nature and organiza-
tion of the NARS. Historically, the colonial
ministries of agriculture were not only
understaffed, but also focused on export
agricultural crops and technical aspects of
agricultural production. The external and
technical focus of agricultural institutions and
policy were expressed in the agricultural
research system. The continuities in colonial and
postcolonial practices account for the
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contemporary marginal location of farmers in
agricultural policy and institutions, including the
NARS. To be sure, contemporary African
agricultural policy and research institutions have
been making an effort to better engage farmers,
even though the preference continues to be
mostly large-scale farmers in export crop
production.
Two noteworthy cases of the interaction
between African farmers and agricultural
biotechnology will form the basis of the analysis
in this section: Bt cotton farmers in the Makhatini
Flats of KwaZulu Natal in South Africa, and in
Burkina Faso, as well as the New Rice for Africa
(NERICA) and rice production in several African
countries (Diagne et al., 2011; Dalohoun, Hall and
Mele, 2009; Diagne, 2006; Gouse, 2009; Gouse et
al., 2005; Thirtle et al., 2003). It must be noted
that even though Burkina Faso is not one of the
“Big Eight” African countries driving agricultural
research, the country's policies, as discussed
shortly, account for the origins of the production
of agricultural biotechnology cotton. Generally,
the variations of biotechnology in agriculture
reflect differences in countries relative to
biotechnology policy and institutions.
Specifically, the two cases illustrate the role and
place of farmers in the national agricultural
institution and policy making process, the
relationship between farmers and the NARS
(institutions and research policy), the role of
both state and non-state actors, the type of crop
and its value to national and international
agricultural markets and the type of farmers
involved in the production process.
The point of departure of the story of Bt cotton
farmers in South Africa and Burkina Faso is the
institution and policy on agricultural biotechnol-
ogy of the respective governments. South Africa,
being the first African country to establish a
policy framework, also approved commercial
release of GM seeds. In the case of Burkina Faso,
a Ministerial Directive authorized the field trials
of Bt cotton. It was the presence of an
institutional and policy framework that
accounted for Monsanto's role in the Bt cotton
debate in both countries. Monsanto played a
major role in sponsoring South African cotton
producers to bring their accounts to a global
audience (Munro, 2008; Freidberg and Horowitz,
2004). Through this sponsorship, the farmers
presented a compelling narrative on infusing
agricultural biotechnology into their farming
activities (Glover, 2010). The experiences of the
two countries underscore the need for and
importance of an appropriate institutional
framework in addition to other relevant
conditions.
Another important variable is the market for
cotton. In South Africa where “most cotton … is
imported, the producer price is closely tied to the
international price (because if the local price
went up, local purchasers would simply import
more of their cotton needs). And the
international price, of course, is shaped
significantly by subsidies in the global north”
(Munro, 2008:264). In effect, the increases in
cotton production in South Africa, due to the
technological improvements did not translate
into increases in income for the small-scale
farmers. The argument put forward by Gouse et
al. (2005) is that the case of Bt cotton in KwaZulu
Natal was a technological triumph, but an
institutional failure. It was an institutional failure
because the farmers, among other problems, did
not have access to credit. Indeed, institutional
credit is one of several factors that African
governments have to address if farmers are
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expected to adopt agricultural biotechnology
and benefit from it. Burkina Faso cotton farmers
were faced with the reverse of the South African
situation, since they have to export their cotton
directly into international markets, and were also
confronted with the situation of price
instabilities and uncertainties. The utility of
harnessing biotechnology to produce what
farmers are likely to eat should be an integral
part of the policy framework. The argument
underscores the fact that farmers are not likely
to adopt agricultural biotechnology for non-food
crops, because if the new crop fails either to
produce or capture the market, they will have no
source of food or income to buy the food items
they need but did not produce. This theoretical
argument is supported by an analysis of the New
Rice for Africa (NERICA) project.
The Africa Rice Centre (AfricaRice), formerly the
West Africa Rice Development Association
(WARDA), is one of the agricultural research
centers under the umbrella of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR). Rice, of course, is a staple food in many
African societies, and while domestic production
has been rising, there continues to be a shortfall
that is filled by imports. In 2009, rice imports cost
Africa almost US$4 billion, a huge figure that
could have been invested in domestic
production (Seck et al., 2010). Development of
the NERICA varieties began in 1991 and the initial
difficulties were addressed by 1994 “through
perseverance and the use of biotechnology tools
such as anther culture and embryo rescue
techniques” (Diagne et al., 2011:255). The
success of the NERICA project and its
implications for food security has been widely
acknowledged (Anderson and Jackson, 2005).
For example, the Centre and its director (Monty
Jones) won the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research's (CGIAR)
King Baudouin Award and the World Food Prize
in 2000 and 2004 respectively.
The essential feature of the NERICA project
critical to the current inquiry is the role of the
participatory varietal selection (PVS) methodol-
ogy in the subsequent adoption of the NERICA
varieties across Africa, from Burkina Faso and
Gambia to Uganda and beyond (Diagne et al,
2011:260). PVS provides an opportunity for
farmers to choose from available crop varieties,
and the development and dissemination of crop
varieties takes account of site-specificity in terms
of agronomic and selection variables (Diagne et
al., 2011:255). The methodological orientation of
the NERICA made a major difference in the
widespread utilization of NERICA. This is
because, like other African agricultural
development programs, it had external donors.
These donors included the International Rice
Research Institute, research institutes and
development agencies in Japan and the United
States. The success of the methodological focus
of putting farmers first, while not a new
orientation, has to be acknowledged and
celebrated (Chambers, 1987). The extent to
which farmers, specifically small-scale farmers,
as end-users of policy and research, participate in
agricultural policy and research is essential to
outcomes.
The Achilles heel in agricultural biotechnology
utilization in Africa is the nature of participation
by farmers in agricultural policy making and
research (see Box 5.1 on Côte d'Ivoire).
Participation is premised on groups taking part in
decisions that affect them (Brett, 2003). The
motivation behind participation is to engender a
sense of ownership and the subsequent
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acceptance of a specific policy. Implicit in
participation is also a sense of fairness, especially
when previous or existing procedures fail to
consider the needs of specific and relevant social
groups, hence participation could be demanded
by law (Innes and Booher, 2004). The importance
of participation influenced the framing of Article
23 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which
calls for consultation among the various
stakeholders, public awareness and participa-
tion in ongoing discussions on biotechnology.
The problem, however, has been the role of
farmers in such public consultations, given their
historical neglect in agricultural policy processes
and their equally marginal place in technically
focused agricultural research systems. The
NERICA case shows that when farmers are
properly involved in agricultural research, there
are positive outcomes. There is no evidence to
suggest that farmers will not adopt agricultural
biotechnology to improve upon their production
practices. However, as the most vulnerable in
African agricultural systems, farmers are rational
actors who will be concerned about their food
security needs when they adopt agricultural
biotechnology to produce crops which are
BOX 5.1
Agricultural biotechnology utilization and institutional constraints: the case of Ivorian rice sector
Today, approximately 20% of imports to West Africa consist of food supplies, particularly rice. Côte d'Ivoire
imports 753,711 tons of rice per year at a cost of more than 150 million US$ to achieve food security and meet rice
consumption needs (FAOSTAT, 2005). On average Côte d'Ivoire imports more than 50% of its rice consumption
needs.
Increased productivity in the rice sector will require that farmers move from the traditional mode of agricultural
production to one based on science and technology. There is ample evidence that use of improved seed has
been responsible for an important share of world-wide agricultural productivity growth (Tomich et al., 1995;
Hopper, 1993). The contrast between the role played by the improved crop varieties in other regions of the
world and the very limited use of these innovations in sub-Saharan Africa has motivated numerous studies on
issues relating to the adoption of improved technologies. However, in such studies, too much emphasis is
placed on individual attributes implying a “person blame” rather than “system blame” situation. This approach
seemed to suggest that the entire responsibility for agricultural modernization ultimately rests with the
individual.
An empirical analysis of findings from surveys conducted in west Côte d'Ivoire in 2008 demonstrates that not
only farm and farmers' characteristics but also institutional factors, significantly influence the adoption and
intensive use of improved rice varieties (Béké, 2011). Indeed, constraints to the adoption of improved
technologies involve undeniably critical factors such as the lack of credit and the deficiency of transportation
infrastructures. Smallholders generally are dispersed over wide areas, and infrastructure connecting farms
with markets often is poor. In such environment, costs that arise in producing and marketing agricultural
products limit modern technologies profitability. Additionally, subsistence agricultural producers in Côte
d'Ivoire face significant liquidity constraints that limit effective demand for improved technologies. The overall
conclusion deduced from this analysis is that credit constraints and transport costs in accessing agricultural
markets have significant negative effects on the adoption of improved rice varieties. Farmers are able to adopt
intensively improved agricultural technologies if policies improve their access to credit and reduce transport
costs in accessing agricultural markets.
Source: Tomich and al., 1995; Hopper, 1993; Béké, 2011
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Farmers' associations are not homogenous
entities. There, represent different crops
(traditional historical export crops and non-
traditional exotic crops), and locations (rural or
urban) . In severa l nat ional b iosafety
committees, the farmers represented were
those involved in the export of the new non-
traditional crops as was the case in Ghana
(Puplampu, 2011b:200-201). Finally, the
underlying assumptions of participation in the
Protocol were problematic (Jaffe, 2005; Jansen
and Roquas, 2005). Each country was expected
to conceptualize participation in a manner
consistent with existing political and socio-
cultural nuances. However, the assumption that
each country will have the structure to solicit
genuine participation and democratic interac-
tion and outcomes is equally naïve (Rayner,
2003). As the ACI survey data shows, agricultural
capacity is more impacted by country
characteristics than by democracy, except in the
role of the private sector and information
systems (Figure 5.2). Better information systems
in the whole agricultural value chain can reverse
the resource curse. A private sector stronger
than the state can sway elections provided there
are enabling factors such as technology and
infrastructure.
Elections have mixed effects on
indicators of agricultural capacity
-0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06
Difference between election
and no election
Resource curse visible across all
indicators information systems
Strategy
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1
Difference between Resource
Rich and Resource Poor
FIGURE 5.2
Relations between agricultural capacity and democracy.
Private Sector
Info System
Agric Strategy
Train-Innov
Agricultural
Train-Innov
Private Sector
Info System
Source: ACI database 2012
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5.3 Infrastructure bottlenecks
and enablers
An enabling infrastructure environment is
central to agricultural development (Gajigo and
Lukoma, 2011; Juma, 2011; ITU, 2010; Meinzen-
Dick et al., 2010). Infrastructure refers to a range
of services drawn from both the public and
private sectors – and includes “facilities,
structures, associated equipment, services, and
institutional arrangement that facilitate the flow
of agricultural goods, services, and ideas” (Juma,
2011:84). Examples of infrastructure are: water
supply, sanitation, transportation, electricity,
telecommunications, irrigation dams and banks.
Agricultural infrastructure, thus, encompasses
all of the basic services, facilities, equipment, and
institutions needed for the economic growth
and efficient functioning of the food and broader
agricultural markets. Infrastructure serves as the
basis upon which technical knowledge can be
applied in sustainable development (Juma,
2011:84).
A key objective of this section is to highlight the
role of an enabling infrastructure environment in
accelerating agricultural development. Indeed,
as Juma (2011:84) argues, “Africa's [current]
poor infrastructure represents a unique
opportunity to adopt new approaches in the
design and implementation of infrastructure
facilities.” Ndulu et al. (2005:103-104) similarly
posit that during “the four decades since 1960,
African countries…achieved significantly lower
capital accumulation than other developing
regions. … African countries have also largely
under-invested in infrastructure against the
wisdom that countries which typically manage to
invest more, do so particularly in infrastructure
sectors.”
Agricultural infrastructure plays an important
role especially in the African context where a
large percentage of the society depends on this
sector for subsistence. The agricultural sector
itself also plays a dominant role in alleviating
poverty and the overall growth of the
agricultural sector and its components such as
growth of agricultural employment, income, and
output depend largely on the level of investment
m a d e i n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . A n e n a b l i n g
infrastructure environment reduces costs and
enlarges markets for farmers (Ndulu et al.,
2005:109). That said, investing in agriculture-
related infrastructure requires, amongst others,
a research and cooperative extension system
that will enhance production, marketing, food
safety, nutrition, natural resource conservation,
and all other functions of different agencies
concerned in the sector.
Some of the reasons for investing in an enabling
agricultural infrastructure are:
(a) Infrastructure increases agricultural
production and productivity – Gajigo and
Lukoma (2011) argue that the infrastructure
in the agricultural sector enhances the
'comparative advantages' of that region in
which the infrastructural investment is made.
As they put it: “[A] major determinant of
agricultural productivity growth is infrastruc-
ture. In addition to other factors such as
human capital, credit markets, extension
services, and technology research, the
presence of reliable infrastructure increases
both output per capita and output per unit of
land. It is therefore a key contributor to
productivity, mainly by reducing transaction
costs in inputs and outputs markets, as well
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as better integrating within sub-regions”
(2011:1-2). An earlier empirical study by
Binswanger et al. (1993) demonstrated that
increased marketing infrastructure that
includes components such as road facilities
enhanced the total agricultural output with
the elasticity of 0.20. Juma (2011:85) similarly
notes how infrastructure fosters agricultural
trade and “helps integrate economies into
[global] markets… [And] further represents
untapped potential for the creation of
productive employment.” Fan and Zhang
(2008), in a study on Uganda, also noted the
invaluable contribution of infrastructure-led
projects to rural development.
(b) Infrastructure reduces cost of production -
development of agricultural infrastructure in
a particular region not only enhances
agricultural production and productivity but
leads to reduction in the marginal cost of
production (Gajigo and Lukoma, 2011; Juma,
2 0 1 1 ) . A h m e d a n d H u s s a i n ( 1 9 9 0 )
demonstrated that fertilizer use in the
agricultural sector increases with the
improvement in the quality of roads. It could
be argued that the transaction cost– that
generally falls outside the cost of input prices
− can be one of the major components of the
total cost of production in the agricultural
sector and that infrastructure plays a
dominant role in reducing the transaction
cost. Gajigo and Lukoma (2011) argue that
cost of infrastructure as reflected in spatial
price dispersion can be substantial (Table
Country Commodity Price dispersion
* (January to June 2011)
Kenya Rice 32%
Maize 39%
Tanzania Rice 25%
Maize 37%
Uganda Rice 14%
Maize 30%
TABLE 5.1
Cost of infrastructure as reflected in spatial commodity
price dispersion in some African countries
Source: Regional Agricultural Trade Information Network (2011). *The ratio of monthly price
differences in major cities in a country to the monthly average price level of commodity.
Transportation costs incurred by the farmers
in a particular region, both for transporting
inputs to the field from the place of purchase
and transporting the output to the market
place for final sale, can be substantial in the
absence of proper transportation facilities.
Once the transportation infrastructure has
been introduced, the transaction cost may be
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considerably reduced, which has a bearing on
the total marginal cost of production (Gajigo
and Lukoma, 2011; Juma, 2011). This will either
result in benefiting the farmers by way of
increased 'producer surplus' or it would
result in diversion of the additional cost
saved towards other productive activities by
the farmers that would enhance the overall
output and income of the region. As Juma
(2011:87) argues, “Transportation is a key link
for food security and agribusiness-based
economic growth. Roads [are] the most
obvious and critical element [although]
modern seaports, airports and rail networks
are also [critical], particularly for export-led
agricultural innovation such as cut flowers or
green beans in Kenya” (see also Essegbey
and Puplampu (2007) on pineapple exporters
in Ghana).
(c) Infrastructure enhances value addition –
agricultural infrastructure arguably
enhances the level of 'value added' in a
region or sector. Increased levels of
agricultural infrastructure in a particular
region would lead to investment in allied
sectors which can produce high value added
products through linkage loops. The
increased level of capital formation due to
the availability of agricultural infrastructure
leads to 'derived demand' for investment in
the industries that produce value added
commodities. For example, increased
banking or agricultural training facilities may
attract a new kind of investment in areas such
as food processing, etc. This would increase
the regional as well as sectoral income and
employment that will have its multiplier
effect.
(d) Infrastructure and the social benefits – the
provision of an initial level of agricultural
infrastructure, or enhancement of the
existing one, may lead to different kinds of
cropping patterns that generate some
indirect positive benefits or positive
externalities/spill-overs. For example,
introduction of a new technology such as
sprinkler irrigation in a region may reduce the
exploitation of groundwater in that region
and this would make groundwater available
for farmers downstream several miles away.
This would probably save the marginal cost
of digging boreholes, preventing failure of
wells, etc. that would save considerable cost
to the farmers downstream. Also, introduc-
tion of a new technology may lead to
cropping pattern change that would entail
moving from crops that cause soil erosion, to
crops that may prevent soil erosion. The
secondary effects of soil erosion such as loss
of fertility of the top soil, sedimentation of
irrigation tanks, eutrophication of lakes, etc.
are considerably reduced and this results in a
reduction in the social costs or an increase in
the social benefits. The Altoona Irrigation
Project in Mali is a case in point. Initiated in
2007, the project when completed “will
introduce innovative agricultural, land
tenure, credit and water management
practices, as well as policy and organizational
reforms aimed at realizing the office du
Niger's potential to serve as an engine of
rural growth for Mali. [The] project seeks to
develop 16,00o hectares of newly irrigated
lands in the Alatoona production zone of the
Office du Niger, representing al almost 20%
increase of “drought-proof” cropland”
(Juma, 2011:91-92).
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(e) Infrastructure enhances economies of scale –
some types of infrastructure may result in
increased economies of scale that would
increase the agricultural income. The
economies of scale are realized when the
cost of production of a particular firm
declines due to external advantages.
Provision of one particular infrastructure for
a specific objective may result in satisfying
multiple objectives, thereby increasing the
economies of scale the production activities.
For example, rural electrification designed to
provide electricity for the agricultural sector,
or a rural road network, may attract small-
scale industrial units that also consume
electricity, as well as roads, in the production
process. The small-scale units in this case
need not have additional expenditures on
the infrastructure required for consumption
of electricity (such as electricity posts, etc.)
or roads since that kind of facility is readily
available for immediate consumption. This
adds to cost saving, and increases the private
benefits.
(f) Infrastructure and accelerator effects – it can
be argued that a particular type of
agricultural infrastructure in one region will
have its multiplier as well as accelerated
effects in other areas, especially in urban
centers. For example, additional areas of land
can be brought under cultivation because of
construction of an irrigation dam in a
particular region. This would lead to
increased consumption of fertilizer which
would either warrant expansion of the
reserved capacity in the fertilizer industry or
would require investment in the new
fertilizer units in urban areas. This multiplier
effect in turn would lead to an increase the
investment in the 'producer goods'– such as
machines required for the fertilizer units –
putting an accelerator effect into operation.
In this way, infrastructure in one area may
have cascading effects in other areas,
resulting in increased real output and
employment.
(g) Infrastructure enhances welfare of producers
and consumers – certain types of agricultural
infrastructure lead to improvements in both
producer and consumer surplus. For
example, increased availability of banking
operations in rural areas, increased
availability of transportation facilities and so
on, prevent the 'middle-men' and the money
lenders from appropriating substantial
amounts of producer and consumer
surpluses. The welfare of the producers and
the consumers improves due to the fact that
increased infrastructural facility brings
producers and consumers to a single place,
where the producer can get a higher price for
his/her products, and consumers can pay a
lower price for the same product.
The development of infrastructure such as
roads and regulated markets increases the
efficiency of both marketing and production
since they reduce transaction costs and
ensure competitive pricing (Gajigo and
Lukoma, 2011; Juma, 2011; Minten, 1999).
Minten (1999) documented the relationship
between access to infrastructure, output
markets and rural agricultural prices using
community surveys in Madagascar. The study
concludes that the hard infrastructure is an
important determinant of the price level, but
adding the soft infrastructure on top of it
would be more beneficial in terms of
reducing the price variability and the
resulting food security in the rural areas.
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(h) Infrastructure reduces price oscillation –
another form of loss of producer and
consumer surpluses is the oscillation in the
price of the agricultural commodities. When
there is a supply shortage and the demand
for the commodity is constant, the
producer/seller will charge a price equivalent
to the 'quasi-rent' thereby extorting a
considerable amount of consumer surplus.
When there is an excess supply of the same
commodity, the market becomes a buyer's
market and the price paid by the consumers
would be sub-optimal. The price oscillation in
this case is attributed mainly to the
information asymmetry existing in the
market and once adequate amount of
investment is made in the communication
infrastructure, then this information gap
would be removed and prices stabilized.
Gajigo and Lukoma (2011) argue that three main
types of agricultural infrastructure are crucial in
Africa: transportation, irrigation equipment and
post-harvest storage technology. Transporta-
tion is critical to enhance connectivity, irrigation
facilities relieve the farmer from the constraints
of rain-fed agriculture and post-harvest storage
facilities ensure that farmers do not suffer losses
due to inadequate storage capabilities. As they
put it: “countries face huge post-harvest losses:
for perishable agro-commodities such as fruits
and vegetables, the losses average 35-50 percent
of total attainable production, while for grains
the losses varies between 15 and 25 percent.
Food availability decreases just a few months
after harvest because sellers find it difficult to
store perishable commodities” (2011: 5; see also
Juma, 2011). As Juma puts it, investing in
infrastructure “is a critical aspect of stimulating
innovation in agriculture. It is also one of the
areas that can, [and should] benefit from
regional coordination.” However, in order to
attain this, Africa's Regional Economic Communi-
ties (RECs) need to engage each other to harness
and maximize existing capacities particularly in
critical sectors such as “transportation, energy,
water, telecommunications [and post-harvest
storage technologies]…” (Juma, 2011:112-113).
5.4 Financing agriculture in a
changing landscape
The commitment of African governments to
agricultural financing does not match the
contribution of agriculture to the economy, with
its critical importance in poverty reduction and
food security. Over the years, government
interventions through a multiplicity of credit
institutions have not resulted in any significant
improvement in financial intermediation. The
liberalization of the economy since the
introduction of the SAPs in the 1980s has tended
to exacerbate the financial problems of the
agricultural sector. Government funds available
for lending have dwindled considerably. The cost
of borrowing has escalated substantially and the
financial outlay for agricultural enterprises has
multiplied several-fold irrespective of the scale
of the operation, due to the ravages of inflation.
Consequently, only a limited number of
entrepreneurs are in a position to meet their
financial requirements. At the same time,
international development assistance to
agriculture has been declining – and arguably
more so with the current financial crisis.
There are many documented reasons to explain
the decline in agricultural assistance to Africa.
These include new donor priorities that have
emerged in recent times that address issues of
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social protection, health and HIV/AIDS,
development policy lending, anti-corruption and
public administration amongst others. Large
scale agriculture projects have fallen out of
favor. New style agriculture projects have
emerged that require less investment. These
typica l ly deal with community -dr iven
development (CDD) irrigation systems, micro
credit, research, resource rehabilitation and land
management. Agriculture seemingly has not
been prioritized in many Africa countries. This,
combined with the twin issues of expanding
urban poverty and the quality and high cost
issues of agricultural projects, has exacerbated
the decline in funding. The situation is
exacerbated by market failures in the financial
sector, which persistently place farmers at a
disadvantaged position in securing access to
financing that is required for operating
profitable agricultural enterprises.
The difficulty African agricultural financing is
facing is not unconnected with the liberalization
of the economies, including the financial sectors
of many countries. Lending to agriculture, for
example, has been de-controlled. Interest rates
are currently determined on the basis of market
fundamentals, with commercial banks setting
their lending rates based on central bank rates,
the risk levels, costs of doing business, profit
mark-ups and other considerations. The result is
very high lending interest rates for the private
sector in general and agriculture in particular.
Rates sometimes reach double digits and are
very unattractive to agricultural sector investors.
This development has accounted for the low rate
of participation of commercial banks in
agricultural financing in recent times. Moreover,
monetary policies in many African countries
provide a risk-free haven for commercial banks
to invest. The open market operations of the
central banks, which involve the mopping up of
excess liquidity through the issuance of
government securities, in an attempt to control
inflation, have indirectly affected the flow of
investment funds to the agricultural sector.
More often than not, the biggest buyers of such
securities are commercial banks. In such cases,
what should have been loaned out to the private
sector by banks is instead invested in risk-free
government securities. This leads to the
crowding out of bank lending to the private
sector, making it even more difficult for highly
risky sectors like agriculture.
The foregoing raises the question as to why it has
been difficult to design innovative approaches
for the provision of adequate finance for
agricultural development in Africa. Besides,
what is the nature of financing of agriculture in
Africa and the implications for food security?
What factors militate against sustainable
investment and financing of agriculture? Has
there been satisfactory progress in government
expenditure allocation to agriculture? What are
the paradigmatic shifts required for effective
financing and transformation of the agricultural
sector to improve food security in Africa? What
are the prospects for public-private partnerships
(PPP) in funding the agricultural sector? What
other funding innovations could be devised and
what are the capacity building implications for
the agricultural sector?
5.5 Needs and mechanisms for
agricultural finance in Africa
In spite of recent advances in technology, the
financial sector has not been able to provide the
required services for the transformation of the
agricultural sector. Each of the sub-sectors of
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agriculture – crop, livestock, fisheries and
forestry – is in dire need of financial services. The
services required vary by type and location of
enterprise as well as scale of operation. In
general the need for finance will be in the form of
accumulation of funds (savings), working and
investment capital, money transfer and risk
mitigation (insurance). According to MFW4A
(2011), secure savings deposit facilities are
needed to meet contingency expenditure and to
smooth cash flows. Farmers may wish to
accumulate funds for significant productive
investments, both seasonal (e.g. fertilizer,
improved seeds, labor, stock) and medium term
(e.g. machinery, motive power). Security of
savings deposits is also fundamental to building
an effective bridge between the mass of small
farmers and the financial sector. Furthermore,
savings deposits can assume the important
function of serving as collateral support to
borrowing. Although efforts are being made by
both donors and governments to increase
agricultural investment in Africa, the sector
remains grossly undercapitalized. Farmers and
other stakeholders in the value chain need credit
in order to address the issue of poor capitaliza-
tion, low level of use of modern inputs and low
productivity.
The range of loans for which an effective
demand exists includes short-term (seasonal)
loans of periods less than one year, medium term
loans for periods of up to five years and long-
term loans of between six and ten years. Short-
term loans are designed to meet important
financing needs in the agricultural production
cycle including the provision of advances for
crop and livestock intakes, production
requirements, production credit and other
related services that include the handling,
manufacturing, packing, processing, storage,
transport and marketing of agricultural
products. Medium and long-term loans are
granted for the support of investment in
processing and farm machinery, in water supply
and irrigation equipment, in livestock structures
and fencing, in fish farming (ponds and cages)
and in farm forestry development. Long-term
loans may be in the form of establishment loans
to farmers for perennial crops. These loans are
typically used for establishing sugar cane
plantations, citrus and deciduous fruit orchards,
timber plantations and vineyards for table and
wine grapes. They can be designed specifically
for acquiring farming equipment, implements,
farming vehicles, livestock, improvement of
structures and irrigation systems.
Agricultural financing should also provide
opportunities for money transfer within an
economy or internationally, whether for
production activities or international trade. Such
transfer is particularly important given the fact
that agricultural activities are time-bound and
delays may have adverse consequences on farm
operations. Money transfer is very crucial in
meeting the financial needs of investors in rural
areas, which constitute the domain where
farming is carried out. Many partners with whom
the rural dwellers have to transact business live
in urban areas. Transactions can go on at reduced
cost and in a timely fashion if there are
opportunities for money transfer. The advent of
cell-phone banking (also known as mobile
money) has transformed the money transfer
landscape across Africa, lowering the cost of
making such transfers and increasing greatly the
convenience of doing so. The financial system
and the telecommunication sector should have
sufficient confidence and trust building
mechanisms so that the masses of the rural
producers and other business enterprises can
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benefit from such services.
Furthermore, since agriculture involves a very
high level of risk mitigation measures are needed
in order to further encourage investment, both
on-farm and further down agricultural value
chains. Traditional techniques for managing risk;
for example, inter-cropping species with
different moisture requirements, staggering of
planting (even in rain-fed agriculture), inter-
seasonal on-farm food storage and maintenance
of a contingency savings fund, are all important
traditional techniques. The need to use financial
mechanisms for risk management is clear, in
view of the rising levels of investment and
involvement of the financial sector. The
insurance market is still not properly developed
across the continent. However, there are a few
countries (e.g. South Africa and Nigeria) where
insurance against losses in agriculture – crops
and livestock – has been formalized and
operational over a long period of time. According
to MFW4A (2011), there are also a number of
other countries where weather index insurance
is being pioneered (e.g. Malawi and Kenya).
Availability of agricultural insurance services will
help farmers cope with the risky nature of
agricultural enterprises. It gives the poor a sense
of security that allows them to dare to pursue
profit-oriented activities and hence to borrow,
since the income shock when insurance claims
are settled will be minimized. A strategy of
linking insurance with credit provision will
ensure that lenders have better loan recovery
performance, and this guarantees the viability of
the credit institution. Figure 5.3 shows variation
in value-chain as share of GDP against cereal
yields for the period 1990-2010 for a number of
Source:  Agricultural value added as a share of GDP and cereal yields
per hectare from World Bank Data Finder.  All other data from ACI database 2012.
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FIGURE 5.3
Variation in value-chain as share of GDP against cereal
yields selected African countries (1990-2010)
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Due to a number of factors including a high
incidence of poverty, low savings and harsh
economic conditions, it has been difficult for
farmers to rely on equity capital to meet their
needs as specified above. They have therefore
continued to seek debt capital from various
sources including informal and formal sources.
The following describes the various mechanisms
through which they have access to credit and
other financial services.
5.5.1 Mechanisms for agricultural finance
The formal approach to agricultural financing in
Africa has largely been supply-led and efforts
seem to have been concentrated on the use of
credit for the promotion of output expansion.
The producers operate small-scale enterprises
that rely on the rural informal sector for financial
support. Where state-owned institutions are set
up to supply credit, the smallholders are usually
rationed out of the market through cumbersome
lending procedures and high transaction costs.
Thus in examining the state of agricultural
financing in Africa in this section attention will be
focused on both the formal and informal finance.
 Informal Finance: By definition, informal
finance operates outside the purview of the
legal, fiscal, regulatory and prudential
framework of the monetary and financial
authorities. In many developing countries, a
large number of rural dwellers rely on the
informal sector for their financial services on
account of its relatively low information and
transaction costs, ease of access to low-
income groups, timeliness of operation,
simplicity and flexibility in financial
procedures. Indeed, informal finance is much
more extensive and diverse than formal
finance and accounts for most of the financial
services, other than term finance, provided
to the rural sector. Across much of Africa
countries, formal rural credit accounts for
less than 10% of total credit disbursed (Popiel,
1994).
Studies on informal finance in Africa have
demonstrated that both in the urban and
rural areas, the informal sector has been a
veritable source of credit for production and
consumption purposes (Olomola, 2000;
Aredo, 1993; Hyuha et al. 1993; Seibel, 1986;
Tapsoba, 1981). It is evident from the studies
that the continued relevance of the sector
depends on simplicity of lending procedures,
the speed of operation, and liberal loan
conditions including the waiver of collateral
requirement. Nonetheless, there are some
inherent drawbacks in economies of scope
and scale, maturity transformation, spatial
transfer of savings, predominance of cash
transactions and shallowness of intermedia-
tion.
 Budgetary Finance: Although agricultural
spending in Africa has been rising, it has
generally performed below expectation as
an effective instrument for sustained growth
and food security. Public expenditure on
agriculture, which was virtually stagnant
over the 1980s and 1990s, more than doubled
between 2000 and 2005 to nearly US$9
billion (World Bank, 2007b). Over the same
period, the share of agricultural expenditure
in agricultural GDP rose from less than 4% in
2000 to more than 6 percent in 2005. There
are large variations across countries in Africa,
nevertheless. Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Morocco, Togo, and Zambia, for example,
experienced negative growth rates of
agricultural spending between 1980 and
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2005. On the other hand, Burkina Faso,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tunisia saw high
growth rates of over 8 percent in the same
period, having accelerated largely after 2000
(World Bank, 2007b).
5.6 Progress towards 10% budgetary
allocation to agriculture in Africa
There are significant variations in the extent to
which African countries have complied with the
2003 Maputo Declaration (NEPAD, 2009). For
example, the 2007 AU/NEPAD survey showed
that 50% of African countries devoted less than
5% of their national expenditure on agricultural
development (NEPAD, 2009:1). However, the
same study also noted that 28% of the countries
(Benin, Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia)
were on track to meet the target, while the
number of countries spending more than 10%
actually increased from 11% to 22% in 2003 and
2006 respectively (NEPAD, 2009:2). Countries in
the latter group include Comoros, Ethiopia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger and Zimbabwe.
Other studies on budgetary allocations to
agriculture in Africa continue to show variations
(Fan, Omilola and Lambert, 2009). These
variations, some of which are instances of
significant policy success, also demonstrate
differences in the extent to which CAADP can
bring about the required policy and institutional
changes for African agriculture (NEPAD, 2010;
Omilola et al., 2010).
As of 2009, only eight countries—Burkina Faso,
Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi, Ghana, Niger, Senegal
and Zimbabwe—had reached or surpassed the
10 percent stipulated in the Maputo Declaration.
Sixteen other countries (Benin, Chad,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, The
Gambia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe) reached expenditure shares
between 5 and 10 percent while 14 countries
(Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Cote
d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco and Rwanda)
devoted less than 5 percent of their total
budgets to the sector (Fan et al., 2009). The
inability of the African continent to substantially
raise the level of their agricultural investments
may have serious implications for poverty
reduction and food security. Recent estimates by
IFPRI indicate that in order to achieve MDG1, the
continent will need to boost agricultural
spending by $13.6 billion 2007 dollars annually
from 2008 to 2015, with a cumulative total of
$95.7 billion. This suggests that the continent will
need to increase its agricultural spending by at
least 20 percent per year (Fan et al., 2009).
5.7 Credit Flow from Commercial
Banks
Agricultural financing by commercial banks in
Africa is grossly limited. The banks regard
agriculture as a high risk sector and continue to
clamor for special incentives which will make
lending to the sector more attractive. Many
countries have designed various incentives to
encourage commercial bank lending to
agriculture. These include insurance policies as
well as fiscal and monetary policy measures
backed up in some countries with appropriate
legislation. For example in the UEMOA countries,
there is the law on “Groupement d'intérêt
économique” which is a piece of legislation that
confers legal status on even small groups bound
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by common economic interest. In some cases,
reminded of their responsibility to society, banks
have been persuaded to set aside funds (e.g. 10%
of profits before taxation), to finance small-scale
enterprises (FAO, 2004c). In Nigeria, the
government established the agricultural credit
guarantee scheme (ACGS) in order to induce
commercial banks to increase their lending to
agriculture. It has been possible to leverage
substantial commercial bank financing to
Nigerian agriculture over the years through the
instrumentality of the ACGS (see Box 5.2).
Nevertheless, the participation of commercial
banks has been limited. Commercial banks
established in Nigeria within the last ten years
are far more reluctant to lend to agriculture than
the older banks. Although the use of loan
guarantee has a fairly long history in some parts
of Africa its adoption has not been widespread.
Recently AGRA has introduced the use of loan
guarantees in some parts of Africa and this has
started to show successes in leveraging
commercial banks to lend to agriculture,
especially in East Africa. With the use of $16
million in loan guarantees for commercial banks,
AGRA has been able to leverage $170 million in
market-based and affordable loans for
smallholder farmers and agricultural value
chains that support them in Tanzania, Uganda,
Kenya, Mozambique and Ghana (Adesina, 2009).
To increase the flow of credit from commercial
banks in Africa especially for the benefit of
smallholders, both the farmers and the bankers
need substantial skill upgrading to fully
understand the business orientation of
agriculture in all its ramifications. The farmers are
grossly financially illiterate while the staff of
commercial banks lack the requisite expertise in
agricultural financing and agribusiness
management. Whereas many public and private
agencies are ready to provide training for the
farmers (and they in turn are ready to learn all the
time), the banks are in a world of their own –
pursuing corporate customers in ostensibly risk-
free zones and ignoring the fact that agricultural
financing can provide good business given the
right orientation, innovation and management
strategies. Over the years, the banking system
has failed to design appropriate products to
serve agriculture, to address the perceived risk in
the sector and to exploit the monumental
resources in the sector to their own advantage,
especially in terms of improved profitability,
enhanced capital base, portfolio diversification
and viability. In Nigeria for instance, the
agricultural market has not unleashed any
hardship on the banking sector compared to the
aftermath of the collapse of the capital market in
that country in 2009. The banks prefer margin
loans for operators in the capital market, while
discriminating against agriculture. Some of them
were destabilized, distressed, and collapsed
completely due to exposure to risk in the capital
market, as well as associated management
inadequacies. The capital market crisis in Nigeria
over the past three years has demonstrated
clearly that bank lending risk is not limited to
agriculture, and no bank has suffered erosion of
its capital base due to agricultural lending that
can be compared in any way to the heavy
financial losses and loss of customers'
confidence arising from exposure to risks in
other sectors of the economy. Arguably
therefore, it is an error of judgement on the part
of any bank in Africa that ignores the financing of
agriculture – a sector which provides
employment for about 70% of the population and
accounts for a third of GDP.
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BOX 5.2
Nigeria's Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme: A Boost to Commercial Lending
In Nigeria, Act 20 of 1977 established the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) which started
operation in 1978. The principal objective of the scheme was to facilitate the provision of credit to farmers
by providing guarantees to participating commercial banks for loans granted to farmers in accordance with
the scheme enabling act. The setting up of the ACGSF was predicated on the unwillingness of commercial
banks to give loans to smallholder farmers for reasons of high default rate on loan repayment and therefore
high risk of repayment. This was compounded by lack of collateral for banks to fall back on in case of default
and the high cost of administering low unit value loans to farmers who remained widely scattered. The
ACGSF had an initial authorized capital of 100.00 million. This was reviewed upward to 1.00 billion in 1999 
and then 3.00 billion in 2000. This fund was meant to provide cover to commercial banks to the tune of 75%
of any net default, which might arise from loans given to farmers. The financial risk of default in loan
repayment was to be borne by the ACGSF. The scheme required commercial banks to give 10% of their profit
before tax to farmers as loans. Any defaulting banks were to be penalized by the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN). In addition, commercial banks were required to have a certain percentage of their branches in rural
areas where farmers can gain easy access. By 2004, out of 25 universal banks in Nigeria, 11 were participating
in the Fund. In addition, five out of the 669 eligible community banks, now micro credit finance houses, have
joined the scheme.
As at 2009, the CBN guaranteed a total of 53,639 loans valued at 8.35 billion thereby bringing the
cumulative loans from the inception of the scheme in 1978 to 647,351 valued at 34.41 billion. The scheme
has made modest contribution to food security in the country since the loans were devoted to the
cultivation of vital food commodities including comprising crops, livestock and fisheries. A sub-sectoral
analysis of the loans guaranteed shows that food crops got the highest volume of 44,672 loans valued 5.52
billion followed by livestock with 3,789 loans valued 1.73 billion and fisheries with 9,612 loans valued 1.51 
billion. Cash crops had 16,693 loans valued 0.82 billion, while mixed farming and others had 95 and 539
loans valued 0.01 billion and 0.09 billion respectively. 
Source: Olomola, 2011
The establishment of agricultural development
banks (AgDBs) is another common approach to
agricultural financing in many African countries.
Except in the case of Banque Nationale Agricole
in Tunisia, Farmers' Commercial Bank in Sudan,
Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole in
Mali, Agricultural Bank in Zimbabwe and a few
others, financial services provided by banks
across Africa generally tend to be limited to the
provision of credit. As shown in Table 5.2, AgDBs
have been in existence for a long time, and are
largely owned by the government. They were
funded by resources from the government and
donors who also provided technical assistance
(Giehler, 1999). Their performance and impact
were not monitored over a long period of time.
When donors finally did evaluate their support to
AgDBs, many cut down or even stopped their
assistance. In recent years, there has been a
tendency to ignore AgDBs in programmes of
rural and microfinance systems development.
According to Seibel et al. (2005), AgDBs are weak
or distressed in the majority of African countries.
They fail to mobilize savings and domestic capital
market resources. Repayment rates are low and
transaction costs high. Moreover, there has
been a lack of supervision by regulatory agencies
and donors. As a result, many AgDBs are
unsustainable, and their outreach and growth is
restricted.
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In most cases, these banks' contribution to
poverty reduction has been minimal. Many are
technically bankrupt and a number of them have
actually been closed. Nonetheless, some of them
have undergone considerable reform and they
continue to be major providers of rural and
microfinance services in most countries through
their branch network.
For instance, in Nigeria, the Bank of Agriculture
(BOA) is the nation's main agricultural and rural
development finance institution. As a
development finance institution, it is govern-
ment owned (CBN 40% and Federal Ministry of
Finance 60%), and supervised by the Federal
Ministry of Agriculture. The Bank was
incorporated as Nigerian Agricultural Bank
(NAB) in 1973, and in 1978 was renamed Nigerian
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB).
Subsequently in 2000, it was merged with the
People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN) and took over the
risk assets of Family Economic Advancement
Programme (FEAP) to become Nigerian
Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development
Bank Limited. In November 2010 the bank was
Region Name of Bank Year
Established
Type Government
Ownership
NORTH
AFRICA
Banque de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural Algeria
Banque Nationale Agricole Tunisie
Agricultural Bank of Libya
Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit, Egypt
Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA), Morocco
1982
1959
1957
1931
1961
DB
CB
DB
DB
DB
100
65
100
100
100
EAST
AFRICA
Agricultural Finance Corporation Kenya,  AFC
Centenary Rural Development Bank Ltd (CERUDEB), Uganda
Development Bank of Ethiopia, DBE
Farmer’s Commercial Bank, Sudan, FCB
Agricultural Bank of Sudan, ABS
1963
1983
1970
1998
1957
DB
DB
DB
CB
DB
100
100
100
0
100
WEST
AFRICA
Agricultural Development Bank Ghana
Banque Agricole et Commerciale du Burkina, Burkina Faso
Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank Ltd Nigeria, NACB
Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole Mali, BNDA
Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal, CNCA
1965
1980
1973
1981
1984
DB
DB
DB
CB
DB
100
80
100
0
100
SOUTHERN
AFRICA
Agribank of Namibia
Land Bank South Africa
Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe
1991
1912
1999
DB
DB
CB
100
100
100
Source: FAO AgriBank-Stat, http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/agsm/banks/index.htm
Note: DB = Development Bank, CB = Commercial Bank
TABLE 5.2
The Spread of Agricultural Banks in Africa
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renamed the Bank of Agriculture Limited (BOA).
The existence of this bank has not led to any
significant improvement in the delivery of
agricultural finance services over the years.
Agriculture is the largest employer of labor (60%)
and also the largest contributor to the national
GDP in Nigeria (42%). However, agricultural credit
as a percentage of banks' total credit in Nigeria
was 1.4% in 2008 and has averaged 2.4% between
2008 and 2010.
If AgDBs are to contribute meaningfully to
agricultural financing, they have to be licensed to
operate as commercial agricultural banks and
not as parastatals of the ministries of agriculture
as is currently the case in some countries.
Moreover, they need to be depoliticized,
restructured and recapitalized. Part of the
restructuring will involve the creation of savings
functions and inclusion of other financial services
in their operations. For instance, since its
establishment, the agricultural bank in Nigeria
focused only on credit disbursement without any
provision for savings and other financial services
for its clients. It has also relied largely on the
government as the source of its loanable funds.
Apart from their commercial orientation, AgDBs
should also diversify their clients so that they can
provide services for various actors along the
agricultural commodity value chain. In terms of
the financial service delivery, they have to move
in the direction of the Agricultural Bank of
Zimbabwe Limited, which provides commercial,
retail, corporate, and international banking
services in Zimbabwe. The agricultural bank in
Zimbabwe offers agricultural loans, treasury,
bridge finance provision, advisory, savings and
current accounts, overdrafts, letters of credit,
order financing/invoice discounting, bank
guarantee, investment, certificates of deposit,
foreign currency dealing, offshore financing, and
mail transfer services. This holistic approach to
financial service delivery is required for the
transformation of agriculture in Africa.
5.8 International alliance for
financing African agriculture and
food security
Many African countries have also relied on
financial support from international financial
institutions to address the inadequacies of their
financial systems in financing agriculture and
food security. Indeed, the focus of the African
Union, NEPAD and G20 on food security and the
unmanageable global food price crisis have
tended to move agricultural finance on top of the
African and international development agenda.
Agricultural production needs to increase by 70%
by 2050 to feed the world, while climate change
and urbanization will heavily reduce the area of
cultivable land. One key to this problem lies in
increased output and productivity of African
agriculture. Arguably, facilitating access to
finance to fund the growth of African agriculture
is one of the greatest challenges for
stakeholders with an interest in both financial
and agricultural sector development in the
continent. It is therefore, not surprising that
African governments, G20 members, private
institutions and development partners are
teaming up to enhance finance for food and
agricultural development. Recently there are
two major parties driving the alliance: namely –
the G20 Sub-group on Agricultural Finance and
the Africa-wide Task Force on Agricultural
Finance, initiated by the partnership for 'Making
Finance Work for Africa' (MFW4A).
T h e P a r t n e r s h i p f o r M F W 4 A , A f r i c a n
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
174
governments, private institutions and
development partners have gathered to form a
comprehensive, Africa-wide Task Force on
Agricultural Finance. The Task Force is closely
linked to the African Union Commission and
NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
(NPCA), as drivers of the CAADP agenda, as well
as the AfDB and AFRACA (the African Rural and
Agricultural Credit Association). Development
and private partners such as the World Bank,
AFD, UNCDF, FAO, IFAD, USAID, German
Development Cooperation, FinMark Trust, AGRA
and Stanbic Bank are supporting the Task Force.
The targeted results are clear guidelines on
policies and practices geared to supporting
substantial increases in investment in African
agricultural sectors. The agreed guidelines are to
be synthesized in one major African Agricultural
Finance Policy paper. It is expected that the
guidelines will jointly be incorporated by the AUC
and NPCA as part of the CAADP investment plans
to be used by the G20 and taken up by African
governments and development partners in the
continent.
5.8.1 Global partnership for agriculture and
food security (GPAFS)
The Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food
Security (GPAFS) is another funding mechanism,
albeit focused on providing a response to the
high food prices, as well as more broadly toward
food security and agriculture. GPAFS is a
multilateral financing mechanism, which allows
for the immediate targeting and delivery of
additional funding to public and private entities
to support national and regional strategic plans
for agriculture and food security in poor
countries. African leaders have reacted
positively to the GPAFS initiative suggesting that
CAADP plays a crucial role in view of the need to
sustain long-term food security in Africa
(Mkandawire, 2009). In this connection,
emphasis is to be placed on key areas such as
improved volume and quality of investment in
agriculture, knowledge and information support
and business partnerships with emphasis on
private sector financing.
5.8.2 Support from international finance
institutions
The aforementioned notwithstanding, the
World Bank is still the biggest source of funding
for African agriculture. World Bank's African
agricultural funding fell as low as US$ 200 million
in 2001 but rose to US$ 685 million later in
2006/07. IFAD's funding of African agriculture
has also increased at a steady pace from US$ 150
million in 2002/03 to US$ 234 million in 2006/07.
5.9 Agricultural finance constraints
in Africa
Although sustainable access to financial
services—that is savings, credit, payments, and
insurance—contributes to economic growth
and poverty reduction, such access is highly
restricted in many African countries. Access to
financial services is lowest in Africa. Less than
one percent of commercial lending goes to
agriculture (Varangis, 2010). Less than 1% of
farmers in Zambia, and less than two percent of
the rural population in Nigeria, have access to
credit from formal financial institutions.
Financial constraints are more pervasive in
agriculture and related activities than in many
other sectors, reflecting both the nature of
agricultural activity and the average size of firms.
Financial contracts in rural areas involve higher
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transaction costs and risks than those in urban
settings because of the greater spatial
dispersion of production, lower population
densities, the generally lower quality of
infrastructure, and the seasonality and often
high covariance of rural production activities.
Thus, banks and other traditional for-profit
financial intermediaries tend to limit their
activities to urban areas and to more densely
populated, more affluent, more commercial
areas of the rural economy. For effective delivery
of financial services in the agricultural sector
there is need to understand the constraints
faced by lenders and borrowers and those
imposed by the forces of nature and the market
as well as governance of the financial
transactions. Several constraints derive from
policy failures, while others are sector-specific
risks, administrative constraints and operational
bottlenecks.
(a) Policy failures and institutional weaknesses –
the agricultural sector has been poorly
served by the financial system partly on
account of the unfavorable pol icy
environment. Many countries lack an
enabling environment for efficient operation
of the financial system. The economies are
characterized by weak regulatory regimes,
poor physical and financial infrastructure,
and policies that repress financial market
development. It is expensive to provide
financial services in rural areas, which are
typically less dense in economic activity, have
poorer infrastructure, and are more subject
to risks from weather and agricultural price
changes than in urban areas. Furthermore,
financial institutions often have a weak
institutional capacity for providing financial
services in rural areas. Besides, operators
within the financial sector often display
limited understanding of the agriculture
sector, and this greatly enhances their
perception of the risks involved in financing
the sector.
(b) Supply and demand-side constraints and
market failures – supply and demand-side
constraints refer to obstacles faced by
lenders and borrowers in the financial
system. A clear distinction between these
sets of constraints is important in the sense
that it can facilitate the design of remedial
measures including identification of capacity
building needs. The various obstacles are
presented in Table 5.3. Clearly, intervention
strategies aimed at enhancing the
performance of agricultural finance are not
Obstacles Faced By Borrowers Lenders Obstacles
 They lack personal capital. Most first -generation
farmers, particularly beginning farmers, have little or
no personal equity and very limited cash flow.
 They are unable to convey farm production
knowledge or management experience.
 Their personal credit histories are poor or insufficient
to secure loans.
 They lack business plans and the ability to project
realistic cash flow.
 Weak farmers organisations and other chain actors
 Poor farmer access to markets
 Decline in numbers of financial
institutions providing agricultural loans.
 Decreases in lender staffing levels;
 Fewer staff with agriculture expertise
even in rural areas
 Lenders’ unwillingness to venture
outside their specialty areas.
TABLE 5.3
Obstacles Faced by Borrowers and Lenders
Source: Olomola, 2011
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(c) Stringent terms and conditions of financial
products – the credit market in agriculture is
encumbered by operational and administra-
t ive inadequacies and exploitat ive
tendencies of financial institutions. These
include, (i) stringent loan terms and
conditions set by financial institutions, (ii)
negative attitude of financial institutions, (iii)
high interest rates, (iv) inadequate capacity
to offer services, (v) inappropriate financial
products and services. Other constraints of a
general nature include poor agricultural
statistics and information systems and an
underdeveloped property rights regime. For
instance, farmers cannot use land as
collateral for loans.
An evidence of market failure in the financial
sector has been that private banks have
failed to provide appropriate credit and
financial services to small family farms and
rural areas. The agricultural credit market is
beset by several imperfections including
market segmentation, covariate risk, scarcity
of collateral, information imperfections and
mass illiteracy of clients. The widespread
information asymmetry often leads to
problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard, which underpin the reluctance of
commercial banks to lend to small-scale
farmers (Olomola, 1996, 1999). Adverse
selection arises when the lenders do not
know the particular characteristics of
borrowers, especially in terms of uncertain-
ties about a borrower's preferences for
undertaking risky projects. In the case of
moral hazard, the main problem is that
borrowers' actions are not discernible by
lenders. This heightens the risk of default in
the sense that individual borrowers may be
lax in efforts to make the project successful
or they may change the type of project that
they undertake.
(d) Agricultural sector-specific risks – the sector-
specific risks can be discussed under seven
categories namely, (a) Production and yield
risks, (b) market and price risks, (c) financial
risk, (d) legal and environmental risks and (e)
risk of loan collateral limitations, (f) human
resource risk and (g) risk of policy instability.
Details of the various manifestations of these
risks are presented in Table 5.4. These forms of
risks are not peculiar to Africa with the
exception of policy risk. They are characteristic
of agriculture in many parts of the developed
and developing countries. In the USA, the risks
are also endemic but they are being vigorously
addressed in various ways. Some of the
strategies adopted are also presented in Table
5.4. Again, the exception here is policy risk
which is a major problem in the African
context. Many of the mitigation strategies are
generic and canbe adapted to address relevant
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S/N AGRICULTURAL RISK RISK-MITIGATION STRATEGY USED BY SMALLER FARMERS
1 Production
•Weather, including drought,
freezes, excessive rainfall at
harvest
• Pests, including insect and
disease damage
Enterprise and crop diversification
• Technology to protect crops (season extension)
• On-farm production of as many inputs as possible— e.g., fertilizer, hay
• Knowledge of other production in area or cooperation with other farmers
• Production of what grows well — skills and soils
• Access to variety of seeds, locally adapted varieties
2 Marketing
• Price risk due to increases in
supply, or changed demand
• Loss of market access due to
the relocation or closing of a
processing plant
• Loss of marketing power
due to small size of farm
sellers relative to buyers, etc
-Lack of market information.
• Market plans
• Informal cooperatives/relationships
• Up-front contracts
• Internet savvy
• Multiple markets
• Mix of wholesale and retail markets
• Online wholesale lists with support for aggregation and distribution
• Demand forecasting
• Testing markets before making huge investment
• Customers as personal references or brokers
• Knowledge sharing with other farmers and through farm organizations
3 Financial
• Production risks and price
risks from above
• Inflation, especially cost
increases on key inputs
• Changes in interest and
exchange rates
• Family expenses control
• concessional loans, grants, Individual Development Accounts (IDAs),
micro-financing
• Use of sustainability practices as a way to cut costs
• Off-farm income
• Leased or creative farm tenure deals to reduce expenses
• Bootstrapping farm growth for few years/investment of sweat equity
• Focus on the money makers and those that support them
• Tax filing and schedules that are appropriate
• Boundaries between family and farm expenses
• Debt reduction in good years to increase solvency
• Debt pre -payment or establishment of capital reserve fund to enable a
move into new arena
• Improved understanding of the difficulties of undercapitalization
4 Legal/Environmental
• Tort liability — being subject
to a civil suit — is of special
concern to direct marketers
• Legal risk also relates to
environmental liability and
business structure
• Use of sustainable practices to limit environmental risks
• Knowledge of regulatory approval bodies and processes
• Knowledge of food safety regulations
• Knowledge of labor rules and regulations, i.e., housing and wages
5 Human Resource
The three D’s: divorce,
death, or disability of an
• Investment time in traininglabor
• Use of family labor
• Acquisition of business and financial management training
6 Risk of Poor Collateral
Lack of land title, low land
value and rudimentary farm
assets
• Virile agricultural insurance policy
• Land reform
7 Policy Risks
Policy somersault,
inconsistency and
discontinuity
• Improved political commitment
• Enhanced social and political capital
• Strong legislation
• Adherence to rule of law
TABLE 5.4
Agricultural Risks and Mitigation Strategies
Source: Adapted from Cocciarelli et al., (2010)
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5.10 Towards a paradigm shift in
African agricultural finance
A major transformation is a shift of emphasis
from concentrating finance on upstream
agriculture to massive investment in the
downstream sector, in partnership with private
agribusiness firms to promote pro-poor growth
and enhance food security. Financial innovation
has been stymied for a long time due to the focus
of financial institutions mainly on funding
agricultural output expansion. The approach has
failed to generate meaningful value added and
the necessary financial capacity on the part of
producers. The situation is worse for small-scale
producers, whose access to market and
alternative employment opportunities is highly
restricted.
Another key transformation of the agricultural
sector will be brought about by shifting
emphasis to financing of agricultural commodity
value chains. Such a shift will address the
erroneous belief that the problem of finance is
limited to the production stage. To generate high
value-added products, employment and wealth
in the agribusiness sector, finance is required for
the transformation of products from primary to
secondary and even tertiary forms. This is the
way value-chain financing can support agro-
industrialization. Sometimes production is
adversely affected if there is a problem with
marketing. Market expansion and agro-
processing can be supported by appropriate
financial products, such as warehouse receipt
f inancing and other innovative credit
mechanisms. Contract farming schemes in which
formal and informal linkages are being forged in
the agribusiness sectors in some countries,
including Nigeria, have clearly demonstrated the
need for financial support by the banking system
to agribusiness firms and through them to the
small-scale farmers. This has stimulated actions
within the country to develop the value chains of
commodities such as rice, cotton, tobacco,
ginger and soya bean (Olomola, 2010). Even for
export commodities, there is a need for financing
to promote growth and compete effectively in
the international market. The formal financial
system will therefore, have an increasing role to
play in attracting investors at different stages in
the value chain and to ensure that commodity-
dependent African countries transform from
being exporters of primary products to
exporters of high value-added commodities.
5.10.1 Characteristics of agricultural
commodity value chains
The development of the value chains requires
adequate financing of major activities from the
production stage to the end users. The key
stages in the chain and the specific types of
activities that need to be financed are presented
in Table 5.5.
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S/N Value Chain Level Types of Activities
1 Farming  Land Preparation, Planting, Spraying, Fertilizer application, Harvesting
2 Post-Harvest  Sorting/cleaning, Grading, Inspection, Packing
3 Transport to Market  Movement of goods in domestic market
 Shipping of goods across borders(involving clearance, customs, inspections)
 Storing
4 Distribution  Contractual arrangements
 Logistic coordination
5 Retail  Specifications – Quality, Traceability
 Delivery
 Product Development
6 Consumers  End product Buyers
 Urban vs. rural buyers
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5.10.2 Shift from traditional lending to
value chain finance
The emphasis on value chain financing implies
that lending has to be done differently.. It is
important to stress that the shift has to be
backed up by an appropriate framework for
capacity building. In this regard, the differences
between the traditional lending conditions and
approaches and the value chain finance are
shown clearly in Table 5.6. For Africa, a major
difference will be the emphasis on small-scale
producers. Whereas the conventional lending
system discriminates against small producers
who are responsible for food security on the
continent, value chain finance recognizes the
potential of this category of farmers, and the
economic transformation that can be achieved
through their exposure to the necessary
financial resources for operating their farms as
business concerns.
TABLE 5.5
Agricultural Commodity Value Chain Characteristics
Source: Olomola, 2011
AREA TRADITIONAL LENDING VALUE CHAIN FINANCE
Lending Asset based Cash flow based Contracts
Credit Risk Traditional assessment: needs
sufficient client information
Improved systems for risk
assessment/automation/parametric information
through existing relations in supply chain
Risk Mitigation Careful client selection
Insurance/hedging
Loan portfolio diversification
Risk sharing/first loss
Insurance/hedging
Client Type Larger commercial farmers Smaller commercial farmers
Organizations/associations of small farmers
Capacity Building Clients are knowledgeable Need financial education and awareness raising to
become better clients for FIs
TABLE 5.6
Value Chain Finance versus Traditional Lending
Source: Olomola, 2011
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5.10.3 Financial products for value
chain actors
In addition to the types of activities to be
supported, financial institutions must keep
abreast of the recent developments in packaging
suitable financial products for various categories
of producers – small, medium and large – and for
different actors along the value chain.
Agricultural finance should cover the whole
value chain. Although the loan terms will vary,
risk for financial institutions will generally
decrease as the value chain moves forward. The
types of financial products that will be required
for various levels of the value chain are
presented in Table 5.7. Whereas short-term
credit/working capital will be required for input
procurement, cash flow management and
income smoothing term credit will be required at
any level for fixed asset or land acquisition,
leasing and inventory build-up. It will also be
necessary for financial institutions to provide
deposit and transfer services for cash flow
management, risk mitigation, investment and
asset building. Non-bank financial institutions
such as insurance companies will also have to
play critical role in designing appropriate
insurance products to address risks arising from
the forces of nature (health, life, weather).
TABLE 5.7
Types of Financial Products Required By Agricultural Value Chain Actors
S/N Value Chain Actors Types of Financial Products Required
1 Inputs suppliers and producers Premises financing, stocking and restocking financial products,
appropriate saving schemes, assets financing, insurance for stocks and
technical training and entrepreneurship skills
2 Transporters Money to purchases trucks, and maintenance. They also need services on
insurance and guidance on importation of inputs
3 Traders Operating capital, assets financing (equipment and trucks) and invoice
discounting;
4 Consumers Money to purchase goods, effective distributions and consumers
protection
Source: Olomola (2011)
In the light of the foregoing, stakeholders in the
agricultural finance market should realize the
opportunities and possibilities that exist in Africa
to transform agriculture through the instrumen-
tality of value chain financing. The approach can
enhance farmers' access to credit directly and
indirectly. The development of agricultural
commodity value chains through increased
private-sector financing will reduce agricultural
wastage in general and post-harvest losses in
particular and thus improve the profitability of
farming. With increased earnings, farmers'
access to equity capital for production purposes
will rise. Increased financing of downstream
activities that is possible with value chain
financing will likely lead to an expansion in the
output market and increase farmers' access and
participation. This will in turn increase the
commercial orientation of farming and may lead
to an improvement in the way lenders perceive
the risk associated with agricultural production.
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Besides, farmers may benefit directly in terms of
increased access to finance from actors in the
value chain. For instance, an agribusiness firm
involved in producing value-added products with
financial assistance from the banking sector can
on its own establish a contractual relationship
with farmers and provide them with finance for
farm operations. This is another important
mechanism for eliciting private sector response
to the financial problems facing small-scale
farmers in Africa (Olomola, 2010).
5.11 Reform of state-owned
agricultural finance institutions
As mentioned earlier, the establishment of
agricultural banks has been a major instrument
of agricultural development in Africa over the
years. The performance of many of such banks
has, however, been far from satisfactory. Where
such banks still exist, they have to be
restructured, depoliticized and recapitalized.
Several institutions have been established to
perform agricultural development functions
which will therefore, make it imperative for the
agricultural banks to focus strictly on financing in
a manner that will meet the requirements of the
expected transformation in the sector. Such
banks have to shift their focus from traditional
lenders and loss makers that rely on government
funds, to value chain finance institutions with
commercial orientation and efficient providers
of financial services. Their activities can
therefore, not be limited to lending alone. There
must be provision for providing savings and
transfer services for cash flow management, risk
mitigation and enhanced investment in the
agricultural sector. The envisaged reform is to
have a regulatory and legislative component that
will ensure that such banks function as banks and
not as parastatals of ministries of agriculture.
Ultimately, there will be need to diversify the
source of funds of such institutions. With
adequate financial orientation it should be
possible for them to develop to a stage where
they will perform so well as to qualify for listing
on the stock exchange and derive funding from
the general public and interested organizations.
5.12 Innovations for effective
agricultural financing in Africa
After the review and analysis of the various
constraints, financing modalities and paradigm
shifts, this section focuses on the following eight
innovative approaches for mobilizing and
delivering funds for agricultural development
and food security in Africa.
(a) Promote Investments in Rural Finance
Infrastructure – technology and innovation in
rural finance has helped access to finance
become a reality for the rural poor across the
world. Innovations can be organizational,
and have proven to dramatically reduce costs
and improve outreach elsewhere in Africa
(e.g. Ghana). Investing in apex organization
for financial cooperatives and/or the newly
formed Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in
Nigeria, therefore, is based on established
good practice and can be scaled up in areas
where the conditions permit.
(b) Promote Savings Groups – another approach
is to actively promote savings groups, with
emphasis on the quality of group formation.
This will more accurately target the rural poor
who cannot afford efficient market rates.
Savings will reduce the vulnerability of this
target population and provide small amounts
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of own capital for rotating savings schemes
found in many parts of Africa. Savings groups
can eventually be linked into formal financial
systems.
(c) Formal-Informal Credit Linkage Program – a
typical example of this form of linkage is the
provision of financial services through self-
h e l p g r o u p s ( S H G s ) a n d f i n a n c i a l
cooperatives. This approach has been used
successfully in India, less so in Africa, to
finance agriculture among smallholders. For
instance in several Indian states, a separate
movement has emerged, based on village-
level women's self-help groups and their
federations at the village, mandal (or block
are sub-districts but can also refer to division,
and comprise several villages or village
clusters), and district levels. These estimated
2.2 million groups collect funds from their
members and either deposit them in rural
banks or lend them to members. After
demonstrating their capacity to collect on
loans over a six-month time period, rural
banks will typically leverage a group's savings
by a factor of four, providing additional
capital that is mostly used for agricultural
purposes. It is often easier for self-help
groups to obtain loans than it is for larger
farmers, many of them poor customers for
rural banks. With the self-help groups
responsible for all screening, processing, and
collection activities, the transaction costs for
loans are greatly reduced (Box 5.3).
BOX 5.3
Access for the Rural Vulnerable Poor: The case of SHGs in India
Over the past 15 years, the average annual growth of Self-Help Groups (SHGs) in India has topped 80%. One of
the most important initiatives guiding this development is the SHG Banking Linkage Program, launched in 1992
by the government-owned National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). Working with
620,109 SHGs in 2006, it integrated more than nine million households into the financial sector.
Indian SHG's have between 15-20 members and are autonomous groups that collect savings and then deliver
loans to members. Emphasis is on voluntary and high quality group formation. SHGs are usually formed with the
assistance of a promoting institution (governmental or non-governmental), most SHGs are federated to help
with financial monitoring and accessing finance from external sources. Most Indian SHG's reach the very poor, a
population that is both landless and illiterate. A CGAP study of 150 of the more successful SHGs in India finds
that the majority of members live in very remote areas (far from paved roads and other infrastructure). Initial
loan sizes are very small (US$ 2.50 – 45.00), and livelihood support services (health care, literacy training, mid-
day meal, skills training) are often offered in tandem by the promoting institution. Members join to get loans
and access these other services.
Other lessons from the Indian success story for Nigeria include: Member participation and group solidarity is
critical to a SHG's sustainability, as are good organizational support and social mobilization techniques on
behalf of the promoting institution. Groups formed to respond to immediate incentives (like accessing
government gas connections) tend to disband once the member's short-term goal is achieved.
Sources: CGAP (2007), Fouillet (2007)
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Financial cooperatives and their networks
are re-emerging as promising institutions in
rural finance in many countries, combining
the advantages of proximity with modern
management tools. Locally based, their
transaction costs are typically lower than
those of other financial institutions. But
because they are members of a larger
network, they can offer the variety and
volume of financial services that rural
customers require, and they can pool risks as
well as costs. In Burkina Faso, the Reseau des
Caisses Populaires du Burkina (RCPB), the
largest network of financial cooperatives, is
establishing rural service points and very
small village-based credit unions, managed
and supervised by financial cooperatives in
larger villages. RCPB was created in 1972 in
the region of Bougouriba. It has benefited
from a long-term relationship with La
Compagnie Internationale de Développ-
ement Rural Canada (CIDR), which became
Développement International Desjardins
(DID). Over the past 30 years, RCPB has
become the largest credit and savings co-
operative network in Burkina Faso. As of
2009, RCPB operated in 43 out of 45
provinces, offering credit and savings
products to a variety of clients, including
farmers, entrepreneurs, artisans, and
salaried employees. RCPB comprises 103
savings and credit coops, 31 point of sales, 4
regional unions, 5 technical offices and a
federation. Each savings and credit
cooperative is owned by its members.
(d) Expanding the reach of rural finance –
information technologies offer a broad array
of new ways to extend financial services to
rural areas, for value chains and for
agriculture more broadly. The use of mobile
phones for banking is being pioneered by
Wizzit in South Africa and by Globe Telecom
and Smart in the Philippines. The phones can
be used to pay for purchases in stores and to
transfer funds, significantly reducing
transaction costs. With legal frameworks in
place, m-banking could be one of the major
breakthroughs in extending outreach to
poor customers. Branchless banking – using
post offices, stores, gas stations, and input
providers – is another successful approach to
reaching rural customers at low cost. Brazil,
India, Kenya, the Philippines, and South
Africa demonstrate its financial viability,
although there are issues in regulating such
endeavors.
Rural leasing is another financing option for
rural entrepreneurs, in agriculture and in the
rural nonfarm economy. Here again,
examples of commercial providers in Mexico,
Pakistan, and Uganda show that leasing can
finance the acquisition of productive assets.
Now running profitably, these commercial
providers all benefited from access to
government and donor funds to jump-start
their operations, demonstrating the
potential benefits of public-private
partnerships.
(e) Financing through Interlinked Agent – yet
another way to increase agricultural access
to capital is financial intermediation through
linked agents in value chains (input suppliers
or output processors). Those agents are
often more able to cost-effectively monitor
on-farm behavior (eliminating information
asymmetries), thus reducing monitoring
costs and enabling financial institutions to
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accept non-standard forms of wealth as
collateral, such as standing crops or, for
warehouse receipt financing, harvested
crops.
Further work is needed to determine
whether these (often spatially monopolistic)
practices offer finance at competitive rates
and whether transaction costs continue to
negat ive ly affect smal lholders . As
mentioned, some microfinance institutions
(MFIs) and cooperatives have themselves
begun to adopt this form of secured lending.
But their success has in many instances been
u n d e r m i n e d b y i n a d e q u a t e l e g a l
frameworks, which often prevent the
collaterali-zation of less conventional assets
such as an input supplier's contract for a
standing crop. Further undercutting
collateralized lending are legal systems that
fail to provide clear rules for priority claims on
assets and prompt redress in the event of
default. Without collateral, high risks cannot
always be compensated by higher interest
rate premiums, so many smallholders are
simply cut off from the credit market.
(f) Adapting microfinance to reach smallholders
– the inadequacies of rural financial markets
reflect real risks and real transaction costs
that cannot easily be resolved through
legislation. Innovations are required to
permit more flexible forms of lending, while
guaranteeing that borrowers repay loans.
One approach to resolve these problems
flows from the pioneering efforts of the
Grameen Bank. Microfinance institutions
(MFIs) extend the selection of available
contracts with new arrangements that
substitute for collateral. They often have
guidelines to favor groups – particularly
women – excluded from borrowing through
other channels. Many MFIs lend to local
groups whose members select one another
and share the liability for repaying loans, so
local social capital substitutes for wealth as
collateral. MFIs often target rural areas,
where social capital is stronger (Olomola,
2000).
To meet the underserved agricultural
market, MFIs have begun to innovate in other
parts of the developing world such as in
Guatemala and Malawi, where individual
loans have been offered to agricultural
producers specializing in short-cycle
tomatoes and other vegetable crops. The
value chain approach has been adapted to
financing inputs and outputs, using standing
crops as collateral. Moreover, Caja los Andes
in Bolivia began to accept non-standard
collateral assets and lend to farmers well
diversified across a range of agricultural and
non-agricultural activities. In 2006 it became
a bank, Banco Los Andes Procredit, and
agricultural loans now constitute 10% of its
portfolio.
In short, while microfinance lending in
agriculture is still small, there are hopeful
signs that innovation will permit the
microfinance movement to partially fill the
agricultural void, at least for producers with
small enterprises engaged in high-value
activities, particularly animal husbandry and
horticulture. There is a strong case for public
policy support to search for, and pilot test,
technological and institutional innovations
that reduce the costs and risks of doing
business. Many of the newly developed
BOX 5.4
Success Stories in Term Finance: The case of leasing in Madagascar
The Caisse d'Epargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuel (CECAM) is an agricultural finance cooperative in
Madagascar. CECAM introduced leasing in 1993 for a range of assets including farm implements, draft animals,
dairy cows, irrigation equipment, bicycles and sewing machines. Flexible payment schedules are adapted to the
crop cycle and the leased asset is the main security and source of payment. Given the lack of collateral of many
rural households, this was an ideal option for CECAM. Factors critical to CECAM's success include the selection
of clients with good experience and skills in handling the asset. So, for example, CECAM's clients will tend to
already have some equipment or animals and the lease represents an upgrade. CECAM also requires down
payments, and involves farmers groups in the assessment of the lease application and prospective lessee.
CECAM originally made the group jointly liable for the lease, but this requirement faded away with experience
and a reduction in the perception of risk. Other factors contributing to CECAM's success include strong
monitoring and supervision using community groups. Default is immediately dealt with, maintaining the
credibility and profitability of the intervention.
Source: Hollinger (2004)
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innovations may have the character of a
public good, because innovations by one
lender may be quickly adopted by another.
This justifies public support for promising
start-ups to enable them to become
financially viable within predetermined time
periods.
(g) Promote Private Sector Participation
Through Contract Farming – contract farming
is a partnership arrangement between the
private sector and small-scale farmers which
should be encouraged in view of its
commercial orientation and employment
potential, especially in ensuring longer-term
contractual production relationships.
Contract farming is becoming increasingly
recognized as an important approach for the
modernization of peasant farming. It
guarantees linkages between smallholders
and large-scale producers and facilitates
access to modern inputs and production
credit. Many agricultural products such as
banana, rubber, cotton and sugar have been
produced and marketed through contracting
small-scale producers in African countries.
For instance, in many COMESA countries,
private companies have been promoting the
growing and marketing of cotton, tobacco,
coffee, tea, sugar, and high value
horticultural crops through provision to
smallholder farmers of extension, credit and
even markets for their crops. Kenya and
Zimbabwe supply off-season specialty
vegetables; South Africa is a major exporter
of off-season fruit to European markets. In
particular, contract farming is becoming
increasingly important in the Zimbabwean
horticulture export trade in which
smallholders produce for larger commercial
farms engaged in packing. About 3,000
smallholders are growing for export on a
contract basis (IFAD, 2001). Indeed, Kenya
and Zimbabwe have demonstrated that
smallholder sourcing can meet the quality
requirements of supermarkets in Europe.
Usually, the exporter takes responsibility for
organizing growers, arranging finance,
providing technical support and ensuring
traceability.
(h) Term Finance (e.g. Leasing in Madagascar) –
as indicated earlier, term finance will be
required at various levels of the value chain.
Leasing can be an appropriate instrument in
designing appropriate financial products for
value chain financing. The Madagascar
experience, presented in Box 5.4, indicates
the coverage of assets which can be involved
especially in addressing the problem of risk of
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5.13 AfDB recent initiatives for
agricultural value chain financing
For the period 2011-2014, the AfDB is sharpening
its focus in agricultural financing to cover
agribusiness and agro-industrial development
with a three-fold objective of increasing
agricultural productivity, enhancing food
security and conserving natural resources.
In financing the private sector AfDB plans to
adopt two approaches: (i) General Financial
intermediaries: Lines of credit, partial credit
guarantee schemes and generalist private equity
funds which represent around US$50 million to
indirect finance of agriculture in the last 3 years,
and (ii) Agriculture and Agribusiness focused
projects and funds such as trade finance, debt
finance, private equity funds, which represent a
total of US$ 160 million in its active portfolio for
the same period. Other initiatives of the AfDB in
investing capital in agriculture include the
following:
(a) African Agriculture Fund – this is an Equity
Fund focused on agriculture and agribusiness
which provides equity across the full
agricultural value chain. The size at first
closing was/ US$150 million in investments,
with projected return at 12%, and US$14
million in Technical Assistance to guarantee
high development impact. In the past year,
despite sector specific challenges, but
encouraged by effective reforms, there was
an increased number of requests for
financing from Agriculture and Agribusiness
focused equity and guarantee funds that are
professionally managed, aim at investing in
the whole value chain and attract
institutional investors with acceptable
although lower projected returns but
sizeable social returns.
(b) Equity and Guarantee Fund of Funds – this is a
Fund of Funds which aims at providing equity
and debt financing to investment funds
focused on Agriculture and Agribusiness. The
target size is between US$750 million to US$1
billion aiming to provide financing or
guarantee scheme to 10-15 sub-funds. The
geographical area comprises the five African
sub regions
(c) Equity and Guarantee Fund for Agriculture
and Agribusiness in Africa (EGFAA) – the
EGFAA is a US$1.2 billion financial package set
up in 2010 for use in funding the African
A g r i b u s i n e s s a n d A g r o - i n d u s t r i e s
D e v e l o p m e n t I n i t i a t i v e w h i c h w a s
established in March 2010. One of the key
objectives of the facility is to encourage the
involvement of finance and expertise across
African nations in order to support private
sector investments in agribusiness and agro-
industry. Preference is given to Funds
investing in agricultural infrastructure or with
a pipeline that covers the whole food value
chain. The Fund of Funds is to be managed by
professional fund managers who will be
selected based on their investment skills and
their proven track record in managing
Technical Assistance program and other
initiatives. The Bank is to provide 25% of the
target commitments of the Fund of Funds.
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5.14 Commercial agricultural credit
scheme in Nigeria
As part of its developmental role, and in line with
advances taking place on the African continent,
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in collabora-
tion with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and
Water Resources recently established the
Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS)
for promoting commercial agricultural
enterprises in Nigeria. The objectives of the
scheme are: (i) to fast track development of the
agricultural sector of the Nigerian economy by
providing credit facilities to commercial
agricultural enterprises at a single digit interest
rate; (ii) to enhance national food security by
increasing food supply and effecting lower
agricultural produce and product prices, thereby
promoting low food inflation; (iii) to reduce the
cost of credit in agricultural production to enable
farmers to exploit the potentials of the sector;
and, (iv) to increase output, generate
employment, diversify the revenue base,
increase foreign exchange earnings and provide
input for the industrial sector on a sustainable
basis.
The scheme is financed from the proceeds of the
200 bill ion bond raised by the Debt
Management Office (DMO) and made available
to the participating bank(s) to finance
commercial agricultural enterprises. In addition,
State Governments and the Federal Capital
Territory Administration (FCTA) could also
borrow up to 20% of the bond proceeds for on-
lending to farmers. Key Agricultural commodi-
ties covered under the scheme are; (i) Cultivation
of target crops (rice, cassava, cotton, oil palm,
wheat, rubber, sugar cane, Jatropha carcus,
fruits and vegetable); (ii)Livestock (dairy,
poultry, piggery), (iii) Fisheries. Credit support to
the target commodities is administered along
the entire value chain of production, storage,
processing, market and enterprise development
In July 2011, Nigeria further initiated an
agricultural finance framework known as the
Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for
Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) to address the
problem of low level of agricultural financing in
the country. It is focused at the pilot stage, on the
development of value chains in respect of 6
commodities namely; tomato, cotton, maize,
soya bean, rice and cassava. Details of the value
chain activities to be financed, the expected
benefits and the governance structure are
provided in Box 5.5. NIRSAL, unlike previous
schemes, which encouraged banks to lend
without clear strategy to the entire spectrum of
the agricultural value chain, emphasizes lending
to the value chain and to all sizes of producers.
Success of this initiative will depend on the
effectiveness of the governance structure,
commitment of the stakeholders to discharge
their financial responsibilities under the initiative
and political will to undertake the required
sector-specific and fiscal policy reforms for the
effective performance of the agricultural sector
BOX 5.5
The NIRSAL Initiative in Nigeria
What is NIRSAL?
NIRSAL is a dynamic, holistic approach that tackles both the agricultural value chain and the agricultural
financing value chain. NIRSAL does two things at once; , so that banks can lendfixes the agricultural value chain
with confidence to the sector and, by offering themencourages banks to lend to the agricultural value chain
strong incentives and technical assistance.
What are the value chain activities to be financed?
There are five pillars to be addressed by an estimated USD 500 million of CBN money that will be invested as
follows:
1. Risk-sharing Facility (USD 300 million). This component would address banks' perception of high-risks in
the sector by sharing losses on agricultural loans.
2. Insurance Facility (USD 30 million). The facility's primary goal is to expand insurance products for
agricultural lending from the current coverage to new products, such as weather index insurance, new
variants of pest and disease insurance etc.
3. Technical Assistance Facility (USD 60 million). This would equip banks to lend sustainably to agriculture,
producers to borrow and use loans more effectively and increase output of better quality agricultural
products.
4. This mechanism rates banks on the basis of two factors,Holistic Bank Rating Mechanism (USD 10 million).
the effectiveness of their agricultural lending and the social impact and makes them available for the public.
5. ). This mechanism offers winning banks in Pillar four,Bank Incentives Mechanism (USD 100 million
additional incentives to build their long-term capabilities to lend to agriculture. It will be in terms of cash
awards.
What are the expected benefits?
 Generate an additional USD 3 billion of bank lending within 10 years to increase agricultural lending from the
current 1.4 to 7% of total bank lending.
 Increase lending to the “pooled” small farmer segment to 50 percent of the total (typically, banks do not
reach these producers individually but through “pools”, i.e., aggregating mediators, such as MFIs and
cooperatives).
 Reach 3.8 million agricultural producers by 2020 through pooling mechanisms such as value chains, MFIs,
and cooperatives.
 Reduce banks' break-even interest rate to borrowers from 14 to 7.5-10.5%.
What is the governance structure?
NIRSAL and its five pillars will be administered by a Non-Banking Financial Institution (NBFI.) At the national
level, the NBFI will administer the five NIRSAL pillars. It will report to a Board of Directors chaired by the CBN
and memberships from AGRA, the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, and Commerce and Industry. The Board
will have ultimate decision-making and strategy-setting responsibility for the Fund. The CEO of the NBFI will be
responsible for NIRSAL's overall implementation and for maintaining relationships with key stakeholders. At
the regional levels, Regional Transformation Engines will administer NIRSAL, through Portfolio Investment
Managers and Technical Assistance Representatives.
Source; Olomola, 2011
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5.15 Implications for capacity
development
The innovative approaches enunciated in this
chapter have implications for capacity
development at three levels viz.: policy reform
and formulation, business enterprises and
financial institutions.
(a) Policy and Regulatory Reforms – securing
access to finance is a means of ensuring food
security. African governments have to be
sensitized and convinced of the need to
provide an enabling environment for finance
to flourish. The justification for reforms (both
macroeconomic and sector-specific) has to
be clearly articulated and the benefits
substantiated to guarantee the commitment
of policy makers to effect the required
changes and to continue to strengthen the
policy environment. Both the executive and
legislative arms of government will need
technical support in this regard.
(b) Enterprise Level – All the actors in the
agricultural value chain (farmers, input
dealers, assemblers, processors, wholesal-
ers, exporters, importers) need to know how
to secure access to finance to operate and
develop their businesses. With regard to
farm enterprises (crop and livestock related)
there is need for training in farm accounting
and business management among other
areas.
(c) Banking and Other Financial Institutions –
financial institutions often seek to contain
their risks and costs in financing agriculture.
They need to have competence in developing
commercially attractive financial services
that meet the needs of the various actors in
the value chain and how a value chain focus
can result in market growth and reduced
credit risk. Details of the capacity building
requirements for commercial banks and
microfinance institutions are presented in
Table 5. 8.
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S/N CLIENTS CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS
1 Commercial Banks
 Understand value chain concepts and competitiveness
 Risk assessment and identification of strategic opportunities to
strengthen value chains
 How cohesive value chains can be used to reduce risks and facilitate
access to finance
 How to apply value chain financial products to meet the needs of various
actors in the value chain
 Designing appropriate financial products
 Develop better understanding of specific supply chains and their
economics---identify key agribusinesses and their clients/suppliers and
mapping opportunities for lending
 Understanding, quantifying and managing risks around specific
commodities and supply chains
 Separating systemic (e.g. weather, yield, price) from idiosyncratic risks
(e.g. client performance)
 Use of technologies to reach new clients and reduce the cost of serving
them (e.g. mobile banking, mobile phones, etc.)
 Development of loan products to better meet client needs and the
particularities of commodities and supply chains
 Designing Risk Sharing Facilities (Reduce credit risk on the specific
agriculture loan portfolio, Increase capacity to originate new loans
Improve key balance sheet ratios, risk management and operational
efficiency and Potentially increase risk-adjusted return on capital)
 ICT infrastructure banking services to difficult-to-reach communities
2 Microfinance
institutions
 Designing and lending products for agriculture and value chain financing
 Ways to vet new clients for credit approval
 Understanding financial risks
 Identifying opportunities and managing risks
3 Farmers, suppliers,
processors, buyers
and others
 farm accounting and business management
 Understanding financial risks
 Identifying opportunities and managing risks
 Understanding market needs
 Training in loan application writing for bankable agricultural projects with
emphasis on cash flows and project costs
 Methods in mitigating and adapting to climate change
4 Intervention agencies
National and
International NGOs
Development
partners
 Building cohesive value chains
 Internal and external approaches to value chain finance
 Promotion, awareness raising, and training of potential clients: SME
agribusinesses and farmers
 R and D  and use to improve agricultural productivity
 Mind-set change from negative public perception against agriculture
especially by the youths
 Land titling and collateralization– ways of turning farm
 plots into collaterals which commercial banks often demand
TABLE 5.8
Capacity Building Needs in Agricultural Finance Delivery System
Source: Adapted from Olomola, 2011
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5.16 Markets and agriculture
transformation
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, the
performance of agricultural markets is crucial for
enabling farmers and agribusiness to exploit the
expanding opportunities that are arising from
the ongoing changes in domestic and global
markets, particularly the rapidly increasing
demand for high-value primary and processed
agricultural products that come with the rising
incomes in emerging markets. Agricultural
markets are also important for food staples -
they remain a mainstay of smallholder
producers, not least because food staples are
especially important for food security, as the
majority of smallholder households are net food
buyers even in favored areas. Markets unify
actors across different spatial and temporal
scales (Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2005).
Well-functioning (integrated) agricultural
markets can therefore increase incomes to
farmers, reduce the cost of food, mitigate the
uncertainty of supply, as well as improve food
security particularly for the poor (World Bank,
2007a; Barret and Mutambatsere, 2005). They
ensure that macro and sectoral policies
influence/change the incentives and constraints
faced by micro-level decision makers (Barrett
and Mutambatsere, 2005). Efficient agricultural
markets link farmers, traders and other market
intermediaries more closely to consumers, and
smal lholder farmers to domest ic and
international agricultural value chains for high-
value produce. The timely transmission of price
signals to farmers so they can adjust their
production to meet projected market supply
changes and changing consumer preferences is a
hallmark of efficient markets. Public policies and
institutions are important for the development
of agricultural markets in order to reduce
transactions costs, manage risks, resolve
information asymmetries, and enforce
contracts. However, smallholders may need to
professionalize their bargaining power through
farmer organizations to ensure equitable market
outcomes, with the assistance of public policy.
Zoell ick (2011) proposes a number of
institutional, analytical and financial innovations
as well as international collective action in order
to enhance the facility of unfettered markets for
helping feed the world against the headwinds of
resurgent food prices across the developing
world, arguing that “the answer to food price
volatility is not to prosecute or block markets,
but to use them better.” In essence, well-
functioning markets provide opportunities at
the micro-level for welfare improvements
snowballing into sustained macro-level growth
and development.
Innovation is crucial in developing well-
functioning agricultural markets (Juma, 2011;
Zoellick, 2011). Bonnen (1998) argues forcefully
that institutional innovation was the key driver of
agricultural productivity growth in the United
States. A clear and sustained national policy with
clear goals guided the development of the
necessary public and private institutions, which
both preceded and interacted with human
capital in a dynamic fashion to create new
technologies. These institutions were critical to
ensuring the creation and development of
knowledge all the way to its use in some
coordinated, interlinked and systematic manner.
Furthermore, institutions are matters of human
contrivance, which can neither be achieved
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serendipitously nor left sorely to market forces
Markets are also crucial for managing risks
associated with supply and demand shocks by
smoothening out stock flows across space and
time, thus reducing price variability. Markets
thus perform multiple functions: distribution,
transformation of unprocessed commodities
into value-added products, and transmission of
information and risks (Barrett and Mutamba-
tsere, 2005).
As articulated in Chapter 4, a better understand-
ing of the dynamics in African agriculture can be
situated in the political economy context. In that
sense, the history of agricultural markets in these
countries reflects the evolution of thinking on
the role for government in creating institutions,
physical infrastructure and enhancing
competition. The emphasis in the 1960s and
1970s on government interventions to allegedly
resolve market failures saw the creation of
marketing boards, payment of subsidies and
significant pressures on the fiscus. The 1980s saw
emphasis on market liberalization to 'get prices
right', and more recently, focus on 'getting
institutions right.'
5.17 Conclusion
There have been considerable efforts toward
creating the conditions for growth in Africa. A lot
of emphasis is on the influence of government
policy and behavior and how that in turn impacts
risk, and barriers to competition across the
sectors including agriculture. Capacity for
agricultural transformation requires a holistic
u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y a l l s t a k e h o l d e r s .
Notwithstanding, governments have an
important role in providing public goods,
supporting the provision of infrastructure, and
addressing market failures through the creation
of the right policy and institutional environment.
Under-provision of these 'public goods' can
significantly increase costs to firms and farmers
making potential opportunities unprofitable.
The three fundamental constraints to Africa's
future prosperity: capacities, market integration,
and institutions remain binding on the
agricultural sector. In this chapter, it has been
argued that geographical disadvantages due to
weak infrastructure and market integration are
not a predicament for agricultural transforma-
tion and food insecurity, as their effects can be
offset or ameliorated by capacities. There is need
for innovations in technology and financing for
agricultural transformation. These efforts
should be developed strategically to deal with
emerging issues such as climate change and the
need for climate adaptation.
The agricultural transformation agenda should
therefore embrace the development of
commodity value chains in the crops, livestock,
fisheries and forestry sectors with a view to
transforming the sector from a farming system,
labor-trapping occupational sector into a
commercial, competitive agribusiness sector
capable of catalyzing the industrial revolution in
Africa. Africa's financial systems, as well as
developments in technology and infrastructure,
need to purge themselves of the age-long
discrimination against agriculture. Agriculture
cannot operate as a business without appropri-
ate financing and other supportive mechanisms
to enhance productivity, value addition and
competitiveness in the various commodity value
chains. The foregoing has implications for
capacity building. For example, the strength,
depth and sustainability of the financial system
will depend on the impact it is making on the
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development of the real sector in general and
the agricultural sector in particular. The financial
sector should therefore be strengthened
through appropriate training in agricultural risk
assessment and value chain financing in line with
the various strategies being adopted in the
continent to modernize and transform the
agricultural sector to enhance growth and
poverty reduction. The financial system must
accommodate all sizes of producers – small,
medium and large-scale. The negative
perception of smallholders as incapable of
managing a profitable enterprise and unworthy
of access to formal credit has to change.
Moreover, government must provide the
enabling environment to enable sustainable
development of the value chains. Banks need
incentives and technical assistance to lend to
agricultural commodity value chains. Finally,
with the growing awareness of the importance
of value chain financing, attraction of private
sector investment and by committing resources
for the required capacity building for meaningful
participation by stakeholders, it is possible for
agricultural financing in Africa to lead to
increased growth, agro-industrial development
and sustained food security. This creative way of
thinking could be applied to infrastructure
financing where public-private partnerships
would be explored. More resources may need to
be put aside to deal with the dangers to
agriculture posed by changing climatic
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6.0 Introduction
The experience of the past two decades has increased the understanding of African leaders regarding
the impact and magnitude of climate change on agriculture. Fischer et al. (2011) maintain that climate
change poses a serious threat to food production in Africa, an aspect that brings an additional risk of
tipping the continent into severe poverty. African farmers are involved in complex food production
systems that range from tef in Ethiopia to yam in Nigeria; from irrigated rice in Mali to commercial
farms in South Africa; and from maize and bean smallholdings in Kenya to dairy farms in Zimbabwe
(Toulmin, 2009).Chemnitz and Hoeffler (2011) see climate change as a major threat to the
development of rural Africa. Although contributing less than 3% of total global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, Africa is the worst affected in terms of the negative impacts from climate change (IPCC,
2007c). African governments must confront what Chemnitz and Hoeffler (2011) term a three-fold
challenge: produce more food for the growing population, adapt better to climate change, and by so
doing, minimize GHG emissions that cause global warming which leads to climate change. Adaptation
and technological needs for Africa are estimated in the range of 5-10% of gross domestic product
(GDP) for coastal countries alone with global warming predicted to cost Africa between $50-100
billion by 2020 (FAO, 2009c).
As already noted, the agricultural sector plays a central role in Africa's development, contributing
between 35-40% of GDP and even half of total export earnings (Fisher et al., 2011). Climate change and
environmental degradation will result in, among other negative impacts: less land under cultivation,
water, crop variety and livestock. This will threaten food security and lead to a decline in income and
ultimately malnutrition. Hence, African agriculture is at crossroads when we consider the challenges
of climate change and environmental degradation. Overall, African governments need to adapt to the
negative impacts associated with climate change and environmental degradation.
6.1 Climate change and agriculture
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), climate change refers to
“any change in climate over time, whether due to
natural variability or as a result of human
activity” (IPCC, 2007c). Ngaira (2007), maintains
that there is strong evidence that increases in
green houses gases (GHGs) have led to global
warming, sea level rise and space-time changes
in climatic zones around the globe, including
Africa. Snow cover on Mount Kilimanjaro and
Mount Kenya has decreased by about 50% since
1960 in response to land surface temperature
increases (Ngaira, 2007).
The IPCC (2007c) predicts the following trends in
weather and climate events, much of which bear
New Threats – Debating Climate
Change and Adaptation
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negatively on Africa: by 2020, between 75 and
250 million people will be affected by water
shortages; by 2020, in some countries, yields
from rain-fed agriculture will be reduced by up to
50%; towards the end of the 21 century,
st
projected sea level rise could affect low-lying
coastal areas with large populations and the cost
of adaptation could amount to at least 5-10% of
GDP; and by 2080, an increase of 5-8% of arid and
semi-arid land in Africa is projected under a range
of climate scenarios. Temperatures are expected
to rise by between 1.5-4 C in the 21 century. The
0 st
IPCC further predicts prolonged droughts and
floods with agricultural losses of between 2-7% of
GDP by 2100 in some parts of Africa. Western
Africa is projected to experience agricultural
losses of 2-4% of GDP whilst the rest of Africa will
experience agricultural losses of between 0.4-
1.3% of GDP. It is also predicted that fisheries will
be negatively impacted, with an estimated
decrease in productivity due to sea temperature
rise reaching between 50-60% by 2100 (Ibid).
Natural disaster data from EM-DAT show an
upward natural disaster trend for Africa since the
1900s (Figure 6.1). The same trend was observed
for global data. A total of 276 droughts, 765
floods and 201 storms were reported over the
period 1900-2010 in Africa. Other major disasters
included ten events of extreme heat, five insect
infestations and twenty-six wildfires. There have
been a number of extreme weather events
related to climate change in Africa. Among them
are the 1986-87 and 1991-2 droughts in southern
Africa; the drought of 2010-11 in the horn of
Africa; and Cyclone Eline that hit southern Africa
in 2000.
FIGURE 6.1
Trends in selected African natural disasters (1900-2010)
Source: Nhamo (2011) (Data from EM-DAT)
Drawing from indicators (e.g. climate-related
hazard exposure, population density; household
and community resilience, governance and
violence), White (2011) computed Africa's
vulnerability to climate change. The eight
countries most vulnerable were identified as
Angola, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Swaziland.
Wheeler (2010) performed comprehensive
accounting of climate change vulnerability for
African countries and developed risk indicators
for three critical problems: increasing weather-
related disasters, sea-level rise, and loss of
agricultural productivity. Nhamo (2011)
forecasted (median) agricultural productivity
loss from 2008-2050. The findings show that
Central Africa will be the worst affected with
19.8% loss, Southern Africa (18.95%), North Africa
(18%), Sahelian Africa (17.05%), Coastal West
Africa (16.35%) and East Africa (10.25%). An
overview of climate change impacts on
agriculture across Africa is shown in Table (6.1)
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The extant literature is replete with new and
contested terminologies, such as environmental
refugees, ecological refugees, environmental
migrants, environmentally impelled migrants,
environmentally displaced persons and climate
change migrants (Algan and Kuncek, 1998; Dow
et al., 2005; Geisler and Sousa, 2000; Reuveny,
2007). The UN Human Development Report
introduced the notion of human security in 1994
(Geisler and Sousa, 2000: 1). Human security is a
function of “safety from chronic threats of
hunger, disease, and repression on the one hand
and protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in daily life on the other” (UNDP,
1994:22-23). In this context, environmental
insecurity is part of human insecurity induced by
natural disasters and mismanaged environmen-
tal endowment. From this, the term “environ-
mental refugee” emerged. Over the past two
decades, the term “environmental refugees”
has increasingly been invoked to describe
growing waves of people displaced by
environmental problems. Approximately 150
million people will be environmental refugees by
2050, largely due to the negative impacts
associated with climate change (IPCC, 2007c).
Reuveny (2007), draws on the broader extant
literature, to map out the nature of climate
change induced movements in selected African
countries (Table 6.2).
Sub-continent Climate change impacts
East Africa
 Changes in the storage of the East African Great Lakes and reservoirs due to changes
in rainfall, which could adversely impact agricultural production
 Ecosystem impacts, including impacts on mountain biodiversity
 Declines in fisheries in some of the major East African lakes could occur due to
increases in temperature coupled with overfishing
 Extreme droughts
North Africa
 Climate change could negatively impact mixed rain-fed and semi-arid agricultural
systems, particularly the length of the growing season, for example on the margins of
the Sahel
 Possible decreases in runoff in parts of North Africa by 2050
 The Nile river is sensitive to rises in sea-level, as salination could occur
Southern Africa
 Heightened water stress
 Climate changes may in certain areas favor horticulture over plantation forestry
 Coastal marine fisheries are likely to be negatively affected by changes in the
Benguela current
West Africa
 Negative impact on crop production and possible agricultural GDP
 Changes in the coastal environment, such as the removal of mangroves and coastal
degradation, could have negative impacts on fisheries and tourism as well as on the
resilience of settlements to heavy storms
 Changes in ecosystem ranges and species locations as well as possible increased risk of
species extinction.
TABLE 6.1
Overview of climate change impacts on African agriculture
Source: Based on IPCC (2007c) and Davis (2011: 5)
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Climate change is closely linked to environmen-
tal degradation with extreme weather events
like droughts and floods leading to desertifica-
tion and erosion. In addition, reduced river flow
lead to siltation and polluted water. These and
other aspects of environmental degradation,
and how they are linked to agriculture, are
discussed in the next section.
6.2 Environmental degradation and agriculture
SEEN (n.d. : 1) def ines environmental
degradation as “a situation in which a part of the
natural environment is damaged.” This can be
damage to land, water, atmosphere as well as
loss of biodiversity. Environmental degradation
negatively impacts on land availability. Gullies,
sand dunes, degraded grazing land, sheet
erosion and declining soil fertility show the
extent of environmental degradation in Africa
(Nhamo and Inyang, 2011). According to UNEP
(2008), a number of African countries are faced
with challenges of environmental degradation:
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Djibouti, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Somalia and Tunisia.
What is clearly understood is the fact that climate
change aggravates circumstances leading to
environmental degradation. The shortage of
water, for example, leads to river courses losing
their velocity, and silting. Siltation in turn leads to
shortages in irrigation water. In areas where
boreholes are used for irrigation and watering
livestock the impacts are similar as aquifer
recharge is reduced leading to drying up of
boreholes and wells. Similarly, excessive
wildfires destroy habitats and biodiversity
leading to barren land, soil erosion and siltation.
Lesotho, for example, faces serious soil erosion
and gully formation challenges. Unlike droughts,
the environmental damage from floods is
immediate, localized and can be irreversible.
Origin/period Destination Environmental push Numbers
Mauritania, 1980s-
1990s
Senegal, Senegal River
Valley
Drought, soil erosion,
desertification, deforestation,
water scarcity
69,000
Somalia, late 1970s Somalia, Ethiopia border
region, Ogaden
Arable/grazing land degradation,
water scarcity
400,000
Sahel rural areas, late
1960s-1980s
Sahel urban regions,
Neighboring coastal states
Droughts, famines, land scarcity 10 million
Sudan, north,
south, west,
1970s-1980s
Sudan, Khartoum, Kordofan
East
Droughts, famine, desertification,
deforestation, erosion
3.5-4 Million
by early 1990
Nigeria, Jos Plateau,
1970s-1990s
Urban areas, intraregional Soil/water/air pollution, silted
rivers, land scarcity or
degradation
-
Somalia, late 1980s-
mid 1990s
Somalia-Ogaden, Kenya,
Ethiopia, Djibouti
Drought, erosion, deforestation 2.8 million
Kenya, Western,
Northern, 1960s-1990s
Kenya, Rift Valley, urban
centres
Drought, land degradation, land
scarcity, famine
150,000-200,000
TABLE 6.2
Climate change-induced migration in selected African countries
Source: Adapted from Reuveny (2007: 663-665)
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Floods can tear away top soil from poorly
managed subsistence farming communities.
Flood damaged lands also take longer to
regenerate life if artificial assistance is not
provided immediately. While the impact of
environmental degradation on agriculture is
clear, agriculture contributes to the degradation
of the atmosphere though GHG emissions from
residue burning, forest clearing, manure
management, fertilizer applications and
livestock production. The level of GHG emissions
for African agriculture compared to global
emissions in the same sector is shown in Figure
6.2. While Africa's emissions are relatively low
compared to the global total, emissions have
risen significantly over the years.
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FIGURE 6.2
Agricultural emissions 1990-2020 (Mt CO2 equivalence)
Source: Based on GTZ (2008: 6)
Another challenge associated with climate
change is increasing aridity. This is the situation
faced around the Moshi region in Tanzania. The
rapid disappearance of ice caps on mountains in
equatorial East Africa (Kilimanjaro, Kenya and
Elgon) has been partly attributed to land use
changes particularly deforestation. Land use
changes including deforestation, overgrazing
and burning of vegetation not only add to the
carbon load but also cause changes in energy and
moisture fluxes, with noticeable consequences
on weather and climate patterns at local and
regional levels (Ngaira, 2007). An estimated 11%
of the land in Africa is at risk of being lost for crop
agriculture due to climate change induced
environmental degradation (Fisher et al., 2011). It
is estimated that there will be an increase in areas
with severe dry conditions in Africa by about
5–8%, or 60–90 million hectares by 2080 (Ibid).
6.3 Impact, adaptation and
mitigation in key sectors
The impacts of climate change as well as relevant
adaptation and mitigation measures in the
water, crop, livestock, fisheries and horticulture
sectors are key to agricultural transformation
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and food security in Africa. Adaptation in
agriculture refers to measures put in place to
allow farmers to live with the changing climate.
Hisali et al. (in press), view adaptation strategies
as responses to actual or expected climatic
stimuli (and their effects) which are intended to
moderate harm or exploit associated beneficial
opportunities. The adjustments can be broadly
categorized either as responses to current
occurrences (climate variability) or planned
adaptation to long term changes. Mitigation is
“any anthropogenic intervention that either
reduces sources of GHG emissions (abatement)
or enhances their carbon sinks (sequestration)”
(GTZ, 2008: 8). Carbon sequestration in soils, and
o n - f a r m e m i s s i o n r e d u c t i o n a n d t h e
displacement of fossil fuels through cleaner-
burning bioenergy like ethanol, biogas and
methane, are key mitigation measures in
agriculture. A holistic view to address climate
change in agriculture is advocated for (Figure
6.3). A number of additional pointers can be
drawn from Figure 6.3. For example, African
farmers and governments might not be able to
adapt if there is no funding or if governance of
funds is not instituted properly. The shortage of
skills in the fields of adaptation and mitigation is
still high on the continent. On the other hand,
appropriate mitigation measures can result in
less GHG emissions, an aspect that will result in
less extreme weather events and other negative
impacts associated with climate change.
Awareness
Raising
Technology
Governance
Capacity
Development
Mitigation
Finance
Research &
Development
Adaptation
FIGURE 6.3
Holistic view on climate change adaptation and agriculture
Source: Nhamo (2011)
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In line with the central role played by adaptation
in agriculture as shown in the holistic approach
discussed above, Easterling (2011), develops an
adaptation toolkit. This toolkit puts adaptation
tools under four groups namely: natural
resources and inputs, technological innovation,
human ingenuity as well as information and
knowledge (see Table 6.3).
Category Adaptation Elements/Actions
Natural resources and inputs
 Water, energy, labor, land, fertilizer, pesticides
Technological innovation
 Breeding and genetic modification
 Energy, water and soil conservation
 Pest management
 Specialized equipment
 Information technology
Human ingenuity
 Crop and animal translocation
 Improved agronomic practices, including diversification, energy
efficiency
 Strategic marketing
 Harvest and storage efficiency
Information and knowledge
 Environmental monitoring systems
 Outreach and information dissemination
 Risk management
 Research and development (R&D)
TABLE: 6.3
Socio-agroecological systems (SAS) adaptation toolkit
Source: Easterling (2011: 277) cited in Nhamo, 2011
Across Africa, a number of sectors (water, crop,
livestock, fisheries and horticulture) are vital to
grasping the nexus between climate change and
agriculture. The following sections will examine
these sectors in detail.
(a) Water sector – Water plays a central and
uncontested role in Africa's development (Africa
Partnership Forum, 2008). The sector is the most
vulnerable in terms of climate variability and
change. Water is a key driver, which impacts on
food production and supply (Hanjra and Qureshi,
2010). Major impacts are on quality and quantity.
If not handled well, the impacts of climate
change will aggravate water related disputes
across the continent. Already, there is a standing
conflict in the Nile River Basin (Davis, 2011). Many
African countries are on the verge of exhausting
their available water resources. By 2025, 25
countries are expected to have water scarcity or
water stress (Africa Partnership Forum, 2008).
Specific countries identified as having problems
related to water pollution, access, scarcity and
stress are: Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Libya,
Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda, Western Sahara and
Zimbabwe (UNEP, 2008).
Most African countries fall within the tropical
zone that is marked by seasonal shifts of the
tropical rainfall systems (Toulmin, 2009). The
Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) is one
such dominant rainfall system associated with
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countries stretching from Swaziland to Liberia.
The ITCZ often follows an almost predictable
seasonal pattern of change in surface tempera-
ture to bring reliable rainfall to the continent.
The only exception is when the system is
disturbed by the El Niño/La Niña-Southern
Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon that leads to
unusually warm sea surface temperatures in the
tropical Pacific leading to either extreme
droughts or wet conditions. Indeed, the 1991/92
drought in southern Africa is believed to have
been caused by ENSO.
FAO (2007) estimates the utilization of Africa's
freshwater resources at 5.5% compared to 20.4%
in Asia. A 2005 FAO survey indicated that there
are about 1,300 large and medium-size dams
across Africa, with 517 (40%) of these located in
South Africa. Many of the dams were built to
fulfill the demands of growing populations and
irrigation agriculture. In terms of percentage
share, an estimated 52% of the dams serve the
purposes of irrigation, 20% are for municipalities
and 20% for multiple purposes that include
power generation (Ibid). As of December 2010,
South Africa was using up to 98% of her surface
water yield, with 41% of the annual usable
potential of groundwater having been allocated
(Davis, 2011). Apart from agriculture, water is
also used up in industry, power generation, and
for domestic purposes (DST, 2010). All these uses
for water will compete more in the future given
the dwindling supplies as a result of climate
change. The potential for inter-basin water
transfers has not been fully utilized on the
continent, (FAO, 2007). Plans for inter-basin
transfers out of the Congo and Niger systems
into the Sahelian and southern Africa basins are
still at pre-feasibility stages. The plans include
proposals for a transfer from the Oubangi sub-
basin of the Congo into the Chari-Logone sub-
basin of Lake Chad (Ibid).
It is predicted that an 8% reduction in rainfall may
lead to a corresponding 31% reduction in
groundwater recharge and a 30% reduction in
surface runoff (Wakhungu, 2010). With rapid
climate change, the major risks to water
resources include: decreased availability of
water due to increased temperatures that result
in excessive evaporation (shifts in the timing and
amounts of rainfall will also have similar effects);
as well as increased risk of water pollution and
decreased water quality resulting from erosion
and high rainfall events that increase the
presence of sediments, nutrients, dissolved
organic carbon, pathogens and pesticides, and
increased water temperature, which promote
algal blooms (Davis, 2011).
One key adaptation strategy in the water sector
is the revision of national regulatory measures on
water rights. To this end, governments and key
stakeholders must embark on mainstreaming
climate change into national water laws and
regional water protocols. Southern Africa and
other African sub-continental zones have been
working on cross-border river basin water
transfer schemes. The bottom line, however, is
that if climate change continues unabated, there
might be less water to transfer from the basins.
The Africa Partnership Forum (2008) suggests
adaptation measures in the water sector at three
spatial levels namely: SSA, North Africa and
Africa in general. For SSA, there is need to
develop water storage infrastructure (see also
Juma, 2011). The average storage capacity in sub-
Saharan Africa in 2007 was estimated at
200m /person/year, a figure noticeably low by
3
international standards. Integrated river basin
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management that combines water storage
infrastructure with hydroelectric power
development and water for irrigation are
encouraged. The African Partnership Forum also
recommends for SSA the need to strengthen
water policies and water resource management
including making the private sector more active.
With regard to North Africa, there is need to
realign water demand with available supply
through comprehensive institutional and policy
reform as well as strengthen water scarcity
management strategies. Water-saving technolo-
gies and demand-management measures are
deemed necessary interventions. For Africa as a
whole, disaster risk management needs to be
improved, especially with regard to floods since
for every US$1 spent preparing for disasters,
US$7 is saved in the cost of post-disaster
recovery and reconstruction (Africa Partnership
Forum, 2008).
Many natural lakes also exist in Africa including
lakes Chad, Victoria and Malawi. The Great Lakes
region is a contested area, as there are
conflicting positions regarding how best to
manage this shared resource. Programs aimed at
controlling deforestation, desertification and silt
control should be put in place. Also knowledge-
sharing amongst the different national
institutions responsible for managing this
precious resource, is required.
(b) Crop sector – The crop sector [cash or food] is
the largest in the agricultural industry in Africa.
Using the International Model for Policy Analysis
of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT), Ringler et al. (2011) considered three
possible climate change impacts on crop
production to 2050 in Africa The identified
possible climate change impacts were: the direct
effects on rain-fed yields through changes in
temperature and precipitation; indirect effects
on irrigated yields from changes in temperature
and available irrigation water (including
precipitation); and autonomous adjustments to
area and yield due to price effects and changes in
trade flows.
The IFPRI IMPACT applied by Ringler at el. (2011),
showed reduced crop yields in Africa by 2050 as a
result of climate change. The results show very
low increases in sugarcane production (0.21%),
millet (0.5%) and sorghum (1.02%). These are
crops that can thrive in much drier climatic
conditions. Overall the picture depicted is one of
a net negative impact yields with wheat
production projected to reduce by as much as -
21.64%, sweet potatoes and yams (-13.67%),
cassava (-8.67%), maize (-4.73%) and rice (-1.11%).
The IPPC (2007c), similarly projects that without
appropriate adaptation Africa could witness up
to 40% decline in cereal production by 2050.
In a study applying a meta-database of future
crop yields from 16 recent studies in West Africa,
Roudier et al. (2011), established that there was a
large dispersion of yield changes ranging from -
50% to +90%. However, the median was a crop
yield loss of about -11%. The predicted impacts
were greater in northern West Africa (Sudano-
Sahelian countries at -18%, followed by southern
West Africa (Guinean countries) at -13%. Lobell et
al. (2011) similarly studied nonlinear heat effects
on African maize as evidenced by historical yield
trials. Drawing from a wealth of historical crop-
trial data that exists in the African tropics and
previously not utilized for climate research, the
authors used a data set of more than 20,000
historical maize trials. This was coupled with
daily weather data to show a nonlinear
relationship between warming and maize yields.
Weather stations with daily data for the study
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period stretching from 1999–2007 were used.
The major findings were that each day spent with
temperatures above 30 C reduced maize yield by
0
1% under optimal rain-fed conditions and by 1.7%
under drought conditions (see also Auffhammer,
2011).
In a related study in Malawi by Pauw et al. (2010)
based on both historical production and climate
patterns, it was revealed that maize production
loss during climate events of different return
periods (RPs) vary. The study separated maize on
the basis of cultivars namely: local breed,
composite and hybrid. Local varieties are usually
the worst hit by droughts. Production could fall
by at least 27% during an RP10 drought, whereas
hybrid maize production falls by 10% (Pauw et al,
2010). Composites were found to be most
drought-resistant in the country. With regard to
floods, the study found that there was loss for all
maize varieties since physiological differences
between maize types were irrelevant during
floods.
Since crop farming in Africa is mainly rain fed, the
first port of call for adaptation should be in
improving weather forecasts and early warning
systems. Fisher et al. (2011) advise that African
governments should mobilize resources to
provide climate information and forecasting as
well as strengthen research and development.
Reliable early warning systems mean that
governments must invest in infrastructure and
human resources. Very few African countries
have the technological know-how to predict
weather accurately, due to limited investment in
this area. For accurate national and Africa-wide
weather and climate forecasts and simulations,
the continent must be networked through well-
equipped weather stations. South Africa's
climate change experts involved in grooming
African adaptive capacity is a welcome
development. At the national level, South Africa
has developed a useful Risk and Vulnerability
Atlas (DST, 2010). The Atlas has gained
recognition as a valid portal of data and
information at the national, provincial, municipal
and business sector levels.
Nhemachena and Hassan (2011) have established
that 67% of farmers across Southern Africa were
adapting to climate change. Among the common
adaptation measures were: crop diversification,
planting different varieties, replacing farm
activities with nonfarm activities, changing
planting and harvesting dates, increasing the use
of irrigation, and increasing the use of water and
soil conservation techniques. A related study of
9,000 farms to determine if integrated farms are
more resilient to climate change in Burkina Faso,
Egypt, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger,
Senegal, South Africa and Zambia revealed that
this was likely to be so (Seo, 2010). In fact, the
results indicate that the productivity of
integrated and resilient farms increases while
that of specialized ones decreases. The
projections were for various climate predictions
to 2060. The study concluded that integrated
farms become relatively profitable over
specialized ones, with the impacts of climate
change on integrated farms ranging from 9% loss
to 27% gain depending on climate scenarios.
In an effort to communicate with rural farmers,
FAO piloted the use of tools such as farmer field
schools and multimedia materials through rural
radios and extension agencies to generate
climate change knowledge (FAO, 2009c). Similar
research was carried out in West Africa (Tall,
2010) from the 2008 Red Cross early warning
work. Tall (2010) and Ogallo (2010) both note
that language, lack of trust between extension
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work and communities, and low local capacity to
act on forecasts are challenges. To address
these, Tall (2010) suggests the need to: initiate
forums that bring together national-level
forecasters and local-level stakeholders; simplify
the content of forecast bulletins; and develop
trust between farmers and providers of climate
information.
The role of local and indigenous knowledge
systems should find its rightful place in the
climate change adaptation discourse. Deliberate
national policies integrating various kinds of
knowledge systems, especially local and
indigenous, as well as scientific knowledge
systems should be put in place. Linked to
knowledge systems is the emerging discipline of
knowledge management. African countries
need to better document, store and retrieve
knowledge for long term usage.
Another solution presented is to dam more
water bodies for irrigation (FAO, 2008),
especially given the geographic spread of large
dams across the continent. That said, one key
challenge pertains to maintaining the dams to
avoid siltation. Coupled with this is the uneven
distribution of suitable dam sites in certain
countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe. The
total area under irrigation in Africa is estimated
at 13.4 million ha in 2005 (Ibid). In terms of
irrigated land, about 70% are located in five
countries: Egypt, Madagascar, Morocco, South
Africa and Sudan.
According to Petherick (2011) most studies on
climate change and the crop sector tend to
ignore indirect impacts such as changes in levels
of pests and diseases. This kind of information is
now necessary for policymakers seeking
research that helps them plan accordingly. As for
other mitigation measures, Fisher et al. (2011)
suggest that African governments should reduce
their GHG emissions through precision
agriculture that will ensure efficient use of
fertilizers and the rehabilitation of degraded
crops. This requires that financing is secured
from both national and international sources.
Weather Index Insurance (WII) is another
initiative gaining acceptance as a valuable
climate change adaptation strategy (Dilley,
2007). The drought insurance in Ethiopia
presents one of the classic cases in WII (Dilley,
2007). A similar initiative was also piloted in
Malawi (Meze-Hausken et al., 2009). The 2006
Ethiopian initiative was aimed at insuring the
vulnerable population at risk from droughts. An
index was constructed based on the dominant
case of emergencies, i.e., rainfall required to
protect the livelihoods of the 'at risk' population,
estimated at 16.2 million people. The index was
based on the insurance contract, and variations
in the index trigger timely payouts used to
finance the World Food Program (WFP) and
government contingency plans. The payment
was to be triggered when data gathered over a
period from March to October 2006 indicated
that rainfall is significantly below historic
averages, pointing to the likelihood of
widespread crop failure. The contingency
funding was secured through the AXA Re
contract and a maximum of $7.1 million paid out
for a $930,000 premium. The model was
designed on the basis of the potential losses that
17 million poor Ethiopian farmers risk should an
extreme drought arise (Pantuliano and Wekesa,
2008). African governments might wish to
continue rolling out the Ethiopian WII prototype
as is or with amendments.
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(c) Livestock (including game farming) sector –
Although historical changes in demand for
livestock products have been largely driven by
human population growth, income and
urbanization; in the future, livestock production
will increasingly be affected by competition for
natural resources (particularly land and water),
and by the need to operate in a green economy
(UNEP, 2010a). According to Notenbaert et al.
( 2 0 1 0 ) , p a s t o r a l s y s t e m s a r e f a c i n g
demographic, economic, socio-political and
climatic pressures that are driving many
pastoralists into non-livestock based livelihood
strategies. The poultry sub-sector is also very
sensitive to extreme heat and cold with either
extremes leading to deaths.
Fischer et al. (2011) predict that approximately
33% of African countries are at risk of significant
decreases in pasture production as a result of
climate change. Animal husbandry accounts for
about 18% of total GHG emissions in Africa (Naqvi
and Sejian, 2011). Methane is one of the chief
GHGs that ruminants such as cattle, buffalo,
sheep and goats generate. In addition, extensive
deforestation has been taking place in some
parts of the tropical rainforest in Africa to create
livestock grazing. A summary of climate change
impacts on livestock is shown in Figure 6.4.
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In countries like Botswana, the livestock sector is
one of the major consumers of water, much of
which originate from aquifers (Masike and Urich,
2009). These underground water reserves are
accessed through borehole drilling that can
stretch to more than a hundred meters. Climate
variability and change, particularly temperature
and rainfall influence per capita daily water
demand and livestock drinking behavior at the
boreholes. Through such linkages, climate
change is expected to affect the cost of water
supply for the livestock sector in Botswana.
Drawing from a systems approach, to assess the
impacts of climate change to 2050, the results
indicate that climate change will lead to an
increase in the cost of water supply by 23% (Ibid).
De Leeuw et al. (2011), in a study following
Kenya's devastating 2008–2009 drought,
suggested that climate change be mainstreamed
into Kenyan drought management policies. The
role of research and development as an
adaptation measure in the livestock sector
cannot be overemphasized. Wakhungu (2010: 2)
concludes that there is the need to improve
education and capacity to analyze climate
change model data in order to inform policy.
Livestock selection, changes in grazing patterns
and water allocation are some of the measures
that will mitigate against droughts (Ringler,
2011). As Sissoko et al. (2011) also point out, in the
West African Sahel, farmers have adapted to
climate change through selling livestock and
engaging in on-farm diversification or specializa-
tion.
Pastoralists consider mobility and access to
natural resources as the most important
adaptation mechanisms to drought. However,
mobility is particularly restricted in areas of
conflict and access to land and water may be
problematic. Governments should therefore
organize and monitor migratory movements,
allowing access to unused grazing areas (De
Leeuw et al., 2011). Input from local communities
on how to mitigate droughts should be sought
by those in positions of political authority. To
Tarawali et al. (2011), it is imperative to
encourage mixed farming of crop and livestock
as a viable strategy to stock feed supply,
especially when it is difficult to purchase in
times of droughts, floods and other economic
shocks.
Pastoral communities in East Africa have a long
history of utilizing indigenous forecasting
methods to predict seasonal climate events
(Luseno et al, 2003). However, many traditional
forecasting methods are perceived as becoming
less reliable with increasing climate variability.
Among common indigenous forecasting
observations are: clouds; wind; lightning;
behaviour of livestock, wildlife or local flora;
movement of intestines of slaughtered animals;
watching stars or the moon; and interpretation
of dreams.
Notenbaert et al. (2010) approve of risk
management (including the traditional early
warning systems) and cl imate-robust
development as promising approaches to
adaptation measures in the livestock sector.
Index based livestock insurance similar to that
applied in the crop sector also offers innovative
opportunities for protecting farmers. In addition
to the measures proposed, diversification in the
arid- and semi-arid regions might turn into
economically viable livelihood strategies for
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those in the livestock sector. To the list could be
added carbon off-setting and manure
management (GTZ, 2008).
Methane reduction strategies mainly come in the
form of management and nutritional initiatives
(Naqvi and Sejian, 2011). African governments
could reduce GHG emissions in the livestock
sector through 'precision' agriculture that would
ensure the rehabilitation of degraded pasture
land (Fisher et al., 2011; Naqvi and Sejian, 2011)
provide ways in which methane can be mitigated
in the livestock and game farming sector
including: improved genetic selection to produce
low methane producing animals; reducing
livestock population; improving nutrition and
grassland management; diet modification
through ammonia and molasses feeding to
reduce methane; and employing advance
technology like immunization and recombinant
technology for reducing methane production.
(d) Fisheries, aquaculture and entomology –
Fisheries play a critical role in food security and
African diet. In West Africa, fish constitutes up to
30% of average daily animal protein (Minard,
2006). Benin, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia,
Sierra Leone and Ghana are countries most
dependent on fish in West Africa whilst in
southern Africa, Malawi and Zambia stand out
above the rest. Of the 520 million people
worldwide who depended on fisheries and
aquaculture for their living in 2006, between 30-
45 million were based in Africa with 27.8% of total
agricultural exports in West Africa realized from
this sector. Women dominate the processing,
retailing and local trade as well as the artisan
fisheries. Some of the key river basins producing
fish include the Senegal-Gambia, Volta, Chad,
Congo, Nile, Zambezi and Limpopo. However,
there is pressure on African fisheries from
industries from Europe and South-East Asia that
have bought fishing rights from African
governments seeking foreign currency (Toulmin,
2009).
In an era of globalization and a changing climate
landscape, some African countries are
threatened with overfishing: Angola, Burundi,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Western
Sahara (UNEP, 2008).
NEPAD, with the objective of developing the fish
and aquaculture sector in Africa, in September
2005, organized the first Fish for All African
Summit in Abuja, Nigeria to galvanize regional
and international investment (Minard, 2006). A
US$30 million NEPAD-WorldFish Program for
Sustainable African Aquaculture was announced
during the 2005 Abuja Summit. The NEPAD-
WorldFish Program aims to realize an annual
increase in fish production of 10% that will create
employment for about five million people by
2020 and provide food security for many
(Badjeck et al., 2009). As of 2008, the African
Development Bank had an ongoing fisheries and
aquaculture portfolio comprised of 21 projects
and programs that were benefiting 23 countries
(AfDB, 2008).
Scholars such as Toulmin (2009) submit that a 2 C
0
rise in temperature is likely to have a major
impact on African fisheries with Mauritania and
Angola being the worst hit. However, a negative
impact on fisheries in one country might witness
a positive impact in another in coastal areas as
fish species are highly migratory. Among the
impacts resulting from climate change are:
changes in freshwater flows into lagoons and
large lakes, intrusion of salt water into lagoons,
rising sea levels and changing ocean currents
could impact coral reef development (ibid).
Allison et al. (2007) present evidence of negative
impact of climate variability and climate change
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on the African lakes of Tanganyika and Chilwa.
Climate variability and change can be realized on
a series of pathways or effects (Badjeck et al.,
2009). The effects include production ecology,
fishing and aquaculture operations, communi-
ties' livelihoods as well as wider society and
economy effects. Climate change has both a
negative and positive impact on ocean currents,
ENSO, sea level rise, rainfall, river flows, lake
flows, lake levels, storm severity and frequency
and acidification (WorldFish Centre, 2007).
Extreme weather events will affect fishing
infrastructure and systems, as the number of
fishing days could be reduced; nets traps and
long-lines damaged; loss of lives to fishermen;
damage to boats and shore facilities (Allison et
al., cited in Toulmin, 2009).
In light of the above, one suggested key
adaptat ion strategy for f isher ies and
aquaculture is to integrate with other farming
systems so as to assist farmers in coping with
drought conditions (WorldFish Centre, 2007).
WorldFish has established partnerships with the
African Union and NEPAD in a bid to bridge the
knowledge and technical gaps in the fisheries
and aquaculture sector. Other initiatives like the
FishBase provide a global most comprehensive
and authentic database. In addition, ReefBase
documents 10,000 reefs in 40 countries whilst
the BayFish model provides a set of decision
making support tools that assist in the
management of river basins. In dealing with
adaptation in the fisheries and aquaculture
sector, stakeholders should be aware of other
drivers outside climate change that include
socio-economic, credits, population growth,
regionalization, research and development,
technology and genera l management
(WorldFish Centre, 2010).
To build more resilient fishery systems in Africa,
Toulmin (2009) further suggests a number of
strategies. These include: reducing fish harvest
to ensure sustainable consumption; strengthen-
ing management rights over fish stocks and
water; and regeneration of coastal habitats. In
addition, rising sea levels could be utilized to
increase flood areas where fish can be farmed.
Aquaculture is already a growing industry in the
DRC, Nigeria, Madagascar, South Africa,
Tanzania and Uganda.
Mangrove conservation under Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation plus (REDD+) projects have also
been put forth as a viable mitigation measure in
fisheries and aquaculture (Badjeck et al., 2009).
T h r o u g h R E D D + p r o j e c t s , G H G s a r e
sequestrated.
Entomology is yet another growing agricultural
activity in Africa. Bee-keeping, for example,
generates income at both commercial and
subsistence scales. Given that climate change
could affect flowering cycles, one cannot rule
out the adverse impact this could bring to the
industry.
(e) Horticulture sector – In its 2007 report, the
World Bank (2007c: 13) provides a critical
overview of the horticulture sector, defining it “as
the production and marketing of highly
perishable products destined for fresh consump-
tion, with relatively high-value per unit”. From this
report, the average annual global production and
trade in horticultural goods that include fruits,
leguminous vegetables, cut flowers, nuts, and
spices grew steadily as world trade increased by
37 percent to an estimated USD 75 billion from
1993-2002. Asia was the leading exporter of fresh
fruit and vegetables with a total trade value of
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US$607 million. This was followed by Latin
America at US$408 million whilst SSA came in fifth
at US$89.6 million behind the USA with US$205
million and the EU with US$96 million.
Horticulture increased in many African countries,
with the bulk of produce coming from South
Africa and Kenya.
Climate change impacts directly on water
availability and temperature, and these influence
pest and disease distribution, flowering and
fruiting seasons in the horticulture industry
(South African Fruit and Wine Initiative, 2010).
Rising awareness of climate change amongst
consumers in export d est inat ions of
horticultural products in Europe and Australia
also negatively impact the sector as there is now
demand for low-carbon products. The air freight
has been debated as an aggravating element
that increases the carbon footprints of the
horticulture industry in Africa (MacGregor and
Groom, 2007). Activities such as land-use change,
agrochemical application and fossil fuel use
increase GHG emissions (GRET, 2006).
To address the negative impacts associated with
climate change in the fruit and wine industry of
South Africa, for example initiated the Confront-
ing Climate Change Initiative (CCCI) in 2009. The
CCCI aims to highlight and communicate climate
change issues, opportunities and threats to the
agricultural sector; to create an industry
standard for GHG auditing within the fruit and
wine sector, and to ensure a standardized
measurement, reporting and comparison of
individual farm emissions and emission
reduction opportunities; to enable informed and
authoritative comment, debate and negotiation
by stakeholders and policy-makers; and to guide
short and long term strategy formulation by
decision-makers across the industry (South
African Fruit and Wine Initiative, 2010). However,
through conservative energy technologies and
sustainable farming practices, GHG emissions
could be significantly reduced. Since the CCCI, a
carbon calculator for the fruit and wine industry
has been developed in order to mitigate GHGs
emissions and meet some of the market
demands from Europe (Garside et al. 2008). The
horticulture industry in Ethiopia has also been
following similar footsteps in order to address
carbon footprints in the industry (Ethiopian
Horticultural Development Agency, 2011). Since
the horticulture industry is very sensitive to
climatic changes, national, state and/or
provincial risk and vulnerability atlases as well as
the development of new agro-ecological maps
will assist greatly towards adaptation.
6.4 Biofuels, carbon farming
and food security
Tirado et al. (2010), identify pathways through
which climate change may impact food security.
Includedinthepathwaysareincreasedfrequency
andintensityofextremeclimaticevents;reduction
infreshwaterresources;sea-levelriseandflooding
of coastal lands that lead to salination and/or
contamination of water, agricultural lands;
impacts of temperature increase and water
scarcityonplantandanimalphysiology; influence
on plant and livestock diseases and pest species
and livestock diseases; destruction of livestock,
fisheries and aquaculture and impaired
sustainability.
In an effort to mitigate against climate change
caused by the use of fossil fuels, biofuels
production has come in as a good substitute.
Millionsofhectaresoflandacrosstheglobeandin
Africaarebeing'grabbed'forbiofuelsandcarbon
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farming by commercial entities. Apart from the
increasingthreattostaplefoodproduction,biofuels
consume a lot of water. Competing land uses
betweencropandlivestockproductionlinksdirectly
to biofuelsand carbonfarmingin Africa.Harveyand
Pilgrim (2011: S41) present the concept of “the
trilemma challenge.” This is a challenge emerging
from increased demand for food and energy that
leads to pressure on land conversion, which in turn
results in land clearance and climate change that
ultimately affect productivity and availabi-lity of
land.
NigeriaisworkingwithBraziltoproduce$150million
worth of cassava ethanol annually (Pisces, 2009).
China has requested two million hectares for
jatrophafarminginZambia(VonBraunandMeinzen-
Dick, 2009). In their study focusing on land grabs in
Africa, Cotula et al. (2009) looked at land deals in
Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique and
Tanzania. The countries were sampled based on
mediareportsthatpointedoutsignificantinterestsin
the countries. The authors reveal that in 2008 GEM
BiofuelsPlcconcludedadealonexclusiverightsfor50
years over 452,500 hectares of land in Southern
Madagascar for jatropha. Furthermore, United
Kingdom energy company CAMS Group, acquired a
lease over 45,000 hectares of land in Tanzania in the
same year to produce sweet sorghum for biofuels.
Details concerning land grabs in the five countries
cited earlier are shown in Figure 6.5. The issue of
water, land rights and livelihoods are central in
Tanzanian biofuels deals (Centre for Human Rights
andGlobalJustice,2010).Amigunetal. (2011)realise
thatthelinebetweenenergyandagricultureinsome
African countries is becoming blurred. In Ghana for
example, a number of foreign investors including
Norwegian, Brazilian, Dutch, Swedish, German and
Food,
1366384.00
Biofuels,
1106300.00
Mixed Output,
20000.00
FIGURE 6.5
Land grabbed by product 2004-2009 (ha)
Source: Adapted from Cotula et al. (2009: 51)
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Carbon farming is a new phenomenon that
emerged from the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto
Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997) of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change –
UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2009) requires that 37
industrialized countries reduce their GHG
emissions on average by 5.2% based on their 1990
emissions levels. Within the Kyoto Protocol
mechanisms is the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), a mechanism that allows any
one of the 37 industrialized countries given GHG
emissions reduction quotas to invest in a project
that reduces GHG emissions in Africa and
account for such through international
mechanisms. One such set of mechanisms can be
based on carbon farming in Africa through
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation plus (REDD+) (Nhamo, 2011).
While this is a good initiative, unfortunately land
is being grabbed for the purposes of REDD+. The
Congo Basin is on the limelight in this regard
(CBFF, 2008). Through REDD+, the forests
conserved serve the purpose to sink carbon to
which carbon credits are issued to the investing
country for either international trade on the
open market or off-setting quotas from the
Kyoto Protocol. REDD+ investment in Africa is
also consuming land, some of which could be
used for food production. However, the
magnitude of the land taken away according to
Cotula et al. (2009) is not yet clearly known.
6.5 Agricultural trade under climate
change
The history of agriculture in global climate
negotiations can be traced from the provisions
of the UNFCCC of 1992. Article 4 (1) (c) calls upon
Parties to promote and cooperate in the
development of technologies, practices and
processes that control, reduce or prevent GHGs
in all relevant sectors, among them agriculture
and forestry. Article 4(1) (e) further discusses the
need to prepare for adaptation to the impacts of
climate change including developing and
elaborating appropriate and integrated plans for
agriculture. Agriculture is also addressed under
Articles 2 and 10 as well as Annex A of the Kyoto
Protocol. Article 2 (1) (a) (iii) urges Parties to
promote sustainable forms of agriculture in
order to address climate change. Article 10(b) (i)
takes note of the need for Parties to formulate,
implement, publish and regularly update
national and appropriate regional programs that
address climate change mitigation as well as
measures that facilitate adequate adaptation
within the agricultural and forestry sectors.
Annex 'A' presents agriculture as a source of
GHG emissions from enteric fermentation
processes, manure management, r ice
cultivation, agricultural soils, prescribed burning
of savannas and field burning of agricultural
residues.
By 2080 climate change could result in a
reduction of Africa's projected agricultural GDP
by up to 8% (Fisher et al., 2011). This could also be
aggravated by the changing international trade
policy on agricultural commodities and carbon
footprints (how much carbon can be accounted
towards the production of a certain agricultural
commodity, especially from Africa).
Apart from the carbon generated from inputs
such as fertilizers and the use of electricity, fuels
and clearing of forests, airfreight has caused
problems as consumers and other 'green'
organizations battle to establish the carbon
footprint associated with such trade (Nhamo,
2009). This is an additional cost to African
farmers who are already faced with low donor
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assistance and downward the trend of world
market prices. The recent 'Food Miles' argument
of the EU presents a serious threat to agricultural
commodities trade with that region. A number of
organic certifiers in Europe withdrew organic
certification to air freighted products like
flowers and wines because of their high carbon
footprint. Leading airfreight exporting countries
including Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, US, Zambia
and to a significant extent, South Africa,
Cameroon, Gambia and Ghana (ICTSD and IPC,
2010) have had problems linked to the high
carbon footprint of produce.
Studies in Malawi indicate that agriculture
suffers the greatest trade losses, with declines in
GDP ranging from 1.1 to 21.5% during RP5 and
RP25 droughts respectively (Pauw et al., 2010).
The resultant food shortages also cause local
grain prices to rise while grain imports increase.
For example, maize imports in Malawi increased
by between 6 and 256% during RP5 and RP25
droughts respectively. Local currencies are also
affected as the demand for foreign currency for
import. A typical case has been the 15.5%
devaluation of the Kenya shilling since the start
of the drought in the horn of Africa (Bonyo, 2011).
Many aid agencies in Kenya were sourcing food
for both Kenya and Somalia and this has left the
shilling at 93.60 to the US dollar as of 8 August
2011.
At the core of climate change and trade is the
emergence of the green global economy. This is
an economy that emerged from the desire to
address both the global financial crisis of 2008
and the ongoing negative impacts of
environmental decay, particularly climate
change. According to UNEP (2010) the green
economy recognizes a number of key aspects:
the value of and need to invest in natural capital;
is central to poverty alleviation; creates jobs and
enhances social equity; substitutes renewable
energy and low-carbon technologies for fossil
fuels; promotes enhanced resource and energy
efficiency; delivers more sustainable urban living
and low-carbon mobility and grows faster than a
brown economy over time, while maintaining
and restoring natural capital (Nhamo and Van
Zyl, 2011). UNEP (2010) further stipulates
enabling conditions for the attainment of a
green (African) economy. The enablers include:
the establishment of a sound regulatory
framework; prioritization of government
investment and spending in areas that stimulate
the greening of economic sectors; limiting
government spending in areas that deplete
natural capital; use of taxes and market-based
instruments that enhance green investment and
innovation; investment in capacity building,
training and education; as well as strengthening
of international governance framework, among
them, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol that
deal directly with climate change.
Over the years, and especially since COP13 in Bali
2007, key themes with a bearing on climate
change and agriculture such as mitigation,
adaptation, technology, capacity building and
awareness as well as financing have emerged as
negotiation spaces. In 2010, the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations made a submission during COP16 in
Mexico entitled “Towards a Work Programme on
Agriculture” (FAO, 2010b). The FAO submission
made it clear that agriculture was one of the
sectors with significant GHG emissions. The FAO
indicated that adaptation of the agriculture
sector to the changing climate was not an option
but an imperative for survival. It also highlighted
that developed countries needed to set an
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example by setting ambitious levels of reducing
their GHG emissions. The FAO submission
highlighted that responding to climate change in
developing countries should be approached in a
manner that would not “jeopardize, or better
still enhance, nationally-owned development
processes that prioritize food security and
poverty reduction, wherein agriculture plays a
key role” (FAO, 2010b:1). From the FAO's
perspective, agriculture offered options that
provided multiple benefits for mitigation,
adaptation, development and food security. To
this end, incentives, policy approaches and
institutional mechanisms including adequate
financing, technology and capacity-building
support could make agriculture one of the
practical solutions to the interdependent
challenges of climate change and food security.
Overall, the FAO Work Program on Agriculture
recommended that mitigation become a key
element of the program, including options with
adaptation co-benefits. However, the FAO Work
Program on Agriculture was not adopted as one
of the decisions of COP16 in Cancun, Mexico
(Farming First, 2010).
In the lead to COP17 in Durban, South Africa,
African voices emerged demanding that climate
negotiations take full recognition of the role
agriculture plays in sustaining African
economies. The Food, Agriculture and Natural
Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN)
called for a climate deal that would promote
food security despite the realities of climate
change (Rootman, 2011). A 'No agriculture, no
deal' call was presented in order to emphasis the
importance of agriculture to Africa. The Call by
FANRPAN was supported and followed up by
another on 3 December 2011 from 16 leading
agriculture organizations following the
Agriculture and Rural Development Day (IISD,
2011). The organizations challenged negotiators
to include agriculture in the text of the climate
agreement from Durban. More than 500
participants to the Agriculture and Rural
Development Day addressed priorities for
meeting food security challenges while
supporting climate change mitigation and
adaptation. The participants also noted that the
Work Program on Agriculture has stalled in the
UNFCCC Ad hoc Working Group on Long Term
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) negotiating text.
A call was also made for collaboration between
b u s i n e s s , g o v e r n m e n t , r e s e a r c h , a n d
development organisations. Among key
organizations that endorsed the call and
forwarded a letter to the UNFCCC were: FAO,
World Food Program (WFP), International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World
Bank, Southern African Confederation of
Agricultural Unions (SACAU), International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Global Forum
on Agricultural Research (GFAR), Food,
Agriculture and Natural Resource Policy Analysis
Network (FANRPAN), Wor ld Farmers '
Organization (WFO), Farming First and Danish
Agriculture and Food Council.
6.6 Conclusion
It is important to consider climate change and
environmental degradation impacts, as well as
adaptation and mitigation phenomena in
relation to a number of areas that include water,
crop, livestock, horticulture and fisheries
sectors. The contemporary discourse on biofuels
and carbon farming need to be revisited in the
context of Africa with an emphasis on land grabs
and switch by subsistence and commercial
farmers to these new ventures. Although both
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positive and negative impacts of climate change
are evident on the continent, the net effect is
negative. Climate change was also found to
accelerate environmental degradation. Looking
into the future, policies have to address concerns
from the global, to the continental, national,
municipal as well as household and/or farm
spatial levels. The household and/or farm spatial
scale are critical if Africa is to win the future
against climate change and environmental
degradation. Agriculture has finally been placed
on global climate change negotiations. Hence
the operationalization of mechanisms upon
which aspects pertaining to mitigation,
especially the measurement, reporting and
verification (MRV) of GHG emissions in the sector
as well as adaptation financing will become
clearer leading to and during the conclusion of
COP18 in Qatar. However, Africa needs to
continue calling for a deal that realizes the
central role played by agriculture in the
economy, particularly food security and jobs
creation. Capacity needs to be enhanced in the
new areas like climate smart agriculture, MRV
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7.0 Introduction
Agriculture has the potential to reduce poverty, enhance development and transform livelihoods.
However, a number of important questions need to be considered: Why has agricultural transforma-
tion not been consistently realized across Africa? What are the roles of the state, the private sector,
and civil society in promoting agriculture and food security? How can agricultural policy making
implementation be enhanced and transformed? How can Africa make finance, infrastructure, markets
and technology more effective for agricultural transformation? What can good leadership contribute
toward agriculture-for-development? And how does capacity development contribute in the process
of agricultural transformation and enhancing food security?
Other important questions relate to the variety of outcomes on the contribution of the sector to
development results. Agriculture has been used effectively for sustainable development and food
security by some countries, yet not so well by others, despite its unique abilities to reduce poverty.
Raising productivity to make agriculture better perform as an instrument for development will be
difﬁcult, particularly in some of the poorest countries where it is needed most. Unpredictable price
spikes undermine the viability of many production and food systems at current levels of productivity.
With globalization and continuing strong demographic pressures, enhancing land productivity—and
sustainable land management—will become fundamental. Rising energy prices also affect the future
of agricultural intensiﬁcation based on petroleum derivatives such as nitrogen fertilizer.
Another area where questions arise is the delivery of technological innovations. The speed and depth
of innovation may be delayed by underinvestment in research and development (R&D) and lack of
safeguards to guide the adoption of new techniques. Climate change and growing water scarcity will
require more research and innovation on the efﬁcient use of water and resilient farming systems.
Climate change will severely impact some of the poorest African countries where water management
is least developed and science least funded to generate new adaptive technologies and capacities.
Future agricultural growth therefore has to be productive and environmentally friendly, involve
smallholders, especially women, and create jobs.
How holistic the sector has been viewed also varies across country contexts. Many countries face
challenges in developing specific agricultural products, raising productivity and linking to value
chains, particularly supermarkets and high-value export markets. Improved policies, institutions, and
223
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
224
7.1 Taking leadership, politics and
policy variations in country
contexts seriously
As was argued in Chapters 1 and 4, setting the
'right' policies for agricultural transformation
requires some savvy leadership and political
guidance – at the core of which will be the need
for participation by the local populace in the
policy processes. That makes strengthening
governance a prerequisite not only for policy
making, but also for implementing the agricul-
tural agenda effectively and using public
resources efﬁciently. The leadership must
identify combinations of approaches that are
both politically feasible and ﬁt country condi-
tions (World Bank, 2007a:251). Equally, support-
ing leaders is crucial to creating the conditions
for effective democracy – characterized by
participation, transparency, accountability and
social inclusion. As Blair (2010:9) notes, it is not:
“a question of doing this instead of strengthen-
ing transparency and accountability. The two
must go hand in hand, to create a positive cycle
where elected leaders are able to deliver for their
citizens, in turn nurturing a politics that is about
issues and competence not just ethnicity or
patronage, and which oﬀers a model to inspire
future generations of leaders. But to get there
we need a proper understanding of the realities
of leadership.”
As submitted in preceding chapters, the decades
of the 1980s and 1990s in Africa were character-
ized by reforms aimed at securing macroeco-
nomic stability. The importance of policy in
delivering these noble objectives has been widely
acknowledged, but how that policy should be
developed is a matter of contention. Chapter 4,
for example, contends that one of the main
constraints on economic policy for poverty
reduction is a mindset that African countries can
do very little, or the extreme version, that any
proactive state intervention to reduce poverty
will worsen the situation. However, given the
political will, alternatives can be worked out as
evidenced by the development of CAADP, which
has mobilized action at the national, sub-regional
and regional levels alike. Local agencies should
also play a greater role in both agricultural
project designs and resource mobilization. There
are, of course, other constraints such as weak
institutional capacity, unclear mandates of the
various agencies and Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) that oversee poverty
reduction strategies. Additional challenges are
the centralization and partisanship of the policy
making process. According to Kararach
(2011:132), “[W]idening the policy dialogue
process to include civil society will go a long way
in dealing with the various policy constraints. In
any case, policy failures would be accommo-
dated by society if it had shared in the process in
the first place.”
investments in agriculture cannot reduce poverty by themselves. Comprehensive multi-sectoral
strategies are required to coordinate the contributions of agriculture with investments in other
sectors, raising complex issues of investment prioritization, political tradeoffs in budgetary pro-
cesses, and holistic coordination of implementation. The political economy of agricultural transforma-
tion and food security will continue to be difficult and yet it has to be dealt with through pragmatic
capacity development initiatives.
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Another actor that has not featured prominently
in the discourse on agricultural transformation
and food security in Africa, is the private sector.
Although the discourse on the reforms in the
past decades has elevated the role of the market
– accordingly, the private sector as the only
acceptable development mechanism – this
seems to sit in isolation of what other parties can
contribute. The debate can be shifted in that the
motives of private sector agencies, while profit
driven, should be harnessed through proactive
civil politics to encapsulate the achievement of
socio-economic justice. Civil society can serve as
facilitator of public-private partnerships giving
value-addition of full social inclusion through
greater social investments (Tendler, 1982). In
particular, organized farmers and other repre-
sentative organizations around smallholders can
provide effective value in the interface between
the state and the private sector.
The lack of transparency and accountability in
many African countries has continued to
undermine the development of broad policies –
including those for agriculture and food security.
Many policy decisions continue to be presented
technocratically and without consulting the local
population – thus limiting the benefits of any
efforts at decentralization. This failure is in part a
result of the democratic deficit in many Least
Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa being no
exception. Oligarchies have emerged in many of
the so-called reform countries and dominated
the socio-economic discourse over the last two
decades or so. Many African countries have gone
through elections but it is unclear whether or not
they have emerged with their democratic
credentials, in terms of the efforts to reduce
poverty and hunger.
The pressure for a country to undertake reform
is, in part, an outcome of both domestic and
international socio-economic dynamics. The
internal dynamics are the result of both political
and apolitical forces. For example, drought has
been known to adversely affect African coun-
tries, as they depend on rain-fed agriculture. The
resultant poor harvest may put pressure on
prices and the balance of payments. The point
here is that a clearly apolitical factor does have
obvious political and policy implications.
Therefore, framing of agricultural policy has to
be understood in the wider context of national
priority and geopolitics. The tendency in many
African countries has been that national
priorities are conceived within a relatively
narrow framework characterized by nepotism
and corruption. The need to broaden the policy
agenda reflects the broader forces for democra-
tization and social inclusion. Any changes that
challenge the status quo are likely to be met with
resistance from those with a stake in it. Institu-
tions that are allegedly free of political control,
such as independent central banks, revenue
authorities, etc., must realize that the policy
recommendations they make will directly
inf luence the socio-pol i t ica l landscape
(Kararach, 2011). The case should be made that
the development of agricultural policy is not an
end in itself, but is a service the state renders to
its citizens (Bond, 2004).
This Report contends that how policies work in
organizations will depend on a host of factors,
from organizational culture to the nature of
existing bureaucratic arrangements. Under-
standing policies and capacity development in
context is thus critical as every development
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organization is a complex agent, not just an actor
whose views and positions can be personiﬁed
and treated as singular. Indeed, published
policies of development agencies may be
products of successful discourse coalitions, but
may neither represent nor even resonate with
the perspectives of those charged with their
implementation (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). This
is why leadership becomes the crucial driver
beyond pronouncements of given policies
including those related to agriculture and food
security. There is a need to decipher and
understand the local context in countries by
conducting country capacity needs assessment.
7.2 Globalization, competition and
food markets
While the approaches to addressing food
insecurity currently in use are laudable, they
place emphasis on a global approach to attaining
food security and also put large multinational
corporations in charge of the food chain. To
Schanbacher (2010), the current model for
dealing with world hunger and food insecurity
advanced by the United Nations, World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade
Organization (WTO) and other international
organizations are too dependent and focused on
trade, as well as over-reliant on international
agribusiness. This approach also generally
n e g a t i v e l y i m p a c t s t h e r i g h t t o s e l f -
determination and ability of local people to be
autonomous in the food chain. Windfuhr and
Jonsén (2005: 9) claim that people facing hunger
and malnutrition are, to a large extent,
smallholders, landless workers, pastoralists or
fisher folk, often situated in marginal and
vulnerable ecological environments. These
people are often neglected by both national and
international policies. Without proper support
they cannot compete with increasingly subsi-
dized industrialized agriculture. For many of
them, market liberalization has resulted in
damaging and often unfair competition with
farmers or commercial entities that have
'acquired' comparative advantages through
decades of direct and indirect subsidies.
According to Windfuhr and Jonsén (2005), the
situation often results in smallholders being
forced off their land and moving to even more
marginal areas or migrating to the shantytowns
around cities.
Given that current mainstream answers to the
problems causing malnutrition are failing, and
adherence to a set of central ideas, based around
an ever-greater concentration on trade-based
food security is inadequate to tackle the
problems, additional analysis and a search for
new, innovative solutions are needed (Windfuhr
and Jonsén, 2005). However, due to the fact that
the role of international trade and international
agribusinesses cannot be completely ignored,
the search for an alternative gets embodied in
the idea of food sovereignty. Also, as a result of
concerns with the neo-liberal approach to
promoting food security that emphasized
market deregulation and the rolling back of the
state, food sovereignty is seen as a food
enhancing paradigm and an alternative to the
neo-liberal model. Food sovereignty principles
call for the re-organization of food trade, social
peace, as well as the protection of natural
resources. It also requires placing priority on
food production for domestic and local markets,
based on peasant and family farmer diversified
and agro-ecological production systems(SWAC,
2006). It further warrants fair prices to farmers.
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This means power to protect internal markets
from low-priced dumped imports; access to land,
water, forests, fishing areas and other produc-
tive resources through genuine redistribution.
Likewise, it places emphasis on the recognition
and promotion of women's role in food produc-
tion and equitable access and control over
productive resources. In addition, food sover-
eignty entails public investment in support of the
productive activities of families and communities
that are geared towards empowerment, local
control and production of food for the people
and local markets (SWAC, 2006).
Another important aspect and principle of food
sovereignty centers on the rights to territory for
indigenous peoples and their perspective that
nature is a living being which is essential to the
identity and culture of their communities.
Currently, as part of the world trading system,
there is the WTO trade-related aspect of
intellectual property rights (TRIPs). The TRIPs
agreement seeks to ensure that the rules and
laws relating to the protection of intellectual
property are consistent among WTO member
countries, and in the process facilitate trade. It
also involves the equal application by all
members of minimum standards of protection in
relation to all categories of intellectual property.
Furthermore, the TRIPS agreement developed
minimum standards of protection in the areas of
copyright, trademarks, geographical indicators,
industrial designs, patents, and undisclosed
information (Edelman, 2003:204; Arthur, 2004).
However, there are a number of concerns with
the TRIPs that have negative implications for
food sovereignty in Africa. First, the agreement
allows individuals and multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) to profess exclusive rights over life
forms, genes, microorganisms and the micro-
processes by which they perform their functions,
as well as ignores the knowledge of indigenous
people, and ultimately makes it easier for their
knowledge to be appropriated. Biodiversity
resources that are indigenous to African
communities as well as other parts of the
developing world are patented by MNCs as their
own discoveries. Since intellectual property
protection was frequently non-existent in
developing countries, MNCs are going to
developing countries and engaging in 'biopiracy'
by patenting products, as well as claiming
monopoly rights over traditional knowledge and
resources, which have been in existence since
time immemorial (Arthur, 2004). For example,
companies such as W. R. Grace, a US-based
agriculture company, that self describes itself as
a 'premier specialty chemicals and materials
company', acquired US patents for active
ingredients in the seeds of the neem tree, which
many local communities in both Africa and South
Asia had utilized since ancient times as an
insecticide, toothpaste substitute, and medicine
(Edelman, 2003:204). Thus, the TRIPS agree-
ment does not take into consideration the
cultural basis of knowledge, whereby all of
society shares research findings (Arthur, 2004).
There is therefore the need to address the issue
of the TRIPs agreement, which allows MNCs to
patent biological materials and life-forms found
in Africa, and which undermine the rights of
African farmers over seeds and other forms of
indigenous knowledge (Arthur, 2004). As food
sovereignty advocates contend, the current
situation in the world trading system where
intellectual property rights over living resources
including seeds, plants and animals is the norm
and contributes to de facto biological monopo-
lies and where the seed or breed is rendered
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sterile, needs to be reexamined and possibly
banned if African countries are to attain food
sovereignty. African countries should push the
WTO to recognize the fact that they own the
rights to their biological resources, knowledge
and techniques, so there is no reason why the
collective nature of these should be patented
(Arthur, 2004). A food sovereignty framework
will allow local people to have equitable access
to resources and the rights to use them rather
than have them patented by MNCs. Models that
seek to patent such indigenous knowledge for
the benefit of the local people who have tacitly
embedded it in their practices should also be
explored.
Aside from that, it is unfortunate that in an era
where the West and many international institu-
tions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO all
advocate neoliberalism and the Washington-
consensus model to socio-economic develop-
ment, they have not put into practice what they
call for, especially as it pertains to the agricultural
sector. Indeed, western countries have persis-
tently adopted protectionist policies and also
subsidized their agricultural sector, while the
WTO has failed to ensure the enforcement of the
liberal trade policies and obligations that it has
agreed to with member states (Lee and Smith,
2008:259). The WTO has been unable to compel
the USA and the EU to stop the subsidization of
their domestic industry, which reinforces an
unequal playing field between African countries
and the West (Lee and Smith, 2008:269).
Consequently, despite the pronouncements of
Western governments to engage in free trade
and reduce agricultural subsidies, this has not
been the case. Rather, export subsidy levels have
either remained the same, or in certain instances
actually increased, and this has certainly affected
the economic development efforts of African
countries. Export subsidies by Western govern-
ments such as the USA and EU generate food
surpluses that benefit big farmers and busi-
nesses in their countries but distort the world
market and also make farming and agricultural
activities in developing countries expensive and
uncompetitive. The result is the dumping of
subsidized agricultural products from the West
on the markets of African countries, invariably
contributing to the impoverishment of farmers
in Africa (Arthur, 2004). For example, African
countries became victims of 'dumping,' when
European C-grade beef entered the South
African market, thereby undermining Namibian
beef exports to South Africa (Cheru, 2002: 27).
It is therefore important that western govern-
ments remove provisions of current national
policies that subsidize their agricultural sector
and which in turn negatively impact food
sovereignty in Africa and other parts of the
developing world. It is hypocritical for the West
to call for free trade, and then provide huge
export subsidies to their farmers (Arthur, 2004).
Until there is a fair and transparent world trading
system and western governments change their
current agricultural policy approaches, there is
no reason why African countries should not
undertake reforms in the agricultural sector that
entail a central and dominant role for the state,
and contributes to food sovereignty. For
example, the comprehensive agricultural input
subsidy program introduced by the government
of Malawi from 2005/6 to 2008/9 has achieved
substantial benefits and successes. Through the
provision of vouchers to farmers to receive
fertilizers for tobacco and maize production, as
well as improved maize seeds, wider economic
growth, poverty reduction, higher real wages,
and food availability and security were attained
(Dorward et al., 2011). Similarly, in Ghana, the
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intervention by the government either in or
starting in 2001 to raise productivity in the cocoa
sector through the adoption of hybrid cocoa
varieties, increase in the use of fertilizer, better
disease and pest control, as well as favorable
price regimes and improvement in marketing, all
combined to increase productivity by 30%,
reduce poverty, and improve the living condi-
tions of cocoa farmers and the sector as a whole
(Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011). Such policies
together with the increase in agriculture
extension services to food farmers helped to
advance and promote food security and food
sovereignty in Ghana, and resulted in the World
Food Prize Foundation awarding Ghana's former
President J. A. Kufour, together with Luiz da
Silva, former president of Brazil, the 2011 World
Food Prize.
7.3 Developing coherent frame-
works embedded in national
policies
From the discussions above, African countries
need to domesticate CAADP and embed policies
in national contexts and realities. Agricultural
transformation and food sovereignty need
comprehensive agrarian reforms that uphold
individual and community rights of access to, and
control over, territories. According to La Via
Campesina, one of the principles to achieve food
sovereignty is the need for a genuine agrarian
reform, which gives landless and farming people
– especially women – ownership and control of
the land they work and the return of territories to
indigenous peoples. Since land belongs to those
who work it, the right to land must be free of
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion,
race, social class or ideology (Windfuhr and
Jonsén, 2005: 17). Equitable access to and
control of land, labor and agrarian resources, and
state support particularly to small producers, are
critical to reversing the social costs of human
deprivation arising from food insecurity, and to
achieving food sovereignty (Moyo, 2010). It is
widely accepted that improved access to land is
good for the poor, particularly in terms of food
security. This is because not only does income
increase with land access, but also it leads to the
relaxation of credit constraints, which allows
households to undertake profitable investments
(Valente, 2009:1541). It further increases wages
and the availability of basic food for consump-
tion by the majority of the working people
(Moyo, 2010). In the unique case of Southern
Africa (Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe)
for example, land reforms were adopted with
the primary objective of redistributing land from
white settlers to black people who were
dispossessed of valuable land during the colonial
and apartheid period (Malope and Batisani,
2008:383). Thus, the essence of agrarian reforms
is to ensure that governments in Africa imple-
ment effective public policies that guarantee
community (those who derive their livelihood)
control over all natural resources. It also
contributes to strong accountability mecha-
nisms that help deal with the concerns associ-
ated with the violations of these rights.
It is important to note that land and agrarian
reforms in many Latin American and African
countries, are often disparaged in the Western
media as only contributing to political opportun-
ism, cronyism, violence and deadly attacks, and a
destruction of food production and socioeco-
nomic activities. Critics of such agrarian reform
argue that not only is the so-called modern neo-
liberal approach essential for food security, but
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also large-scale agriculture promotes develop-
ment and has a positive trickle-down effect on
the poor. For example, Valente (2009) concludes
from two national surveys in South Africa that on
average, land grant recipients in South Africa
were more food insecure than comparable non-
participants. Similarly, in Botswana, land reform
policies are alleged to have harmed many poor
households living in communal areas. Also, poor
people were excluded from the benefits of land
reforms by constraints such as high financial and
development costs and the lack of human capital
(Malope and Batisani, 2008). It is these chal-
lenges, constraints and criticisms that have
made land reforms, as part of agrarian reforms,
difficult to implement in many African countries.
It also helps explain the call by international
institutions like the IMF and World Bank for a
neoliberal approach to land reform, which takes
the form of secure property rights and 'willing-
buyer-willing-seller' models of reform.
Despite the criticisms of the state-led agrarian
reforms in Africa, under the neoliberal approach
of agrarian reforms, many indigenous farmers
and peasants are unable to have adequate
access to land. Aside from that, the neo-liberal
approach leads to commercialization of land,
lack of access to land by the poor, increased debt
for poor rural farmers, and the concentration of
land in the hands of the urban elites, most of who
are absentee farmers. It is in this regard that rural
actors have mobilized in Southern Africa and
Latin America to demand changes in their
relationship to property and land (Wolford,
2007:557). Indeed, Scoones (2008) has called
into question the myths about land and agrarian
reforms in Zimbabwe. The study shows that
contrary to western media depictions and
stereotypes of abject poverty, land and agrarian
reforms in Zimbabwe were not a total failure and
did not overall negatively impact food security.
Besides finding that 'ordinary' people were the
main beneficiaries of land reforms as opposed to
political cronies, many rural farmers also
invested heavily on their resettled lands (Winter,
2010). Such findings are similar to ones in the
Philippines and other Asian and Latin American
countries that showed that agrarian land
reforms contribute positively to overall socio-
economic development, increase in household
incomes, and reduction in poverty. It is in this
regard that land reforms as part of food sover-
eignty should take the form of providing
complementary resources such as credit,
irrigation, technical assistance and transport,
processing and marketing facilities that are
required for successful peasant enterprises
(Edelman, 2003: 207).
7.4 Listening to farmers –
participation, governance and
social inclusion
Equally, attaining agricultural transformation
and food sovereignty will be dependent on the
extent to which African countries are willing to
meeting their own needs through food self-
sufficiency rather than relying on the developed
world. This will involve improvements in the local
food systems, as well as infrastructure like roads
and other transportation systems (Cheru, 2002).
Underlying all the various arguments is the fact
that food sovereignty can only be attained when
there is sustainable economic growth in Africa.
This in turn can be realized under circumstances
when there is an enabling environment, good
governance structure and of course the
necessary capacity development initiatives. As
Tweeten (1999) asserts, although not essential,
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democracy is a positive force for food sover-
eignty and security to the extent that it creates
an orderly succession of leadership useful for
business planning. A democratic system can
expose corruption and provide checks and
balances, as well as provide some empowerment
through voting by the poor to receive human
resource investments in health, education, and
food transfers from governments for broad-
based developments. Thus, the promotion of
good governance, reforms as well as direct
democracy in the agricultural sector will not only
help in stemming the tide of food insecurity, but
also help create enabling environment for food
sovereignty and a dynamic agricultural sector
that can contribute to further socioeconomic
development. More importantly, a food
sovereignty framework that adopts the direct
democracy model will help promote the greater
involvement and participation of the local
population in the formulation and implementa-
tion of policies, as well as research agenda for the
food and agricultural sector.
Locally generated and holistic approaches to
agriculture that concurrently address produc-
tion, profitability, economic development,
natural resource conservation and human well-
being are more effective than strategies that
address these issues in isolation (IAASTD,
2009a). Local and traditional knowledge related
to agriculture exemplifies such an approach – it
can encompass production planning, cultivation,
harvest practices and post-harvest handling, to
storage and food processing methods. Through
informal learning and adaptation, small-scale
producers in the tropics have developed a wide
range of farming practices that are compatible
with their ecological niches. The bio-diverse
character of many farming practices facilitates
environmental sustainability by provisioning
diverse ecological services (Di Falco and Chavas,
2006). These practices have helped to ensure the
conservation of the diverse genetic pool of
landraces needed for modern plant breeding
(Brush, 2000). Nonetheless, professional
specialization of marginalized local and tradi-
tional knowledge, assumes that farmers are
passive actors whose own knowledge needed to
be improved or replaced. The role of women
farmers in local and traditional knowledge
systems has been even less valued. However, as
mult i -stakeholder approaches to agro-
ecosystem management started to become
more common during the 1990s and to value
chain development since 2000, and as policy-
making started to favor evidence-based
procedures, place-based user knowledge began
to regain value (IAASTD, 2009a).
Increasingly, future breakthroughs in Africa will
need to include improved resource management
practices, a complex and site-specific undertak-
ing. Given the heterogeneity within African
agriculture, and the fact that 90% of sub-Saharan
African farmers currently practice diversified
agricultural production systems (IAC, 2004),
these efforts will require participatory, genuinely
collaborative research involving scientists and
local farmers and groups in order to identify
practices suitable for specific conditions and
systems. This puts local people's knowledge,
culture and perspectives at the center of
research and development efforts. Traditional
knowledge can be effective and reliable (Warren
et al., 1991; Reij et al., 1996) with respect to: (1)
knowledge about the agro-ecosystem and
seasonality in which the farmers operate; (2)
information about what local people need, want
and have capacity for in terms of resources and
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access to markets; (3) locally adapted technical
knowledge and practices; and (4) a systems view
based on having to live by the results. Multi-
stakeholder approaches that stimulate sharing
knowledge and insights from diverse actors can
also be an effective and efficient way to address
issues in complex systems (IAASTD, 2009b),
thereby overcoming any weaknesses or gaps in
local knowledge.
Participatory research provides opportunities
for local and traditional knowledge to interact
a n d c o - e v o l v e w i t h f o r m a l k n o w l e d g e
(Haverkort et al., 2002) so that recommended
practices emanating from new research results
will fit with small-scale farmers' agro-ecosystems
and be adopted and sustained (Neuensch-
wander, 1993). Indeed, a 'basket' of agricultural
technology and management practices can
provide farmers with flexibility in choosing
among options that best match the site-specific
diversity of their fields (soil types, water
availability and variability) and socioeconomic
circumstances (including access to credit and
insurance). These technologies may be adapted
from traditional and local practices, or devel-
oped through collaborative efforts involving
farmers and scientists, that are resilient to the
high weather variability, resource availability and
market fluctuations. This contrasts with the
typical approach in which only a small number of
'preferred' technologies are made available
through extension services (IAASTD, 2009a).
Of course, combining various forms of exoge-
nous scientific knowledge with highly diverse
forms of local and traditional knowledge does
present some challenges. Different actor groups
represent different forms of knowledge – local,
indigenous or experiential and tacit (farmers,
traders, craftsmen, etc.) or external, researched
and scientific (researchers, civil servants,
extension workers, service providers, etc.), each
with their own pre-existing knowledge system
(IAASTD, 2009b). Nonetheless, the paradigm of
involving farmers in research is based on strong
evidence that enhancing farmers' technical skills
and research capabilities and involving them as
decision makers in the technology development
process results in innovations that are more
responsive to their priorities, needs and
constraints (Pretty and Hine, 2001).
Some illustrative examples of collaborative R&D
are instructive. Local or informal seed systems
are increasingly being used to deliver new
varieties to farmers (IAASTD, 2009b). Participa-
tory plant breeding (PPB) and farmer participa-
tory research processes decentralized control
over the research agenda, all permit a broader
set of stakeholders to become involved in
research, thereby also addressing the different
needs of men and women for technical innova-
tion (IAASTD, 2009a). Improved local and
traditional knowledge is essential for manage-
ment of diseases and pests, which affect crops
and livestock (IAASTD, 2009a). The develop-
ment and adoption of a varied range of technolo-
gies for water harvesting and conservation in
East Africa has been attributed in part to the
adoption of community-based participatory
approaches in technology research and exten-
sion (Lundgren, 1993 in Mazur, 2011a). The
farmer field school (FFS) approach fosters
'interactive learning' (IAASTD, 2009a). In east
and southern Africa, FFS have contributed to
establishing producer and consumer markets for
vitamin A enriched orange-fleshed sweet
potatoes (Ochieng, 2007). Shortcomings of FFS,
however, include relatively high investment
costs to establish, sustain and replicate, and
being less inclusive of poorer farmers (Davis,
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2006).
However, farmer- led and part ic ipatory
approaches have some limitations. To address
the relative neglect of value chain development
compared to food security appropriate technol-
ogies would need to be adopted. Involving
private sector market actors will increase the
relevance and further adoption of such technolo-
gies (Heemskerk et al., 2003). The focus on
applied and adaptive research and technology
transfer rather than generation of scientific data
probably cannot be wholly overcome, given the
nature of scientists' rewards system which
values analysis of meso and macro level data
(Probst et al., 2003 cited in Mazur, 2011a).
However, it may be possible to generate results
that are satisfactory within the context of a
particular production system. Further, research-
ers working with development practitioners can
understand how participatory approaches can
be adapted and used with large numbers of
farmers to achieve wider impact, while still
retaining the expected human and social capital
benefits of participation (IAASTD, 2009a).
A current example that exemplifies these
principles is the collaborative research and
development project on enhancing nutritional
value and marketability of beans through
research and strengthening key value-chain
stakeholders in Uganda and Rwanda (Mazur et
al., 2011). The R&D team (farmers groups, non-
governmental organization extension staff,
national agricultural organization researchers,
university researchers, and private business
sector) is improving harvested bean quality and
yields, enhancing the nutritional value and
appeal of beans through appropriate handling
and processing practices and technologies, and
addressing constraints to increased market
access and consumption. This project (2008-
2012) is embedded within a broader, long-term
sustainable rural livelihoods program involving
1,200 small scale farm households in eastern
Uganda that supports community-based training
and outreach for improving agricultural produc-
tivity, nutrition, and incomes (Mazur, 2011b;
Sseguya et al., 2009; Butler and Mazur, 2007). It
also addresses key elements of natural resource
management (Mazur and Stakhanov, 2008).
Creating space for local experimentation and
innovation is a critical means of generating large-
scale impacts from incremental changes. Such
successes do emerge from localized experi-
ments that allow participants to learn from their
mistakes, adapt to changes in the landscape,
evolve as the playing field becomes more
complex, and pursue incremental approaches to
scaling up. By vesting communities with a stake
in ownership of the development process,
grassroots participation contributes much to the
long-term sustainability of the desired change.
“Involving communities and smaller groups in
local consultations, policy deliberations,
scientific research, and experimentation is all
part of building from the bottom-up to achieve
success. Similarly, involving local practices,
customs, and knowledge in an intervention are
the seeds of big successes” (Spielman and
Pandya-Lorch, 2009:13). Scaling up also requires
strong links to non-governmental and grassroots
organizations with the capacity to help farmers
and communities introduce and manage
improved practices (Haggblade et al., 2010b).
Evolving forms of protection of rights over local
and traditional knowledge include material
transfer agreements that involve providing
material (resources or information) in exchange
for monetary or non-monetary benefits.
Examples of fair and equitable benefit sharing
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between users and custodians of traditional
knowledge can be found in several countries
(IAASTD, 2009a). In West Africa, farmers
developed varieties of cowpea more resistant to
bruchid beetles in storage. The gene responsible
for this resistance was later identified, isolated
and patented by the UK's Agricultural Genetics
Company. An instructive example of benefit
sharing was provided by LUBILOSA, an interna-
tional locust control endeavor that resulted in a
commercialized mycoinsecticide whose benefits
are shared with national institutions (IAASTD,
2009a).
7.5 Galvanizing action and
leadership for agricultural
transformation and food
security in Africa – reflections on
the various capacity issues
Africa's food production per capita is declining
partly due to population pressures and condi-
tions that have undermined significant transfor-
mation of the agricultural sector in noteworthy
ways to enhance food security. Rapid population
growth rates combined with rising per capita
income in some countries has caused relatively
rapid growth in food consumption and thus
pushing up imports of basic food staples.
There are a number of considerations that will
provide the most practical and economical
approach to achieving agricultural transforma-
tion and food security. It is important to enhance
the efficiency of the existing agricultural
economy through capacity development
initiatives on a broad front. Africa needs to
broaden the range of alternative production
possibilities available to farm operators and
strengthen their capacity to make and execute
decisions on the basis of more adequate
knowledge of agricultural technology. Infra-
structure, R&D and training programs are some
of the supportive initiatives required. Limited
resources demand identifying priority programs
and also makes it desirable to identify those
geographical regions within a country that have
high potential for large increases in production.
Equally, capacity to supply the food to expanding
urban centers or a capacity for low-cost produc-
tion of export crops with good market prospects
are particularly pertinent considerations now
and likely to be in future. Strong and democratic
local government institutions, increasing
literacy, and instituting rural social change by
community development or other techniques
are required for these huge tasks.
This Report recognizes that there are severe
limitations on the capacity of an underdeveloped
African country to do everything at once. That
said, it can be argued that the following number
of strategic galvanized actions and leadership
steps are required to achieve agricultural
transformation and food security in Africa:
(a) Markets, public investment and
governance
There are two fundamental prerequisites for
sustained agricultural growth among small-
holder farmers: (1) sustained increases in
agricultural productivity as a result of improved
technology (broadly defined), and (2) favorable
incentives for farmers and agribusinesses in the
form of financially attractive market outlets
(Haggblade, 2010). Yet, as shown in the data
collected and analyzed for the ACIR, few
countries have seen the productivity increases
needed to guarantee food security. Further-
more, Africa's small-scale farmers growing
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staple foods now have less access to markets
and credit, pay higher prices for modern inputs,
and are more fully exposed to the vagaries of
market prices and production risks compared to
two decades ago. Inadequate processing and
storage infrastructure close to the main
producing areas inhibits value addition, contrib-
uting to low farm-gate prices for outputs. Taken
together, these factors constitute real disincen-
tives for resource-poor farmers to shift from
subsistence to market-oriented agriculture and
have resulted in a significant reduction in the
adoption of modern crop varieties and fertilizers
(IAASTD, 2009a). Currently, financing of African
farm inputs depends largely on cash crop credit
schemes and associated spillovers, as well as on
the non-farm earnings of farm households and
remittances. Trade liberalization may further
penalize African farmers. “Many models of Doha
Round trade liberalization suggest that African
farmers may lose out as access to protected
European agricultural markets opens up to
competition from Brazil, India, Indonesia, and
Thailand, particularly under partial liberalization
scenarios” (Haggblade et al., 2010b).
Compelling roles for government investment in
1
public goods (agricultural research, rural
education, rural road networks, communica-
tions, transportation facilities, control of
contagious livestock diseases, extension
systems, health systems, and market infrastruc-
ture) can be easily identified as contributing to
increased production and incomes. Investments
in roads, for example, reduce marketing costs,
lower input prices, and raise output prices
received by farmers, thus raising their incomes.
Since the mid-1980s (era of economic structural
adjustment programs), spending on transport
and communication has fallen significantly
(IAASTD, 2009b). Africa today has only a fraction
of the infrastructure of Asia in the 1950s: only 12%
of roads in sub-Saharan Africa are paved
compared to 57% in South Asia; the road density
(km of road/surface area) is 0.13 in sub-Saharan
2
Africa compared to 0.85 in South Asia; access to
electricity is 26% versus 52% (Livingston et al.,
2011). The use of mechanization is also substan-
tially lower than in other regions. In sub-Saharan
Africa only 15 tractors are in use per 100 km , in
2
contrast to 170 in East Asia and South Asia, and
100 in Latin American/Caribbean (Livingston et
al., 2011:13). African countries, on average,
currently devote 5-7% of their public expendi-
tures to agriculture, compared to 8-10% percent
in Asia (Livingston et al., 2011:7). Despite its value
to society, agriculture does not attract private
sector investment because of little immediate
opportunity for profit (Spielman and Pandya-
Lorch, 2009). Unfortunately, many African
governments have yet to successfully manage
the role of the public sector in providing (or at
least financing) key public goods, and to
implement policies, laws, and regulations that
create an enabling economic and institutional
environment in which private and civil society
agents, including farmers, can flourish
(Haggblade et al., 2010b). Critics highlight
Africa's weak state institutions, poor gover-
nance, bad policies, and regional conflicts that
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compromise the efficiency of public interven-
tions in agriculture as well as in other sectors
(Collier, 2007). Years of under-funding and
relative neglect have greatly weakened the
ability of public extension and research organiza-
tions to deliver demand-driven, client focused
services (OECD, 2006).
Much of the failure of agriculture to achieve its
potential is institutional. Public institutions need
to be strengthened in their capacity to develop
an appropriate blend of policies, regulatory
frameworks and investments to re-launch the
agricultural sector. At the same time, the role of
private sector institutions needs to be strength-
ened to help address a range of problems
including: limited access to financial services
including credit and risk management instru-
ments, to key inputs such as seed and fertilizer,
and to output markets (OECD, 2006). Decision
makers should design and implement strategies
that take a comprehensive approach to raising
agricultural productivity, increasing incomes,
and reducing poverty (Spielman and Pandya-
Lorch, 2009). Most discussions of broad-based
agricultural development focus on the interac-
tion of five main factors - innovation, inputs,
infrastructure, institutions and incentives
(Hazell, 1999; IAASTD, 2009b). Often, the
solutions needed to address agricultural
development challenges require dedicated
individuals to make the difference - champions to
push the issue to the forefront of the public's
consciousness, demonstrate what can be done
in the face of seemingly insurmountable
challenges, or mobilize the political and financial
capital to overcome inertia (Spielman and
Pandya-Lorch, 2009). These efforts can be
reinforced by African farmers, organized in
strong sub-regional and national associations,
who successfully lobby to shape the policy
environment and influence the design and
development of government support programs
(Haggblade, 2010; IAASTD, 2009b).
National and regional market development is
predicated on effective public-private partner-
ship. In the long run, to function efficiently,
private traders require stable, predictable
policies. Governments want to see reliable,
competitive, efficient markets develop. The
mutual trust required to achieve both ends
grows through dialogue, transparency, predict-
ability, and market competition (Haggblade,
2010). Large retailers, processors, and exporters
require large lots, consistent quality, standard
packaging, food safety compliance, and
guaranteed timing of delivery – things most
smallholders find difficult to achieve without
some sort of collective action, investments, or
support. This implies a growing public role in
helping to enable collective smallholder action
by facilitating institutional innovation, establish-
ing standards, supporting provision of accurate
and timely market information, enforcing
contracts, and mediating disputes (Haggblade et
al., 2010b; Spielman and Pandya-Lorch, 2009).
Key tenets of agricultural success expressed by
policy makers are adoption of a value chain
approach embedded within an environment of
democratic decentralization and good gover-
nance.
An environment of good governance
for the generation and application of
AKST [agricultural knowledge, science
a n d t e c h n o l o g y ] w o u l d i n c l u d e
empowerment of farmers to take on a
larger role in agricultural research and
development; activities to ensure the
inclusion of marginalized groups such
as women and pastoralists; decentral-
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ization of economic and political
structures of governance; promotion of
the principles of subsidiarity and
plurality in service provision; use of
local and traditional knowledge, and
private and public sector skills; and well
defined and enforced property rights
(IAASTD, 2009a:99).
Regional approaches to value chain develop-
ment are key to address the relatively small
geographic size and population of many African
countries that have many sociocultural and agro-
ecological similarities across borders. During the
2006 African Food Security Summit, strategic
commodities were identified as entry points for a
regional approach to value chain development
that offers an opportunity to realize the benefits
of this new vision to agricultural development in
Africa (IAASTD, 2009a). Expanding regional
trade markets can serve as a vent for surplus
production; they can help to increase the
volumes traded in thin domestic markets and
diminish the likelihood of price collapse follow-
ing significant gains in agricultural productivity
(Haggblade et al., 2010b). Increased trade
opportunities associated with regional integra-
tion could help to facilitate private sector
involvement and ultimately, market led produc-
tivity and production improvements.
Experience demonstrates that by directly relying
on poor people to drive development activities,
treating them as assets and partners in the
development process and building on their
institutions and resources, community driven
development has the potential to make agricul-
tural development and poverty reduction efforts
more demand responsive, inclusive, sustainable,
and cost-effective than traditionally centralized
approaches. Community driven development is
more likely to be effective if these conditions are
met (IAASTD, 2009a:102):
 Local government institutions are strength-
ened to provide organizational and technical
support, adequate resources, decision-
making authority and mechanisms for
grassroots participation;
 Rural communities and farmers' associations
are entrusted with legal authority and are
able to build their capacity to take full part in
agricultural development matters (e.g.,
contracting loans, initiating and implement-
ing programs and projects);
 Linkages are created between research
institutions, extension services and technol-
ogy users for exchange of knowledge and
experience on development issues; and
 Legal and financial frameworks are devel-
oped that encourage local communities to
claim ownership of these services and
infrastructure.
Managing risks and reducing vulnerabilities are
essential elements in sustainable pro-poor
agricultural development. The World Bank's
social risk management strategy can serve as a
useful framework for African governments. The
strategy repositions the traditional areas of
social protection (labor market intervention,
social insurance and social safety nets) in a
framework that includes:
 Three strategies to deal with risk (preven-
tion, mitigation, coping);
 Three levels of formality of risk management
(informal, market-based, publicly man-
dated);
 Many actors (individuals, households,
communities, NGOs, governments at various
levels and international organizations)
against the background of asymmetric
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information and different types of risk.
This expanded view of social protection
emphasizes the double role of risk management
instruments in protecting basic livelihoods and
promoting risk taking. It focuses on the poor
since they are the most vulnerable to risk and
typically lack appropriate risk management
instruments, constraining them from riskier but
also higher return activities and thus from
moving out of chronic poverty (OECD, 2006).
A very mixed success story of the intersection of
markets, public investment, and governance is
Rwanda's recent dramatic transformation of
agriculture. Goals of the Crop Intensification
Program (CIP) are to increase national food self-
sufficiency and reduce food imports. The
program involves regional specialization,
monoculture, and cooperativization; mass
rollout of commercial seeds, imported fertilizers
(from 4 to 22 kg per hectare), and pesticides;
erosion control; structuring of markets and
private sector entities; improved access to
credit, a strengthened role for agronomists, and
massive spending. Aided by abundant rainfall,
maize and wheat harvests increased by 227% and
173%, respectively, between 2007 and 2009; and
cassava experienced similar growth. Average
maize yields increased from 1.5 to over 4 tons per
hectare for open-pollinated varieties and from 6
to 7 tons for hybrids imported from Kenya and
Tanzania. Overall, Rwanda's agricultural
production increased by about 14% per annum,
and with grain imports decreasing by 20% per
annum.
The underside of these spectacular short-term
2
results is a coerced shift from subsistence to
market-oriented monoculture agriculture that
may compromise small-scale farmers' liveli-
h o o d s a n d f o o d s e c u r i t y ( M i l z , 2 0 1 0 ) .
Intercropping is prohibited. Crops (sweet
potatoes, vegetables) other than those pre-
scribed (maize, soybeans) have been uprooted
by authorities (e.g., in Cyuve, Musanze district,
and a Gitarama cooperative), despite expressed
interests of small-scale farmers, especially
women, to continue growing a variety of crops
to minimize risk. They are now dependent on a
complex supply chain for seeds they once
produced themselves. Planting dates are rigidly
prescribed, overriding farmers' years of
experience with weather conditions. The Land
Act of 2005 provides for fines and land confisca-
tion if rules are not obeyed. Given that many
farmers have pledged their land as loan security,
as the law now allows, they are highly risk-averse
and are constrained to plant exactly what the
government specified.
The tradeoffs between short-term success and
long-term vulnerability are clear. Crop and
varietal diversification important in pest and
disease control also provide farmers with the
crop germplasm necessary to breed plants for
changing environmental conditions. Replacing
native crop diversity with one or two 'improved'
varieties over large areas poses unprecedented
risks. The impact of crop regionalization and
concomitant loss of agricultural diversity is
revealed in farmers' markets. Little local produce
is available, while staple items are now being
shipped around the country. While waiting to sell
their produce through prescribed official
channels, many farmers have only maize to eat
and no money to buy other food. The nutritional
quality of most vegetables and tubers is
declining, post-harvest losses are greater, and
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food prices are on the rise. Thus, unintended
consequences of the policy include negative
impact on food security and nutrition. Like the
Asian Green Revolution of the 1960s, the CIP in
Rwanda is concentrating on a minority of better-
off farmers, most of who are organized in
cooperatives that cultivate on flatlands and in
marshes. Other than some government support
for terracing and erosion control, there is little
help available for the great majority of hill-
dwelling peasants, who are dealing with serious
erosion, soil fertility, and land fragmentation
problems.
(b) Technology and agricultural research
collaboration
Farmers have used technological innovations to
aid their agricultural practices since the begin-
ning of time. There is no reason to expect that to
change in the foreseeable future. The question is
not about the place of technology per se in
agricultural practices. Rather, the nature of the
technology and its impact on agricultural
practices. African governments continue to
assume the primary role in agriculture for the
national development effort. The delay in
crafting and initiating biotechnology policies in
Africa, for example, had nothing to do with
governments being cautious or thoughtful
about the place and role of biotechnology in
agricultural development. This is because a focus
on institutional effectiveness will be able to
address any likely health or environmental
problems that might be associated with
agricultural biotechnology. The delay rather
highlights the perennial lack of political commit-
ment and foresight in addressing the needs of
the citizenry. Given that resources are always
scarce, the need for serious domestic planning
cannot be overemphasized. Three main policy
issues deserve some attention: creating capable
institutions; the role of donors; and, cooperation
among national, regional and global institutions.
(i) Creating capable institutions: policy makers
should understand that the creation of
institutions, while desirable, is not the end or
substitute for capable institutions. Capable
institutions are able to discharge their
mandate and do so because they have both
adequate and consistent resources – both
human and physical. The funding regime for
policy and research units has to dramatically
improve. Whether or not agricultural
research is administered by a single unit or an
umbrella organization, the need for excep-
tional leadership in coordinating the
activities in order to optimize the policy
strides towards technological innovations
should be paramount in policy planning.
Knowledge producing institutions within the
agricultural system should assume a
prominent role in their research activities in
support of the national development effort.
Ejeta (2010) is therefore correct in stressing
the need to focus on locally developed and
locally relevant technologies, pay attention
to human capital development and institu-
tional capacity in an environment of strong
national leadership. Then again, institutions,
for example, need to have the required
resources to engage in policy research, in
order to produce the nuanced research and
knowledge that is required to address the
role of specific circumstances of agricultural
technology in the national agricultural
development agenda (Urama et. al., 2010;
Eicher et al, 2006; Tettey, 2006; UNESCO,
2006). Hence, the continuing neglect of
small-scale farmers in agricultural policy
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making needs to be rectified (Puplampu,
2004:114). As end-users, all farmers, particu-
larly the small-scale producers, should have a
more visible and active role in the generation
and utilization of agricultural knowledge to
address prevailing problems. A concerted
effort to integrate farmers' knowledge into
agricultural policy and research should be
taken more seriously (Lwoga, Ngulube and
Stilwell, 2011; Richards, 1985).
(ii) Role of donors in crafting institutions and
policy frameworks in Africa: It goes without
saying that the agenda of foreign sources of
funding might not dovetail neatly into
domestic policy priorities. That suggests that
African governments will have to be aware of
the domestic policy priorities when allocat-
ing scarce national resources. It is when
national agricultural institutions are capable
that they will play their expected role in the
national development effort. The Africa Rice
story (Chapter 5) is a worthy example of how
institutions can perform when they have the
required resources. That example also shows
that global institutions can contribute their
quota if they have to liaise with capable
internal institutions and, by extension, the
need to strengthen national capacity,
particularly in science, technology and higher
education, to enable them negotiate better
terms with their external or global partners
(Commission for Africa, 2005).
As an indication of the inherent challenges in
increasing production of food and other
agricultural products, -½ of crop research⅓
worldwide focuses on maintenance breeding
to stabilize yields in the face of evolving pests
and diseases, with timelines for effective
research often measured in decades rather
than years. Yet the effort can be worthwhile,
with physical productivity of new crop
varieties, cattle breeds, and input packages
frequently exceeding 100%, and returns to
labor typically 50-100% (Haggblade, 2010). In
Africa, the relatively small size of most
countries prevents them from maintaining
comprehensive research and development
(R&D) programs for all of their important
crops and livestock species. There are nearly
200 public research institutions and another
200 universities (Haggblade et al., 2010b).
Partnerships in agricultural and social science
research and education offer potential to
advance public interest science and increase
its relevance to development goals (Lele et
al., 2010). Ensuring that research findings
make their way to farmers is another area
that can really speed up productivity
increases and raise production volumes.
(iii) Collaboration among national, regional and
global institutions: This policyshould be at the
center of the agricultural biotechnology
policy and institutions in Africa. At the
national level, policy and planning institu-
tions “should ensure the elimination of
duplication and aim at deepening the
synergies that the various institutions could
bring to bear on their respective activities”
(Puplampu and Essegbey, 2004:286).
Lessons learned from the national level could
then be extended to the regional framework.
That framework can best operate when the
specific strengths of the national context are
brought to bear within a collaborative
framework. The Forum for African Agricul-
tural Research (FARA)-sponsored regional
nodal centers and similar initiatives, for
instance, the African Agricultural Technology
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
241
Foundation, are steps in the right direction
(Mignouna et. al., 2008; FARA, 2006). Finally,
global institutions can serve as clearing
houses for best practices and collaborative
policy planning and research activities.
However, such institutions are not problem-
free and African governments need to be
aware of the limitations of global institutions.
For example, CGIAR, FAO and UNEP are
useful global institutions in agricultural
biotechnology policy and research. CGIAR,
for example, continues to be handicapped by
the activities of some agro-biotechnology
companies and their demands for intellectual
property rights (Meldolesi, 2002). Once
African policy makers realize the constraints
facing global institutions, they will, hopefully,
reorient their mindset and attitudes to
ensure that national and regional institutions
have consistent and sufficient resources and
hence capable institutions that can discharge
their mandate.
The preceding discussion on strategic galvanized
actions and leadership steps, particularly the
nexus between technology and agricultural
research, has implications for Africa. First, as
succinctly articulated in the immediate para-
graph above, recognizing and building on the
numerous effective R&D programs that involve
significant cross-country collaboration and
technology spillovers is critical. To the extent
that molecular biology and genetic engineering
may be important for addressing crop problems
in Africa's drought- and pest-prone environ-
ments, and for overcoming many entrenched
livestock diseases, regional and international
partnerships will be vital to leverage the current
limitations of few countries (South Africa, Kenya
and Uganda) having the regulatory environment
and research capacity (Haggblade et al., 2010b).
Regional level efforts include the West African
and Central African Council for Agricultural
Research and Development (WECARD/ CORAF)
(established 1987), Association for Strengthen-
ing Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central
Africa (ASARECA) (established 1994), Southern
African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural
Research and Training (SACCAR) (established
1984), and Forum for Agricultural Research in
Africa (FARA) (established 2002), the umbrella
organization bringing together and forming
coalitions of major stakeholders in agricultural
research and development in Africa. FARA is
testing 'Innovation Platforms' to better
understand how processes for systemic
innovation can be organized among researchers
from different disciplines, the private business
sector (input suppliers, output markets, market
information systems, microfinance institutions),
practitioners (NGOs, extension departments),
decision makers, rural communities and farmer
organizations in order to make innovations
useful, affordable and accessible to end users
(CGIAR-ISPC, 2010).
Second, it is invaluable to involve farmers in
agricultural research and extension. Such
collaborative efforts will not only facilitate
adaptive site-specific research in diverse and
complex environments, but also foster research-
ers learning from and with farmers. However,
while collaboration is now recognized as
essential to R&D for increasing food security and
reducing poverty, little funding is directed
toward understanding how such collaborations
can be most effective and efficient with limited
resources. About one-half of all agricultural
research activities in the developing world are
directed toward crop improvement (53% in
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Asia/Pacific, 46% in SSA, 43% in Latin Amer-
ica/Caribbean). Of the remaining 50%, 15-20%
goes to livestock, 7-13% to natural resources
related research, and 4-8 % to forestry. Post-
harvest related research accounts for less than
5% in every region. Many farmers across Africa
currently suffer significant post-harvest losses
from grain shattering, spillage during transport,
and from bio-deterioration during each step of
the chain, including storage. Cereal grain losses
in East and Southern Africa are 14-17% (PHL
Network, 2010; World Bank, 2011c). Yet relatively
low-cost storage and transport facilities and
protocols are increasingly available in forms and
at prices accessible to smallholders based on
innovations from Southeast and South Asia
(Livingston et al., 2011). Socioeconomic research
currently receives the least support (Lele et al.
2010), but will become increasingly important as
demographic changes reshape the nature of
farming in Africa as the farm population ages,
rural male workers migrate to cities, and rural
areas become urbanized (IAC 2004). Agricultural
research will need to devote more attention to
women farmers and older farmers (IAASTD,
2009a).
(c) Urban food security and urban agriculture
As argued in Chapter 3, urban agriculture – if
properly promoted – can play a crucial role in
Africa's quest for food security, including food
availability, enhancement of nutrition for
residents and dietary diversity. Other major
contributions to the economies of African
countries include employment and income
generation for millions of people, along with a
host of environmental benefits. Indeed, given
the enormity of the food crisis facing Africa
currently, alternative sources of food supply
need to be explored to supplement the existing
sources. To use urban agriculture as an additional
source of food supply, policy makers need to pay
attention to the range of variables that impinge
upon it, but too often have been largely ignored.
There are issues that demand serious consider-
ations for the potential of urban agriculture as a
contributor to Africa's food security to be fully
realized viz.:
( ) Strategic planning for urban agriculturei -
Urban agriculture presently exists in a
context where institutional responses to
farming in the cities are generally based on
subjective judgments of city assembly
officials. This precarious policy environment,
in which farming is prohibited, promoted on
ad hoc basis, or considered a secondary issue,
reveals the need for African city govern-
ments to develop a city-wide vision that
supports urban agriculture. This vision
should clearly demonstrate how urban
agriculture contributes to broader goals of
national agriculture, livelihood, and food
security.
( ) Countering institutional prejudiceii - As a
prerequisite for long-term development of
agricultural economies in African urban
areas, systemic biases against urban
agriculture need to be addressed. Policy
makers need the capacity to research and
establish the merits of urban agriculture, the
impacts of land use change, the shifting mix
of actors, and challenges of urban agriculture
in the context of rapidly changing urban
conditions. This institutional bias can also be
addressed through sponsorship of aware-
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ness and education programs (e.g., radio or
television shows, school curriculum) that
advocate for urban agriculture. Such
programs will provide more visibility and
legitimacy to urban agriculture.
( ) Community participation in municipal keyiii
decisions on urban agriculture - Policy and
legal challenges facing urban agriculture
development are intertwined with more
general issues of urban governance and
decision-making processes. Therefore, wider
consultations and participation by city
residents are needed on urban agriculture
planning issues, including input on undesir-
able aspects of zoning codes. Mechanisms to
ensure adequate and fair representation by
all stakeholders should be fostered. This
includes establishing municipal procedures
to deal directly with issues related to urban
agriculture.
( )Develop linkages with other sectorsiv - The
ability of urban farmers to access the
technical and financial support available to
rural farmers is vital to the sustainability of
this sector. Policy makers need to consider
the large population of poor urban farmers
who are sidelined in the national subsidized
agriculture input and extension programs
implemented by many African governments.
Local and national governments should also
provide an appropriate structure of incen-
tives to promote urban agriculture, including
policies aimed at stimulating more effective
market chains. This can only happen if urban
agriculture is viewed as an integral part of a
broad national food security policy.
( ) Coordinating multiple levels of responsibilityv -
By virtue of its nature, urban agriculture
mobilizes a wide range of stakeholders and
interests. For example, across many African
cities, two of the most vital elements of
agriculture, land and water, are coordinated
by disparate institutional settings. Meaning-
ful, long-term urban agriculture planning
requires coordination between various
government ministries and departments,
including those that oversee lands, public
health, inter and intra-regional transport and
the environment.
( )Water for foodvi – Integration of urban
agriculture into the African cities' planning
vision should be accompanied by policies
that seek to expand the water supply
infrastructure to accommodate urban
agriculture. Given that the use of tapped
water for urban farming in Africa raises vital
ethical questions, efforts should focus on
developing technologies that promote safe
water recycling for urban agriculture use.
Small-scale and low technologies, such as
treadle pumps, can be important for
smallholder urban farmers, who usually do
not have sufficient resources to acquire more
sophisticated irrigation systems. Even then,
water technology choices need to be
matched with urban agriculture water needs
of specific African cities, given marked
regional variations in rainfall.
( )Appropriate land tenure choicesvii - National
and local governments should support either
affordable urban land tenure reforms or
long-term leases for poor urban farmers.
Unfortunately, the choices may not be
straightforward, and policies that advance
one-size-fits-all solutions will suffocate urban
agricultural development. A continuum of
land tenure systems exist in African cities,
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each with relative strengths with respect to
the long-term success of urban agriculture.
Thus, national and local governments should
carefully examine the merits of alternative
tenure systems in consideration of their
appropriate social and spatial contexts and
should promote models on the basis of
prevailing circumstances, which may vary
across urban areas both within and between
countries. Officials should also pay attention
to potential negative side-effects of pro-
posed land tenure changes among vulnera-
ble urban populations.
( )More inclusive land zoning codesviii – Before
making efforts to integrate urban agriculture
into broader city planning and development
policies, policy makers need to identify and
reformulate aspects of municipal statutes
that are detrimental to city farming. For
example, zoning codes should be revised to
support urban food production. The current
official position of urban farming, where it is
largely dependent on the subjective
judgments of city authorities, means that the
future of urban agriculture rests on a highly
shaky policy ground.
( )Mobilization for urban agricultureix – To meet
the dual challenge of raising the profile of
urban agriculture and generating the political
will to put it permanently on the national
development agenda, a broad-based
coalition of stakeholders is needed to lobby
policy makers. Although the involvement of
various state-level actors are vital for
enhancing the profile of urban agriculture,
non-state and other informal actors should
also be actively engaged in this process. Both
local and international NGOs can play a
pivotal role in this cause, especially given
their ability to solicit the views of hard-to-
reach populations and to articulate these
views in ways that could be used to galvanize
a broad-based coalition that will serve as a
platform for pro-urban agriculture policy
change at both local and national levels.
( ) Measures to protect the economic interest ofx
farmers – The growing demand for fresh
fruits and vegetables create a strategic
opportunity that urban farmers can exploit.
These emerging market niches can provide
important income sources for the urban
poor. However, appropriate policy measures
are needed to protect the economic interests
of these farmers against powerful markets in
a globalized world. In addition, policies are
needed to ensure that these markets are not
pursued at the expense of domestic food
needs, as has usually occurred with export-
driven agriculture.
(d) Financing agricultural transformation
Africa's financial system has been intensively
liberalized over the last two decades and this has
tended to stifle access to financial services for
the transformation of the agricultural sector.
The need for finance is widely recognized and
several approaches and interventionist schemes
have been designed from time immemorial to
supply credit to the agricultural sector. These
included the supply-led approaches leading to
the establishment of agricultural development
banks across the continent over the years. To
date however, the small-scale farmers who
constitute the majority of producers rely largely
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on informal and semi-formal finance. Access to
formal finance especially from commercial banks
in Africa is less than 10 percent. Many countries
are yet to meet the Maputo Declaration target.
The innovative approaches enunciated in this
Report have implications for capacity building
and development at three levels viz: policy
reform and formulation, business enterprises
and financial institutions.
(i) Policy and Regulatory Reforms - Securing
access to finance is means of ensuring food
security. African governments have to be
sensitized and convinced of the need to
provide an enabling environment for finance
to flourish. The justification for reforms (both
macroeconomic and sector-specific) has to
be clearly articulated and the benefits
substantiated to guarantee the commitment
of policy makers to effect the required
changes and to continue to strengthen the
policy environment. Both the executive and
legislative arms of government will need
technical support in this regard.
(ii) Enterprise Level - All the actors in the
agricultural value chain (farmers, input
dealers, assemblers, processors, wholesal-
ers, exporters, importers) need to know how
to secure access to finance to operate and
develop their businesses. With regard to
farm enterprises (crop and livestock related)
there is need for training in farm accounting
and business management as well as other
areas specified in Table 7.1.
(iii)Banking and Other Financial Institutions -
Financial institutions often seek to contain
their risks and costs in financing agriculture.
They need to have competence in developing
commercially attractive financial services
that meet the needs of the various actors in
the value chain and how a value chain focus
can result in market growth and reduced
credit risk. Details of the capacity building
requirements for commercial banks and
microfinance institutions are presented in
Table 7.1.
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No. CLIENTS CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
1 Commercial Banks  Understand value chain concepts and competitiveness
 Risk assessment and identification of strategic opportunities to strengthen
value chains
 How cohesive value chains can be used to reduce risks and facilitate access
to finance
 How to apply value chain financial products to meet the needs of various
actors in the value chain
 Designing appropriate financial products
 Develop better understanding of specific supply chains and their economics-
--identify key agribusi nesses and their clients/suppliers and mapping
opportunities for lending
 Understanding, quantifying and managing risks around specific
commodities and supply chains
 Separating systemic (e.g. weather, yield, price) from idiosyncratic risks (e.g.
client performance)
 Use of technologies to reach new clients and reduce the cost of serving
them (e.g. mobile banking, mobile phones, etc.)
 Development of loan products to better meet client needs and the
particularities of commodities and supply chains
 Designing Ris k Sharing Facilities (Reduce credit risk on the specific
agriculture loan portfolio, Increase capacity to originate new loans Improve
key balance sheet ratios, risk management and operational efficiency and
Potentially increase risk-adjusted return on capital)
 ICT infrastructure banking services to difficult-to-reach communities
2 Microfinance institutions  Designing and lending products for agriculture and value chain financing
 Ways to vet new clients for credit approval
 Understanding financial risks
 Identifying opportunities and managing risks
3 Farmers, suppliers,
processors, buyers and others
 farm accounting and business management
 Understanding financial risks
 Identifying opportunities and managing risks
 Understanding market needs
 Training in loan application writing for bankable agricultural projects with
emphasis on cash flows and project costs
 Methods in mitigating and adapting to climate change
4 Intervention agencies
National and International
NGOs
Development partners
 Building cohesive valuechains
 Internal and external approaches to value chain finance
 Promotion, awareness raising, and training of potential clients: SME
agribusinesses and farmers
 R & D  and use to improve agricultural productivity
 Mind-set change from negative public percept ion against agriculture
especially by the youths
 Land titling and collateralization– ways of turning farm
plots into collaterals which commercial banks often demand
TABLE 7.1
Capacity Building Needs in Agricultural Finance Delivery System
Source: Adapted from Olomola (2011)
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(e) Infrastructure
Infrastructural development is crucial for the
transformation of agriculture and food security.
There are a number of areas that need attention:
energy, transportation, water and sanitation,
health and education – especially in fragile and
distressed areas. Strengthening African
countries' investment framework is critical to
generate more employment and inclusive
growth. Mobilizing investment in infrastructure
and agriculture, priority sectors for NEPAD since
its inception, is of particular importance for
creating more jobs and economic diversification.
It is estimated that 1 to 2 percent of African GDP
is lost due to infrastructure deficiencies, and the
average productivity of agricultural land in Africa
has been only 40 percent of that of Asia and 50
percent of that of Latin America over the last
decade (Amano, 2011). Agricultural produce
continue to be lost due to inadequate and
tradition storage facilities.
For example, in many parts of Africa, paved rural
roads scarcely exist. Much produce is taken to
market by cart or bicycle over unpaved roads or
by foot along narrow paths cut through the
brush. Africa has the lowest density of paved
roads of any world region. Out of 1.8 million
kilometers of roads in sub-Saharan Africa, only
about 16 per cent are paved. Moreover, many of
Africa's paved roads have deteriorated badly due
to overuse and poor maintenance (Harsch,
3
2004). Because of poor road quality, truck
drivers in rural Cameroon for example often
charge an extra CFA1,000-CFA2,000 (US$2.00-
$4.00) for just a short trip of 6 kilometers. Higher
transport costs raise the prices farmers must
charge, reducing their competitiveness in both
domestic and international markets.
Because farmers will not have much incentive to
grow more without the roads, storage facilities
and other physical infrastructure they need to
market their crops, the CAADP urges that more
than half of the investments projected under the
plan be directed toward rural infrastructure (not
counting irrigation systems). In addition to roads
and other “hard” infrastructure, the CAADP
argues, farmers also need “soft” infrastructure:
communications and accurate price and market
information in order to take the best advantage
of changing market opportunities.
External markets also are vital for many of
Africa's producers of cotton, cocoa, coffee, tea
and other export crops. Yet world market
conditions have not been favorable to African
farmers. Not only are international agricultural
prices volatile, but African exports face restric-
tions on access to Northern markets and are
severely hurt by the high subsidies paid to rich
farmers in the industrialized countries. However,
there are some positive trends. Private participa-
tion in infrastructure is increasing faster in Africa
than in other developing regions, while 60
percent of the world's uncultivated land lies
within the continent (Amano, 2011). Govern-
ments are aware of these opportunities. Yet,
more robust policy frameworks to attract more
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and better investment in these sectors are
needed. A number of African countries are
experimenting with infrastructure development
through public-private-partner-ships (PPP)
financing modalities. The OECD recently
launched the Aid for Investment (AfI) project to
support the financing of infrastructure in Africa:
US$45 billion has been spent, with US$93 billion
required leaving a financing gap of US$8 billion.
(f) Climate change and climate adaptation
Chapter 5 raised insights with regard to climate
change, environmental degradation and
agriculture in Africa with a number of policy
recommendations (see table 7.2). However,
given that implementation of adaptation and
mitigation measures takes place at the house-
hold and/or farm level, policy measures at this
scale are discussed as follows:
Spatial Scale Key recommendations
Global
 Drawing insights and learning points from successful implementation of existing
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
 Lobbying for a fair, ambitious and legally binding future climate deal
 Striking a balance between adaptation and mitigation agendas
 Continued mobilization of adaptation funds
 Need for effective governance mechanisms for adaptation
Africa
 Need for Africa Union based framework legislation on environment
 Promotion of the adaptation agenda and general climate change mainstreaming
 Speaking with one voice in international climate negotiation regimes
 Developing a standing climate risk and vulnerability country list
 Drawing up an inventory for climate change and agriculture initiatives
National
 Mainstreaming climate change within and across institutions and legislation
 Drawing up risk and vulnerabilityatlases and new agro-ecological maps
 Finance, economic and planning ministers to embrace climate change
 Financing capacity building and utilization, awareness raising as well as research and
development
 Enhancing roles of extension work(ers)
 Enhancing good governance
 Growing strategic food reserves
Municipal
 Mainstreaming climate change and disaster risk management within and across
departments
 Harmonizing planning, environmental and disaster risk management laws
 Harnessing the power of the mobile phone
 Making use of regional plans
Household and/or
Farm (critical focus)
 Refer to detailed account under this section
TABLE 7.2
Summary of policy recommendations
Source: Nhamo (2011)
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The household and/or farm level presents the
most applicable platform to implement policy
measures arising from the other spatial scales
identified. Based on the key impacts as well as
adaptation and mitigation measures discussed
earlier in the Chapter 5, the following policy
recommendations are made:
i. Water Sector - African governments need to
work out appropriate treaties for shared
river basins such as the Nile. Integrated water
catchment management plans should be
part of the treaties. Damming still remains
one of the options in countries where
appropriate sites exist. Water rights must be
allocated in a manner that recognizes
farmers and other users. Subsistence
farmers usually suffer from restricted access
to water. Governments should also allocate
water for ecological purposes.
ii. Crop sector - Improved weather forecasts and
early warning systems must be the first line of
adaptation and this should be instituted. The
mobile phone presents numerous opportuni-
ties in this regard since most remote areas in
Africa are now networked. There is need for
crop diversification, planting different
varieties, adding non farm activities to farm
activities, increasing the use of irrigation, and
water and soil conservation techniques.
There is also need to harness local and
indigenous knowledge systems and fuse it
with modern scientific knowledge brought
to commu-nit ies through extens ion
work(ers). Responsible national depart-
ments should have standing programs to
assist farmers, for example, replanting in the
event of droughts. Governments could assist
subsistence and small scale farmers with low-
cost finance and instituting Weather Index
Insurance. Compensation for crop and
farmland losses that result from major
disasters by governments is a measure that
requires further understanding.
iii. Livestock sector - Policies on methane
management are critical. In addition,
measures to assist, especially subsistence
and pastoral communities are needed. This
includes traditional programs in terms of
animal breeding and marketing of products.
As with the crop sector, the role of extension
work as well as local and indigenous knowl-
edge systems cannot be overlooked.
Governments should have standing pro-
grams to assist farmers in re-stocking and
translocations after periods of droughts and
other disasters. Policies to enhance livestock
selection, changes in grazing patterns and
water availability must be instituted. Early
warning should be part of farm level
management.
iv. Horticulture Sector - This sector is sensitive to
water availability and temperature change.
Measures therefore must be taken to
address water shortage and deal with
increasing dry conditions. This is an aspect
that requires the use of varieties that are
resistant to heat stress. Farmers need to be
aware of developments concerning the
carbon footprint, an aspect that farmer
associations and governments need to
address. The role of extension work(ers)
cannot be overemphasized.
v. Fisheries Sector - Measures to integrate
fisheries with other farming systems such as
crop should be put in place to assist farmers
cope with droughts. Knowledge sharing in
terms of climate change is critical for
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communities dependent on fisheries for their
livelihoods. Programs to conserve mang-
roves under Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus
(REDD+) projects are viable adaptation and
mitigation measures in fisheries.
(g) Strategic Partnerships
While public and private sector interventions
that increase the availability, access, and quality
of food are all desirable, the resources available
to undertake these interventions are limited.
This mandates weighing the benefits against
costs in terms of economic and financial gains,
environmental impacts, and sociopolitical
importance (Spielman and Pandya-Lorch, 2009).
The way forward is a facilitated process of
negotiation, shared (social) learning, and
agreement on concerted action, based on trust,
fairness and reciprocity (IAASTD, 2009b). There
is increasing evidence that societies are capable
of agreeing on sustainable solutions and of
creating institutional conditions that support the
implementation of such solutions. Many
successes are built around the notion of
cooperation and collaboration. Partnerships
among diverse actors in the agricultural sector -
research institutes, community-based organiza-
tions, private companies, government agencies,
and international bodies - are evident in almost
all successes (Spielman and Pandya-Lorch,
2009). African societies and governments need
to continue to take a flexible and opportunistic
approach that builds on strategic partnerships
between key actors at the local, meso, and
macro levels (non-governmental and commu-
nity-based organizations, and private firms).
Such an approach is reflected in the process of
articulating and promoting the Comprehensive
Africa Agriculture Development Programme
(CAADP), the key platform for the restoration of
agriculture growth, food security, and rural
development in Africa. The CAADP's Framework
for African Food Security (FAFS) provides a
comprehensive approach to reducing hunger
and poverty, improving rural livelihoods, and
facilitating equitable, environmentally, socially
and economically sustainable development in
Africa. It covers: (a) risk management, (b)
increasing food supply, (c) increasing the
incomes of the most vulnerable, and (d) nutrition
and diet quality (CAADP, 2010). The four priority
areas for action ('pillars') are: (1) programs to
extend the land under sustainable land manage-
ment and reliable water control systems; (2)
programs that improve rural infrastructure and
trade-related capacity for market access; (3)
programs that increase food supply and reduce
hunger; and (4) programs that promote
agricultural research, technology, dissemination
and adoption; embedded in this is agricultural
research for technology generation, and the
ultimate dissemination and adoption of those
technologies.
A key part of the CAADP process involves
defining a framework under which stakeholders,
such as the private and public sectors, civil
society and NGOs, can contribute to the
development and implementation of policies
and strategies to promote agricultural growth. It
has made good progress: developing frame-
w o r k s t o g u i d e n a t i o n a l a n d r e g i o n a l
policymaking; engaging with national govern-
ments to develop comprehensive, coherent,
cost-sensitive and evidence-based strategies for
agricultural development; and promoting broad
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engagement of stakeholders in the policy-
making process. Examples of applying the
C A A D P framework at national level are
observed in Ethiopia and Ghana where the
CAADP has contributed to the analysis of key
issues facing agriculture and is working with
governments to ensure that policy and invest-
ment are consistent with CAADP framework. In
Rwanda, the CAADP framework played a key
role in engaging donors in a dialogue about the
strategy and financing needs for agriculture. At
the country level, there has been considerable
progress in engaging a broad range of stake-
holders in the CAADP process. Ethiopia's CAADP
National Steering Committee involves several
government ministries, civil society bodies and a
farmers-cooperative. In Ghana, farmers'
associations and private sector federations have
contributed to policy-making through the
CAADP process, and interactions between the
Ministries of Agriculture and Finance on
budgeting have been strengthened. Similar
processes are under way in Tanzania and Kenya
(CAADP, 2010).
Many initiatives in support of the CAADP agenda
are implemented through collaborative
arrangements with different civil society
organizations, including NGO groups, farmers
associations, and the Pan African Agribusiness
Consortium - a network of networks involving
national and sub-regional associations of
producers, input suppliers, marketers, transport-
ers, processors, research systems, financiers and
exporters as well as corporate enterprises to
improve agricultural productivity and the
competitiveness of Africa's agriculture (Lele et
al., 2010). African governments have agreed to
increase public investments in agriculture by a
minimum of 10% of their national budget, and to
raise agricultural productivity by at least 6%.
However, CAADP remains heavily dependent on
donor funding. The African Peer Review
Mechanism monitors CAADP's implementation
and progress toward its established targets
(Haggblade et al., 2010b).
7.6 Importance of implementation,
monitoring and evaluation -the
special role of data and
statistics/ACIR findings
Effective planning, monitoring and evaluation
are essential for the achievement of policy and
program objectives discussed in this Report.
Without good planning, monitoring and
evaluation, it would be impossible to assess
progress of implementation and to demonstrate
achievement of results. The realization of the
purpose of these development initiatives are
contingent on a logical relationship between
planning, monitoring and evaluation, a weak-
ness in any of them will negatively affect
successful implementation and achievement of
intended results. Like any development effort,
agricultural transformative initiatives and food
security effort across Africa, require effective
planning, monitoring and evaluation. As already
noted, the planning process should be participa-
tory and inclusive. It must be systematic and
comprehensive involving all relevant stake-
holders to ensure that emerging issues, views
and needs of stakeholders are captured to
inform the prioritization and sequencing of
intervention. As a critical part of any transfor-
mational process, planning establishes the basis
for effective monitoring and evaluation by
setting out the results to be achieved in a clear
and measurable manner, delineating the key
implementation processes, defining resource
requirements and detailing timelines for the
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achievement of intended results.
Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms must be
agreed upon at the design stage of the project to
ensure timely collection, analysis and reporting
on progress of implementation and achievement
of results. Monitoring must be continuous and
cumulative in order to provide managers and
stakeholders with timely information to guide
decision making and proactively identify and
solve implementation challenges and bottle-
necks on time.
Evaluation on the other hand, facilitates
systematic assessment and use of timely as well
as relevant in-depth information that enables
managers and stakeholders to respond to the
'why' and 'how' results are being achieved or
otherwise. Conscientious effort must be made to
conduct and use evaluation information at
agreed intervals to improve agricultural
productivity as well as other interventions aimed
at transforming agriculture in Africa. To ensure
increased and sustained demand and utilization
of evaluation information for decision making,
efforts must be made to balance the accountabil-
ity and learning dimensions of the process.
Agricultural project monitoring and evaluation
are mainly intended to enhance project imple-
mentation and the achievement and demonstra-
tion of results of agricultural interventions. It is
also aimed at stimulating learning and increasing
the understanding of stakeholders at all the
stages of the project cycle. The monitoring and
evaluation process can be defined within three
broad stages along the policy, program or
project cycle; the upstream-policy formulation or
project design, midstream-implementation and
downstream – completion and review.
At the upstream level monitoring and evaluation
provides quality assurance by ensuring that the
design logic and results are consistent with the
underlying concepts, risks and assumptions. The
process also entails the assessment of the
evaluability of the outcomes. It further ensures
that results are realistic, achievable and
monitorable. The midstream or implementation
stage encompass the design and operationa-
lization of monitoring and evaluation systems
including data collection, collation, analysis and
reporting tools to guide implementation and
effective decision making. Midterm review is
also conducted at this stage to facilitate
midcourse changes and programmatic fine
tuning. At the end of the project, evaluations are
conducted to ascertain the achievement or
otherwise of intended results as well as docu-
ment lessons that can support future decision
making. This process is very critical for agricul-
tural interventions in that it provides the basis for
future funding and demonstrates its value in
terms of the benefits generated.
7.7 Capacity to influence
international policy
Africa needs capacity at the regional and
national level to influence agricultural policy in a
globalized world. This includes working for
trade policies that make sense for the objec-
tives of the continent, embedding effective
agricultural policies in the negotiations for
external assistance, and having a voice in the
regulation of harmful technological choices of
investments in the agricultural sector on the
continent. There are also capacity issues related
to trade, pricing and technology choice. The
level of research and analysis needed to
understand the effect of policy choices in a
globalized world is particularly relevant, as was
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indicated by the impact on food prices and
social stability of subsidies for maize growing
and biofuels in countries far from the continent.
Scientific capacity and its link to policy capacity
at the regional level to better understand and
influence changes in sectors related or
impacting agriculture like climate change is also
critical.
7.8 Conclusion
Agriculture can be perceived of as a “low-
hanging fruit” for the achievement of the MDGs.
Four of the goals—those for poverty and
hunger , gender equity , env i ronmenta l
sustainability, and equitable exchange in
international trade—are closely linked to the
need for agricultural transformation and food
security in Africa. African countries need to
develop policies and frameworks that allow for
poverty reduction as well as sustainable
livelihoods, and need to be well aware of
emerging challenges such as climate change and
the need for climate adaptation. Strategies must
be developed to deal with household vulnerabili-
ties by strengthening resilience and reducing
risks. Innovative sources of financing have to be
sought in the context of the evolving global aid
architecture. Indeed, ODA is one of the major
instruments for enhancing global justice and
equity if used appropriately by both donors and
recipient African countries. Assistance –
especially food aid has been known to have
immediate positive impact on food insecurity.
Because of climate change, developed countries'
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) already
undermine the productivity of farming systems
essential to survival of the poor in many African
countries. The burden of climate change needs
to be fairly shared.
Given the heterogeneity and complexity of
agroecological conditions and farming systems
across Africa, externally generated blueprints
have little or no positive role in Africa's agricul-
tural transformation. Genuinely collaborative
research involving scientists and local farmers
and other stakeholders is necessary to identify
and adopt suitable practices for sustainable
agricultural intensification which blend local and
exogenous knowledge, and create space for
local experimentation and innovation – key
undervalued elements in 'sustainability.' Such
R&D efforts can generate a 'basket' of agricul-
tural technology and management practices that
provide farmers with flexibility in choosing
among options that best match the site-specific
diversity of their fields and socioeconomic
circumstances, effectively boost farm productiv-
ity, and are resilient to weather variability,
resource availability and market fluctuations.
Successful technologies improve existing
farming systems rather than seek to replace
them. In addition to crop and soil-related
initiatives, irrigation systems that are initiated,
funded and managed by smallholder farmers
have proven successful and merit further
support. Similarly, successful CBNRM requires
genuine proprietorship - the right to use
resources, and determine rules of access, modes
of usage, and distribution of benefits.
In light of the prominent role women play in
agriculture and the provisioning of food for
African households, gender equity, environmen-
tal-sustainability and agricultural transformation
are closely intertwined. Women must have
reproductive choices and freedom of participa-
tion in decision-making. Contraceptive preva-
lence and usage; and the ability of women to
make reproductive choices are critical to the
environment and for women's empowerment.
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Women's political empowerment is not only
intrinsically important, but it also has conse-
quences for pro-environment policy and
agricultural practice. This is more so when
women are actively involved farmers organiza-
tion.
There are readily identifiable roles for govern-
ment investment in public goods (agricultural
research, rural education, rural road networks,
communications, transportation facilities,
control of contagious livestock diseases,
extension systems, health systems, and market
infrastructure). Governments also have the
responsibility to implement policies, laws, and
regulations that create an enabling economic
and institutional environment in which private
and civil society agents, including farmers, can
flourish. Social equity concerns challenge policy-
makers, researchers, practitioners and donors to
work together to provide not only the techno-
logical means, but also the social support needed
to encourage and enable uptake of new
techniques by those previously lacking skills
training, extension services or credit facilities.
Regional interventions and a voice internation-
ally remain important to create space for Africa
to succeed in transforming its agriculture. A
holistic approach is required to get the drive
towards agricultural transformation and food
security in Africa right!
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End Notes
Chapter 1
1
For an illustration of the capacities China has grown and how it is
has used knowledge and innovation to benefit from Foreign
Direct Investment see Fu (2008), “Foreign Direct Investment,
Absorptive Capacity and Regional Innovation Capabilities:
Evidence from China”, 36, 1: 89-110.Oxford Development Studies,
2
Confirmation of the findings by a relevant statistical test will be
possible in the future when there is ample data. However, having
the result hold two years in a row indicates that the structural
assumptions made in 2011 still hold in 2012 and that the indices
and sub-indices can be compared to extract trends and
relationships.
3
Cohen's kappa measures the agreement between two raters
who each classify N items into C mutually exclusive categories.
The equation for K is: K=[Pr(a)-Pr(e)]/[1-Pr(e)]
Where Pr(a) is the relative observed agreement among raters,
and Pr(e) is the hypothetical probability of chance agreement,
using the observed data to calculate the probabilities of each
observer randomly saying each category. If the raters are in
complete agreement then K = 1. If there is no agreement among
the raters other than what would be expected by chance, then
K ≤ 0.
Chapter 2
1
Food inventories play a moderating role in agricultural prices, by
augmenting demand in times of glut and supplementing supply
in times of scarcity, little doubt that they are a key focus of the
international policy debate on the food price crisis.
2
The “large-country” assumption in international trade theory
posits that shocks to excess demand (for large-country
importers) or excess supply (for large-country exporters) have
sizeable impacts on world market prices; in contrast to small-
country exporters or importers that are presumably price-takers
on world markets, bereft of any influence on the world market
price for a commodity or product. The upshot is that monitoring
of dynamics in large-country importers or exporters is crucial for
international commodity market surveillance.
Chapter 3
1
Inputs per hectare on farm(ed) land.
2
n.d: no data available for lower or upper limit. The proportion
includes both part-time and full-time urban farmers.
Chapter 5
1
At the heart of biotechnology is the application of technological
breakthroughs in the natural sciences and bioengineering
techniques, in direct or indirect ways, to living organisms. These
breakthroughs have given rise to genomics, molecular breeding and
diagnostic, gene extraction and sequencing as well as recombinant
deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA). The specific focus in this study is the
application of biotechnology to the production of agricultural crops.
2
Is generally considered as the set of ideals or intellectual phenomena
generated with the scientific method. The scientific method proceeds
on the assumption that systematic processes can be employed to study
phenomena, and such outcomes are rational. As used here, scientific
knowledge is associated with knowledge producing entities like policy
analysts and researchers in state and non-state institutions (national,
international, public or private).
3
In broad strokes society is a collection of individuals united by social
relations which mark those associated individuals from others who do
not belong to that set of relations. Society is thus an operating unit. The
state and non-state institutions are the main operating units in society.
Their interaction is governed by political, economic and socio-cultural
factors, including laws and values. As an operating unit, no society exists
in a watertight compartment. Societies are influenced by waves of
currents from each other.
4
Agricultural research - is primarily concerned with generating scientific
knowledge that can be utilized in agricultural organization, whether at
the level of production, marketing or consumption. The dissemination
of research findings, by a capable extension service, will enhance the
value of agricultural production, distribution as well as consumption.
Agricultural research consists of both technical and social
considerations and this complementary relationship is significant for
research outcomes with respect to utilization. The technical and social
aspects of agricultural research intersect at the farm level where
production takes place, in the community where support services for
agricultural production are organized and at the societal level where
consumers make use of agricultural produce (Ruttan, 1982:298).
Agricultural research takes place within the context of research
systems, in many cases state or non-state (national or international,
public or private).
5
Preferences for choice, quality and food safety.
Chapter 7
1
Photo taken by Frannie Léautier on the road from Ibadan to Lagos in
December 2011 showing a marketplace and the active trade between
buyers and sellers with the transport and parking space limitations
2
Photo courtesy of Frannie Léautier - highlighting agricultural activities
on the road from Harare to Tengenenge, Zimbabwe (January 2011).
3
Photo courtesy of Frannie Léautier (November 2011) - the road from
Douala to Yaoundé depicting the impact of logging on transport
infrastructure.
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ACIR Team Organogram
A - ACIR TEAM ORGANIZATION
The ACIR Team comprises a dedicated ACBF group supported by various stakeholders and partners at different level as presented
in the chart below.
ACBF ACIR Team
A dedicated group of individuals (ACIRTeam) within the
ACBF Secretariat is constituted to spearhead the process
from conceptualization through to the publication of the
ACI Flagship Report. Team members come from the various
units and departments within the Secretariat.
External Reference Group (ERG)
The ERG is created to provide motivation and intellectual
guidance, as well as to challenge the ACBF ACI team to
develop its thinking behind the assessment and ensure that
the team achieves its objective of delivering a quality
publication. To this end, the External Reference Group acts
as the ACI team's strategic partner to ensure that:
• The approach and methodologies employed in
preparing the Flagship are theoretically sound,
conceptually appropriate, rigorous, balanced, and draws
in divergence as appropriate;
• The data capturing instruments are adequately reviewed
and appropriate;
• Comments on the ACI survey template, selected
indicators, case studies and stories are provided in a timely
manner;
• Presentation of findings balances views from across the
broad spectrum of opinion and reflect current and
innovative practice;
• The review and report balance public, legal and
operational perspectives appropriately;
• There is feedback on implementation support and costing
tools for specific topics examined in the ACIR, and on the
appropriateness of, for example, the costing assumptions
and the approach adopted within the tools as well as peer
Policy Institutes
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review of the background papers;
• Where needed, ACBF is supported in the
identification of appropriate networks and/or
experts with whom to engage to assist in the
development of the tools; and
• All conclusions drawn and policy recommendations
provided are sound and evidence-based.
Background papers
The goal of the competitive consultancy is to provide
detailed background papers on agreed upon thematic
issues that would assist the ACIR Team in better grasping
and contextualizing the issues of capacity development for
agricultural transformation and food security. Seven (07)
thematic papers were accepted (following the extensive
peer-review) and covered the following areas: State and
Agricultural Policy in Africa; Science-Society Relations and
the Biotechnology Revolution; Food Security and Food
Sovereignty in Africa; Climate Change and Environmental
Degradation; Poverty, Sustainable Livelihoods and
Agricultural Transformation; Urban Agriculture; and,
Agricultural Financing.
Focal regional points
On the basis of their geographic and linguistic affinity, the
targeted countries were grouped into five broad regions –
Anglophone West Africa; Francophone West Africa; Central
Africa; East Africa and the Horn; Southern Africa and the Indian
Ocean. A Policy Unit was tasked with coordinating and supervising
the country data collection process within each of the above-
mentioned regions.
Data collectors
At the country level, a national familiar with the country context,
was identified and selected through an open and competitive
process, invited to a 3-day training session on the ACI survey
instrument; following which he/she conducted the administration
of the questionnaire. However Section G of the survey instrument
on the CPIA was administered by seventeen (17) nationally and
internationally recognized Policy Institutes in surveyed countries.
B - DATA COLLECTION
Coverage
In line with the target of covering all African countries, the number
of countries covered during this second edition increased from 34
(in 2010) to 42(see list below).
Group 1
West English
-speaking countries
Group 2
West and North French
-speaking countries
Group 3
Central Africa and other
French-speaking countries
Group 4
Eastern Africa
Group 5
Southern Africa
TABLE X
List of countries covered by the study
Cape Verde
Gambia (The)
Ghana
Liberia
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Benin
Burkina Faso
Côte d’Ivoire
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Niger
Senegal
Togo
Burundi
Cameroon
CAR
Chad
Congo (Rep. of)
Congo (Dem. Rep. of)
Djibouti
Gabon
Madagascar
Ethiopia
Kenya
Malawi
Rwanda
Tanzania
Uganda
Angola
Botswana
Lesotho
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
South Africa
Swaziland
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
Component 4
Component 5
Component 6
Component 7
Component 8
Component 9
Component 10
Component 11
Component 12
Component 13
Component 14
Component 15
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Questions
Agriculture and
Food Security
Section I
ACI
Enabling
Environment
Section B
Section C
Section D
Organizational
Level
Section E
Section F
Individual
Level
Section G
Section H
Training workshop
As alluded to above, a training workshop was organized from 13-18 June 2011 for the all the selected in-country data collectors who
were to administer the main questionnaire (excluding Section G on CPIA which was done by the Policy Institutes). During the
workshop, the data collection instrument was reviewed, revised and the final version adopted. Also during the workshop, the
potential sources of information per country were discussed and agreed upon. However, it was acknowledged and agreed that the
list could be adjusted during the field data collection to suit country-specific needs (e.g. Ministry of Women Affairs in country A,
Data collection instrument
The data collection instrument is designed along the three dimensions of capacity: (i) Enabling environment; (ii) Organizational
level; and (iii) Individual level. These dimensions constitute the three primary components of the data collection instrument.
However, two specific sections are dedicated to explicit issues: the Section G on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) and the Section I on Agricultural Transformation and Food Security, the thematic focus of this year's Report. The structure
of the questionnaire is presented in Chart 2 below. One single questionnaire was administered in each of the countries covered by
the study.
CHART 2
Structure of the data collection instrument
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could be Ministry of Gender in country B, etc.). A separate workshop was organized for the seventeen (17) Policy Institutes that
were to lead the CPIA country self-assessment in their respective countries.
Period of field data collection
The field data collection was conducted from July 1 through August15 2011. Reporting was done on a weekly basis. At the end of
st th
the field data collection, the data collectors submitted their completed questionnaires along with their final field report.
C - COMPUTING THE INDICES
C.1. Scoring the answers to questions
Each question is assigned an associated variable indicator whose nature depends on the type of question asked. The scoring of the
variable indicators is in relation with their respective natures. The scores are standardized on a scale ranging from 0-100.
Qualitative variables
A value is attributed to each expected answer. Questions with a YES or NO answer are scored 0 or 100. Questions with three
possible answers are scored 0; 50; and 100. Questions with 4 answers are scored 0, 33.3, 66.7 and 100. Questions with 5 answers are
scored 0; 25; 50; 75 and 100.
Question No. Question Expected answers Score
B1 Does the country have a National
Development Strategy (Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, National
Development Plan, Vision Strategy,
etc) ?
YES 100
NO 0
B4 Is Capacity Development (CD)
integrated in the country’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy/National
Development Plan?
CD is not mainstreamed in the
current PRSP/National Development
Plan
0
CD is mainstreamed, but with no
clear objectives and targets
50
Clear objectives and targets set in the
PRSP/National Development Plan
100
B13b How effective is the dialog mechanism
with development partners?
Very High
High
Average
Low
Very Low
100
Some few examples:
Numerical variables
a- The answer is a proportion
The score is the answer (assuming that moving from 0 to 100% is improving, otherwise, one may just read backwards)
b- Numerical variable in the form of ordinal scales
The values on the predetermined scale is brought to a scale ranging from 0 – 100.
75
50
25
0
C4: On the scale1 (Very weak) to 6 (Very strong), assess how support to capacity is being coordinated in the country
Very weak = 1  2  3  4  5  6 = Very strong
Answer 1 2 3 4 5 6
Score 0 20 40 60 80 100
Example:
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Option 1 (Best achievement)
From the minimum and maximum values observed (among the 42 countries), define a range 0 - 100 where 0 is associated with the
minimum value, and 100 with the maximum value. One disadvantage for this option is that it may not capture sufficiently the
progress made by a country, as its efforts are assessed with respect to those of other countries.
Option 2 (Best progress)
A country may be assessed with respect to efforts it made the previous years with regard to the concerned variable. The indicator
would measure the variation in the efforts it is making on its own. This is another way to measure investment in capacity
development.
One disadvantage of the above option is that positive variations may range from 0 to infinity. Two countries shifting respectively
for example from 0 to 1 and from 0 to 1000 would have the same infinite rate of increase.
Option 3 (Best relative change)
This option is the same as option 2, but with a formula that mitigates the disadvantage with the formula in option 2.
A minor disadvantage presented by this formula is that if a country experiences a drastic decrease (more
than 50%), then the indicator will be less than -100%. This situation, though rare, may apply to a country
facing some turmoil.
The option 1 is used so far. The other options will be tested in further years, when a time series of ACI variables is constituted.
C.2 Computation of the Indices
C.2.1 The ACI Composite Index
During the first edition of the ACI Report, the exploratory approach was used to define the components of the ACI composite
index. To this end, the hierarchical cluster analysis was carried out, using the Ward's method applying squared Euclidian distance as
the distance or similarity measure. From the findings of the analysis, 4 groups of factors appeared to be the most relevant. They are
the following:
i. Cluster 1: Policy environment
ii. Cluster 2: Processes for implementation
iii. Cluster 3: Development results
iv. Cluster 4: Capacity development outcomes.
Four cluster indices  are then calculated, each one being the arithmetic mean of its cluster  variable indicators.
Cluster Index j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) is the arithmetic mean of variable indicators within cluster j.
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c- Numerical variable in the form of absolute value
Three different options wereconsidered.
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The ACI Composite Index is the harmonic mean of the four cluster indices. The rationale for choosing the harmonic mean formula is
that capacity development is an indivisible whole of its dimensions. As such, none of the capacity development factors as given by
the four clusters should be neglected. Weakness in one of the four components should be easily captured by the harmonic mean
formula, which is sensitive to small values.
C.2.2 Sub-indices
In addition to the clusters indices, a number of sub-indicators are also calculated. They are built around the component and the
sections of the questionnaire (see structure of the questionnaire, Chart 2)
Component Indicators
Eleven component indices are calculated as follows:
Component Index j (j = 1, 2,…, 11) is the arithmetic mean of the variable indicators within that component.
The list of the component indices is presented below.
No. Name of the Component
1 Strategic choices for capacity development
2 Policy environment/Efficiency of instrument
3 Dialogue mechanisms for capacity development
4 Strategic policy choices for improving the capacity of statistical system
5 Financial commitment for capacity development
6 Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities
7 Gender Equality
8 Social inclusion
9 Partnering for capacity development
10 Capacity profiling and capacity needs assessment
11 Inputs/outputs related to capacity development
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Thematic Indicators
Six thematic Indices are calculated with the same formula as for the component indices.
Thematic index k (k = 1, 2,…, 6) is the arithmetic mean of Component Indexes within that thematic section.
The list of the thematic indices is presented below.
No. Name
1 Policy choices for capacity development
2 Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities
3 Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion
4 Partnering for capacity development
5 Capacity profiling and capacity needs assessment
6 inputs/outputs related to capacity development
C.2.3 Agricultural transformation and Food Security Index
Specific sub-indices are computed for the agricultural transformation and food security, the annual theme of this report. They
cover the following four themes:
- Agricultural strategy formulation and implementation
- Training, research and development/innovations in agriculture
- Role of private sector in the value chain
- Information system
Each of the four sub-indices is the arithmetic mean of the variable indicators within that theme.
The agricultural transformation and food security index is the harmonic mean of the four sub-indices above.
C.3 Ranking the countries
According to the index values, the countries are ranked into five categories as follows:
Index value Category Color
1 0 to less than 20 Very Low
2 20 to less than 40 Low
3 40 to less than 60 Medium
4 60 to less than 80 High
5 80 and above Very High
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ACI Indices
1 ANGOLA 17.2 Very Low 38
2 BENIN 43.4 Medium 11
3 BOTSWANA 23.1 Low 33
4 BURKINA FASO 53.4 Medium 3
5 BURUNDI 39.5 Low 15
6 CAMEROON 37.3 Low 17
7 CAPE VERDE 40.2 Medium 14
8 CAR 28.1 Low 25
9 CHAD 20.2 Low 36
10 CONGO (DRC) 34.5 Low 20
11 CONGO, REP 34.1 Low 21
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 24.6 Low 30
13 DJIBOUTI 18.2 Very Low 37
14 ETHIOPIA 52.8 Medium 4
15 GABON 40.4 Medium 13
16 GAMBIA (THE) 33.9 Low 22
17 GHANA 60.2 High 1
18 GUINEA 15.7 Very Low 39
19 GUINEA BISSAU 27.0 Low 27
20 KENYA 58.1 Medium 2
21 LESOTHO 24.6 Low 31
22 LIBERIA 35.6 Low 19
23 MADAGASCAR 10.2 Very Low 42
24 MALAWI 27.7 Low 26
25 MALI 50.3 Medium 7
26 MAURITANIA 14.6 Very Low 41
27 MAURITIUS 14.8 Very Low 40
28 MOROCCO 36.2 Low 18
29 MOZAMBIQUE 33.4 Low 23
30 NAMIBIA 25.2 Low 29
31 NIGER 30.7 Low 24
32 NIGERIA 50.5 Medium 6
33 RWANDA 51.9 Medium 5
34 SENEGAL 42.7 Medium 12
35 SIERRA LEONE 23.6 Low 32
36 SOUTH AFRICA 26.0 Low 28
37 SWAZILAND 22.5 Low 34
38 TANZANIA 37.6 Low 16
39 TOGO 20.7 Low 35
40 UGANDA 45.2 Medium 10
41 ZAMBIA 49.7 Medium 8
42 ZIMBABWE 48.6 Medium 9
Table A1. ACI Composite Index by countries (in alphabetical order)
No. Country ACI 2012 composite value Level of capacity development Rank
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More effort ahead to the highest
level of capacity development
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No countries
1 country
13 countries
22 countries
6 countries
Graphical representation capacity development levels
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Uganda
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Somalia
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Gambia
Guinea
Bissau
Chad
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Level % of countries
Very Low 14.3
Low 52.4
Medium 31.0
High 2.4
Very High 0.0
TOTAL 100
Table A2. Percentage of countries by levels of capacity development
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Table A3. Clusters indices values
No. Country
Cluster 1
Policy environment
1 ANGOLA 91.7 68.5 59.0 5.3
2 BENIN 100 85.2 43.0 21.2
3 BOTSWANA 58.3 52.8 47.0 8.6
4 BURKINA FASO 91.7 75.9 79.0 26.2
5 BURUNDI 100 75.9 44.0 18.1
6 CAMEROON 91.7 58.3 52.0 16.7
7 CAPE VERDE 91.7 75.9 64.0 16.7
8 CAR 91.7 75.0 24.0 13.1
9 CHAD 79.2 53.7 48.0 6.9
10 CONGO (DRC) 75.0 61.1 34.0 17.6
11 CONGO, REP 91.7 48.1 40.0 16.5
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 75.0 51.9 22.0 11.8
13 DJIBOUTI 91.7 79.6 64.0 5.5
14 ETHIOPIA 91.7 71.3 44.0 35.5
15 GABON 79.2 57.4 42.0 22.1
16 GAMBIA (THE) 95.8 72.2 46.0 13.9
17 GHANA 100 83.3 41.0 49.8
18 GUINEA 79.2 62.0 34.0 5.1
19 GUINEA BISSAU 79.2 59.3 56.0 9.9
20 KENYA 75.0 75.9 52.0 43.3
21 LESOTHO 79.2 74.1 46.0 8.7
22 LIBERIA 83.3 75.9 52.0 14.7
23 MADAGASCAR 91.7 50.0 51.0 2.9
24 MALAWI 100 87.0 59.0 9.4
25 MALI 91.7 81.5 47.0 28.5
26 MAURITANIA 91.7 59.3 26.0 4.8
27 MAURITIUS 83.3 89.8 51.0 4.4
28 MOROCCO 70.8 75.9 84.0 14.0
29 MOZAMBIQUE 100 86.1 78.0 11.7
30 NAMIBIA 87.5 57.4 49.0 9.2
31 NIGER 95.8 72.2 46.0 11.9
32 NIGERIA 83.3 66.7 40.0 36.7
33 RWANDA 95.8 85.2 66.0 25.2
34 SENEGAL 87.5 72.2 56.0 19.8
35 SIERRA LEONE 100 67.6 34.0 8.7
36 SOUTH AFRICA 87.5 52.8 48.0 9.7
37 SWAZILAND 75.0 50.9 33.0 8.7
38 TANZANIA 95.8 62.0 42.0 17.8
39 TOGO 95.8 51.9 39.0 7.3
40 UGANDA 95.8 72.2 55.0 21.7
41 ZAMBIA 95.8 50.0 54.0 31.7
42 ZIMBABWE 87.5 78.7 44.0 28.3
Cluster 2
Processes for implementation
Cluster 3
Development results at country level
Cluster 4
Capacity development outcome
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Table A4. Levels of capacity by cluster
No. Country
Cluster 1
Policy environment
Cluster 2
Processes for implementation
Cluster 3
Development results at country level
Cluster 4
Capacity development outcome
1 ANGOLA Very High High Medium Very Low
2 BENIN Very High Very High Medium Low
3 BOTSWANA Medium Medium Medium Very Low
4 BURKINA FASO Very High High High Low
5 BURUNDI Very High High Medium Very Low
6 CAMEROON Very High Medium Medium Very Low
7 CAPE VERDE Very High High High Very Low
8 CAR Very High High Low Very Low
9 CHAD High Medium Medium Very Low
10 CONGO (DRC) High High Low Very Low
11 CONGO, REP Very High Medium Medium Very Low
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE High Medium Low Very Low
13 DJIBOUTI Very High High High Very Low
14 ETHIOPIA Very High High Medium Low
15 GABON High Medium Medium Low
16 GAMBIA (THE) Very High High Medium Very Low
17 GHANA Very High Very High Medium Medium
18 GUINEA High High Low Very Low
19 GUINEA BISSAU High Medium Medium Very Low
20 KENYA High High Medium Medium
21 LESOTHO High High Medium Very Low
22 LIBERIA Very High High Medium Very Low
23 MADAGASCAR Very High Medium Medium Very Low
24 MALAWI Very High Very High Medium Very Low
25 MALI Very High Very High Medium Low
26 MAURITANIA Very High Medium Low Very Low
27 MAURITIUS Very High Very High Medium Very Low
28 MOROCCO High High Very High Very Low
29 MOZAMBIQUE Very High Very High High Very Low
30 NAMIBIA Very High Medium Medium Very Low
31 NIGER Very High High Medium Very Low
32 NIGERIA Very High High Medium Low
33 RWANDA Very High Very High High Low
34 SENEGAL Very High High Medium Very Low
35 SIERRA LEONE Very High High Low Very Low
36 SOUTH AFRICA Very High Medium Medium Very Low
37 SWAZILAND High Medium Low Very Low
38 TANZANIA Very High High Medium Very Low
39 TOGO Very High Medium Low Very Low
40 UGANDA Very High High Medium Low
41 ZAMBIA Very High Medium Medium Low
42 ZIMBABWE Very High High Medium Low
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No. Country
Table A5. Thematic indices values by countries
Policy choices for
capacity
development
Aid effectiveness
related to capacity
development activities
Gender equality
mainstreaming and
social inclusion
Partnering for
capacity
development
Capacity profiling
and capacity needs
assessment
Inputs/outputs related
to capacity
development
1 ANGOLA 51.7 67.5 83.3 100 50.0 0.0
2 BENIN 58.7 78.8 80.8 100 100 21.1
3 BOTSWANA 44.5 40.0 41.7 100 50.0 4.8
4 BURKINA FASO 57.8 61.3 89.2 100 100 25.6
5 BURUNDI 65.5 48.8 79.2 50.0 100 18.6
6 CAMEROON 50.0 65.0 76.7 25.0 0.0 17.3
7 CAPE VERDE 63.9 48.8 83.3 100 100 4.4
8 CAR 49.5 73.8 68.3 75.0 100 8.8
9 CHAD 50.6 53.8 60.8 50.0 0.0 0.3
10 CONGO (DRC) 53.4 23.8 52.5 75.0 100 18.4
11 CONGO, REP 45.1 56.3 75.8 0.0 0.0 9.9
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 47.2 33.8 57.5 25.0 50.0 11.9
13 DJIBOUTI 49.5 73.8 97.5 75.0 100 0.1
14 ETHIOPIA 48.7 73.8 70.0 75.0 50.0 40.5
15 GABON 41.0 58.8 68.3 75.0 0.0 21.8
16 GAMBIA (THE) 63.8 51.3 79.2 75.0 100 1.4
17 GHANA 56.8 82.5 75.8 75.0 100 56.5
18 GUINEA 53.3 55.0 60.8 50.0 50.0 0.0
19 GUINEA BISSAU 48.5 38.8 80.0 100 100 1.5
20 KENYA 70.2 33.8 79.2 25.0 50.0 47.1
21 LESOTHO 59.4 38.8 74.2 100 50.0 4.6
22 LIBERIA 75.4 52.5 54.2 100 100 5.8
23 MADAGASCAR 35.9 63.8 75.8 75.0 0.0 0.1
24 MALAWI 61.0 86.3 80.8 75.0 100 5.1
25 MALI 64.6 58.8 75.8 100 50.0 27.0
26 MAURITANIA 39.2 70.0 68.3 25.0 100 3.6
27 MAURITIUS 65.6 63.8 75.8 50.0 100 0.0
28 MOROCCO 72.6 73.8 76.7 50.0 100 2.6
29 MOZAMBIQUE 66.1 85.0 91.7 50.0 100 11.1
30 NAMIBIA 34.0 42.5 91.7 50.0 50.0 6.2
31 NIGER 57.9 57.5 76.7 75.0 100 6.4
32 NIGERIA 57.3 62.5 63.3 25.0 50.0 43.2
33 RWANDA 64.4 82.5 86.7 75.0 100 22.2
34 SENEGAL 61.1 76.3 62.5 50.0 0.0 20.9
35 SIERRA LEONE 49.5 48.8 81.7 25.0 100 2.8
36 SOUTH AFRICA 32.4 53.8 85.0 75.0 50.0 8.5
37 SWAZILAND 31.1 53.8 74.2 100 50.0 3.1
38 TANZANIA 47.1 77.5 73.3 75.0 0.0 13.9
39 TOGO 39.5 73.8 74.2 75.0 0.0 0.0
40 UGANDA 57.0 75.0 80.8 25.0 50.0 17.8
41 ZAMBIA 39.5 61.3 76.7 25.0 100 31.1
42 ZIMBABWE 57.7 36.3 84.2 50.0 100 29.7
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ANGOLA 67.5 75.0 0.0
BENIN 72.8 100.0 21.1
BOTSWANA 42.1 75.0 4.8
BURKINA FASO 69.4 100.0 25.6
BURUNDI 64.5 75.0 18.6
CAMEROON 63.9 12.5 17.3
CAPE VERDE 65.3 100.0 4.4
CAR 63.9 87.5 8.8
CHAD 55.1 25.0 0.3
CONGO (DRC) 43.2 87.5 18.4
CONGO, REP 59.0 0.0 9.9
CÔTE D'IVOIRE 46.2 37.5 11.9
DJIBOUTI 73.6 87.5 0.1
ETHIOPIA 64.2 62.5 40.5
GABON 56.0 37.5 21.8
GAMBIA (THE) 64.7 87.5 1.4
GHANA 71.7 87.5 56.5
GUINEA 56.4 50.0 0.0
GUINEA BISSAU 55.7 100.0 1.5
KENYA 61.0 37.5 47.1
LESOTHO 57.4 75.0 4.6
LIBERIA 60.7 100.0 5.8
MADAGASCAR 58.5 37.5 0.1
MALAWI 76.0 87.5 5.1
MALI 66.4 75.0 27.0
MAURITANIA 59.2 62.5 3.6
MAURITIUS 68.4 75.0 0.0
MOROCCO 74.3 75.0 2.6
MOZAMBIQUE 80.9 75.0 11.1
NAMIBIA 56.0 50.0 6.2
NIGER 64.0 87.5 6.4
NIGERIA 61.0 37.5 43.2
RWANDA 77.9 87.5 22.2
SENEGAL 66.6 25.0 20.9
SIERRA LEONE 60.0 62.5 2.8
SOUTH AFRICA 57.1 62.5 8.5
SWAZILAND 53.0 75.0 3.1
TANZANIA 66.0 37.5 13.9
TOGO 62.5 37.5 0.0
UGANDA 71.0 37.5 17.8
ZAMBIA 59.2 62.5 31.1
ZIMBABWE 59.4 75.0 29.7
Table A6. Capacity dimension indices values
Enabling environmentCountry Organizational level Individual level
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Enabling environmentCountry Organizational level Individual level
ANGOLA High High Very Low
BENIN High Very High Low
BOTSWANA Medium High Very Low
BURKINA FASO High Very High Low
BURUNDI High High Very Low
CAMEROON High Very Low Very Low
CAPE VERDE High Very High Very Low
CAR High Very High Very Low
CHAD Medium Low Very Low
CONGO (DRC) Medium Very High Very Low
CONGO, REP Medium Very Low Very Low
CÔTE D'IVOIRE Medium Low Very Low
DJIBOUTI High Very High Very Low
ETHIOPIA High High Medium
GABON Medium Low Low
GAMBIA (THE) High Very High Very Low
GHANA High Very High Medium
GUINEA Medium Medium Very Low
GUINEA BISSAU Medium Very High Very Low
KENYA High Low Medium
LESOTHO Medium High Very Low
LIBERIA High Very High Very Low
MADAGASCAR Medium Low Very Low
MALAWI High Very High Very Low
MALI High High Low
MAURITANIA Medium High Very Low
MAURITIUS High High Very Low
MOROCCO High High Very Low
MOZAMBIQUE Very High High Very Low
NAMIBIA Medium Medium Very Low
NIGER High Very High Very Low
NIGERIA High Low Medium
RWANDA High Very High Low
SENEGAL High Low Low
SIERRA LEONE Medium High Very Low
SOUTH AFRICA Medium High Very Low
SWAZILAND Medium High Very Low
TANZANIA High Low Very Low
TOGO High Low Very Low
UGANDA High Low Very Low
ZAMBIA Medium High Low
ZIMBABWE Medium High Low
Table A7. Capacity dimension indices categories
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1 ANGOLA 41.7 Medium
2 BENIN 56.7 Medium
3 BOTSWANA 40.5 Medium
4 BURKINA FASO 60.9 High
5 BURUNDI 34.9 Low
6 CAMEROON 57.8 Medium
7 CAPE VERDE 57.8 Medium
8 CAR 39.1 Low
9 CHAD 61.1 High
10 CONGO (DRC) 36.5 Low
11 CONGO, REP 49.9 Medium
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 33.2 Low
13 DJIBOUTI 45.9 Medium
14 ETHIOPIA 68.5 High
15 GABON 45.4 Medium
16 GAMBIA (THE) 67.2 High
17 GHANA 70.2 High
18 GUINEA 42.4 Medium
19 GUINEA BISSAU 59.1 Medium
20 KENYA 55.5 Medium
21 LESOTHO 53.8 Medium
22 LIBERIA 48.9 Medium
23 MADAGASCAR 57.6 Medium
24 MALAWI 61.3 High
25 MALI 68.3 High
26 MAURITANIA 37.5 Low
27 MAURITIUS 47.9 Medium
28 MOROCCO 65.2 High
29 MOZAMBIQUE 45.3 Medium
30 NAMIBIA 51.5 Medium
31 NIGER 64.8 High
32 NIGERIA 65.4 High
33 RWANDA 56.2 Medium
34 SENEGAL 61.0 High
35 SIERRA LEONE 65.3 High
36 SOUTH AFRICA 53.7 Medium
37 SWAZILAND 58.5 Medium
38 TANZANIA 56.2 Medium
39 TOGO 57.4 Medium
40 UGANDA 64.2 High
41 ZAMBIA 66.6 High
42 ZIMBABWE 56.9 Medium
Table A8. Agricultural transformation and food security composite index values
No. Country ACI Agric Level
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Table A9. Agricultural transformation and food security component indices values
No. Country
Agricultural strategy
formulation and
implementation
Training, research and
development/innovations in
agriculture
Role of private sector
in the value chain Information system
1 ANGOLA 54.3 21.4 73.1 58.3
2 BENIN 60.4 37.9 80.8 65.6
3 BOTSWANA 29.4 23.6 94.2 85.4
4 BURKINA FASO 59.5 40.8 75.0 90.6
5 BURUNDI 28.9 36.8 76.9 25.0
6 CAMEROON 56.1 41.0 75.0 72.9
7 CAPE VERDE 68.3 43.5 48.1 92.7
8 CAR 49.9 25.5 36.5 63.5
9 CHAD 68.6 37.8 71.2 95.8
10 CONGO (DRC) 19.3 41.7 44.2 89.6
11 CONGO, REP 47.1 40.1 53.8 64.6
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 23.9 22.1 75.0 50.0
13 DJIBOUTI 48.3 35.9 42.3 66.7
14 ETHIOPIA 69.8 47.1 78.8 97.9
15 GABON 51.9 32.9 53.8 50.0
16 GAMBIA (THE) 93.6 40.4 82.7 83.3
17 GHANA 67.8 53.2 82.7 88.5
18 GUINEA 49.1 22.6 53.8 88.5
19 GUINEA BISSAU 67.7 39.5 59.6 92.7
20 KENYA 70.6 33.9 73.1 67.7
21 LESOTHO 53.1 36.7 59.6 87.5
22 LIBERIA 50.2 26.6 76.9 89.6
23 MADAGASCAR 42.2 48.3 69.2 93.8
24 MALAWI 63.7 37.9 90.4 82.3
25 MALI 78.1 43.5 88.5 87.5
26 MAURITANIA 35.6 29.4 34.6 63.5
27 MAURITIUS 46.5 33.4 82.7 50.0
28 MOROCCO 65.4 48.4 73.1 85.4
29 MOZAMBIQUE 32.1 38.5 55.8 75.0
30 NAMIBIA 40.6 34.2 82.7 85.4
31 NIGER 78.4 40.4 82.7 82.3
32 NIGERIA 51.7 56.3 82.7 83.3
33 RWANDA 78.1 36.9 65.4 62.5
34 SENEGAL 53.5 40.4 90.4 90.6
35 SIERRA LEONE 74.8 40.8 82.7 88.5
36 SOUTH AFRICA 41.1 53.9 46.2 100
37 SWAZILAND 45.7 40.8 90.4 91.7
38 TANZANIA 42.2 43.7 84.6 78.1
39 TOGO 58.1 40.7 75.0 68.8
40 UGANDA 64.6 42.5 80.8 91.7
41 ZAMBIA 64.0 47.5 84.6 86.5
42 ZIMBABWE 45.6 45.9 69.2 82.3
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Country Profiles
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value................................................................................................................................................................17.2
Level of Capacity Development ...............................................................................................................................................Very Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................38
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development..........................................................................................................................................51.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................67.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................83.3
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.................................................................................................................................41.7
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010) .............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ................................................................................................................................0
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010(US$) ....................................................................................................................................0
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Benin
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................43.4
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank ...... .................................................................................................................................................................................................11
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................58.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................78.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion......................................................................................................................80.8
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................56.7
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.5
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment......................................................................................................................................................4.0
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................21.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010(US$) ........................................................................................................................686,696
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Botswana
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value................................................................................................................................................................23.1
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................33
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................44.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................40.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.......................................................................................................................41.7
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................40.5
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment.......................................................................................................................................................5.1
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................4.8
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) .........................................................................................................................245,514
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................53.4
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank ........................................................................................................................................................................................................3
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................57.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.........................................................................................................61.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................89.2
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ...............................................................................................................................60.9
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................4.3
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development............................................................................................................................25.6
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................6
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)......................................................................................................................3,747,629
Burkina Faso
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................39.5
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................15
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................65.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................48.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................79.2
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................34.9
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010)................................................................................................................................................3.1
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010) ............................................................................................................................ Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... 3.4
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development............................................................................................................................18.6
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).........................................................................................................................787,624
Burundi
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................37.3
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................17
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................50.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................65.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................76.7
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................57.8
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.2
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment.......................................................................................................................................................3.1
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ............................................................................................................................17.3
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................4
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)......................................................................................................................1,674,938
Cameroon
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................40.2
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................14
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................63.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................48.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................83.3
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................57.8
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010)................................................................................................................................................4.1
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment......................................................................................................................................................4.0
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................4.4
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 .....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).........................................................................................................................222,660
Cape Verde
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
308
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value................................................................................................................................................................28.1
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................25
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................49.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................73.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................68.3
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................39.1
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................8.8
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................734,982
Central African Republic
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................20.2
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................36
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development ........................................................................................................................................50.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................53.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion......................................................................................................................60.8
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security… .............................................................................................................................61.1
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development..............................................................................................................................0.3
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)..........................................................................................................................154,210
Chad
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................34.5
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................20
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................53.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................23.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.......................................................................................................................52.5
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................36.5
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development............................................................................................................................18.4
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................884,323
Congo (Dem. Rep. of)
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value................................................................................................................................................................34.1
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank .......................................................................................................................................................................................................21
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................45.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................56.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................75.8
Development agencies ..........................................................................................................................................................................0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................49.9
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.9
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)............................................................................................................................. Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................9.9
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2009 ...................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2009 (US$)........................................................................................................................554,250
Congo
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................24.6
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................30
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................47.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................33.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.......................................................................................................................57.5
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................33.2
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................3.5
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.............................................................................................................................11.9
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).......................................................................................................................1,093,821
Côte d'Ivoire
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value................................................................................................................................................................18.2
Level of Capacity Development ...............................................................................................................................................Very Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................37
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................49.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................73.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................97.5
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................45.9
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.2
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ..............................................................................................................................0.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)...........................................................................................................................77,288
Djibouti
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................52.8
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank ........................................................................................................................................................................................................4
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................48.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................73.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................70.0
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................68.5
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010) .....................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ...........................................................................................................................40.5
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ......................................................................................................................2,332,234
Ethiopia
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................40.4
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................13
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................41.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................58.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................68.3
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................45.4
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ............................................................................................................................21.8
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................5
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).......................................................................................................................1,450,812
Gabon
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................33.9
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................22
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................63.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities .........................................................................................................51.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................79.2
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................67.2
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ..............................................................................................................................1.4
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ..........................................................................................................................68,055
Gambia (The)
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................60.1
Level of Capacity Development .......................................................................................................................................................High
Rank ...... ..................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development ........................................................................................................................................58.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................82.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................75.8
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................70.2
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.9
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................3.6
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development............................................................................................................................56.5
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................6
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ......................................................................................................................3,057,139
Ghana
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
318
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value................................................................................................................................................................15.7
Level of Capacity Development ...............................................................................................................................................Very Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................39
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................53.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................55.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion......................................................................................................................60.8
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................42.4
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)............................................................................................................................. Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ................................................................................................................................0
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 20101 ...................................................................................................................................0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2009 (US$)...................................................................................................................................0
Guinea
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
319
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................27.0
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................27
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................48.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................38.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion......................................................................................................................80.0
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................59.1
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ..............................................................................................................................1.5
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 .....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)...........................................................................................................................67,952
Guinea Bissau
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................58.1
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank ...... ..................................................................................................................................................................................................2
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................70.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................33.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................79.2
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................55.5
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................4.3
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ............................................................................................................................47.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................7
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ......................................................................................................................2,180,753
Kenya
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
321
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................24.6
Level of Capacity Development....................................................................................................................................................... Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................31
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................59.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................38.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................74.2
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................53.8
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.5
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................4.6
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).........................................................................................................................254,928
Lesotho
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................35.6
Level of Capacity Development....................................................................................................................................................... Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................19
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................75.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.........................................................................................................52.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................54.2
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................48.9
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.9
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010) .............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... 4.0
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................5.8
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 .....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) .........................................................................................................................184,207
Liberia
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
323
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value................................................................................................................................................................10.2
Level of Capacity Development ...............................................................................................................................................Very Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................42
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................35.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................63.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................75.8
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................57.6
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................3.4
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ..............................................................................................................................0.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)...........................................................................................................................73,524
Madagascar
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
324
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................27.7
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................26
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................61.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................86.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion......................................................................................................................80.8
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................61.3
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.3
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ..............................................................................................................................5.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).........................................................................................................................183,834
Malawi
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325
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................50.3
Level of Capacity Development ................................................................................................................................................ Medium
Rank ...... ..................................................................................................................................................................................................7
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development ........................................................................................................................................64.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................58.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................75.8
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................68.3
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.6
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development............................................................................................................................27.0
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................4
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).........................................................................................................................855,166
Mali
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................14.6
Level of Capacity Development ...............................................................................................................................................Very Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................41
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................39.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................70.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................68.3
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................39.1
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.2
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................3.0
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development..............................................................................................................................3.6
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 .....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)..........................................................................................................................232,361
Mauritania
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
327
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................14.8
Level of Capacity Development ...............................................................................................................................................Very Low
Rank ...... ...............................................................................................................................................................................................40
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development ........................................................................................................................................65.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................63.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................75.8
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................47.9
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010) .....................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ................................................................................................................................0
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ...................................................................................................................................0
Mauritius
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
328
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................36.2
Level of Capacity Development....................................................................................................................................................... Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................18
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................72.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................73.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................76.7
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................65.2
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development..............................................................................................................................2.6
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 .....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ............................................................................................................................6,903
Morocco
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
329
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................33.4
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................23
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................66.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................85.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.......................................................................................................................91.7
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................45.3
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................11.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$).........................................................................................................................612,940
Mozambique
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................25.2
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................29
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................34.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................42.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.......................................................................................................................91.7
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.................................................................................................................................51.5
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development..............................................................................................................................6.2
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................582,589
Namibia
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
331
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................30.7
Level of Capacity Development....................................................................................................................................................... Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................24
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................57.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................57.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................76.7
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ...............................................................................................................................64.8
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... 4.3
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................6.4
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 .....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................355,685
Niger
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
332
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................50.5
Level of Capacity Development ................................................................................................................................................ Medium
Rank ........................................................................................................................................................................................................6
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................57.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................62.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................63.3
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................65.4
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development............................................................................................................................43.2
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................7
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................594,936
Nigeria
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
333
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................51.9
Level of Capacity Development ................................................................................................................................................ Medium
Rank ........................................................................................................................................................................................................5
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development ........................................................................................................................................64.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................82.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................86.7
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................56.2
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ............................................................................................................................22.2
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)......................................................................................................................1,005,029
Rwanda
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
334
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................42.7
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank .......................................................................................................................................................................................................12
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development..........................................................................................................................................61.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................76.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................62.5
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................61.0
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.7
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ...........................................................................................................................20.9
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................5
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)......................................................................................................................1,484,362
Senegal
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
335
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................23.6
Level of Capacity Development....................................................................................................................................................... Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................32
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................49.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities........................................................................................................48.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.......................................................................................................................81.7
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................65.3
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.3
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)............................................................................................................................. Fragile
• Self-country assessment ..................................................................................................................................................... NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development..............................................................................................................................2.8
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ...........................................................................................................................21,387
Sierra Leone
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
336
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................25.8
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................28
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................32.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................53.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................85.0
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................53.7
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development .............................................................................................................................8.5
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................4
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................353,644
South Africa
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
337
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................22.5
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ......................................................................................................................................................................................................34
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development ..........................................................................................................................................31.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................53.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................74.2
Development agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................100
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................58.5
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................NA
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ..............................................................................................................................3.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 .....................................................................................................................................1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) .........................................................................................................................297,416
Swaziland
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
338
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................37.6
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................16
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................47.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.........................................................................................................77.5
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.......................................................................................................................73.3
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................56.2
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..................................................................................................................... Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment...................................................................................................................................................... 2.7
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ............................................................................................................................13.9
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................855,654
Tanzania
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
339
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................20.7
Level of Capacity Development........................................................................................................................................................Low
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................35
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................39.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................73.8
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................74.2
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................75.0
Assessment of needs .............................................................................................................................................................................0
Agricultural transformation and food security ................................................................................................................................57.4
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.9
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010) .............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................NA
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ................................................................................................................................0
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ...........................................................................................................................24,871
Togo
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ...............................................................................................................................................................45.2
Level of Capacity Development ................................................................................................................................................ Medium
Rank ...... ................................................................................................................................................................................................10
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................57.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................75.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion......................................................................................................................80.8
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs ........................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................64.2
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.8
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment.......................................................................................................................................................3.1
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development ............................................................................................................................17.8
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) ........................................................................................................................983,594
Uganda
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
341
ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value...............................................................................................................................................................49.7
Level of Capacity Development .................................................................................................................................................Medium
Rank ........................................................................................................................................................................................................8
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development.........................................................................................................................................39.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.........................................................................................................61.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................76.7
Development agencies......................................................................................................................................................................25.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security ...............................................................................................................................66.6
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................3.4
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)......................................................................................................................Non-Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................3.4
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development.............................................................................................................................31.1
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010.....................................................................................................................................3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$) .......................................................................................................................1,156,815
Zambia
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
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ACI Composite Index
ACI Composite Index value ..............................................................................................................................................................48.6
Level of Capacity Development ................................................................................................................................................ Medium
Rank ........................................................................................................................................................................................................9
Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values
Policy choices for capacity development .........................................................................................................................................57.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities ........................................................................................................36.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion ......................................................................................................................84.2
Development agencies .....................................................................................................................................................................50.0
Assessment of needs..........................................................................................................................................................................100
Agricultural transformation and food security................................................................................................................................56.9
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
• IRAI Value(World Bank 2010) ...............................................................................................................................................2.0
• State of Fragility (World Bank 2010)..............................................................................................................................Fragile
• Self-country assessment ......................................................................................................................................................3.9
ACBF-related activities
Inputs/outputs related to capacity development............................................................................................................................29.7
No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2010 ....................................................................................................................................5
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2010 (US$)......................................................................................................................1,438,586
Zimbabwe
AFRICA CAPACITY INDICATORS 2012
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Compendium of Statistics
1 ANGOLA YES 2009 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES Average 4
2 BENIN YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO HIGH 0
3 BOTSWANA YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives YES HIGH 0
4 BURKINA FASO YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 1
5 BURUNDI YES 2006 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 0
6 CAMEROON YES 2009 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO AVERAGE 0
7 CAPE VERDE YES 2008 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives YES HIGH 5
8 CAR YES 2007 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES LOW 0
9 CHAD YES 2008 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 0
10 CONGO (DRC) YES 2006 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES LOW 0
11 CONGO, REP YES 2008 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO HIGH 4
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES 2009 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO HIGH 0
13 DJIBOUTI YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO AVERAGE 2
14 ETHIOPIA YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 0
15 GABON YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives NO AVERAGE 2
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES 2007 CD not mainstreamed NO HIGH 5
17 GHANA YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO HIGH 0
18 GUINEA YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES LOW 0
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES 2004 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES AVERAGE 0
20 KENYA YES 2008 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 2
21 LESOTHO YES 2009 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 0
22 LIBERIA YES 2008 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 0
23 MADAGASCAR YES 2007 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES AVERAGE 0
24 MALAWI YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO HIGH 0
25 MALI YES 2006 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives YES HIGH 2
26 MAURITANIA YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives NO AVERAGE 1
27 MAURITIUS YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives YES AVERAGE 2
28 MOROCCO YES 2008 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives YES AVERAGE 4
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives YES HIGH 0
30 NAMIBIA YES 2001 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives NO HIGH 3
31 NIGER YES 2007 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 0
32 NIGERIA YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 0
33 RWANDA YES 2007 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 4
34 SENEGAL YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives YES HIGH 0
35 SIERRA LEONE YES 2009 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO HIGH 0
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES … CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives NO AVERAGE …
37 SWAZILAND YES 2006 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO LOW 0
38 TANZANIA YES 2010 CD not mainstreamed NO HIGH 1
39 TOGO YES 2009 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives NO AVERAGE 0
40 UGANDA YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives NO AVERAGE 3
41 ZAMBIA YES 2011 CD mainstreamed, clear objectives YES HIGH 1
42 ZIMBABWE YES 2010 CD mainstreamed, no clear objectives NO HIGH 1
Strategic policy choices for capacity development
Integration of Capacity Development  in National
Development Strategy/National Development Plan
(NDS)No. Country
Existence of a
National
Development
Strategy
Year of
adoption of
latest
version
Specific
National
Program
for CD
Level of
Government
Commitment to
MDGs
Number
of MDGs
achieved
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NDS = National Development Strategy/National Development Plan
CD = Capacity Development
MDGs = Millennium Development Goals
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Policy environment/Efficiency of instrument
No. Country
Level of legitimacy of the National
Development Strategy
Levels of incentives for compliance
provided by the National Development
Strategy
Level of flexibility of the National
Development Strategy
2Compendium of Statistics
1 ANGOLA AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE
2 BENIN HIGH HIGH HIGH
3 BOTSWANA HIGH LOW AVERAGE
4 BURKINA FASO HIGH AVERAGE AVERAGE
5 BURUNDI HIGH HIGH HIGH
6 CAMEROON HIGH AVERAGE AVERAGE
7 CAPE VERDE HIGH HIGH LOW
8 CAR HIGH HIGH AVERAGE
9 CHAD AVERAGE HIGH HIGH
10 CONGO (DRC) HIGH HIGH HIGH
11 CONGO, REP HIGH HIGH AVERAGE
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE HIGH HIGH HIGH
13 DJIBOUTI AVERAGE AVERAGE HIGH
14 ETHIOPIA HIGH AVERAGE LOW
15 GABON AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE
16 GAMBIA (THE) HIGH HIGH HIGH
17 GHANA HIGH HIGH AVERAGE
18 GUINEA HIGH AVERAGE HIGH
19 GUINEA BISSAU HIGH HIGH HIGH
20 KENYA HIGH HIGH HIGH
21 LESOTHO HIGH HIGH AVERAGE
22 LIBERIA HIGH HIGH AVERAGE
23 MADAGASCAR AVERAGE AVERAGE LOW
24 MALAWI HIGH AVERAGE AVERAGE
25 MALI HIGH HIGH HIGH
26 MAURITANIA HIGH HIGH AVERAGE
27 MAURITIUS HIGH AVERAGE AVERAGE
28 MOROCCO AVERAGE AVERAGE LOW
29 MOZAMBIQUE HIGH AVERAGE HIGH
30 NAMIBIA AVERAGE LOW LOW
31 NIGER HIGH AVERAGE HIGH
32 NIGERIA AVERAGE HIGH HIGH
33 RWANDA HIGH HIGH HIGH
34 SENEGAL AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE
35 SIERRA LEONE HIGH AVERAGE AVERAGE
36 SOUTH AFRICA AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE
37 SWAZILAND HIGH LOW HIGH
38 TANZANIA AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE
39 TOGO HIGH AVERAGE HIGH
40 UGANDA HIGH HIGH AVERAGE
41 ZAMBIA HIGH AVERAGE AVERAGE
42 ZIMBABWE HIGH AVERAGE AVERAGE
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1 ANGOLA Informal dialog AVERAGE CD discussed within broader dial AVERAGE
2 BENIN No institutionalized mechanism … No institutionalized mechanism VERY HIGH
3 BOTSWANA Institutionalized dialog HIGH Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
4 BURKINA FASO Institutionalized dialog LOW Institutionalized dialog LOW
5 BURUNDI Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
6 CAMEROON Informal dialog AVERAGE No institutionalized mechanism HIGH
7 CAPE VERDE Informal dialog LOW CD discussed within broader dial HIGH
8 CAR Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE CD discussed within broader dial HIGH
9 CHAD Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
10 CONGO (DRC) Institutionalized dialog HIGH Institutionalized dialog HIGH
11 CONGO, REP Informal dialog VERY LOW No institutionalized mechanism …
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE No institutionalized mechanism …
13 DJIBOUTI Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
14 ETHIOPIA Informal dialog LOW CD discussed within broader dial AVERAGE
15 GABON Institutionalized dialog LOW Institutionalized dialog LOW
16 GAMBIA (THE) No institutionalized mechanism … CD discussed within broader dial VERY HIGH
17 GHANA Informal dialog HIGH CD discussed within broader dial HIGH
18 GUINEA Institutionalized dialog LOW Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
19 GUINEA BISSAU No institutionalized mechanism VERY HIGH No institutionalized mechanism …
20 KENYA Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
21 LESOTHO No institutionalized mechanism AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
22 LIBERIA Institutionalized dialog HIGH Institutionalized dialog HIGH
23 MADAGASCAR Informal dialog … CD discussed within broader dial …
24 MALAWI Institutionalized dialog HIGH No institutionalized mechanism HIGH
25 MALI Institutionalized dialog VERY HIGH Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
26 MAURITANIA Informal dialog AVERAGE CD discussed within broader dial AVERAGE
27 MAURITIUS Institutionalized dialog HIGH Institutionalized dialog VERY HIGH
28 MOROCCO Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
29 MOZAMBIQUE Institutionalized dialog VERY HIGH CD discussed within broader dial HIGH
30 NAMIBIA No institutionalized mechanism … CD discussed within broader dial AVERAGE
31 NIGER Informal dialog AVERAGE No institutionalized mechanism …
32 NIGERIA No institutionalized mechanism … Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
33 RWANDA Institutionalized dialog HIGH CD discussed within broader dial HIGH
34 SENEGAL Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE
35 SIERRA LEONE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE CD discussed within broader dial HIGH
36 SOUTH AFRICA Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE … HIGH
37 SWAZILAND Informal dialog LOW No institutionalized mechanism …
38 TANZANIA Institutionalized dialog VERY HIGH CD discussed within broader dial HIGH
39 TOGO No institutionalized mechanism … No institutionalized mechanism …
40 UGANDA Informal dialog AVERAGE CD discussed within broader dial AVERAGE
41 ZAMBIA No institutionalized mechanism … CD discussed within broader dial AVERAGE
42 ZIMBABWE Institutionalized dialog AVERAGE Institutionalized dialog HIGH
Dialogue mechanisms for capacity development
3Compendium of Statistics
No. Country
Effective dialog mechanism
(and other links as
appropriate) among domestic
institutions (civil society,
private sector) engaged in CD Level of effectiveness Level of effectiveness
Effective dialogue mechanism
established by Government
with development partners
relating specifically to CD
(…) Data not available
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1 ANGOLA … … …
2 BENIN At least 3 times AVERAGE HIGH
3 BOTSWANA At least 3 times AVERAGE HIGH
4 BURKINA FASO At least 3 times AVERAGE LOW
5 BURUNDI At least 3 times AVERAGE HIGH
6 CAMEROON Once or twice HIGH AVERAGE
7 CAPE VERDE At least 3 times HIGH AVERAGE
8 CAR At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
9 CHAD At least 3 times HIGH AVERAGE
10 CONGO (DRC) Once or twice HIGH HIGH
11 CONGO, REP At least 3 times LOW LOW
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE Once or twice AVERAGE LOW
13 DJIBOUTI Once or twice AVERAGE AVERAGE
14 ETHIOPIA At least 3 times LOW HIGH
15 GABON At least 3 times AVERAGE AVERAGE
16 GAMBIA (THE) At least 3 times HIGH AVERAGE
17 GHANA At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
18 GUINEA Once or twice AVERAGE AVERAGE
19 GUINEA BISSAU Once or twice LOW LOW
20 KENYA At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
21 LESOTHO At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
22 LIBERIA At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
23 MADAGASCAR No public speech LOW LOW
24 MALAWI At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
25 MALI At least 3 times HIGH AVERAGE
26 MAURITANIA No public speech LOW LOW
27 MAURITIUS At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
28 MOROCCO At least 3 times HIGH AVERAGE
29 MOZAMBIQUE Once or twice AVERAGE HIGH
30 NAMIBIA At least 3 times LOW AVERAGE
31 NIGER Once or twice HIGH AVERAGE
32 NIGERIA At least 3 times LOW AVERAGE
33 RWANDA At least 3 times AVERAGE AVERAGE
34 SENEGAL At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
35 SIERRA LEONE At least 3 times LOW AVERAGE
36 SOUTH AFRICA … … …
37 SWAZILAND Once or twice LOW LOW
38 TANZANIA … … …
39 TOGO Once or twice LOW AVERAGE
40 UGANDA At least 3 times HIGH AVERAGE
41 ZAMBIA … … …
42 ZIMBABWE At least 3 times HIGH HIGH
Dialogue mechanisms for capacity development (Cont'd)
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No. Country
(…) Data not available
During 2009 calendar year, how frequently did the
Head of State, the Head of government and/or
other high officials speak publicly and favorably
about capacity development efforts?
Level of civil society participation
in priority setting related to
capacity development agenda
Level of transparency of information to
civil society about the capacity
development agenda
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(…) Data not available
NA - Not applicable
1 ANGOLA YES 2011 YES YES YES YES
2 BENIN YES 2008 YES YES YES NO
3 BOTSWANA NO NA … YES NO NO
4 BURKINA FASO YES 2003 YES NO YES YES
5 BURUNDI YES 2011 YES NO NO YES
6 CAMEROON YES 2009 YES YES NO YES
7 CAPE VERDE YES 2006 YES YES NO YES
8 CAR NO NA NO YES NO NO
9 CHAD NO NA … NO NO NO
10 CONGO (DRC) NO NA NO YES NO NO
11 CONGO, REP NO NA NO YES NO YES
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE NO NA … YES … YES
13 DJIBOUTI YES 2010 YES YES NO NO
14 ETHIOPIA YES 2009 YES YES NO NO
15 GABON YES 2010 NO YES NO NO
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES 2007 YES YES YES YES
17 GHANA YES 2008 YES YES NO NO
18 GUINEA YES 2008 YES YES NO NO
19 GUINEA BISSAU NO NA NO YES YES NO
20 KENYA YES 2011 YES YES NO YES
21 LESOTHO YES 2011 YES YES NO NO
22 LIBERIA YES 2008 YES NO YES YES
23 MADAGASCAR YES 2008 NO YES YES NO
24 MALAWI YES 2006 YES YES YES YES
25 MALI YES 2006 YES NO NO YES
26 MAURITANIA YES 2008 YES NO NO NO
27 MAURITIUS YES 2007 YES YES YES YES
28 MOROCCO YES 2004 YES YES YES YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES 2008 YES YES YES YES
30 NAMIBIA YES 2006 NO YES YES NO
31 NIGER YES 2008 YES YES YES NO
32 NIGERIA YES 2010 YES YES YES NO
33 RWANDA YES 2010 YES YES NO NO
34 SENEGAL YES 2007 YES YES YES YES
35 SIERRA LEONE YES 2008 YES YES NO NO
36 SOUTH AFRICA NO NA … YES YES NO
37 SWAZILAND NO NA … YES NO NO
38 TANZANIA YES 2010 NO YES NO NO
39 TOGO YES 2008 YES YES NO NO
40 UGANDA YES 2006 YES YES NO YES
41 ZAMBIA NO NA … YES NO NO
42 ZIMBABWE YES 2007 YES YES YES NO
No. Country
Ratification of the
African Charter on
Statistics (adopted on
February 3, 2009)
National Statistics
Office operate an
in-service training
center
Statistics taught
at any of the higher
training
institutions
NSDS is fully
operational
Year of adoption
of NSDS
Existence of a National
Strategy for the
Development
of Statistics (NSDS)
Strategic policy choices for improving the statistical system
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1 ANGOLA … …
2 BENIN 5.25 1.54
3 BOTSWANA … 0.72
4 BURKINA FASO 2.60 3.22
5 BURUNDI 0.08 17.29
6 CAMEROON … …
7 CAPE VERDE 14.50 37.78
8 CAR 0.61 3.85
9 CHAD 20.44 1.89
10 CONGO (DRC) 0.06 2.92
11 CONGO, REP 20.72 0.27
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 0.04 0.66
13 DJIBOUTI 2.00 0.75
14 ETHIOPIA … …
15 GABON 10.37 0.58
16 GAMBIA (THE) 1.04 17.95
17 GHANA … …
18 GUINEA 1.02 4.22
19 GUINEA BISSAU 13.59 8.13
20 KENYA 0.74 0.09
21 LESOTHO … 4.73
22 LIBERIA 0.70 80.68
23 MADAGASCAR 0.08 3.41
24 MALAWI … …
25 MALI 2.87 1.99
26 MAURITANIA 2.68 0.28
27 MAURITIUS … …
28 MOROCCO 115.00 47.50
29 MOZAMBIQUE … 4.72
30 NAMIBIA … …
31 NIGER 3.49 3.33
32 NIGERIA … …
33 RWANDA … …
34 SENEGAL … …
35 SIERRA LEONE … …
36 SOUTH AFRICA … …
37 SWAZILAND 22.03 0.00
38 TANZANIA 33.66 22.12
39 TOGO 0.07 0.00
40 UGANDA … …
41 ZAMBIA … …
42 ZIMBABWE 0.20 0.29
No. Country Official Development Assistance as % of government budget
Financial commitment for capacity development
Proportion of Government budget allocated to CD (%)
(…) Data not available
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No. Country
Endorsement of the
Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness
Technical cooperation
disbursed to the country
through coordinated
programs in support of
CD in 2010
Million US$
Existence of an aid
coordination
policy
Existence of an aid
coordination
mechanism
Assessment of
coordination of
support to capacity in
the country
Scale 1 = Very weak
to 6 = Very strong
No. of parallel
project
implementation
units for CD
development
partners made
use of in 2010
1 ANGOLA YES YES YES … 3 …
2 BENIN YES YES YES 78 5 62
3 BOTSWANA YES NO YES 716 2 1
4 BURKINA FASO YES NO YES 56.1 3 47
5 BURUNDI YES YES YES 78.4 3 98
6 CAMEROON YES YES YES 87.1 2 8
7 CAPE VERDE YES YES … 1.9 3 0
8 CAR YES YES YES 4.9 3 13
9 CHAD YES NO NO 40.1 5 40
10 CONGO (DRC) YES NO NO … 3 138
11 CONGO, REP YES YES NO 0 1 0
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES NO NO … 2 4
13 DJIBOUTI YES YES YES 57.4 3 4
14 ETHIOPIA YES YES YES … 3 0
15 GABON YES NO YES 13.5 2 1
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES YES YES 34.5 4 16
17 GHANA YES YES YES 125 4 3
18 GUINEA YES NO YES 23.3 3 45
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES YES NO … 4 …
20 KENYA YES NO NO … 2 21
21 LESOTHO YES NO YES 67.1 4 3
22 LIBERIA YES YES YES 2.1 2 8
23 MADAGASCAR YES YES YES 49.6 4 7
24 MALAWI YES YES YES … 3 3
25 MALI YES NO YES 128.2 2 82
26 MAURITANIA YES YES YES 2.7 4 39
27 MAURITIUS YES YES … 4 0
28 MOROCCO YES YES YES 1608.5 3 5
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES YES YES 60 5 6
30 NAMIBIA YES YES NO … 3 …
31 NIGER YES YES YES 436 4 2
32 NIGERIA YES YES YES … 1 …
33 RWANDA YES YES YES 585.1 4 31
34 SENEGAL YES YES YES … 4 …
35 SIERRA LEONE YES YES YES 8.1 3 3
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES YES YES 6913.9 5 26
37 SWAZILAND YES YES 38 5 4
38 TANZANIA YES YES YES … 2 …
39 TOGO YES YES YES 12.6 3 4
40 UGANDA YES YES YES … 1 …
41 ZAMBIA YES YES YES … 3 …
42 ZIMBABWE NO YES YES 6.5 3 0
(…) Data not available
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities
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1 ANGOLA Remained stable … … Increased
2 BENIN Remained stable 18 97 Increased
3 BOTSWANA Increased 84 95 Remained stable
4 BURKINA FASO Decreased 75 56 Remained stable
5 BURUNDI Increased 133 92 Increased
6 CAMEROON Decreased 100 … Increased
7 CAPE VERDE Decreased 45 25 Increased
8 CAR Decreased 77.8 30.2 Increased
9 CHAD Decreased 84 80 Decreased
10 CONGO (DRC) Increased 33 93 Increased
11 CONGO, REP Increased 1.4 0 Decreased
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE Increased … … …
13 DJIBOUTI Remained stable 40 15 Remained stable
14 ETHIOPIA Decreased … … Increased
15 GABON Decreased 56.4 100 Decreased
16 GAMBIA (THE) Increased 70 95 Increased
17 GHANA Decreased … … Remained stable
18 GUINEA Decreased 32.4 58 Decreased
19 GUINEA BISSAU Increased 52 … Increased
20 KENYA Decreased 58 78 Increased
21 LESOTHO Increased 121 64 Increased
22 LIBERIA Decreased 15.6 85 Increased
23 MADAGASCAR Increased 58.9 92 Remained stable
24 MALAWI Decreased 60 20 Remained stable
25 MALI Increased 39.9 25 Remained stable
26 MAURITANIA Increased 70.8 55 Decreased
27 MAURITIUS Remained stable … 30 Increased
28 MOROCCO Decreased 25 35 Increased
29 MOZAMBIQUE Decreased 12.6 88 Increased
30 NAMIBIA Increased … … Remained stable
31 NIGER Increased 46 84 Increased
32 NIGERIA Decreased … … …
33 RWANDA Decreased 73 78 Increased
34 SENEGAL Decreased … … …
35 SIERRA LEONE Increased 6 Increased
36 SOUTH AFRICA Increased … 70
37 SWAZILAND Increased Remained stable
38 TANZANIA Decreased … … …
39 TOGO Decreased 58 0 Remained stable
40 UGANDA Decreased 70 Remained stable
41 ZAMBIA Decreased … … …
42 ZIMBABWE Increased 0 0 Increased
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities (Cont'd)
No. Country
Trend of the number
of parallel units the
development
partners are making
use of in CD since
2010
(…) Data not available
Proportion of ODA for CD scheduled in
2009 and disbursed within 2010 (%)
Percent of bilateral aid for capacity
that was untied in calendar year
2010 (%)
Trend of proportion of bilateral aid
for CD, with respect to 2009
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Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities (Cont'd)
No. Country
1 ANGOLA … … M&E tools, but not adequate YES
2 BENIN 20.0 63.2 Adequate M&E underway YES
3 BOTSWANA 5.3 61.5 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
4 BURKINA FASO 80.0 100.0 Adequate M&E underway NO
5 BURUNDI 20.9 43.9 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
6 CAMEROON 100.0 100.0 Adequate M&E underway NO
7 CAPE VERDE 50.0 50.0 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
8 CAR … … M&E tools, but not adequate YES
9 CHAD 12.2 41.9 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
10 CONGO (DRC) 33.9 45.0 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
11 CONGO, REP 0.0 100.0 M&E tools, but not adequate YES
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 0.0 NA M&E tools, but not adequate YES
13 DJIBOUTI 100.0 50.0 M&E tools, but not adequate YES
14 ETHIOPIA 100.0 100.0 M&E tools, but not adequate YES
15 GABON 20.0 57.1 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
16 GAMBIA (THE) 100.0 100.0 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
17 GHANA 15.6 41.9 M&E tools, but not adequate YES
18 GUINEA 37.5 100.0 No M&E mechanism in place NO
19 GUINEA BISSAU NA NA M&E tools, but not adequate NO
20 KENYA … … M&E tools, but not adequate NO
21 LESOTHO 18.3 71.8 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
22 LIBERIA 22.2 48.8 No M&E mechanism in place NO
23 MADAGASCAR NA NA Adequate M&E underway NO
24 MALAWI NA 100.0 Adequate M&E underway YES
25 MALI 14.9 36.4 Adequate M&E underway YES
26 MAURITANIA 100.0 Adequate M&E underway NO
27 MAURITIUS 100.0 100.0 Adequate M&E underway YES
28 MOROCCO 50.0 66.7 M&E tools, but not adequate YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE 11.3 35.4 Adequate M&E underway YES
30 NAMIBIA 43.3 58.8 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
31 NIGER 55.7 32.4 Adequate M&E underway NO
32 NIGERIA Adequate M&E underway NO
33 RWANDA 20.6 25.6 Adequate M&E underway YES
34 SENEGAL … M&E tools, but not adequate YES
35 SIERRA LEONE NA 33.9 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
36 SOUTH AFRICA 79.5 52.0 M&E tools, but not adequate NO
37 SWAZILAND NA NA Adequate M&E underway NO
38 TANZANIA … … Adequate M&E underway YES
39 TOGO 100.0 100.0 Adequate M&E underway NO
40 UGANDA NA NA M&E tools, but not adequate YES
41 ZAMBIA … M&E tools, but not adequate NO
42 ZIMBABWE 100.0 NA M&E tools, but not adequate NO
% of joint donors'
missions
conducted to the
field 2010
% of joint donors' analytic works
undertaken in calendar year 2010
Existence of transparent and
monitorable performance assessment
frameworks to assess progress
against the national development
strategy and sector program
Mutual assessment of progress in
implementing agreed commitments
between the government and the
community of donors conducted
(…) Data not available
NA - Not applicable
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No. Country Ratification of CEDAW Year of ratification Report to the Committee
Institutional mechanisms to implement
the CEDAW
(…) Data not available
1 ANGOLA CEDAW ratified without reservation … Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
2 BENIN CEDAW ratified without reservation 1992 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
3 BOTSWANA CEDAW ratified with reservations 1996 No reporting Focal point at appropriate level
4 BURKINA FASO CEDAW ratified without reservation 1984 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
5 BURUNDI CEDAW ratified without reservation 1991 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
6 CAMEROON CEDAW ratified without reservation 1994 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
7 CAPE VERDE CEDAW ratified without reservation 1979 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
8 CAR CEDAW ratified without reservation 1991 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
9 CHAD CEDAW ratified without reservation 1995 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
10 CONGO (DRC) CEDAW ratified without reservation 1986 Some reporting done Focal person without special mandate
11 CONGO, REP CEDAW ratified without reservation 1982 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE CEDAW ratified without reservation 1995 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
13 DJIBOUTI CEDAW ratified without reservation 1998 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
14 ETHIOPIA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1981 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
15 GABON CEDAW ratified without reservation 1979 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
16 GAMBIA (THE) CEDAW ratified without reservation 1992 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
17 GHANA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1986 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
18 GUINEA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1982 Some reporting done Focal person without special mandate
19 GUINEA BISSAU CEDAW ratified without reservation 2008 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
20 KENYA CEDAW ratified with reservations 1984 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
21 LESOTHO CEDAW ratified with reservations 1995 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
22 LIBERIA CEDAW ratified without reservation 2009 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
23 MADAGASCAR CEDAW ratified without reservation 1998 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
24 MALAWI CEDAW ratified without reservation 1987 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
25 MALI CEDAW ratified without reservation 1985 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
26 MAURITANIA CEDAW ratified without reservation 2000 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
27 MAURITIUS CEDAW ratified without reservation 1984 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
28 MOROCCO CEDAW ratified without reservation 1993 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
29 MOZAMBIQUE CEDAW ratified without reservation 1993 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
30 NAMIBIA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1992 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
31 NIGER CEDAW ratified with reservations … Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
32 NIGERIA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1985 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
33 RWANDA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1981 Reporting is up to date Focal person without special mandate
34 SENEGAL CEDAW ratified without reservation 1985 Some reporting done Focal person without special mandate
35 SIERRA LEONE CEDAW ratified without reservation 1988 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
36 SOUTH AFRICA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1996 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
37 SWAZILAND CEDAW ratified without reservation 2004 Some reporting done Focal person without special mandate
38 TANZANIA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1986 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
39 TOGO CEDAW ratified without reservation 1983 Some reporting done Focal point at appropriate level
40 UGANDA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1985 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
41 ZAMBIA CEDAW ratified without reservation 1985 Reporting is up to date …
42 ZIMBABWE CEDAW ratified with reservations 1991 Reporting is up to date Focal point at appropriate level
Gender equality mainstreaming
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Gender equality mainstreaming (Cont'd)
No. Country
(…) Data not available
1 ANGOLA YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
2 BENIN YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
3 BOTSWANA YES Draft law in place Draft law in place YES
4 BURKINA FASO YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
5 BURUNDI NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
6 CAMEROON YES Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
7 CAPE VERDE YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
8 CAR NO Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
9 CHAD NO Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place NO
10 CONGO (DRC) NO Law approved by Parliament No law or legal measure YES
11 CONGO, REP YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE NO Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
13 DJIBOUTI YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
14 ETHIOPIA NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
15 GABON YES Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
16 GAMBIA (THE) NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
17 GHANA YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
18 GUINEA NO Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament NO
20 KENYA NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
21 LESOTHO NO Draft law in place Draft law in place YES
22 LIBERIA YES No law or legal measure Draft law in place YES
23 MADAGASCAR YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
24 MALAWI YES Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
25 MALI YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
26 MAURITANIA NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
27 MAURITIUS YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
28 MOROCCO YES Draft law in place Draft law in place YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
30 NAMIBIA YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
31 NIGER YES Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
32 NIGERIA YES No law or legal measure No law or legal measure YES
33 RWANDA YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
34 SENEGAL YES Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
35 SIERRA LEONE NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES Law approved by Parliament … YES
37 SWAZILAND NO Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
38 TANZANIA YES Law approved by Parliament No law or legal measure YES
39 TOGO NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
40 UGANDA YES Law approved by Parliament Draft law in place YES
41 ZAMBIA NO Draft law in place Draft law in place YES
42 ZIMBABWE NO Law approved by Parliament Law approved by Parliament YES
Ratification of the
Optional Protocol
Embodiment of the principle of
equality of men and women in
national constitution or other
appropriate legislation
Consistency of family laws with
the principles of equality
between the sexes as under
provision of Article 16 of the
CEDAW
The country has put in place
(enacted) a gender policy
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Gender equality mainstreaming (Cont'd)
No. Country
(…) Data not available
1 ANGOLA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
2 BENIN Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated Clear guide
3 BOTSWANA Gender not mainstreamed Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
4 BURKINA FASO Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated Clear guide
5 BURUNDI Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
6 CAMEROON Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
7 CAPE VERDE Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
8 CAR Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated No clear guide
9 CHAD Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
10 CONGO (DRC) Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
11 CONGO, REP Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated No clear guide
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
13 DJIBOUTI Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
14 ETHIOPIA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
15 GABON Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
16 GAMBIA (THE) Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated Clear guide
17 GHANA Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
18 GUINEA Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
19 GUINEA BISSAU Gender not mainstreamed Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
20 KENYA Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated Clear guide
21 LESOTHO Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
22 LIBERIA Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated Clear guide
23 MADAGASCAR Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
24 MALAWI Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
25 MALI Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
26 MAURITANIA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated No clear guide
27 MAURITIUS Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Sufficient budget allocated No clear guide
28 MOROCCO Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated Clear guide
29 MOZAMBIQUE Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
30 NAMIBIA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
31 NIGER Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
32 NIGERIA Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
33 RWANDA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
34 SENEGAL Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated No clear guide
35 SIERRA LEONE Clear objectives and targets set Unclear kind of budget allocated Clear guide
36 SOUTH AFRICA Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives Unclear kind of budget allocated …
37 SWAZILAND Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated No clear guide
38 TANZANIA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated No clear guide
39 TOGO Clear objectives and targets set No budget line allocated No clear guide
40 UGANDA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
41 ZAMBIA Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
42 ZIMBABWE Clear objectives and targets set Sufficient budget allocated Clear guide
Gender equality policy is integrated in the
country's Poverty Reduction Strategy
Government allocated financial resources
to gender related activities
Mainstreaming gender in
statistics
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Social Inclusion
No. Country
Provisions in the country’s
Constitution allowing the
President / Head of State to
appoint some representatives
to Parliament in addition to the
elected representatives
Instances where some
nationals in the country
require special
permission /
qualification to enjoy
certain privileges
Social services
accessible to nationals
in the country on equal
terms
Equal employment
opportunities for all
nationals
Policy or law
that provides
equal
opportunity for
all
Policy or law
that protects
the vulnerable
in the society
(…) Data not available
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1 ANGOLA NO YES YES … YES YES
2 BENIN NO NO YES YES YES YES
3 BOTSWANA YES YES NO NO NO NO
4 BURKINA FASO NO YES YES YES YES YES
5 BURUNDI NO YES YES YES YES YES
6 CAMEROON NO YES YES YES YES YES
7 CAPE VERDE NO NO YES YES YES YES
8 CAR NO NO YES YES YES YES
9 CHAD NO NO YES YES YES YES
10 CONGO (DRC) YES NO NO NO YES YES
11 CONGO, REP NO NO YES YES YES YES
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE NO YES YES NO NO YES
13 DJIBOUTI YES YES YES YES YES YES
14 ETHIOPIA NO NO YES YES YES …
15 GABON NO NO YES YES YES YES
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES NO YES YES YES YES
17 GHANA NO NO YES YES YES YES
18 GUINEA NO NO YES YES YES YES
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES YES YES YES YES YES
20 KENYA YES NO YES YES YES YES
21 LESOTHO YES NO YES YES YES YES
22 LIBERIA NO NO NO YES YES NO
23 MADAGASCAR YES NO YES NO YES YES
24 MALAWI NO NO YES YES YES YES
25 MALI NO NO YES YES YES YES
26 MAURITANIA NO NO YES YES YES YES
27 MAURITIUS NO NO YES YES YES YES
28 MOROCCO YES YES YES YES NO YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE NO YES YES YES YES YES
30 NAMIBIA YES NO YES YES YES YES
31 NIGER NO YES YES YES YES YES
32 NIGERIA NO NO YES YES YES YES
33 RWANDA YES NO YES YES YES YES
34 SENEGAL NO NO YES YES … YES
35 SIERRA LEONE YES NO YES YES YES YES
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES YES YES YES YES YES
37 SWAZILAND YES NO YES YES YES YES
38 TANZANIA YES NO YES NO YES YES
39 TOGO YES NO YES YES YES YES
40 UGANDA NO NO YES YES YES YES
41 ZAMBIA YES NO YES YES YES YES
42 ZIMBABWE YES YES NO YES YES YES
358
No. Country
(…) Data not available
1 ANGOLA Clear Unit established All
2 BENIN Clear Unit established All
3 BOTSWANA Clear Unit established All
4 BURKINA FASO Clear Unit established All
5 BURUNDI Coordination, not formal Not all
6 CAMEROON No institutional Unit Not all
7 CAPE VERDE Clear Unit established All
8 CAR Clear Unit established Not all
9 CHAD No institutional Unit All
10 CONGO (DRC) Clear Unit established Not all
11 CONGO, REP No institutional Unit None
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE No institutional Unit Not all
13 DJIBOUTI Clear Unit established Not all
14 ETHIOPIA Clear Unit established Not all
15 GABON Clear Unit established Not all
16 GAMBIA (THE) Clear Unit established Not all
17 GHANA Coordination, not formal All
18 GUINEA Clear Unit established None
19 GUINEA BISSAU Clear Unit established All
20 KENYA Coordination, not formal …
21 LESOTHO Clear Unit established All
22 LIBERIA Clear Unit established All
23 MADAGASCAR Clear Unit established Not all
24 MALAWI Coordination, not formal All
25 MALI Clear Unit established All
26 MAURITANIA No institutional Unit Not all
27 MAURITIUS No institutional Unit All
28 MOROCCO Coordination, not formal Not all
29 MOZAMBIQUE Coordination, not formal Not all
30 NAMIBIA Coordination, not formal Not all
31 NIGER Clear Unit established Not all
32 NIGERIA No institutional Unit Not all
33 RWANDA Coordination, not formal All
34 SENEGAL Clear Unit established …
35 SIERRA LEONE No institutional Unit Not all
36 SOUTH AFRICA Coordination, not formal All
37 SWAZILAND Clear Unit established All
38 TANZANIA Coordination, not formal All
39 TOGO Clear Unit established Not all
40 UGANDA No institutional Unit Not all
41 ZAMBIA No institutional Unit Not all
42 ZIMBABWE Coordination, not formal Not all
Establishment of a National Assistance Coordinating Unit for CD
by the Government
Main partners from multi-lateral cooperation have developed a
country assistance strategy/program relating to the country
Partnering for capacity development
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No. Country
Development partners areas of intervention in capacity development (Year 2010)
1 ANGOLA
2 BENIN
3 BOTSWANA
4 BURKINA FASO
5 BURUNDI
6 CAMEROON
7 CAPE VERDE
8 CAR
9 CHAD
10 CONGO (DRC)
11 CONGO, REP
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE
13 DJIBOUTI
14 ETHIOPIA
15 GABON
16 GAMBIA (THE)
17 GHANA
18 GUINEA
19 GUINEA BISSAU
20 KENYA
21 LESOTHO
22 LIBERIA
23 MADAGASCAR
24 MALAWI
25 MALI
26 MAURITANIA
27 MAURITIUS
28 MOROCCO
29 MOZAMBIQUE
30 NAMIBIA
31 NIGER
32 NIGERIA
33 RWANDA
34 SENEGAL
35 SIERRA LEONE
36 SOUTH AFRICA
37 SWAZILAND
38 TANZANIA
39 TOGO
40 UGANDA
41 ZAMBIA
42 ZIMBABWE
Macroeconomic
Management Debt Policy Trade
Economic Management Structural Policies
Fiscal Policy Financial Sector
Business Regulatory
Environment
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No. Country
Development partners areas of intervention in capacity development (Year 2010)
1 ANGOLA
2 BENIN
3 BOTSWANA
4 BURKINA FASO
5 BURUNDI
6 CAMEROON
7 CAPE VERDE
8 CAR
9 CHAD
10 CONGO (DRC)
11 CONGO, REP
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE
13 DJIBOUTI
14 ETHIOPIA
15 GABON
16 GAMBIA (THE)
17 GHANA
18 GUINEA
19 GUINEA BISSAU
20 KENYA
21 LESOTHO
22 LIBERIA
23 MADAGASCAR
24 MALAWI
25 MALI
26 MAURITANIA
27 MAURITIUS
28 MOROCCO
29 MOZAMBIQUE
30 NAMIBIA
31 NIGER
32 NIGERIA
33 RWANDA
34 SENEGAL
35 SIERRA LEONE
36 SOUTH AFRICA
37 SWAZILAND
38 TANZANIA
39 TOGO
40 UGANDA
41 ZAMBIA
42 ZIMBABWE
Gender Equality
Equity of Public
Resource Use
Building Human
Resources
Social Protection
and Labor
Policies and Institutions for
Environmental Sustainability
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity
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No. Country
Development partners areas of intervention in capacity development (Year 2010)
1 ANGOLA
2 BENIN
3 BOTSWANA
4 BURKINA FASO
5 BURUNDI
6 CAMEROON
7 CAPE VERDE
8 CAR
9 CHAD
10 CONGO (DRC)
11 CONGO, REP
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE
13 DJIBOUTI
14 ETHIOPIA
15 GABON
16 GAMBIA (THE)
17 GHANA
18 GUINEA
19 GUINEA BISSAU
20 KENYA
21 LESOTHO
22 LIBERIA
23 MADAGASCAR
24 MALAWI
25 MALI
26 MAURITANIA
27 MAURITIUS
28 MOROCCO
29 MOZAMBIQUE
30 NAMIBIA
31 NIGER
32 NIGERIA
33 RWANDA
34 SENEGAL
35 SIERRA LEONE
36 SOUTH AFRICA
37 SWAZILAND
38 TANZANIA
39 TOGO
40 UGANDA
41 ZAMBIA
42 ZIMBABWE
Property Rights
and Rule-based
Governance
Quality of Budgetary
and Financial
Management
Efficiency of Revenue
Mobilization
Quality of Public
Administration
Transparency,
Accountability, and
Corruption in the Public
Sector Agriculture
Public Sector Management and Institutions
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No. Country
Capacity profiling and assessments of needs
1 ANGOLA YES 2010 Government Body … …
2 BENIN YES 2009 Government Body YES Development partner
3 BOTSWANA YES 2008 Gvnt & Dev. Partner NO …
4 BURKINA FASO YES 2008 Government Body YES Government Body
5 BURUNDI YES 2007 Government Body YES Development partner
6 CAMEROON Don't know … … Don't know Gvnt & Dev. Partner
7 CAPE VERDE YES 2010 Government Body YES Government Body
8 CAR YES 2008 Government Body YES Development partner
9 CHAD NO … … NO
10 CONGO (DRC) YES 2008 Government Body YES Government Body
11 CONGO, REP NO … … NO …
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE NO … … YES Development partner
13 DJIBOUTI YES 2007 Government Body YES Government Body
14 ETHIOPIA Don't know … … YES Gvnt & Dev. Partner
15 GABON Don't know … … Don't know
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES 2009 Government Body YES Government Body
17 GHANA YES 2010 Development partner YES Development partner
18 GUINEA NO … … YES Gvnt & Dev. Partner
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES 2007 Government Body YES Government Body
20 KENYA YES 2011 Government Body NO …
21 LESOTHO NO Government Body YES …
22 LIBERIA YES 2008 Gvnt & Dev. Partner YES Gvnt & Dev. Partner
23 MADAGASCAR NO … … NO …
24 MALAWI YES 2009 Government Body YES Government Body
25 MALI NO … … YES Government Body
26 MAURITANIA YES Gvnt & Dev. Partner YES Gvnt & Dev. Partner
27 MAURITIUS YES 2010 Government Body YES Government Body
28 MOROCCO YES 2009 Development partner YES …
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES 2007 Development partner YES Development partner
30 NAMIBIA NO … … YES Development partner
31 NIGER YES 2009 Government Body YES Government Body
32 NIGERIA NO … … YES Gvnt & Dev. Partner
33 RWANDA YES 2009 Government Body YES Government Body
34 SENEGAL Don't know … … Don't know …
35 SIERRA LEONE YES 2010 Government Body YES Government Body
36 SOUTH AFRICA … … Government Body YES Government Body
37 SWAZILAND NO … … YES Government Body
38 TANZANIA NO … … NO …
39 TOGO NO … … NO …
40 UGANDA NO … … YES Development partner
41 ZAMBIA YES 2009 Government Body YES Government Body
42 ZIMBABWE YES 2009 Gvnt & Dev. Partner YES Gvnt & Dev. Partner
(…) Data not available
Capacity profile conducted
in the country since 2006
Date last capacity
profile conducted
Who commissioned the
capacity profiling
Capacity needs
assessment conducted
in the country since 2006
Who commissioned the
capacity needs assessment
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No. Country
Areas where needs assessments were conducted
1 ANGOLA
2 BENIN
3 BOTSWANA
4 BURKINA FASO
5 BURUNDI
6 CAMEROON
7 CAPE VERDE
8 CAR
9 CHAD
10 CONGO (DRC)
11 CONGO, REP
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE
13 DJIBOUTI
14 ETHIOPIA
15 GABON
16 GAMBIA (THE)
17 GHANA
18 GUINEA
19 GUINEA BISSAU
20 KENYA
21 LESOTHO
22 LIBERIA
23 MADAGASCAR
24 MALAWI
25 MALI
26 MAURITANIA
27 MAURITIUS
28 MOROCCO
29 MOZAMBIQUE
30 NAMIBIA
31 NIGER
32 NIGERIA
33 RWANDA
34 SENEGAL
35 SIERRA LEONE
36 SOUTH AFRICA
37 SWAZILAND
38 TANZANIA
39 TOGO
40 UGANDA
41 ZAMBIA
42 ZIMBABWE
Macroeconomic
Management Debt Policy Trade
Economic Management Structural Policies
Fiscal Policy Financial Sector
Business Regulatory
Environment
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No. Country
1 ANGOLA
2 BENIN
3 BOTSWANA
4 BURKINA FASO
5 BURUNDI
6 CAMEROON
7 CAPE VERDE
8 CAR
9 CHAD
10 CONGO (DRC)
11 CONGO, REP
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE
13 DJIBOUTI
14 ETHIOPIA
15 GABON
16 GAMBIA (THE)
17 GHANA
18 GUINEA
19 GUINEA BISSAU
20 KENYA
21 LESOTHO
22 LIBERIA
23 MADAGASCAR
24 MALAWI
25 MALI
26 MAURITANIA
27 MAURITIUS
28 MOROCCO
29 MOZAMBIQUE
30 NAMIBIA
31 NIGER
32 NIGERIA
33 RWANDA
34 SENEGAL
35 SIERRA LEONE
36 SOUTH AFRICA
37 SWAZILAND
38 TANZANIA
39 TOGO
40 UGANDA
41 ZAMBIA
42 ZIMBABWE
Gender Equality
Equity of Public
Resource Use
Building Human
Resources
Social Protection
and Labor
Policies and Institutions for
Environmental Sustainability
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity
Areas where needs assessments were conducted
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No. Country
Property Rights
and Rule-based
Governance
Quality of Budgetary
and Financial
Management
Efficiency of Revenue
Mobilization
Quality of Public
Administration
Transparency,
Accountability, and
Corruption in the Public
Sector Agriculture
Public Sector Management and Institutions
Areas where needs assessments were conducted
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1 ANGOLA
2 BENIN
3 BOTSWANA
4 BURKINA FASO
5 BURUNDI
6 CAMEROON
7 CAPE VERDE
8 CAR
9 CHAD
10 CONGO (DRC)
11 CONGO, REP
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE
13 DJIBOUTI
14 ETHIOPIA
15 GABON
16 GAMBIA (THE)
17 GHANA
18 GUINEA
19 GUINEA BISSAU
20 KENYA
21 LESOTHO
22 LIBERIA
23 MADAGASCAR
24 MALAWI
25 MALI
26 MAURITANIA
27 MAURITIUS
28 MOROCCO
29 MOZAMBIQUE
30 NAMIBIA
31 NIGER
32 NIGERIA
33 RWANDA
34 SENEGAL
35 SIERRA LEONE
36 SOUTH AFRICA
37 SWAZILAND
38 TANZANIA
39 TOGO
40 UGANDA
41 ZAMBIA
42 ZIMBABWE
366
No. Country
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework
1 ANGOLA 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.5 2.0 2.8
2 BENIN 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.7
3 BOTSWANA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
4 BURKINA FASO 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5
5 BURUNDI 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.3 4.0 2.5 2.5 3.0
6 CAMEROON 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.2
7 CAPE VERDE 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.8
8 CAR 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.3 3.5 2.5 2.0 2.7
9 CHAD 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.5
10 CONGO (DRC) 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.3
11 CONGO, REP 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.0
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 3.5 2.5 2.0 2.7 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.3
13 DJIBOUTI 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5
14 ETHIOPIA 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.2
15 GABON NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
16 GAMBIA (THE) 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
17 GHANA 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.2
18 GUINEA 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.3 4.0 3.0 2.5 3.2
19 GUINEA BISSAU 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 4.0 2.5 2.5 3.0
20 KENYA 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
21 LESOTHO 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.2
22 LIBERIA 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.8
23 MADAGASCAR 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.3
24 MALAWI 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.2
25 MALI 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5
26 MAURITANIA 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.3 4.0 2.5 3.0 3.2
27 MAURITIUS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
29 MOZAMBIQUE 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.0 3.7
30 NAMIBIA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
31 NIGER 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.8 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.3
32 NIGERIA 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
33 RWANDA 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.8
34 SENEGAL 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.8
35 SIERRA LEONE 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.2
36 SOUTH AFRICA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
37 SWAZILAND NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
38 TANZANIA 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.8
39 TOGO 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.5 3.0 3.2
40 UGANDA 4.5 4.0 4.5 4.3 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.8
41 ZAMBIA 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.7
42 ZIMBABWE 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.7 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.3
Source: World Bank IRAI 2010 Table.
(NA) Not applicable
Macroeconomic
Management Debt Policy Trade
Economic Management Structural Policies
Fiscal Policy
Financial
Sector
Business Regulatory
Environment AverageAverage
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No. Country
1 ANGOLA 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.8
2 BENIN 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.4
3 BOTSWANA NA NA NA NA NA NA
4 BURKINA FASO 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6
5 BURUNDI 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.4
6 CAMEROON 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.1
7 CAPE VERDE 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.3
8 CAR 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 3.0 2.5
9 CHAD 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.3
10 CONGO (DRC) 2.5 3.0 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.8
11 CONGO, REP 3.0 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.8
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4
13 DJIBOUTI 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3
14 ETHIOPIA 3.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.6
15 GABON NA NA NA NA NA NA
16 GAMBIA (THE) 3.5 4.0 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.4
17 GHANA 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 4.0
18 GUINEA 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0
19 GUINEA BISSAU 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.7
20 KENYA 3.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.7
21 LESOTHO 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.3
22 LIBERIA 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7
23 MADAGASCAR 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6
24 MALAWI 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
25 MALI 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5
26 MAURITANIA 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.2
27 MAURITIUS NA NA NA NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO NA NA NA NA NA NA
29 MOZAMBIQUE 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.4
30 NAMIBIA NA NA NA NA NA NA
31 NIGER 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.2
32 NIGERIA 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.2
33 RWANDA 4.0 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.0
34 SENEGAL 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.4
35 SIERRA LEONE 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.2
36 SOUTH AFRICA NA NA NA NA NA NA
37 SWAZILAND NA NA NA NA NA NA
38 TANZANIA 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.7
39 TOGO 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.8
40 UGANDA 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.7
41 ZAMBIA 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5
42 ZIMBABWE 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.8
Source: World Bank IRAI 2010 Table.
(NA) Not applicable
Gender Equality
Equity of Public
Resource Use
Building Human
Resources
Social Protection
and Labor
Policies and Institutions for
Environmental Sustainability
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework (Cont’d)
Average
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No. Country
Property Rights
and Rule-based
Governance
Quality of Budgetary
and Financial
Management
Efficiency of Revenue
Mobilization
Quality of Public
Administration
Transparency,
Accountability, and
Corruption in the Public
Sector Average
Public Sector Management and Institutions
Assessment of the quality of the country’s policy and institutional framework (Cont’d)
IDA Resource
Allocation Index
(IRAI)
1 ANGOLA 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.8
2 BENIN 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.5
3 BOTSWANA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
4 BURKINA FASO 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8
5 BURUNDI 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.6 3.1
6 CAMEROON 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.9 3.2
7 CAPE VERDE 4.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.1
8 CAR 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8
9 CHAD 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.4
10 CONGO (DRC) 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.7
11 CONGO, REP 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.9
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 2.0 2.5 3.5 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.7
13 DJIBOUTI 2.5 3.0 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.2
14 ETHIOPIA 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.2 3.4
15 GABON NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
16 GAMBIA (THE) 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.4
17 GHANA 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.7 3.9
18 GUINEA 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.6 2.8
19 GUINEA BISSAU 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7
20 KENYA 2.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.3 3.8
21 LESOTHO 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
22 LIBERIA 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.9
23 MADAGASCAR 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.0 3.4
24 MALAWI 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.3
25 MALI 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.6
26 MAURITANIA 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.2
27 MAURITIUS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
29 MOZAMBIQUE 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.7
30 NAMIBIA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
31 NIGER 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.4
32 NIGERIA 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.4
33 RWANDA 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.7 3.8
34 SENEGAL 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.7
35 SIERRA LEONE 2.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3
36 SOUTH AFRICA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
37 SWAZILAND NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
38 TANZANIA 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.0 2.5 3.3 3.8
39 TOGO 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.9
40 UGANDA 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.2 3.8
41 ZAMBIA 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.1 3.4
42 ZIMBABWE 1.5 2.0 3.5 2.0 1.5 2.1 2.0
Source: World Bank IRAI 2010 Table.
(NA) Not applicable
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No. Country
INPUTS: ACBF-supported projects/programs population in 2010
1 ANGOLA 0 0 NA NA NA NA
2 BENIN 2 686,696 25 28.0 10 10.0
3 BOTSWANA 2 245,514 3 66.7 4 50.0
4 BURKINA FASO 6 3,747,629 47 31.9 23 21.7
5 BURUNDI 2 787,624 24 25.0 15 20.0
6 CAMEROON 4 1,674,938 26 38.5 10 60.0
7 CAPE VERDE 1 222,660 7 28.6 5 40.0
8 CAR 2 734,982 9 22.2 3 0.0
9 CHAD 0 154,210 0 NA 0 NA
10 CONGO (DRC) 2 884,323 38 34.2 23 39.1
11 CONGO, REP 2 554,250 12 41.7 5 0.0
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 2 1,093,821 21 33.3 9 11.1
13 DJIBOUTI 0 77,288 NA NA NA NA
14 ETHIOPIA 3 2,332,234 122 32.8 76 31.6
15 GABON 5 1,450,812 47 34.0 13 30.8
16 GAMBIA (THE) 1 68,055 5 40.0 3 33.3
17 GHANA 6 3,057,139 77 27.3 58 29.3
18 GUINEA 0 0 NA NA NA NA
19 GUINEA BISSAU 1 67,952 6 33.3 3 0.0
20 KENYA 7 2,180,753 28 50.0 26 50.0
21 LESOTHO 1 254,928 13 30.8 11 27.3
22 LIBERIA 1 184,207 7 14.3 3 0.0
23 MADAGASCAR 0 73,524 NA NA NA NA
24 MALAWI 2 183,834 11 27.3 8 25.0
25 MALI 4 855,166 22 27.3 9 22.2
26 MAURITANIA 1 232,361 24 20.8 8 25.0
27 MAURITIUS 0 0 NA NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO 1 6,903 3 0.0 2 0.0
29 MOZAMBIQUE 2 612,940 26 38.5 7 57.1
30 NAMIBIA 2 582,589 3 33.3 3 33.3
31 NIGER 1 355,685 12 25.0 6 16.7
32 NIGERIA 7 594,936 17 35.3 17 35.3
33 RWANDA 2 1,005,029 27 37.0 20 45.0
34 SENEGAL 5 1,484,362 34 26.5 16 18.8
35 SIERRA LEONE 2 21,387 5 20.0 4 0.0
36 SOUTH AFRICA 4 353,644 10 60.0 8 62.5
37 SWAZILAND 1 297,416 8 75.0 32 59.4
38 TANZANIA 3 855,654 11 63.6 10 70.0
39 TOGO 0 24,871 NA NA NA NA
40 UGANDA 2 983,594 24 37.5 22 40.9
41 ZAMBIA 3 1,156,815 40 45.0 18 33.3
42 ZIMBABWE 5 1,438,586 58 34.5 36 19.4
(NA) Not applicable
Number of
active ACBF-supported
projects/programs
in  2010
Total grant
disbursed by ACBF
to the country in
2010 (US$)
Total number
of staff
Proportion
female (%)
Total number of
professional staff
Proportion
female (%)
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No. Country
Number of PhD
or equivalent
Proportion
female %
Number of Master’s
Degree or equivalent
Qualification of ACBF-supported projects/programs professional staff
INPUTS: ACBF-supported projects/programs population in 2010 (continued)
Proportion
female %
Number of 1st Degree
of equivalent
Proportion
female %
No. Country NA NA NA NA NA NA
1 ANGOLA 4 0 7 0 1 100
2 BENIN 2 0 0 NA 2 100
3 BOTSWANA 7 14.3 13 15.4 7 71.4
4 BURKINA FASO 2 0 3 0.0 8 37.5
5 BURUNDI 4 50 6 50.0 2 50.0
6 CAMEROON 5 40 2 0.0 3 66.7
7 CAPE VERDE 1 0 0 NA 2 0.0
8 CAR NA NA NA NA NA NA
9 CHAD 2 0 0 NA 18 50.0
10 CONGO (DRC) 1 0 4 0.0 1 0.0
11 CONGO, REP 10 10.0 0 NA 0 NA
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE NA NA NA NA NA NA
13 DJIBOUTI 8 0.0 32 21.9 17 35.3
14 ETHIOPIA 1 0.0 6 66.7 6 0.0
15 GABON 0 NA 1 0.0 2 50.0
16 GAMBIA (THE) 27 11.1 24 45.8 7 57.1
17 GHANA NA NA NA NA NA NA
18 GUINEA 0 NA 0 NA 2 0.0
19 GUINEA BISSAU 10 0.0 6 83.3 13 69.2
20 KENYA 0 NA 4 50.0 5 20.0
21 LESOTHO 0 NA 3 0.0 0 NA
22 LIBERIA NA NA NA NA NA NA
23 MADAGASCAR 1 0.0 4 25.0 3 33.3
24 MALAWI 1 100.0 1 100.0 4 0.0
25 MALI 3 0.0 3 0.0 1 100.0
26 MAURITANIA NA NA NA NA 0 NA
27 MAURITIUS 2 0.0 1 0.0 0 NA
28 MOROCCO 5 20.0 5 20.0 1 100.0
29 MOZAMBIQUE 0 NA 1 0.0 2 50.0
30 NAMIBIA 2 0.0 4 25.0 0 NA
31 NIGER 9 33.3 7 28.6 1 100.0
32 NIGERIA 0 NA 13 38.5 11 36.4
33 RWANDA 2 0.0 13 23.1 11 9.1
34 SENEGAL 0 NA 1 0.0 1 0.0
35 SIERRA LEONE 6 50.0 7 42.9 0 NA
36 SOUTH AFRICA 0 NA 4 75.0 12 83.3
37 SWAZILAND 2 50.0 5 80.0 3 66.7
38 TANZANIA NA NA NA NA 0 NA
39 TOGO 9 44.4 8 37.5 3 66.7
40 UGANDA 2 0.0 5 40.0 11 27.3
41 ZAMBIA 3 0.0 34 17.6 21 23.8
(NA) Not applicable
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No. Country Number of institutions strengthened Number of leaders trained
1 ANGOLA NA NA NA
2 BENIN 52 31 123
3 BOTSWANA 0 0 0
4 BURKINA FASO 23 4 54
5 BURUNDI 7 2 105
6 CAMEROON 14 3 10
7 CAPE VERDE 6 3 3
8 CAR 37 6 0
9 CHAD 0 0 0
10 CONGO (DRC) 9 6 309
11 CONGO, REP 20 3 85
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 16 2 69
13 DJIBOUTI NA NA NA
14 ETHIOPIA 24 2 49
15 GABON 35 0 30
16 GAMBIA (THE) 0 0 0
17 GHANA 206 56 278
18 GUINEA NA NA NA
19 GUINEA BISSAU 0 0 0
20 KENYA 170 0
21 LESOTHO 20 0 9
22 LIBERIA 6 3 72
23 MADAGASCAR NA NA NA
24 MALAWI 8 3 2
25 MALI 47 20 43
26 MAURITANIA 0 0 0
27 MAURITIUS NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO 0 0 0
29 MOZAMBIQUE 4 3 100
30 NAMIBIA 0 0 30
31 NIGER 16 1 142
32 NIGERIA 65 5 853
33 RWANDA 61 1 5
34 SENEGAL 16 10 6
35 SIERRA LEONE 3 0 6
36 SOUTH AFRICA 10 8 40
37 SWAZILAND 0 0 0
38 TANZANIA 1 0 0
39 TOGO NA NA NA
40 UGANDA 10 0 0
41 ZAMBIA 65 0 33
42 ZIMBABWE 17 16 53
(NA) Not applicable
OUTPUTS DELIVERED BY ACBF-SUPPORTED PROJECTS/PROGRAMS IN 2010: Leadership
Number of technical assistance to
government agencies
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No. Country
OUTPUTS DELIVERED BY ACBF-SUPPORTED PROJECTS/PROGRAMS IN 2010: Knowledge and learning
1 ANGOLA NA NA NA NA
2 BENIN 30 14 9 20
3 BOTSWANA 16 4 7 8
4 BURKINA FASO 17 7 2 13
5 BURUNDI 44 16 6 3
6 CAMEROON 8 6 2 4
7 CAPE VERDE 3 2 1 3
8 CAR 3 3 0 1
9 CHAD 0 0 0 0
10 CONGO (DRC) 2 1 1 2
11 CONGO, REP 0 0 0 1
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 17 4 4 9
13 DJIBOUTI NA NA NA NA
14 ETHIOPIA 25 18 10 -
15 GABON 8 0 8 6
16 GAMBIA (THE) 0 0 0 0
17 GHANA 93 2 84 57
18 GUINEA NA NA NA NA
19 GUINEA BISSAU 0 0 0 0
20 KENYA 10 3 3 300
21 LESOTHO 0 0 1 2
22 LIBERIA 2 1 0 1
23 MADAGASCAR NA NA NA NA
24 MALAWI 3 0 0 2
25 MALI 9 9 0 8
26 MAURITANIA 10 5 5 3
27 MAURITIUS NA NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO 0 0 0 0
29 MOZAMBIQUE 32 2 0 0
30 NAMIBIA 0 0 0 6
31 NIGER 6 5 1 2
32 NIGERIA 10 0 0 9
33 RWANDA 4 1 3 2
34 SENEGAL 24 22 1 9
35 SIERRA LEONE 0 0 0 0
36 SOUTH AFRICA 1 0 0 0
37 SWAZILAND 0 0 0 0
38 TANZANIA 13 6 7 0
39 TOGO NA NA NA NA
40 UGANDA 0 0 0 0
41 ZAMBIA 42 0 35 6
42 ZIMBABWE 13 3 2 14
(NA) Not applicable
Number of policy studies, research
Number of publications disseminatedCompleted Commissioned by Government Commissioned by others
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No. Country
OUTPUTS DELIVERED BY ACBF-SUPPORTED PROJECTS/PROGRAMS IN 2010: Short term training program
No. of
beneficiaries
of workshops and
seminars
No. of short
courses
organized
No. of workshops
organized/seminars
No. of beneficiaries
of short courses
% of female
beneficiaries
of short courses
% of female
beneficiaries of
workshops and
seminars
1 ANGOLA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 BENIN 11 13 174 35.6 559 25.2
3 BOTSWANA 0 6 0 NA 80 62.5
4 BURKINA FASO 6 14 183 23.0 307 22.5
5 BURUNDI 9 5 90 18.9 932 21.7
6 CAMEROON 8 18 96 26.0 320 65.9
7 CAPE VERDE 2 2 36 33.3 36 33.3
8 CAR 0 8 0 NA 323 10.8
9 CHAD 0 0 0 NA NA NA
10 CONGO (DRC) 9 10 658 41.5 280 45.0
11 CONGO, REP 6 11 100 55.0 230 49.6
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 7 1 201 17.9 10 0.0
13 DJIBOUTI NA NA NA NA NA NA
14 ETHIOPIA 12 34 502 11.4 1427 15.8
15 GABON 12 14 231 78.4 615 28.9
16 GAMBIA (THE) 0 0 0 NA 0 NA
17 GHANA 0 47 0 NA 1599 40.7
18 GUINEA NA NA NA NA NA NA
19 GUINEA BISSAU 0 0 0 NA 0 NA
20 KENYA 29 11 1168 39.1 1431 36.5
21 LESOTHO 0 11 0 NA 175 0.0
22 LIBERIA 1 2 65 9.2 65 4.6
23 MADAGASCAR NA NA NA NA NA NA
24 MALAWI 2 3 4 0.0 75 38.7
25 MALI 23 24 514 59.5 603 69.0
26 MAURITANIA 0 0 0 NA 0 NA
27 MAURITIUS NA NA NA NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO 3 2 14 50.0 84 17.9
29 MOZAMBIQUE 0 9 0 NA 300 45.0
30 NAMIBIA 0 12 0 NA 300 41.7
31 NIGER 2 4 38 23.7 142 14.8
32 NIGERIA 29 99 366 13.1 1484 17.9
33 RWANDA 6 12 282 38.3 520 32.1
34 SENEGAL 9 19 162 73.5 445 45.8
35 SIERRA LEONE 1 0 6 0.0 0 NA
36 SOUTH AFRICA 1 1 0 NA 230 32.6
37 SWAZILAND 3 2 29 79.3 0 NA
38 TANZANIA 15 14 124 41.9 450 43.8
39 TOGO NA NA NA NA NA NA
40 UGANDA 12 17 244 35.2 1298 0.8
41 ZAMBIA 16 30 357 44.8 517 54.2
42 ZIMBABWE 2 3 101 31.7 1010 38.4
(NA) Not applicable
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No. Country
OUTPUTS DELIVERED BY ACBF-SUPPORTED PROJECTS/PROGRAMS IN 2010: Beneficiaries of tertiary training
No. of PhD
or equiv. % of female
No. of Master’s
Degree or equiv % of female
No. of Certificates
or equiv. % of female
1 ANGOLA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 BENIN 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
3 BOTSWANA 5 60.0 2 100 0 NA
4 BURKINA FASO 3 0.0 80 20.0 0 NA
5 BURUNDI 3 0.0 0 NA 0 NA
6 CAMEROON 0 NA 47 19.1 43 20.9
7 CAPE VERDE 0 NA 0 NA 36 33.3
8 CAR 0 NA 12 25.0 16 12.5
9 CHAD 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
10 CONGO (DRC) 1 0.0 19 15.8 0 NA
11 CONGO, REP 0 NA 0 NA 20 50.0
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 40 20.0 0 NA 0 NA
13 DJIBOUTI NA NA NA NA NA NA
14 ETHIOPIA 12 25.0 8 50.0 2 100
15 GABON 30 16.7 0 NA 25 100
16 GAMBIA (THE) 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
17 GHANA 0 NA 108 32.4 60 33.3
18 GUINEA NA NA NA NA NA NA
19 GUINEA BISSAU 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
20 KENYA 38 28.9 138 28.3 0 NA
21 LESOTHO 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
22 LIBERIA 1 0.0 0 NA 65 9.2
23 MADAGASCAR NA NA 0 NA NA NA
24 MALAWI 0 NA 0 NA 4 25.0
25 MALI 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
26 MAURITANIA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
27 MAURITIUS NA NA 0 NA NA NA
28 MOROCCO 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
29 MOZAMBIQUE 0 NA 0 NA 30 30.0
30 NAMIBIA 0 NA 1 0.0 0 NA
31 NIGER 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
32 NIGERIA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
33 RWANDA 0 NA 18 33.3 278 36.3
34 SENEGAL 0 NA 38 18.4 0 NA
35 SIERRA LEONE 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
36 SOUTH AFRICA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
37 SWAZILAND 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
38 TANZANIA 0 NA 2 0.0 3 100
39 TOGO NA NA NA NA NA NA
40 UGANDA 0 NA 34 32.4 3 33.3
41 ZAMBIA 0 NA 33 24.2 357 44.8
42 ZIMBABWE 3 66.7 32 62.5 40 30.0
(NA) Not applicable
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No.
OUTPUTS DELIVERED BY ACBF-SUPPORTED PROJECTS/PROGRAMS IN 2010: Introducing or adapting curricula
Country No. of new curricula introducedNo. of curricula adapted
1 ANGOLA NA 0
2 BENIN 0 0
3 BOTSWANA 0 0
4 BURKINA FASO 0 0
5 BURUNDI 4 0
6 CAMEROON 0 0
7 CAPE VERDE 0 0
8 CAR 0 0
9 CHAD 0 0
10 CONGO (DRC) 0 0
11 CONGO, REP 0 0
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 0 0
13 DJIBOUTI NA NA
14 ETHIOPIA 0 0
15 GABON 0 0
16 GAMBIA (THE) 0 0
17 GHANA 4 3
18 GUINEA NA NA
19 GUINEA BISSAU 0 0
20 KENYA 0 7
21 LESOTHO 0 0
22 LIBERIA 0 1
23 MADAGASCAR NA NA
24 MALAWI 0 0
25 MALI 3 1
26 MAURITANIA 0 0
27 MAURITIUS NA NA
28 MOROCCO 0 0
29 MOZAMBIQUE 0 0
30 NAMIBIA 0 1
31 NIGER 0 0
32 NIGERIA 0 0
33 RWANDA 4 2
34 SENEGAL 0 0
35 SIERRA LEONE 0 0
36 SOUTH AFRICA 0 0
37 SWAZILAND 0 0
38 TANZANIA 0 0
39 TOGO NA NA
40 UGANDA 0 0
41 ZAMBIA 0 0
42 ZIMBABWE 16 3
(NA ) Not applicable
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No. Country
Agricultural strategy formulation and implementation
Existence of strategy in use
for the agricultural sector CD integrated in that Strategy Level of integration
1 ANGOLA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
2 BENIN YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National & Local
3 BOTSWANA YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National/Federal
4 BURKINA FASO YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National & Regional
5 BURUNDI YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object Local
6 CAMEROON YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
7 CAPE VERDE YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object Regional & Local
8 CAR YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
9 CHAD YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
10 CONGO (DRC) YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
11 CONGO, REP YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
13 DJIBOUTI YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
14 ETHIOPIA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
15 GABON YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National & Regional
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective Region/Province/State
17 GHANA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective Region/Province/State
18 GUINEA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National & Regional
20 KENYA YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National, Regional & Local
21 LESOTHO YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National & Local
22 LIBERIA YES CD not mainstreamed National/Federal
23 MADAGASCAR YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
24 MALAWI YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National/Federal
25 MALI YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
26 MAURITANIA YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National/Federal
27 MAURITIUS YES CD not mainstreamed National/Federal
28 MOROCCO YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
30 NAMIBIA YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National, Regional & Local
31 NIGER YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National & Regional
32 NIGERIA YES CD not mainstreamed National & Regional
33 RWANDA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
34 SENEGAL YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
35 SIERRA LEONE YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
37 SWAZILAND NO … …
38 TANZANIA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
39 TOGO YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National, Regional & Local
40 UGANDA YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective National/Federal
41 ZAMBIA YES CD mainstreamed, no clear object National & Regional
42 ZIMBABWE YES CD mainstreamed, clear objective Local
(…) Data not available
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No. Country
Agricultural strategy formulation and implementation (Cont'd)
Country has completed the
CAADP Investment Plan Pillar 2
Completion of CAADP
donors roundtable
1 ANGOLA YES High High Very High High YES
2 BENIN YES Average Average Average Average NO
3 BOTSWANA NO … … … … …
4 BURKINA FASO YES Average Average Low Average YES
5 BURUNDI YES Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low NO
6 CAMEROON YES Low Average High Average
7 CAPE VERDE YES Average High Very High High NO
8 CAR YES Low Low Low Very Low NO
9 CHAD YES Average Average High Average YES
10 CONGO (DRC) NO … … … … …
11 CONGO, REP YES Low Average Average High …
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES … … … … …
13 DJIBOUTI YES Average Average Average Average NO
14 ETHIOPIA YES High Low High Low YES
15 GABON YES Low Low Average Low NO
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES Very High Very High Very High Very High YES
17 GHANA YES Average Average High Average YES
18 GUINEA YES Low Low Low Low …
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES Very High Very High Very High Very High …
20 KENYA YES Average Very High Average High YES
21 LESOTHO YES Average Low High Average NO
22 LIBERIA YES Average Average Average Average YES
23 MADAGASCAR YES Low Average Low Low …
24 MALAWI YES High High Very High High …
25 MALI YES High Average High High YES
26 MAURITANIA NO Very Low Very Low Low Very Low NO
27 MAURITIUS NO High High High Average NO
28 MOROCCO YES Average Average Average Average NO
29 MOZAMBIQUE NO Low Low Average Low YES
30 NAMIBIA NO High Average High Average …
31 NIGER YES High High High High YES
32 NIGERIA YES Average Average Average Average YES
33 RWANDA YES High Average High Average YES
34 SENEGAL YES Average Low High Average NO
35 SIERRA LEONE YES Low High High High YES
36 SOUTH AFRICA NO … … … … NO
37 SWAZILAND YES Average Average Average Average NO
38 TANZANIA NO Average Average Average Average YES
39 TOGO YES Average Average Average Low NO
40 UGANDA YES Average Average High Very High YES
41 ZAMBIA YES Average Average Average Average YES
42 ZIMBABWE NO Average Average Average Average …
(…) Data not available
Country performance in the CAADP four pillars
Pillar 1 Pillar 3 Pillar 4
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No. Country
Assessment of the level of the implementation of the Strategy for agriculture
In agricultural
productivity In training In R&D
In rural
infrastructure &
marketing
In water
management
In land
management
Level of
organization for
implementation
of CAADP
Overall quality
of current
agricultural
Strategy
1 ANGOLA Very High Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2 BENIN Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium
3 BOTSWANA Low Medium Medium Low Low Low Low Medium
4 BURKINA FASO High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium
5 BURUNDI Low Low Low Very Low Low Low Medium Very Low
6 CAMEROON Medium Medium Low Low Low Low Very High Low
7 CAPE VERDE Medium Medium Medium High Medium Medium High Medium
8 CAR Low Low Low Low Low Low High Medium
9 CHAD Medium Medium High High Medium Medium High Medium
10 CONGO (DRC) Medium Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
11 CONGO, REP Low Medium Low Low Low Medium Low Low
12 COTE D'IVOIRE Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
13 DJIBOUTI Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
14 ETHIOPIA High Medium High High High Medium Medium Medium
15 GABON Low Medium Low Medium High Low Very High Medium
16 GAMBIA (THE) Very High Very High Very High High High Very High Very High Very High
17 GHANA High Medium Medium Medium Low Medium Medium High
18 GUINEA Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Medium Medium
19 GUINEA BISSAU Low Low Low Low Low Medium High High
20 KENYA High Medium High High Medium Medium High High
21 LESOTHO Low Medium Low Low Low Medium High Medium
22 LIBERIA Low Low Low Low Low Low High Medium
23 MADAGASCAR Low Very Low Low Low Low Very Low Low Low
24 MALAWI High High High Medium Low Medium Low Medium
25 MALI Very High High Very High High High Medium High Medium
26 MAURITANIA High High Medium Low High Medium High Low
27 MAURITIUS Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low Medium Low
28 MOROCCO High High Medium High Very High High High Medium
29 MOZAMBIQUE Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
30 NAMIBIA Low Low Low Very Low Low Low Medium Low
31 NIGER High High High High High High Medium Medium
32 NIGERIA Low Medium Low Low Low Low Medium Medium
33 RWANDA Very High High Very High High High High Medium High
34 SENEGAL High Medium Medium Low High High Very Low Very Low
35 SIERRA LEONE Very High Very High High Very High Low Medium High Medium
36 SOUTH AFRICA Low Low Low Low Low Low Very Low Very Low
37 SWAZILAND Medium Medium Low Low Medium Low Medium Low
38 TANZANIA Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
39 TOGO High Medium Low Medium Medium Medium High High
40 UGANDA Low Low Medium Low Low Low Medium Medium
41 ZAMBIA Medium High High High Medium Medium High Medium
42 ZIMBABWE Low Medium Low Low Medium Low Medium Low
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No.
Agriculture and job creation
Country Domain concernedIncentives for youth jobs creation
1 ANGOLA YES Marketing
2 BENIN YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
3 BOTSWANA NO …
4 BURKINA FASO YES Production & Transformation
5 BURUNDI YES Production
6 CAMEROON YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
7 CAPE VERDE YES Production & Transformation
8 CAR YES Production
9 CHAD NO …
10 CONGO (DRC) … …
11 CONGO, REP YES Production
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE … …
13 DJIBOUTI YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
14 ETHIOPIA YES Production & Transformation
15 GABON NO …
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
17 GHANA YES Production
18 GUINEA NO …
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES Production
20 KENYA YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
21 LESOTHO YES Production & Marketing
22 LIBERIA YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
23 MADAGASCAR YES Production
24 MALAWI YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
25 MALI YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
26 MAURITANIA YES Production
27 MAURITIUS YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
28 MOROCCO YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES Production & Marketing
30 NAMIBIA YES Production & Marketing
31 NIGER YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
32 NIGERIA YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
33 RWANDA YES Production & Transformation
34 SENEGAL YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
35 SIERRA LEONE YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
36 SOUTH AFRICA … …
37 SWAZILAND … …
38 TANZANIA YES Production
39 TOGO YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
40 UGANDA YES Production, Transformation & Marketing
41 ZAMBIA NO …
42 ZIMBABWE NO …
(…) Data not available
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No. Country
Training, Research and Development / Innovations in agriculture
No. of tertiary
academic institutions
delivering training in
agriculture
No. of tertiary
academic institutions
delivering training in
agricultural economics
No. of professional
institutions delivering
training in
agriculture
Level of involvement
of NGOs in
agricultural sector
Existence of
institution/research
center dedicated to
agriculture
Notable innovations
in agric. Over the last
five years
1 ANGOLA … … … Average YES …
2 BENIN 4 2 2 Average YES YES
3 BOTSWANA 3 1 2 Average YES NO
4 BURKINA FASO 2 3 1 High YES YES
5 BURUNDI 3 1 0 Average YES YES
6 CAMEROON 1 1 40 Average YES YES
7 CAPE VERDE 1 1 1 Very High YES YES
8 CAR 1 0 2 High YES NO
9 CHAD 3 2 2 Average YES YES
10 CONGO (DRC) 6 2 2 High YES YES
11 CONGO, REP 1 1 2 High YES YES
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE 1 1 1 Average YES NO
13 DJIBOUTI 0 0 0 Average YES YES
14 ETHIOPIA 17 13 25 Average YES YES
15 GABON 1 1 2 Low YES YES
16 GAMBIA (THE) 1 1 4 High YES YES
17 GHANA 7 5 14 High YES YES
18 GUINEA 2 1 3 Average YES NO
19 GUINEA BISSAU 0 0 1 High YES YES
20 KENYA 11 3 1 High YES …
21 LESOTHO 2 1 1 Average YES YES
22 LIBERIA 4 0 4 High YES NO
23 MADAGASCAR 6 1 120 Low YES YES
24 MALAWI 4 3 2 Average YES YES
25 MALI 4 4 9 High YES YES
26 MAURITANIA 1 1 2 Very Low YES YES
27 MAURITIUS 1 1 6 Low YES YES
28 MOROCCO 3 2 11 High YES YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE 5 1 10 Average YES YES
30 NAMIBIA 3 3 3 Low YES YES
31 NIGER 2 1 1 High YES YES
32 NIGERIA 53 48 53 Average … YES
33 RWANDA 3 1 1 Average YES YES
34 SENEGAL 2 1 2 High YES YES
35 SIERRA LEONE 2 3 1 High YES YES
36 SOUTH AFRICA 9 5 … Average YES YES
37 SWAZILAND 4 1 1 High YES YES
38 TANZANIA 16 0 1 High YES YES
39 TOGO 1 2 3 High YES YES
40 UGANDA 5 5 3 High YES YES
41 ZAMBIA 13 2 2 Very High YES YES
42 ZIMBABWE 10 10 8 High YES YES
(…) Data not available
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No. Country
Role of private sector in the value chain
Production and marketing of
agricultural inputs
Production of agricultural
commodities for local consumption
Production of agricultural
commodities for export
Production and processing of
agricultural commodities for
local consumption
1 ANGOLA YES NO YES YES
2 BENIN YES YES YES YES
3 BOTSWANA YES YES YES YES
4 BURKINA FASO YES YES YES YES
5 BURUNDI YES YES YES YES
6 CAMEROON YES YES YES YES
7 CAPE VERDE YES YES NO YES
8 CAR NO YES NO YES
9 CHAD NO YES YES YES
10 CONGO (DRC) NO YES YES YES
11 CONGO, REP YES YES NO YES
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES YES YES YES
13 DJIBOUTI NO YES YES YES
14 ETHIOPIA YES YES YES YES
15 GABON YES NO YES YES
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES YES YES YES
17 GHANA YES YES YES YES
18 GUINEA YES YES YES YES
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES YES YES YES
20 KENYA YES YES YES YES
21 LESOTHO NO YES YES YES
22 LIBERIA YES YES YES YES
23 MADAGASCAR YES YES YES YES
24 MALAWI YES YES YES YES
25 MALI YES YES YES YES
26 MAURITANIA NO YES NO YES
27 MAURITIUS YES YES YES YES
28 MOROCCO YES YES YES NO
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES NO YES NO
30 NAMIBIA YES YES YES YES
31 NIGER YES YES YES YES
32 NIGERIA YES YES YES YES
33 RWANDA NO YES YES YES
34 SENEGAL YES YES YES YES
35 SIERRA LEONE YES YES YES YES
36 SOUTH AFRICA NO NO NO YES
37 SWAZILAND YES YES YES YES
38 TANZANIA YES YES YES YES
39 TOGO YES YES YES YES
40 UGANDA YES YES YES YES
41 ZAMBIA YES YES YES YES
42 ZIMBABWE YES YES NO YES
Intervention of the private sector in the value chain
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No. Country
Role of private sector in the value chain (Cont’d)
Production and processing
of agricultural commodities
for export
Processing of agricultural
products intended for local
consumption
Processing of agricultural
commodities for export
Marketing of agricultural
commodities intended for
local consumption
Marketing of agricultural
commodities intended for
export
1 ANGOLA YES NO NO YES YES
2 BENIN YES YES YES YES YES
3 BOTSWANA YES YES YES YES YES
4 BURKINA FASO YES YES YES YES YES
5 BURUNDI YES YES YES YES YES
6 CAMEROON YES YES YES YES YES
7 CAPE VERDE NO YES NO YES NO
8 CAR NO YES NO YES NO
9 CHAD YES YES YES YES YES
10 CONGO (DRC) NO YES NO YES NO
11 CONGO, REP NO YES NO YES NO
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES YES YES YES YES
13 DJIBOUTI NO NO NO YES NO
14 ETHIOPIA YES YES YES YES YES
15 GABON YES YES YES NO NO
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES YES YES YES YES
17 GHANA YES YES YES YES YES
18 GUINEA NO YES NO YES NO
19 GUINEA BISSAU NO YES NO YES YES
20 KENYA YES NO NO YES YES
21 LESOTHO NO YES YES YES YES
22 LIBERIA YES YES NO YES YES
23 MADAGASCAR YES YES YES YES YES
24 MALAWI YES YES YES YES YES
25 MALI YES YES YES YES YES
26 MAURITANIA NO YES NO YES NO
27 MAURITIUS YES YES YES YES YES
28 MOROCCO YES NO YES YES YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES NO YES NO YES
30 NAMIBIA YES YES YES YES NO
31 NIGER YES YES YES YES YES
32 NIGERIA YES YES YES YES YES
33 RWANDA YES NO NO YES YES
34 SENEGAL YES YES YES YES YES
35 SIERRA LEONE YES YES YES YES YES
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES YES YES NO NO
37 SWAZILAND YES YES YES YES YES
38 TANZANIA YES YES YES YES YES
39 TOGO YES YES YES YES YES
40 UGANDA YES YES YES YES YES
41 ZAMBIA YES YES YES YES YES
42 ZIMBABWE YES YES YES NO NO
Intervention of the private sector in the value chain
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No. Country
Role of private sector in the value chain (Cont’d)
State involvement in
procurement and
distribution of major
agricultural commodities
Major staple agricultural
commodity
Major livestock
commodity
Existence of a financial
institution dedicated to
agriculture
Level of access to market
by small farmers
1 ANGOLA YES Very High High YES High
2 BENIN NO Medium Medium NO Medium
3 BOTSWANA YES Medium Very High YES High
4 BURKINA FASO YES Low Low NO Low
5 BURUNDI NO Low Low NO Medium
6 CAMEROON NO Low Low NO Low
7 CAPE VERDE NO Very Low Very Low YES Low
8 CAR NO Low Low NO Low
9 CHAD YES Low Medium NO Medium
10 CONGO (DRC) NO Very Low Low NO Medium
11 CONGO, REP NO Low Low YES Medium
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE NO Low Low NO Low
13 DJIBOUTI YES Very Low Very Low YES Medium
14 ETHIOPIA YES Very Low Very Low YES Low
15 GABON NO Low Low NO Medium
16 GAMBIA (THE) NO Low Low YES Low
17 GHANA NO Low Low YES Low
18 GUINEA NO Medium Low … Low
19 GUINEA BISSAU NO Medium Low NO Very Low
20 KENYA YES Medium Medium YES Medium
21 LESOTHO YES Low Low NO Low
22 LIBERIA NO Medium Low YES Low
23 MADAGASCAR NO Very Low Very Low NO Very Low
24 MALAWI … Very High High NO Very High
25 MALI YES Low Low YES Very High
26 MAURITANIA NO Very Low Medium … Very Low
27 MAURITIUS YES Very Low Very Low YES High
28 MOROCCO YES Medium Medium YES Medium
29 MOZAMBIQUE NO Medium Medium YES Low
30 NAMIBIA YES Medium High YES Medium
31 NIGER YES Low Low YES Low
32 NIGERIA YES Low Low YES Low
33 RWANDA NO Low High YES Medium
34 SENEGAL NO High Medium YES Medium
35 SIERRA LEONE NO Low Low YES Low
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES Medium Medium YES
37 SWAZILAND YES Very High Medium YES Low
38 TANZANIA NO Medium Very Low YES Medium
39 TOGO YES Low Low NO Low
40 UGANDA NO Very Low Very Low YES Medium
41 ZAMBIA YES High High NO Medium
42 ZIMBABWE YES High High YES Medium
(…) Data not available
Level of processing of key agricultural products
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No. Country
Food security
Country received food aid
over the last 5 years
Existence of a food security
& Early warning system Operated by
The country has put in
place a security policy
The country has put in
place a security program
1 ANGOLA YES YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
2 BENIN YES YES Government YES YES
3 BOTSWANA NO YES Government YES YES
4 BURKINA FASO YES YES Government YES YES
5 BURUNDI YES YES NGO YES YES
6 CAMEROON YES YES Government YES YES
7 CAPE VERDE YES YES Government YES YES
8 CAR YES YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
9 CHAD YES YES Government YES YES
10 CONGO (DRC) YES YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
11 CONGO, REP YES YES Government YES YES
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES YES Government YES YES
13 DJIBOUTI … YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
14 ETHIOPIA YES YES Government YES YES
15 GABON NO NO … YES YES
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES YES Government YES YES
17 GHANA YES YES Government YES YES
18 GUINEA NO YES Government YES YES
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES YES Government YES YES
20 KENYA YES YES Government YES YES
21 LESOTHO YES YES Government YES YES
22 LIBERIA YES YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
23 MADAGASCAR YES YES Government NO YES
24 MALAWI NO YES Government YES YES
25 MALI YES YES Government NO YES
26 MAURITANIA YES YES Government NO YES
27 MAURITIUS NO NO … … YES
28 MOROCCO YES YES Government YES YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES YES Government NO NO
30 NAMIBIA YES YES Government YES YES
31 NIGER YES YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
32 NIGERIA NO YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
33 RWANDA NO YES Government NO YES
34 SENEGAL YES YES Government YES YES
35 SIERRA LEONE YES YES Government YES YES
36 SOUTH AFRICA NO YES Government YES YES
37 SWAZILAND YES YES Government YES YES
38 TANZANIA YES YES Government NO YES
39 TOGO NO YES Government NO YES
40 UGANDA NO YES Gov. & Dev. Partner YES YES
41 ZAMBIA YES YES Government YES YES
42 ZIMBABWE YES YES Government YES YES
(…) Data not available
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Information system: Agricultural statistics
No. Country Agricultural census conducted
Agricultural survey conducted
during the last 5 years
Frequency of agricultural
surveys
Rating of the current
agricultural statistics
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1 ANGOLA YES YES 3-5 Years High
2 BENIN NO YES 3-5 Years Low
3 BOTSWANA YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
4 BURKINA FASO YES YES 3-5 Years Low
5 BURUNDI NO … … …
6 CAMEROON YES NO … Very Low
7 CAPE VERDE YES YES 6 Years and above Low
8 CAR YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
9 CHAD YES YES 1-2 Years Very Low
10 CONGO (DRC) YES YES 3-5 Years Medium
11 CONGO, REP YES NO … Medium
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES NO … …
13 DJIBOUTI YES … 6 Years and above Low
14 ETHIOPIA YES YES 1-2 Years Very Low
15 GABON NO NO Very Low
16 GAMBIA YES YES 1-2 Years High
17 GHANA YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
18 GUINEA YES YES 3-5 Years Medium
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES YES 1-2 Years Low
20 KENYA NO YES 6 Years and above Low
21 LESOTHO YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
22 LIBERIA YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
23 MADAGASCAR YES YES 3-5 Years Low
24 MALAWI YES YES 1-2 Years High
25 MALI YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
26 MAURITANIA YES NO … Medium
27 MAURITIUS NO YES 3-5 Years
28 MOROCCO YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES YES 1-2 Years …
30 NAMIBIA YES YES 3-5 Years Medium
31 NIGER YES YES 1-2 Years High
32 NIGERIA YES YES 1-2 Years High
33 RWANDA NO YES 1-2 Years Medium
34 SENEGAL YES YES 1-2 Years Low
35 SIERRA LEONE YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES YES 1-2 Years …
37 SWAZILAND YES YES 1-2 Years Low
38 TANZANIA YES YES 3-5 Years Very High
39 TOGO YES NO … Low
40 UGANDA YES YES 3-5 Years Low
41 ZAMBIA YES YES 1-2 Years Medium
42 ZIMBABWE YES YES 3-5 Years High
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Information system: Market information
No. Country
Existence of an agricultural
market information system
1 ANGOLA … … … …
2 BENIN YES YES YES YES
3 BOTSWANA YES YES YES
4 BURKINA FASO YES YES YES YES
5 BURUNDI YES NO NO YES
6 CAMEROON YES NO YES YES
7 CAPE VERDE YES YES YES YES
8 CAR NO … … …
9 CHAD YES YES YES NO
10 CONGO (DRC) YES NO YES NO
11 CONGO, REP YES YES YES NO
12 CÔTE D'IVOIRE YES YES YES YES
13 DJIBOUTI YES YES YES NO
14 ETHIOPIA YES YES YES YES
15 GABON YES NO YES NO
16 GAMBIA (THE) YES YES YES YES
17 GHANA YES YES YES YES
18 GUINEA YES YES YES NO
19 GUINEA BISSAU YES YES YES YES
20 KENYA YES YES YES NO
21 LESOTHO YES YES YES NO
22 LIBERIA YES YES YES NO
23 MADAGASCAR YES YES YES YES
24 MALAWI YES YES YES YES
25 MALI YES YES YES NO
26 MAURITANIA YES YES YES YES
27 MAURITIUS YES YES YES NO
28 MOROCCO YES YES YES YES
29 MOZAMBIQUE YES YES YES YES
30 NAMIBIA YES YES YES YES
31 NIGER YES YES YES NO
32 NIGERIA YES YES YES YES
33 RWANDA YES YES YES NO
34 SENEGAL YES YES YES NO
35 SIERRA LEONE YES YES … …
36 SOUTH AFRICA YES … … …
37 SWAZILAND YES YES … …
38 TANZANIA YES YES … …
39 TOGO YES YES YES NO
40 UGANDA YES YES YES NO
41 ZAMBIA YES YES YES YES
42 ZIMBABWE YES YES … …
(…) Data not available
National Local Regional
Coverage
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